

Game-Theoretic Models for Rapid Operational Airlift Network Design in Contested Environments



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Question: How should AMC allocate airlift capacity in a contested environment?



Measuring Airlift Capacity

Definition

The US Air Force uses “**Maximum on Ground (MOG)**” as a measure of an airfield's capacity for processing aircraft.

Reference: AFPAM 10-1403

- ▶ Indicates, e.g., the amount of support equipment and personnel assigned to an airfield.
- ▶ 1 MOG \approx 8 C-17 equivalentents per day



A C-17 engine being loaded onto a C-17 at Yokota Air Base, Japan. (Source: [Air Mobility Command](#))

The Problem, and Our Contributions

The Problem: Determine how much MOG should be at each airfield in the airlift network.

Importance: Airlift is an important means of supplying distributed forces over long distances.

Solutions Without Our Help: Recent work at the Naval Postgraduate School [Whitlow 2022] developed an optimization model of the problem, called the **Airlift Optimization Planning Tool (AOPT)**.

- ▶ Accounts for “risk to force” via penalties.

Our Contribution

We model the problem as a two-player zero-sum game.

- ▶ The **attacker** selects a subset of the airfields to attack.
- ▶ The **defender** allocates the MOG (similarly to AOPT).

The literature on “attacker-defender” models (see e.g., [Alderson et al. 2011]) can be leveraged to compute prescribed MOG allocations.

The Model: Sketch

$$\min_Y \max_{X, A, M} \left\{ X_{ts} - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} q_i Y_i \left[\sum_{j: (i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ij} + \sum_{j: (j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ji} \right] \right\}$$

Data:

- ▶ \mathcal{N} = set of airfields (i.e., “nodes”)
- ▶ \mathcal{A} = set of feasible flight legs (i.e., “arcs”)
- ▶ q_i = penalty for flow through airfield $i \in \mathcal{N}$, if attacked
- ▶ Other data related to supply, cargo capacities of aircraft, ...

Attacker's Decision Variables:

- ▶ $Y_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{N} \text{ is attacked} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Defender's Decision Variables

- ▶ X_{ij} = amount of cargo sent on leg (i, j)
- ▶ A_{ij} = number of aircraft sent on leg (i, j)
- ▶ M_{ij} = amount of MOG moved from airfield i to j

Constraints: The M_{ij} 's constrain the A_{ij} 's, which constrain the X_{ij} 's.

ADAPT Formulation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_Y \max_{X,A,M} X_{ts} - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} q_i Y_i \left[\sum_{j:(i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ij} + \sum_{j:(j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ji} \right] \\
 & \text{subject to} \quad \sum_{j:(i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ij} - \sum_{j:(j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ji} = \begin{cases} X_{ts}, & \text{if } i = s \\ 0, & \text{if } i \notin \mathcal{N} \setminus \{s, t\} \\ -X_{ts} & \text{if } i = t \end{cases} \\
 & X_{ij} \leq \begin{cases} \text{cargocap} \cdot A_{ij} & \text{if } (i, j) \in \mathcal{A} \\ \text{supply} & \text{if } (i, j) = (t, s) \end{cases} \\
 & \sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} M_{ij} \leq \text{maxmogmoved} \\
 & - \sum_{j:(i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} M_{ij} + \sum_{j:(j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} M_{ji} \leq \text{maxmogi} - \text{startmogi} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N} \\
 & \sum_{j:(i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} M_{ij} - \sum_{j:(j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} M_{ji} + \\
 & \quad \text{mogused}_i \left(\sum_{j:(i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} A_{ij} + \sum_{j:(j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} A_{ji} \right) \leq \text{startmogi} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N} \\
 & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} Y_i \leq \text{maxattacks} \\
 & X_{ij}, A_{ij}, M_{ij} \geq 0 \quad \forall (i, j) \in \mathcal{A} \\
 & Y_i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}
 \end{aligned}$$



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THESIS

GAME-THEORETIC MODELS FOR RAPID
OPERATIONAL AIRLIFT NETWORK DESIGN
IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS

by

Alexander J. Cooper

March 2023

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Jefferson Huang
Peter A. Nesbitt

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Determining MOG Allocations

ADAPT Formulation

$$\begin{aligned}
 \min_Y \max_{X, A, M} \quad & X_{ts} - \sum_{i \in N} q_i Y_i \left[\sum_{j: (i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ij} + \sum_{j: (j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ji} \right] \\
 \text{subject to} \quad & \sum_{j: (i,j) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ij} - \sum_{j: (j,i) \in \mathcal{A}} X_{ji} = \begin{cases} X_{ts}, & \text{if } i = s \\ 0, & \text{if } i \notin N \setminus \{s, t\} \\ -X_{ts}, & \text{if } i = t \end{cases} \\
 & X_{ij} \leq \begin{cases} \text{cargocap} \cdot A_{ij} & \text{if } (i, j) \in \mathcal{A} \\ \text{supply} & \text{if } (i, j) = (t, s) \end{cases} \\
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 & Y_i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall i \in N
 \end{aligned}$$

Basic Idea

1. Pick an initial attack Y .
2. Solve the defender's problem for X, A, M , given Y .
3. Try to find a better attack Y , given X, A, M .
4. Repeat ...

More specifically (see [Cooper 2023, Section 3.2]),


- ▶ decompose the minimax problem into a “master” problem and a “defender subproblem”, and
- ▶ iteratively add “Benders cuts” to the master problem.



AMC Scenario

Network Information

- 24 Airfields
- 55 WMOG units
- 2000 cargo-tons



- The adversary will be able to target all airfields in range of DF-26.
- An attack will destroy airfield and capability to move cargo through attacked airfield.

Application to Notional Scenario




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3 Attacks

Results

- Kadena
- Yokosuka
- Osan
- 96% cargo moved



Application to Notional Scenario




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4 Attacks

Results

- Kadena
- Yokosuka
- Osan
- Guam
- 68% cargo moved





Take-Aways and Ongoing Work

Take-Aways

- ▶ Formulated attacker-defender model for allocating airlift capacity in a contested environment.
- ▶ The model can be used to find “robust” MOG allocations.

Ongoing Work

- ▶ The model has been extended to supplying theater entry points with multiple cargo types, and penalties for unsatisfied demand.
- ▶ Part of an ongoing project sponsored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.