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Civility, Security and Islamism



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CULTURES IN DIALOUGE

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

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Labels of Division

The use and role of language is intriguing in either calming or inflaming feelings of apprehension, division, fear and hatred between the conflicting parties.

In the 9-11 aftermath, people world-over were introduced to the term 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' under a new definition, albeit very hazy and inconsistent. Suddenly, the whole world seemed to be engulfed by, involved in and engaged with the 'War on Terror' in one way or another. In fact parties on opposing sides of the same conflict would each claim to be fighting terrorists and waging war against terrorism.

This evolved to include terms such as radicalism, fundamentalism and extremism, despite the first two terms carrying definite positive connotations, the impact was to spread the net of suspicion and animosity much further and wider than was allowed by the term Terrorism.

Recently, and particularly following the failed 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, the terms Islamism has become the must-use word in any discussion about Islam, Muslims and East-West relations. It seems that whilst the above labels could have been used to describe both Muslim and non-Muslim elements, such as the BNP, Neo-Nazi or ultra-left groupings, there was no mistaking whom were meant by 'Islamists'. It is intriguing as to what kind of intellectual process is used to churn out such labels and terms, which only help in widening the gap, heightening suspicion and increasing fear and hatred whilst leading to absolutely no resolution or clarity to the crisis involving absolutely everyone.

It is perfectly natural to disagree, or even to vehemently disagree with anyone's views, ideas and politics, without deeming everyone we disagree with as a potential threat.

We have in our midst a growing number so called experts, “former Muslim extremists” and sadly politicians who pursue an isolationist resolution. Their dogma is be like us, or we will deem you a threat to our lives. Their attitude is one that harks to empirical times in which the white man sought to civilize and educate the savages in far flung corners of the world for their own good, as they knew not what was best for them. They fail to see, or deliberately ignore, that while the West perceives the East, and especially the Muslim East with great suspicion, the East, battered and bruised after centuries of war, poverty, occupation, massacre, colonisation, slavery, hegemony, destruction, siphoning of riches, alteration of cultures and traditions, see the West with even greater suspicion — with an added ingredient of realisation that it does not possess the means to stand up to the West's technological, military and economic advancement.

While the likes of Al-Qaeda, Abu

Hamza, Omar Bakri and their like have done immeasurable damage to the image of Islam and to the minds of many Muslims, those who charge any form of Islamic social or political reawakening as tantamount to extremism and terrorism do similar damage to the face of the West and to the minds of many who live in fear and apprehension as a result of what nonsense they are told and the drivel they are fed.

As we point out the despicable aspects of 'the other', we must never forget that we have our despicable and equally unpalatable features ourselves. If we do, we appear as supremists and arrogant and will be perceived as unworthy of being heard. In the current crisis that touches everyone, we can ill-afford to burn whatever bridges we have remaining.

Anas Altikriti
Chief Executive – The Cordoba Foundation

FROM THE Editor

Welcome to the first edition of Arches Quarterly, a journal of The Cordoba Foundation.

Arches Quarterly is a revamped journal previously published bi-monthly as Arches, which successfully managed to highlight the need for dialogue and measured discussions, between civilisations through a spectrum of writers.

Every Arches edition featured distinguished world figures either through exclusive interviews, or feature articles. These included Dr Norman Kember, prominent peace activist taken hostage in Iraq in 2006; Dr Murad Wilfried Hofmann, a German scholar, former German Ambassador to Algeria (1987) and Morocco (1990) respectively; Alastair Crooke, founder of the Conflicts Forum and former security advisor to Javier Solana; Robert Lambert, Head of the Muslim Contact Unit at the Counter Terrorism Command (S015), Metropolitan Police, and Dr Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia (1993-1998) and currently the advisor to the People's Justice Party (Keadilan), Malaysia. Now, why the change from *Arches* to *Arches Quarterly*?

Whilst *Arches* was able to debate and raise issues involving prolific figures as aforementioned, we felt the need to provide deeper and more nuanced analysis of the issues and developments in the arena of dialogue, civilisations, and a rapprochement between Islam and the West. *Arches Quarterly* is committed to research that goes beyond media sound bites and sensationalised stories that increasingly dominate and shape our worldview.

In this edition, we explore the meaning and origins of Islamism as a global phenomenon. A plethora of viewpoints and misinformation abound on the origins of Islamism and its association with radicalising Muslims to the point of linking it to terrorism. Discussing this, an array of international contributors hailing from different academic, media, legal and theological disciplines provide their take on the debate. Case studies of Muslim communities in Europe, Britain and a focus on prominent British based Islamic organisations in the United Kingdom, provide a good background to the debate and the British Government's response to the threat of terrorism, as well as, how the introduction of various anti-terror legislation impact ordinary people today.

We hope the *Arches Quarterly* will provide a better appreciation of the subject while taking the opportunity to provide us with your views, analysis and observations.

Best wishes,

Abdullah Faliq
Managing Editor

Politics, Poverty, and Rage: Misconceptions About Islamist Movements

Anne Marie Baylouny

In recent years violent movements in the name of Islam have been catapulted to centre stage in U.S. foreign policy circles. Yet before concrete strategies can be formulated to deal with this phenomenon, the nature and dynamics of Islamist mobilisation itself must be understood.[1] What motivates an individual to join an Islamist group and possibly engage in violent activities? Under what conditions will these groups moderate their views, and when will they radicalise? While our policy choices dealing with the Muslim world and international terrorism inevitably hinge on our answers to these questions, a serious theory has been lacking.[2]

Lessons extracted from contentious study are used to provide insight into complex political allegiances in the Muslim world which are further contributing prescriptive policy formulations to defuse Islamist movements' violent path. Social movement theory in particular demonstrates local political inclusion can stimulate moderation, stunting militant Islamism progression in its infancy.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS AND INADEQUACIES

Analysis of the roots of Islamism have typically been based upon emotions, economic desperation, or cultural rejection. By this line of reasoning, poverty, hatred of Western culture, or lack of hope spur group formation that aim, either through the creation of an Islamic state or isolation from the global community, to return the Muslim world to a past state of glory. Some link Islamism to poverty and deprivation while others including Islamists themselves, reiterate Samuel Huntington's claim that the West is culturally opposed to the rest of the world. Under these theories, policies to decrease Islamism's appeal would centre on either economic growth or cultural separation; the rest of the world should work to either increase living standards in Muslim nations or relax their pace of integration into the international economy. Appealing as those objectives may be to many, the data on Islamism, and on oppositional movements in general, indicate that the equation of economic or cultural distress with Islamism is misplaced, or at the very least incomplete.

Psychological and economic explanations situate Islamism as the result of an explosion of pent-up grievances,[3] the last resort of a person "fed up" and gone crazy. While such a description makes intuitive sense, the theory does not fit reality. Varying economic circumstances across regions and time periods do not match the occurrence of rebellions and protest movements, as many scholars have shown.[4] In fact, economic grievances abound throughout history, but movements based on them have been rare. When is a grievance bad enough to start a movement? And why do starving populations often not rebel, while their well-off neighbours do? Iran's Islamist revolution occurred in a context of economic plenty, and an analysis of Muslim countries demonstrates the lack of fit between this theory and the actual history of Islamist actions.[5]

The social background of individual movement members further demonstrates the fallacy of such theories. Islamist activists are neither economically deprived nor culturally monochrome. They are neither loners nor marginalised individuals searching for meaning and belonging in modern society. Rather Islamists background is from the most technically advanced sectors of society, often students or graduates of sciences and social sciences. Islamist activists are well rooted in their communities and have extensive personal networks, parallel to nationalistic terrorists in other regions of the world.[6]

The 9/11 terrorists – along with suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories – are a testament to this profile.[7] A survey of Hizbullah adherents found that despite its rhetoric, the party was not in fact the representative of the lower class rather the bulk of its support came from the middle and upper classes.[8]

Focusing on religion or religiosity to identify Islamists is similarly misguided. Religious involvements in political Islam are not directly related since Islamists and their supporters are not more religious than non-Islamists. Similarly, the level of support for Islamist movements diverges sharply from the level of popular acceptance of their goals, particularly the establishment of an Islamic state. In Lebanon, the overwhelming majority of Hizbullah adherents, along with most Shi'ites in general, prefer a Western political system (modelled on Switzerland or the United States), not a theocratic one. Discrepancies exist between the percentage of people who voted for Hizbullah and those who chose it as their favourite political party with lower ratings for the latter, thus indicating the practice of strategic voting instead of widespread belief in the movement itself. Hizbullah members are not significantly more religious than the adherents of secular political parties. In fact, a significant number of the highly religious declared themselves opposed to the establishment of Islamic political parties.[9] Surveys in the West Bank and Gaza found similar opinions. Overall, less than three percent of Palestinians in the territories desired an Islamic state while almost 21% trusted Hamas more than any other political factions.[10] The group subsequently won the Palestinian elections running on reform and anti-corruption mandate.

Culture and economy are only indirectly related to Islamist mobilisation for violent and moderate groups alike.[11] Grievances alone do not create a movement as such; at most they are but one element that organisers can exploit to aid in organising. This directly contradicts explanations of Islamism based on economic opportunities is the fact that substantial resources and networks are necessary for movements to organise.[12] Leaders generally have privileged backgrounds, thus the substance of the movement and its ability to mobilise members are more important than the broad statements about motivations picked up by the Western press. What does it take to attract an initial following and then organise it into a network?

Islamist movements differ considerably from each other having been moulded by the states they oppose, the resources at their disposal, Islamists networks, and local factors.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND ISLAMIST RESPONSES TO DEMOCRATIC CARROTS

Adversarial political theories, of which social movement is the most prominent branch, are well situated to address these issues.[13] Social movement theory has long addressed the questions of terrorism and violent conflict and through its lenses Islamism conundrum – so baffling from other perspectives – becomes clear. Beyond the demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns common to democratic systems, contentious politics span a wide horizon from riots to revolutions to terrorism.[14] Non-violent movements more typically recognised as social movements are included however these are rare under authoritarian regimes.

In spite of the claims of movement adherents, the real motivating grievances of Islamism are local issues like any other social movements including the anti-globalisation campaign. The concerns that motivate Islamists centre in their towns, provinces, and local economies, however, Islamist movements differ considerably from each other having been moulded by the states they oppose, the resources at their dis-

posal, Islamists networks, and local factors. National movements have different goals than international activists, and ally only when their goals coincide. Even within the same state, movements can have radically opposed motivating agendas and in some cases, compete and attempt to defeat rival Islamist movements[15] as witnessed in parts of Iraq currently. Statements by group leaders and Islamist charters should be viewed in light of their actions in response to concrete changes and often, the "rhetoric of rebellion" does not equate to the actual grievance. Viewing entire movement practices instead of simply their statements reveals an alternative logic.[16] Consider Hamas' political win, inconsistent yet clear changes in party policy on Israel were voiced, including the possibility of subjecting policy on Israel to a public vote whose outcome the party agreed to follow. Internally, Hamas debated and discussed its own positions on elections subjecting them to an internal referendum.[17]

Acknowledging Islamism as a form of opposition politics means its trajectory is not random, rather governed by political considerations and strategic calculations. It can develop into different forms of protest and organisations, including civil society and social welfare associations, given appropriate and credible incentives. The relevant influences for these movements are the array of political opportunities they face. The key questions for policy makers are many and simply put, what are the prevailing power relations? How does the group want these relations to change and what paths to mainstream political inclusion are open or blocked? The third question includes splits among elites that movements can exploit, opportunities to partake in elections, and the character of repression by the state.

Exclusion or inclusion from the political system plays a powerful role in radicalising movements. While fears of "one person, one vote, one time" will remain, data indicates when given the opportunity to participate in politics at the price of moderation, movements will alter their very nature to respond to this stimulus. Hizbullah's experience demonstrates this dynamic. The group moderated to enter general election by reframing its central objective and foregoing its stated goal of an Islamic state. Lebanon's substantial Christian population makes this a special case to which Hizbullah must be sensitive in order to avoid renewed conflict.[18] The party formed alliances with Christians and supported Christian candidates in elections. The incentives Hizbullah responded to demonstrate the fundamental logic of the movement, notwithstanding any rhetoric to the contrary. In parliament, Hizbullah representatives discussed not religion but economic development.[19] Hizbullah's political actions following the 2006 war with Israel further demonstrate the political logic of Islamist movements. Riding on a wave of mass support after the Israeli bombardment, Hizbullah utilised the democratic tools of demonstrations and boycotts in a fight to gain more power in government. Unsuccessful, the movement dropped its tone and offered a compromise.

Democratic theory has long held that mainstream political participation moderates political parties. Movements are co-opted, choosing to work within the limits of the system. Not all will participate, however increasingly Islamist political parties have chosen the electoral path. They hope for change through the political process rather than risk a violent conflict. Furthermore, once leaders or political parties have obtained a vested interest in the system, they will exert pressure upon the more radical wings of their movements not to jeopardise their established position. On the other hand when the opposition party is illegal, no incentive to moderate exists.

To mobilise continuous support organisations must provide public demonstrations of the movement's endurance, a type of advertisement or communication with the constituency. Newsletters may work for Greenpeace, but an illegal movement must employ alternative means to advertise its existence.[20] Front page news serves as advertisements for a movement's effectiveness; international news reaches international adherents while local news suffices for domestic movements. This is one way that violence as a tactic glues a movement together creating an identity and group solidarity.

Absent viable participation in the political realm, violence also serves the movement function of communicating demands to authorities.[21] When groups are legal, demonstrations can perform this vital role.

Movements do not merely build upon pre-existing identities or reflect group feelings already in place. Social movements actively fashion new identities mainly through framing techniques. Framing is the formulation of ideological schemes akin to slogans that sell the movement to a constituency. Frames must resonate with the population by tapping into existing symbols while at the same time transforming their cultural meanings. Problems are spun as unjust grievances for which clear blame can be assessed and a solution proposed by the movement. Familiar symbols are used in novel ways, much in the way that liberation theology altered Christianity by reframing poverty, once accepted as an act of God, now a social issue of fundamental injustice.

Religion plays a key role in Islamist movements without focusing on doctrinal specifics or religiosity of Islamists. The practice of Islam within Islamist movements has been shown to be malleable by adopting aspects of left-wing politics and nationalism to deploying Leninist manoeuvres often deemed antithetical to the religious doctrine itself.[22] Religious movements have distinct advantages in authoritarian contexts given the solidarity frame provided by, particularly when other organisational elements are forbidden.

State restriction on mobilisation not only pushes religious movements to monopolise the organisational field but religion also provides symbols of justice extending beyond the individual's rational cost-benefit calculus.[23] In non-democratic environments, symbolic protest – the veil, the kaffiyeh, the colours of the flag, or vague slogans such as "Islam is the solution" – dominates political communication. The necessary resources and networks to mobilise support – integral to social movement success – are also found in religion's institutional legacy and its charitable activities. In most areas of the Middle East, Islamist movements have been promoted by the state in previous decades as a counter to the left, a harvest whose fruit the region is now reaping[24] and currently, Islamist charities substitute for the state's bankrupt social welfare institutions.

The democratic process itself may well be central to removing the impetus for violent tactics in Islamist movements; however this democracy must be considered fair, authentic, and legitimate within the states in question. The Arab world is rife with countries whose elections display a democratic facade while substantial violations pervade the process, escaping international criticism. Many countries use Islamism rhetoric to deny civil liberties and basic human rights, fuelling precisely the dynamic which drives targeted organisations to use violent tactics in their fight with the opposition. Any policy encouraging democracy must be uniform, neither barring participants from the democratic process or cancelling elections Algerian-style.

CONCLUSION

Islamism is one of the most important geopolitical topics today, yet misconceptions about it flourish. We lose a great deal by ignoring the knowledge generated through years of study in other parts of the world, data that could aid in correctly identifying what Islamism is, what causes it, when it turns violent, and how best to meet our policy aims regarding it. Movement pragmatism provides an opportunity to craft targeted policies. Disregarding Islamist movements to respond to democratic incentives is tantamount to the tunnel vision that led to the surprise at the fall of the Soviet Union and the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Some individuals and groups may be beyond the pale, immune to the blandishments of democratic politics, however even these hard line groups originally grew out of local politics which could have been defused or moderated at that level.

ENDNOTES

1. "Islamism" or political Islam is preferable to Islamic fundamentalism since fundamentalism was derived from the protestant Christian context which loosely fitted Islamic movement.

2. Middle East and Islamic specialists are often found parochial in terms of remaining uninfluenced by social sciences' extensive research into opposition politics and unwittingly operating with discredited theoretical frameworks. Theory-oriented scholars for their part generally steer clear of Islamism, perhaps out of a belief in the area's presumed cultural exceptionalism, or its admittedly complicated details.

3. This is the relative deprivation thesis of rebellion, pioneered by Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

4. See Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

5. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.

6. See Peter Waldmann, "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures," 237-57, and Donatella Della Porta. "Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political Organizations," 3-28, both in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Donatella Della Porta (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1992).

7. On the latter, see Lori Allen, "There Are Many Reasons Why: Suicide Bombers and Martyrs in Palestine," Middle East Report, no. 223 (Summer 2002): 34-37.

8. Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizbullah," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 55.

9. A significant percentage of the highly religious were found to be most distrustful of religious political parties. Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizbullah," 41-67. Confirming these findings, see Hamzeh's data cited in Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a in Lebanon," in Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World, ed. Emile Sahliyeh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 229-41.

10. Interestingly, support for an Islamic state in the West Bank was higher than in the Gaza strip, the home territory of Hamas. Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Public Opinion Poll No. 42: On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics Including the Current Intifada - September 2001, www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2001/no42/htm.

11. The prevailing typology to date distinguishes between radical (that is, violent or extremist) and moderate movements. This categorisation can be based either on the tactics the movement chooses, or more commonly, their stated end goals in relation to the political system. The moderates work within the system, often concentrating on social welfare or civil society organizations.

12. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (May 1977): 1212-41.

13. For social movement theory, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and by the same authors, "To Map Contentious Politics," Mobilization 1, no. 1 (1996): 17-34.

14. Following Tarrow, contentious politics can be defined as collective activity on the part of claimants, which uses extra-institutional channels to communicate their demands. Demands and activities to achieve them exist in relation to the prevailing political system, members of the elite, or the opposition. Social movements are oppositional challenges, which are sustained continuously beyond the distinct moment of protest. Sidney Tarrow, "Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics," American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 874-83.

15. Prominent examples are the various movements in Egypt. Mamoun Fandy, "Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?" Middle East Journal 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 607-25; Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," The Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2001): 487-510; David Zeidan, "Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups," in Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East, ed. Barry Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 11-22.

16. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 234.

17. See Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, "Participation without Presence: Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the Politics of Negotiated Coexistence," Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 3 (July 2002): 1-26; and Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-61.

18. See Nizar A. Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation," Third World Quarterly 14, no. 2 (1993): 321-37; Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah, "Interview: Islamic Unity and Political Change," Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 1 (Autumn 1995): 61-75.

19. el-Bizri, D. (1999). Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais: Les interventions à l'Assemblée des élus de la Jama'a Islamiyya et du Hizb Allah (1992-1996). Beirut, CERMOC.

20. Social movements make collective demands and undertake mobilizing or public activities, which unify the constituency. Charles Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements," in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 253-70.

21. Violence may be unrelated to the movement's actual goals, but serve instead to create organizational cohesion. Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (Portland: Frank Cass, 2001), 13-31.

22. Henry Munson, "Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination," Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 40-53; As'ad AbuKhalil. "Ideology and Practice of Hizbullah in Lebanon: Islamicization of Leninist Organizational Principles," Middle Eastern Studies 27, no. 3 (July 1991): 390-403.

23. Ron Aminzade and Elizabeth J. Perry, "The Sacred, Religious, and Secular in Contentious Politics: Blurring Boundaries," in Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, Jr. Sewell, William H., Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 155-78.

24. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and International Context of Political Islam," in Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, ed. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3-25.

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Islamism and Terrorism: Professor Abu-Rabi' Dissects the Links and the Myths

Ibrahim Abu-Rabi' is professor of Islamic Studies, Co-Director of the Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at Hartford Seminary and co-editor of The Muslim World. His expertise include interfaith dialogue between the Islamic and Christian religious traditions and contemporary Islamic thought, particularly on religion and society. He has authored, translated and edited a plethora of books including Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World.

INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR IBRAHIM ABU-RABI'

REFORMING ISLAM

Arches Quarterly: The German "Shari'a reformer" Bassam Tibi, recently argued in an interview on Spiegel Online, that Muslims have to (1) "bid farewell to the idea of converting others", (2) "renounce Jihad" and (3) "give up…the Shariah" if they want to become Europeans. With current political trend, how credible is Tibi amongst Western policy-makers and do you see a society when Muslims would actually renounce these as Tibi would like?

Ibrahim Abu-Rabi': To my mind the most active missionaries in the world today are not Muslims but Christian Churches and it is easy to prove that statistically. There are plenty of Christian missionary organisations around the world and in the West that are well-funded, highly organised and staffed by young and educated people. Muslims are not near that at all. Therefore, if Christian missionaries and Europeans can co-exist I do not see how Muslims cannot be Muslims and Europeans. As for renouncing jihad it is clear that the meaning of jihad is not confined to politics in the sense that, every religion has its own meaning of jihad which strives to achieve the common good. I do not think Tibi is advising Muslims to renounce the common good.

AQ: What about dropping the Shari'a?

IAR: As for giving up the Sharī'a, how is it possible to do that? One of the fundamental meanings of Sharī'a is to promote human welfare and interest.

AQ: What does it mean to be "progressive Muslims" and "reforming" the Shari'a? I'm thinking of the likes of Irshad Manji and Mohammed Arkoun.

IAR: I do agree that as Muslims we need to debate the principles of Islam in light of a number of issues, such as modernity and globalisation. These issues have to be debated openly and honestly with opposing yet contemporary Islamic thoughts. I think Islam in its nature is progressive and those Muslims who adhere to its progressive essence can be called progressive as well.

AQ: Is reformation of Islam their ultimate aim? Ayaan Hirsi Ali, believes that the only way of reforming Islam "is to rid the Qur'an of its absoluteness". Ali Sina from Faith Freedom International argues "Islam can't be reformed. It must be eradicated".

Those who leave Islam are a tiny minority. Islam is not a sect but a universal religion. Those organisations are wasting their time.

IAR: How can you eradicate a religion that has one a half billion followers? I think it is important to have a dynamic dialogue on the fundamentals of Islam in light of the modern age. This is not a new call. There have been plenty of Muslim reformers in the modern age. We got to mention just a few of them: Afghani, Abduh, Iqbal, and Nursi just to mention few.

AQ: How do Ayaan Hirsi and Irshad Manji compare with Afghnai, Abduh and others you mentioned?
IAR: I do not think that both Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Ali Sina have any impact on contemporary Islam. They tell the West what it likes to hear and they make a good living that way.

AQ: We are witnessing the emergence of numerous organisations that actively encourage Muslims to leave Islam (e.g. Ex-Muslims Forum, Faith Freedom International, Apostates of Islam, and the Council of Ex-Muslims) Should Islam slow down in an effort to stop these bad apples?
IAR: Those who leave Islam are a tiny minority. Islam is not a sect but a universal religion. Those organisations are wasting their time. Islam is a progressive religion in nature since it encourages the believers to be engaged in all aspects of society.

AQ: What about the temptation to argue that being Sufi is being the broad minded Muslim as Salafi is prone to intolerance and prejudice; meanwhile engaging with socio-political Islamic Movements like the Ikhwan makes one a clear terrorist bent on overthrowing secular governments with Shari'a law.
IAR: Both spirituality and through socio-political activism have been at the heart of Islam from the beginning. Islam has always endeavoured to improve both individual and social life, therefore, Islamic activism in the shape of Ikhwan or Jama'at-e-Islami has always been there.

AQ: Recent estimates show around 6 million Muslims have left Islam in African, 2 million ethnic Muslims converted to Christianity in Russia; 50,000 Muslim teenagers apostosised in Malaysia; 10,000 French Muslims converted to Christianity; 35,000 Muslim Turks converted to Christianity last year; and closer to home some 200,000 British Muslims left Islam as reported in TimesOnline in February 5, 2005. What should the Muslim reaction be: inaction or enact apostate punushment?
IAR: I really doubt these numbers. How do you verify these figures in the first place?

AQ: Well, Shaykh Ahmed Katani in an interview on Aljazeera with late Maher Abdullah claimed the 6 million figure leaving Islam in Africa, and the TimesOnline reported 200.000 British Muslims. Statistics aside, are you disputing that large numbers of Muslims are not apostatising today?
IAR: Yes, I am disputing these figures. If this were the case then we would have at least 20,000 leaving Islam in the USA. No one has heard of that.

AQ: Can we read contemporary acts of terrorism in a colonial frame?
IAR: It depends how you define terrorism. It is a mistake to assume that terrorism and Islam are synonymous. How about state terrorism as in the example of the US in Iraq or Israel in the Occupied Territories? By-and-large those who have resorted to violence in

the Muslim world have been in the minority, a very tiny minority. We do not hear about Muslim states resorting to terrorism as in the case of the US and Israel.

AQ: What are the theological foundations of the disagreements between Saudi scholars like late Nasir al-Din Al-Baani and Bin Baaz with the Ikhwan over martyr operations in Palestine and other occupied territories?
IAR: I believe most Salafis in Saudi Arabia, for example, are not militant but support the status quo in the country because of political rigidity and the absence of real democracy. A few salafis have resorted to violence against the ruling elite and their international supporters such as the US. I do not think there are theological disagreements on the matter of suicide operation as much as political disagreements.

AQ: Is their view against resisting occupation of Muslim land purely on theological grounds or is it political expediency?
IAR: The Islamic literature on resisting occupation and oppression is quite immense and it needs to be revived.

AQ: What was the Muslim response to oppressive regimes in the past?
IAR: A good number of the 'ulama resisted oppression; some did not. I think we have to revive that part of Islamic history. You will find in modern history a large number of the 'ulama have opposed colonialism and occupation. Consider for example, most of the Algerian and Moroccan 'ulama since the 19th century. In the case of Algeria we have the 19th century 'Alim [scholar] Abdel Qadir al-Jazairi and in the case of Morocco we have the 20th century Abdel Kareem al-Khattabi, the famous leader of the Rif [countryside] revolt against the French in the 1930s and 40s.

AQ: What is the historical basis of al-Wala' Wa'l Bara' (allying oneself to the Muslims and keeping clear from the Unbelievers)?
IAR: This is an interesting question. I think Muslims cannot cut themselves off from their milieu especially if they live in the West. One must revisit this theological concept while having the interest of the Muslim community in the West in mind, especially in its daily dealings with its environment. The concept of al-Wala' wa'l Bara' became famous in the wake of the publication of Ayman Zawahiri's book, al-Wala' wa'l Bara': 'Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi' Mafqud, in the 1980s [see the book on www.metransparent.com], in which he agues that enmity to the unbelievers is one of the pillars of Islam and that it is impossible to dialogue with the unbelievers or their local supporters in the Muslim world, such as the ruling elite in the contemporary Muslim world.

AQ: Is this the mainstream Muslim view?
IAR: I believe this is an extremist perspective and it is not shared by most Muslims.

SECULARISM AND ISLAM

AQ: The American Khalid Abul Fadl, describes secularism as a "utilitarian experience" that supports a diverse population but not the denial of religion. How do Islamists who believe in a complete way of life but oppose secularism, justify participation in the political life of a secular state?
IAR: Secularism has been a contentious issue in contemporary Muslim thought. It is a fact that many Muslims live in a secular environment. I believe that secularism, if it respects religion, can co-exist with religion. However if secularism is not tolerant of religion such as in Turkey, then it would be harmful.

The Muslim world must unite somewhat in order to stand its ground and remain independent

AQ: And if Muslims desire to live by Shari'a law?
IAR: If Muslims through democratic means choose to live in an Islamic society, then that freedom should be given to them.

Islamism or Islamic resurgence refers to attempts by contemporary Muslims to be faithful to their religious tradition and the requirements of modern life.

AQ: Author of "Clash and Dialogue", Muqtader Khan, criticises the West for not being able to sustain a position of pluralism in the sense of an ideology rather than a descriptor. The relationship between Islam and the West are based on "relations of power" rather than genuine dialogue. Have we learned from each other mostly under conditions of domination?

IAR: I agree that the relationship between the West and the Muslim world [and the third world for the matter] is that of power. I think it is important to establish strong states in the Muslim world that can stand their ground in the new world system. And ultimately the Muslim world must unite somewhat in order to stand its ground and remain independent.

AQ: Do you think multiculturalism is failing in the West?

IAR: Multiculturalism is a big issue in the West. I think if it is applied correctly minorities in the west can keep their identity while reaching out to the larger society.

AQ: But multiculturalism breads ghettoism?

IAR: There is usually some tension between assimilation and preserving one's identity. From my perspective, it is important to totally engage with society, British or American, while keeping your religious identity.

AQ: In your opinion, which Western country best provides a model for culture and civilisation?

IAR: Canada is such a country because it is serious about helping immigrants integrate while giving them the opportunity to preserve their religious identity.

RESURGENT ISLAM

AQ: What should the aims of resurgent Islam be in the West today?

IAR: It is clear that even the most educated people in the West do not know enough about Islam and the Muslim world. Muslim activists should enlighten westerners about that and furthermore, the process of globalisation has not been positive for the Muslim masses. It is important for the Muslim world to be independent at all levels and to be treated equally by the West. I think activist should convene conferences and meetings to promote better understanding of the Muslim World in the West.

AQ: Is Islamic revival a phase which will in time fade as has transpired with Arab nationalism?

IAR: I do not think so. I do not think that the current neo-con attack on Islamism in the guise of terrorism will diminish the power of Islamic revival in the world today.

AQ: To what do you attribute the spread of Islamic resurgence today? Is this our Enlightenment in reaction to modernity?

IAR: This is only one part. I think the main part of the Islamism fight is for social justice, political independence and intellectual honesty.

AQ: Syed Qutb enjoys a prominent place in your writings whose work you describe as representing "a turning point in contemporary Islamic resurgence". Why Qutb?

IAR: Qutb is very important but not the only one. He was able to formulate some major theories in a very difficult phase of Islamism in the Arab world. There are many who have reformulated his ideas in a new light.

AQ: Such as?

IAR: Well, I have in mind the great array of contemporary Islamist thinkers such as Hassan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannoushi, Sayyid Hussein Fadllallah and Munir Shafiq.

AQ: We have pockets of militants who are quick to resort to violence in their quest to unseat existing governments. How do you deal with this Islamist manifestation?

IAR: By and large Islamic resurgence has opted to follow the political process; however, it has been blocked by the political elite in power. Those who say that the political path is not useful have become tired of the political elite and they seek to remove them by force. If mainstream Islamism is not allowed to work peacefully, the ranks of the second trend will swell.

AQ: Recent experiments with Islamic governments in Iran, Sudan, Palestine, and to a lesser degree Turkey, have brought to fore questions whether Islamists would tolerate diversity once in power.
IAR: I think that Islamists in power is somewhat of a recent phenomenon. It needs more time to mature. The example of Turkey is very interesting and with honesty and hard work, the ones in power have been able to ameliorate lot of Turkish people.

AQ: How should the Western world view the Muslim world's aspirations for political administration (a caliphate), self-determination and political independence?
IAR: I think the Muslim world should emancipate itself from any political slavery and choose its own rulers. Real democracy is the only way to go. If Muslims desire to unite in the future then one should respect this choice.

AQ: How do you explain the accusation against the founders of the Islamic movements, like al-Ikhwan and Jama'at-e-Islami, as not being rooted in "traditional" Islamic scholarship rather they promote an erroneous brand of extremist Islam?
IAR: This is a faulty accusation. I think the founders are well-versed in traditional Islamic learning.

AQ: How?
IAR: They have sought to promote the teachings of the Qur'an and elaborated on the need to have dynamic Islamic fiqh or jurisprudence that meets the conditions of the present time.

AQ: Islamic movements have failed to attract the hearts of social elites to their revolutionary call. Is it the message or the messenger at fault?
IAR: Islamic movements have been under threat in most Muslim countries; nevertheless, they have been able to attract a good number of educated people to their leadership positions.

AQ: Like where?
IAR: This is true in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan and Palestine.

AQ: Should the Islamic movement first concentrate on liberating Makkah, as opposed to Palestine?
IAR: I think that Muslims wherever they are should focus on achieving political and economic independence. It does not to begin in one place only.

AQ: Makkah is the focal point of Muslims world-wide, any change here will have a domino effect worldwide.
IAR: I think what is more important than liberating Makkah is getting rid of every dictatorship in the Arab and Muslim worlds, including the one in Saudi Arabia.

Qutb wanted to change his society from the inside and not from the margins.

AQ: Islamic traditions vehemently opposes monarchical rule, how is then possible that the Saudi regime enjoys tacit support from some Islamists within the Kingdom?
IAR: I do not know what you mean by Islamists here. If you mean Wahhabism then this has been the case since the 18th century. It is very hard to break this alliance between Wahhabism and the Saudi family since it has been there for a long time.

AQ: What about the role of the Saudi 'ulama (scholars)?
IAR: Some Wahhabi 'ulama have been critical of the state for some time now and I think that the Saudi political elite cannot keep the lid on criticism in the country for a long time to come.

ISLAMISM AND RADICALISM

AQ: What is your definition of Islamism? Some Muslims dislike the term as it projects itself as another 'ism'.

IAR: One can use all sorts of terms. To me Islamism or Islamic resurgence refers to attempts by contemporary Muslims to be faithful to their religious tradition and the requirements of modern life. Scholars have used a variety of terms to refer to this phenomenon. Islamism is such a term.

AQ: How did Qutb's concept of the modern Jahiliyah came to be construed as being anti-Western and encourage radicalism?

IAR: This concept was constructed in opposition to Nasserist Arab nationalism, initially. Qutb and the Ikhwan leadership of the 1950s opted to create an Islamic state, which was not possible because of Nasserism and Arab nationalism. There has been some debate about this term and what Qutb exactly meant.

AQ: Did Qutb regard all Egyptians as living under Jahiliyah?

IAR: I do not think Qutb meant all Muslims of Egypt were living in Jahiliyah. He might have meant that Muslims needed to radically change those institutions that did not spread Islamic ideas.

AQ: If Qutb were alive today, would he approve the actions of Bin Laden and his ilk?

IAR: Qutb was concerned about true economic and social independence of his country and the Muslim world. He abhorred all sorts of oppression, including Western.

AQ: So, what are you exactly saying?

IAR: I do not think he would have supported someone like bin Laden since Qutb wanted to change his society from the inside and not from the margins.

AQ: Sufism constituted an important part of Imam Hassan al-Banna's early life. How did Qutb view Sufism, and how do you explain the current opposition to Sufism by the Islamic movement in general?

IAR: Qutb was a man of letters initially. I do not think he was as Sufi oriented as al-Banna. Islamic movements desire a fundamental change in the current status quo which is not always the desire of Sufism.

AQ: Al-Banna believed Egypt's Coptic community was an indigenous community, not compromised with Western Christian imperialism. How did later Islamist thinkers deal with the reality of Eastern Christianity?

IAR: There is a lot of literature on that especially in Egypt. To most Islamists, Copts are citizens in addition to being members of a religious community that is protected under the rules of Islam.

AQ: What motivates former Jihadis like Muntasser al-Zayyat (formerly with Takfir wal-Hijra) and other ex-radicals to become moderates?

IAR: There are lot of factors. One of which are the tragic attacks on the US and their impact on the current Islamic movement. This is what al-Zayyat mentions in his excellent work or "Ayman al-Zawahir as I have Known Him".

AQ: What is your assessment of the British and American Muslims psyche in the past few years and specifically post 9/11?

IAR: There is no doubt that Muslims have been under pressure since 9/11. I think that instead of accusing Western Muslims, one must engage them in a larger Muslim-Western dialogue.

‘Civil’ does not have to be ‘Irreligious’: An Islamic Perspective

Dr Jasser ‘Auda & Dr. Wanda Krause

Muslims do contribute to the development of the vibrant civil society in Europe and the West in general. However, there are fundamental problems in the very definition of ‘civility’ that is used by a number of scholars and the media, which aim to exclude anything ‘Islamic’ from the concept of ‘civility.’ As such, we will present four fundamental flaws in popular definitions of civility, namely, the ‘secular’ condition, essentialist concepts, the ‘ideology’ objection, and the biased ideal. Further, this paper proposes that approaching the concept of ‘civility’ through core values, such as tolerance, participation, and empowerment, rather than specific culturally based organisations and structures, offers a fairer and more universal definition that avoids the above problems.

BASIC DEFINITION

Edward Shils provides a basic working definition for civil society. The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the State, and which is largely in autonomy from it. Civil society lies beyond the boundaries of the family and clan and beyond the locality; it lies short of the state.[25]

Building on this basic framework, civil society is the realm loosely located between the family and the State in which individuals participate through structures of independent voluntary associations, networks, or simply, 'discursive space.'

THE ‘SECULAR’ CONDITION

Civil society is often utilised as a normative tool which it is claimed, must embrace ‘secular politics.’ Thus, the behaviours, norms and practices that are perceived to run against secular (or liberal) politics are seen by some as incongruous with the project of civil society and the concept of ‘civility’ itself. While we assert that some groups that are at war with civility should be clearly excluded from a civil society definition, religious groups, in general, and other forms of organisation that are simply different from the dominant Eurocentric worldview of modernity and progress, must not be excluded. As Marlies Glasius argues

“...[C]ivil society is not the exclusive domain of ‘progressive’ human rights, environmental, social justice and women’s rights activists, it is a space co-inhabited by conservatives, anti-abortionists, and religious fundamentalists.”[26]

Such groups from all religions and systems of faith are equally relevant to the sphere in which dominant discourses are challenged and competing views are put forward.

The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the State, and which is largely in autonomy from it.

ESSENTIALIST CONCEPTS

Many theoretical concepts of civil society and civility focus on an essentialism that is explained by culture and religion. The arguments seem to have originated from the old ‘orientalist’ approach, which has now been widely criticised for its erroneous assumptions, especially concerning the Islamic culture and religion. Essentialists argue that ‘Islam’ itself is an absolute impediment to the development of civic values and institutions.[27] Kamrava, for example, states that “Islam...in its current militant form poses an immovable obstacle to social and cultural

When scholars of civil society apply the concept to communities of predominantly 'other' regions and religions, the result is that the activisms of these communities never live up to the idealised 'Western' context.

democratisation."[28] This view is by and large similar to other views expressed by Elie Kedourie, Bernard Lewis, Albert Hourani, and Samuel Huntington.

Nevertheless, Janine Clark, Nilüfer Göle, Amani Kandil, and others, prove through field work and sound analysis that Islamic organisations have an important function in civil society. Clark shows that a danger in analyses has been the blurring between the minority of violent Islamist groups and the majority of non-violent Islamist groups and movements.[29] Göle, in fact, in her study on Turkey, speaks of the creation of an autonomous sphere in society due to Islamic values and the Islamicisation of politics.[30] Looking specifically at Arab women, Kandil recognises that religions play a key role as a motivating factor for their voluntary initiatives since it encourages them to volunteer time and give charity, thus enables them to assume a profound role in civil society.[31] On the other hand, the Tunisian Muslim scholar and thinker, Shaykh Rachid Ghannouchi cautions that the civil society concept, as developed in the West, has been situated as oppositional to a religious society. In his view the roots of this conflict come from French cultural history, which witnessed a violent conflict between the church and the French revolution. The result of this conflict was the idea that religion and 'civility' cannot be one and the same thing. When scholars apply the idea of civil society to Islamic forms of organising, they fail to consider the connotations associated with the term. Ghannouchi asserts that Islam is 'naturally strengthening to civility.'[32]

THE 'IDEOLOGY' OBJECTION

Another fundamental flaw in the assertion that Islamic forms of activism fall short of 'civility' is that its supporting research has been directed to certain Islamist 'ideological' groups only. In addition to the arbitrary usage of the term 'ideology,' the conclusions of scholars who focus on some forms of Islamist politics cannot be applied squarely to the much wider circle of Islamic activism. The blurring of distinctions here is very dangerous because 'Islamism' is often used interchangeably with 'terrorism,' especially in the media. Thus, Muslim contribution to Western civil society become mistakenly labelled as some form of activism that is similar to, for example, the Ku Klux Klan, the Mafia, or other terrorist organisations. These organisations cannot contribute to the strengthening of civility since they demonstrate intolerance and violence.[33] However, excluding Islamic forms of organisation merely because their missions and agenda are guided by 'ideology,' means ignoring the fact that as well as possibly contributing to civility, they can be the most effective means for responding to the needs of citizens.[34]

A BIASED YARDSTICK

And yet another problem found within civil society works is the yardstick which has always been Western civilisation in its white Christian imagery, particularly the United States. When scholars of civil society apply the concept to communities of predominantly 'other' regions and religions, the result is that the activisms of these communities never live up to the idealised 'Western' context. Robert Hefner explains that scholars who follow a "culturalist" line of analysis base their conclusions on the belief that what he terms a "civil democracy" rests upon a constellation of values and institutions unique to the West. Thus, when comparisons of 'civility' are made between the assumed 'white Christian West' and other communities, a hierarchy still remains. As such, when institutions of 'other' origins are measured for "civility", they are left without worth.[35] Chris Hann is right to point that it is

the responsibility of all human communities to seek and create a version of civil society, and that the "burden of scholarship" is to investigate these different versions.[36] Nonetheless, in order to compare these versions scholars must then shift the debates about civil society away from formal structures and organisations and towards an investigation of beliefs, values and everyday practices. This is the essence of our approach in the following few paragraphs, in which we suggest direct relationships between civil values and Islamic values.

'CIVILITY' AS AN ISLAMIC VALUE

Building on the above, the relationship between essential components of 'civility' and some core maqasid (objectives, goals, ends, principles, and intents) of the Islamic law will now be outlined. This will allow for the opening-up of these topics for investigation and research, rather than to provide a detailed analysis. The values considered as essential components of civility are (a) tolerance, (b) cooperation, (c) volunteerism, and (d) empowerment.

(a) Tolerance is about respecting the beliefs or practices of others, which as Jillian Schwedler asserts, is 'paramount' for civility.[37] Toleration of another person's beliefs and practices does not mean that one must like them, accept them for oneself, or even believe that they are correct. On the contrary one must accept the condition of a co-existence with people of diverse beliefs, traditions and practices, with the appreciation that others have the same right as oneself to personal beliefs and ways of behaving. This understanding of tolerance, in the Islamic sources, is embodied in the obligation of samahah (magnanimity) of Muslims. Magnanimity is one of the main maqasid of the Islamic law. There are numerous evidences for the place that magnanimity has in Islam itself as a religion. An authentic narration reports that the Prophet Muhammad had said: 'I was sent to people with a magnanimous religion.'

Participation is an indicator of how vibrant a civil society is. It means some active involvement on part of a group of volunteers, be their activism religious based or otherwise. Participation is said to occur when people organise around specific interests, participate, negotiate and collaborate to reach particular ends. As such, one could make a quantitative assessment with an inquiry in terms of volunteerism levels, growth in numbers of participants, activities/programmes and size of the structures that accommodate larger numbers of people. In the Islamic sources, the idea of participation is embodied in two principles, namely, cooperation (ta'awun) and volunteerism (tatawwu').

(b) 'Cooperation in the way of good' is a trait often praised by the Qur'an and in the Prophetic Tradition. God says (5:2):

Toleration of another person's beliefs and practices does not mean that one must like them, accept them for oneself, or even believe that they are correct.

Cooperate in matters of righteousness and piety; do not cooperate in matters that are sinful and evil.

(c) Volunteerism is also a core Islamic value in which a Muslim volunteer seeks a very high reward from God alone, and hence is highly motivated for the service of society. The Qur'an mentioned this concept in numerous ways in hundreds of verses. For example (Hud, 51):

[Hud said:] O my people! No reward do I ask of you for this [message]: my reward rests with none but Him. Also, (Al-Layl, 19-21): [They are doing good] not for payment to be received, but only out of a longing for the countenance of his Sustainer, the All-Highest.

(d) Although the empowerment process has traditionally been left out of the analysis of social movements and associational activism. Empowerment is a crucial component to include within discourse on civil

The Prophet Muhammad said: 'People are equal like the teeth of a comb.'

society. As such, it is important to emphasise the empowerment as also comprising a process whereby marginalised groups become able to organise themselves to assert their independent right to make choices and to control resources which will assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination and framing by a dominant discourse. As we know, Muslims are increasingly being framed away from harbourers of civility to harbourers of extremism and terrorism. Defining empowerment as such removes emphasis from the sources of oppression that Muslims may face, and instead gives greater focus to the agency of Muslim communities in their own right. Empowerment is another core value of Muslim activism, which is based on the Islamic basic value of equality of human being. The Prophet Muhammad said: 'People are equal like the teeth of a comb.'

The above brief paragraphs do not present, by any means, a detailed analysis of the topic at hand. Their purpose is rather to illustrate the point that approaching the concept of 'civility' through core values, such as tolerance, participation, and empowerment, rather than specific culturally based organisations and structures, offer a fairer and more universal definition. It also avoids the fundamental problems and narrow cultural biases outlined in this paper.

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Balancing Security Versus Liberty: The Wrong Scales Or The Wrong Question?

Anne Costello

The 'War on Terror' in Britain started well before the 11 September, 2001 attacks. The Terrorism Act 2000 extended the definition of terrorism to include the threat of 'serious damage to property', in ways 'designed to influence the government' for a 'political cause'. It gave police powers to detain suspects without charge for seven days, later extended to14, then to 28 days and now being attempted to extend yet further.

This Act also defined innocent actions as crimes such as the "crime of association" that is, belonging to a banned organisation, financing, sharing meeting platform with, or distributing its literature. Organisations could also be banned on the basis of their activities in other countries fitting the broader definition of terrorism. This process stigmatised a wide range of legitimate political activity of foreign liberation movements such as, Kurdish, Tamil, Palestinian, and others which are unconcerned with UK politics.

Some Muslim charities had their bank accounts temporarily frozen under mere suspicion of financing terrorism abroad, and since 2000, the Home Office banned 44 organizations under the Terrorism Act 2000, ranging from Al-Qaeda to Hamas – and the latter remains blacklisted although the Palestinians have elected it to be their Government. [In anticipation that Hizb ut-Tahrir would be banned (although in the end it was not) a students' union official at Middlesex University, who had invited them to address a meeting in the interest of free public debate, was suspended from his studies.] Freedom of speech was further attacked by the creation of new offences of 'glorifying terrorism' and 'disseminating terrorist publications' under the Terrorism Act 2006.

In the 9/11 atrocity, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 granted further powers of detention and surveillance. It became an offence not to inform the authorities of any 'suspected terrorist' activities, potentially imposing on relatives of bombers the near-impossibility of proving that they did not know what was going to be done. This was the beginning of a slippery slope. By 2006, Home Secretary John Reid notoriously asked Muslim parents to spy on their own children. The ATCSA 2001 also authorized the internment of non-UK citizens – in circumstances where the Home Secretary had a suspicion of 'terrorist' links but inadequate evidence for a prosecution, and where Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prevented their deportation to their own country because of the risk of torture. These powers permitted indefinite imprisonment without trial or charge, a measure not used in the UK mainland since World War II. Notably however, its temporary use during the Northern Ireland 'troubles' was dropped when the resulting sense of outrage appeared to draw people into the IRA.

Internment breached the right to liberty guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR – a breach which can only be justified under that Convention by arguing that a serious emergency threatening 'the life of the nation'. After three years of protests and legal challenges, the British Law Lords famously declared in December 2004 that internment was inconsistent with the ECHR; the measure was disproportionate to the emergency being faced and in any case, internment discriminated against foreigners.[38] Internment powers were replaced in March 2005 by 'control orders', which mandated house arrest for all save a few hours each day.[39] Recent reports suggest eleven internees from the Maghreb and the Middle

East were released from Belmarsh Prison to a Control Order regime.

Nonetheless, internment was revived under different powers. In the months which followed several people were re-arrested under immigration law, which from 1971 has permitted detention without trial of persons awaiting deportation. Negotiations were started to obtain undertakings from the receiving Governments (mainly Libya, Algeria and Jordan) not to torture the deportees.

The British Government is trying hard to overturn a challenge in the European Court, specifically, the precedent allowing people not to be deported and risk torture irrespective of 'danger to national security' in the country which wants to expel them. Furthermore, round-up of foreign 'terror suspects' for deportation on this ground since 2005 brought 36 individuals within the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

The Commission hears their appeals against deportation, partly on the basis of secret evidence withheld from the suspects themselves. After over a year of prison or house arrest, several abandoned their appeals and returned to Algeria. Only one has managed to win his appeal and clear his name of the 'terrorist' label.

Whilst the impact of ATCSA 2001 fell mainly on foreigners, the Law Lords' judgement recognised a police opinion that at least 1000 British citizens had visited military training camps in Afghanistan. Unlike internment, Control Orders can apply to British citizens as well as foreigners. Like internment, they serve the purpose of preventive detention, particularly when it became clear that the 7/7 bombers were British.

Police attention now focussed more on the British population and nine out of sixteen persons now controlled are British citizens. After two 'controlled' persons escaped in early 2007, the Home Secretary floated the possibility that internment could be re-introduced. Whilst Appeal Court judgements attacked the more severe control orders, ruling any period of freedom less than seven hours per day to be in breach of Article 5 of the ECHR[40], the then Tony Blair's Government made several threats to weaken or even abolish the Human Rights Act which incorporates the ECHR into British law. The position of Gordon Brown thus far is not yet fully clear.

Brown's Government plans a new anti-terrorism package for autumn 2007, including an extension of the current 28 day maximum period for detention without charge, and a highly controversial power for police to stop and question people in public places. The 'stop and quiz' power, according to a Parliamentary announcement of May 2007, would impose arrest and a fine of up to £5000 for refusing to answer police questions – of an unspecified nature, effectively removing the 'right to silence' from the public even before they have been arrested. A Cabinet row ensued.

Peter Hain and some police spokesmen likened the proposal to the old 'sus' law, the basis of extensive and discriminatory searches of black youth in the 1980s which is said to have caused so much resentment that it fuelled inner city riots. The Home Office consultation document of June 2007 backtracked somewhat and described the proposal without any detail, as being at an early stage of development.

The proposal illustrated the capacity of anti-terrorism measures to spill over into general harassment of Muslim communities and also of demonstrators. ATCSA 2001 included powers to stop and search people in designated areas, whether or not an offence is suspected. The whole of London is so designated, and the power has been widely used to harass peaceful protestors, for example against the Docklands arms fair. Surveillance of students is also an issue. In 2006, plain clothed police officers began to attend the meetings of the student Islamic Society at Dundee University. Tayside police later admitted that they had also visited 18 secondary schools to gather intelligence and look for signs of "extremism" amongst school pupils.[41]

Brown is now seeking an all-party consensus on the new legislative package. It is an

opportune moment to examine how he will achieve this in light of the arguments and political processes which have under laid anti-terrorism legislation of the last seven years. How has the balance of liberty versus security been assessed, and how has Parliament interacted with the police, with NGOs, and with the judiciary on this crucial question?

Parliamentary debates on anti-terrorism measures have been rushed and the 2001 Act passed in a mood of panic following 9/11.The Law Lords' judgement of December 2000 found that ATCSA 2001 barely served its stated purpose. The internment powers allowed non-UK suspected terrorists to leave the country with impunity whilst leaving British suspects at large; and imposing indefinite detention on persons who, 'even if reasonably suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda, may harbour no hostile intentions towards the United Kingdom.'

Since Control Orders replaced internment, there has been scant Parliamentary scrutiny of their working. The debate on renewal of Control Order powers in 2006 was allowed a mere ninety minutes, and revealed that although the Government had a statutory duty to prosecute controlees where possible, police reports were giving no reasons why prosecution was not happening.[42]

There has been some public consultation on the way the anti-terrorism measures have worked, although with little impact on the law making process. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights invited NGOs to present evidence for its enquiry on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights[43], but its criticisms of the 2006 Terrorism Bill were largely ignored. Lord Carlile's enquiry on the appropriateness of the legal definition of terrorism reflected few of the critical submissions made to his public meetings by civil liberties' groups, communities and even the police. Instead, he found that the definition of terrorism was "useful and broadly fit for purpose."[44]

As for detention without charge, the proposal for ninety days seems to have been developed very arbitrarily. The Guardian journalist Vickram Dodd, recently claimed at London's City Circle public meeting, the police originally asked Mr Blair for ninety days, expecting considerable resistance to such a long period, and were surprised when he agreed to put this into the 2006 Terrorism Bill.

The 'stop and quiz' power,...would impose arrest and a fine of up to £5000 for refusing to answer police questions...effectively removing the 'right to silence'

No convincing case has ever been made why it should be that long. The Government has admitted that the 28 day limit has not once proved to be an impediment to police investigations.[45] The Liberal Democrats have suggested that minor charges could be made against suspects and upgraded if and when evidence of more serious crimes becomes available to the police. Yet Scotland Yard, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and security minister Lord West are now calling for unlimited detention.[46]

There is an element of demagogy in the development of anti-terrorism measures – the public, or at least the tabloid journalists, want tougher measures against dangerous people, regardless of the suspects' human rights, thus the Government makes use of this both to gain popularity and to legitimise its own agenda. Critics have argued that this agenda includes suppressing dissent in general, in particular challenges to foreign policy, as well as criminalising supporters of overseas liberation struggles[47], through creating a climate of fear amongst Muslims, migrants, refugee communities and leftist activists. However, whenever the concerns of the human rights lobby are raised, the justification for anti-terrorism measures falls back on the needs and (often secret) arguments of the Secret Services and the police.

The judiciary, and in some instances the House of Lords – more than the House of Commons, to the latter's disgrace – have sometimes taken a stand of principle. But [in accepting, as they are supposed to, the sovereignty of Parliament the judges have not and cannot challenge the exceptions to the right to liberty which are written into the law itself – notably relating to severe national emergencies and to persons awaiting deportation], if Parliament was persuaded to rewrite the Human Rights Act, the judges' opposition to internment might find no basis in law.

The Parliamentary backbencher looking for any coherent analysis of 'what works' to prevent terrorist attacks will find little useful evidence either from the public statements of security experts — although MI5 reports made clear to the Blair Government that the war in Iraq has supplied a major motive for attacks on UK soil. Nor will much relevant experience be found in UK history — beyond Northern Ireland, where punishment without trial was clearly a provocative factor, as was the shooting of the Derry 13. This should be a warning against the 'shoot to kill' policy involved in the death of the innocent Brazilian, Jean-Charles de Menezes.

The Government has admitted that the 28 day limit has not once proved to be an impediment to police investigations.

Overall, the policy formation process on anti-terrorism measures has been rather incoherent. It does not add up to a balanced consideration of what the 'balance' should be between freedom and security. However, that question may be unanswerable in so far as the measurement scales are not definable. Any argument about the necessity of restricting freedom in the name of security must confront considerable uncertainty about what the 'trade-off' really is.

The unknowns are so many that the issue is quite unlike, say, the question of how much to invest in motorway crash barriers to reduce accident deaths. The political and security establishments themselves find it hard to know what measures are necessary or sufficient to prevent terrorism. From 2001 to 2005, the emphasis was on catching foreigners, only to find that the 7/7 bombers were British. Police strategy in relation to investigating British bomb plots seems to have shown many errors of judgement.[48] Of the 1228 people arrested under anti-terrorism laws since 2001, only 19.6% were charged with terrorism offences, and of those so far tried, only 3.6% were convicted of terrorism offences. That leaves a quarter who were charged with 'ordinary' crimes (fraud, conspiracy, explosive offences, etc.) and 16.4% were convicted of these.[49]

One naturally wonders what the terrorism laws have really added to security. However, the issue is not only the law, it is also police practices. The shooting of Mr de Menezes, the failed Forest Gate raid, the recent surveillance of Muslim students, can and did take place without reference to any of the anti-terrorism acts – and perhaps contributed more to community alienation than any of the measures therein.

Can we then find any justification for departing from accepted principles of justice – that is, no punishment without a fair trial, an absolute ban on complicity with torture, and upholding the rights of freedom of speech, expression and association enshrined in the ECHR? The 'cost-benefit' case for setting aside these principles seems rather weak but the case for sticking to principles has another major argument on its side; injustice makes new enemies, becoming the basis for revenge, for breakdown of social cohesion and respect for the law. In police reaction to the proposal for 'stop and question' powers we at last see certain realism about how the public, including amongst them their own enemies, respond to the perceived fairness or unfairness of the state.

To see how such realism might be extended to other measures let us consider two alternative scenarios – one which might be called prioritising security, and the other prioritis-

ing justice. Prioritising security would mean the police chiefs and Security Minister, Admiral West get their way on de-limiting detention without charge. Detention periods creep upwards to ninety days or more; some suspects are released with lives and families wrecked. Deportations based on secret evidence continue; some deportees disappear into foreign prisons. The Human Rights Act is weakened to permit house arrest under Control Orders for 20 or 22 hours per day. Using new 'stop and question' powers to gather intelligence about Muslim communities, police fine several dozen youths for non-cooperation and give them a criminal record.

And the result? Riots develop against punitive street search activity and house raids. Police requests for information and surveillance to combat terrorism fall on deaf ears. Youth who feel targeted whether they do right or wrong turn in despair to vandalism and gangs. In universities, student Islamic societies are restricted from having political speakers and 'extremists' are reported to the police. Muslim students graduate feeling embittered and alienated from British political life. Skilled Muslims of means emigrate, leaving serious holes in inner city economies. British society becomes increasingly more divided and vulnerable. People suffering detention without trial or deportation to torture are presented in Al Qaeda statements as 'martyrs' to be avenged.

Now consider the justice-oriented scenario. Brown's Government develops plans for a rapid exit from Iraq. This does not guarantee that the UK would cease to be targeted in retaliation for its foreign policies, but a swift exit strategy seems a necessity, if not sufficient, condition of removing the motive for further attacks. Within Britain, police are instructed to release terrorism suspects after seven days if no realistic charge can be found against them during that time. Some who are charged are remanded in custody, and further charges might be added later. For others, bail conditions might include some aspects of Control Orders, for example, tagging, but the defendant is charged and awaiting trial.

Privacy, freedom of speech and association are respected; emphasis is placed on policing by consent and on addressing Islamophobia in the police force, the court system and in society at large. If police perceive a serious and immediate threat to life, 'shoot to immobilise' replaces 'shoot to kill'. Procedures for deportation on grounds of 'national security' are brought into line with normal rights to a fair trial. The anti-terrorism laws are gradually repealed and terrorism is addressed as criminality rather than a 'war'.

It is surely not hard to see that the first scenario ('prioritising security') aggravates the initial problem whilst the second ('prioritising justice') has at least some prospect of reducing it.

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ENDNOTES

38. For the text of the Law Lords judgement see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.pdf

39. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_order for a history of control order powers

40. See www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1808475,00.html

41. See http://www.sacc.org.uk/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=367&catid=43&Itemid=43

42. http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2006-02-15b.1499.0

43. See http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/joint_committee_on_human_rights/

44. http://www.sacc.org.uk/sacc/docs/carlile-terrorism-definition.pdf

45. See Ian Loader, Guardian, 20.7.07, on http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2130572,00.html

46. Observer, 15.7.07; see http://www.guardian.co.uk/humanrights/story/0,,2126844,00.html; Guardian 16.7.07, http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2127412,00.html

47. See Ben Hayes of Statewatch, speech on 2.12.06,on http://www.campacc.org.uk/events/conferenceSpeeches/benSpeech.doc

48. Nafeez Ahmed ;The London Bombings: An Independent Inquiry (London: Duckworth, 2006)

49. See http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/

Spotlight On Europe's Muslims

Kristoffer Larsson

About half a century ago, there were not many Muslims in Europe. In a country such as Sweden the Muslim population has grown from almost non-existent to somewhere around 300,000 – approximately 3% of the population. Europe is in general hard for immigrants but more so for Muslims, who face prejudice and threats mainly as a consequence of Europe's difficulties in dealing with the Middle East. While the Americans are the driving force behind issues that divide mainstream Europeans from the Muslim community – such as the question of Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc – many European nations have backed the U.S. militarily, and most – if not all – have given it their political support.

Stuck in the middle of this are the European Muslims, who day in and day out see their religion being linked to terrorism, oppression of women, and honour killings, just to name a few issues.

Attacks against Western occupation troops are common in the Middle East, but Westerners are not used to being targeted on their own soil. It might seem like an extremely cruel phenomenon – that civilians are the targets – but it is a more efficient method. If we are no longer safe at home, then maybe we start to think about what we are doing in the Mideast. Further, these attacks represent a shift in power – half a decade ago it would have been unthinkable for the colonised to attack the colonisers on their own soil.

An outcome of these incidents inevitably generates anti-Muslim sentiments. Muslims cannot be held responsible for the acts of a low number of Muslims individual, yet they are often told they have a responsibility to renounce these acts, which the Islamic establishment in the West also does, however, yet there are people pushing blame on Mr Muslim Average.

Someone who has personal experience with the difficulties Muslims are facing is Mohammed Omar – a poet, culture journalist and lecturer living in the town of Uppsala, just north of the Swedish capital. Omar was born in 1976 to a Swedish Christian mother and a Kenyan non-religious Muslim father. He was raised as a member of the Swedish Church but abandoned his Lutheran faith in favour of Islam. He has written a number of books on poetry and his articles have appeared in a number of leading Swedish newspapers and magazines. As a Muslim, he knows what preconceived notions European Muslims are up against.

"I wouldn't know where to start," Mohammed Omar replies when asked what prejudices Muslims are subjected to in modern Sweden. "Most common are perhaps the belief that Muslims are violent and that they oppress women. In Islam, it is claimed, women are not subjects but limited by the religion. The assertion is that Muslim women really do not wish to be Muslims, that they would prefer the modern Western way of life but are forced to be Muslim."

Omar continues: "Muslims are cautious because they think they are persecuted. They try to hide that they are Muslim in order not to provoke."

Muslims are out to "provoke" might sound rather silly, however this is a common perception in certain circles. A leading member of Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party), when asked about what he thinks when he sees a veiled woman on the street, explained that he wonders if she is forced to wear the veil or if she does it to provoke, that is to show her rejection of Danish culture.

"I have personally been threatened and even physically abused. Just recently my [Kenyan-born] wife was threatened when waiting for

the bus. A man pulled up a knife and started screaming derogatory things."

Despite the significantly bigger problem – Muslims being attacked instead of Muslims being the attackers – media's portrayal and emphasis has been very different emphasis. Whenever Islam is mentioned, it is with regards to terrorism or fundamentalism, and as a Muslim it is hard to recognise the image presented.

"Almost never", Omar answers when I ask him if he feels at home with how the media pictures Islam. "Most of what they write is simply inaccurate and are baseless assertions. I think they [Westerners] have little knowledge about Islam, people in general know close to nothing."

"Many Muslims are already afraid and anxious. They think people are out to get them. This leads to some degree of paranoia among Muslims. To some extent this is also the case, they are being harassed."

We go on to discuss the situation in the United States where the same stereotypes are flourishing, yet Muslims are better integrated into society on the other side of the sea.

"There is a bigger Muslim middle-class in the States. You have a fair share of professional American Muslims, in leading professions, in the culture, and so on," he says. "In Sweden the situation is more difficult. The majority of Swedish Muslims are first generation immigrants and their social status is lower, most speak Swedish poorly."

In addition to Omar's claims, I would argue that the United States is far better at absorption in the first place due to selective immigration policy focusing on one's skill-set, while Europe stands ready to accept all kinds of people – well-educated or not and even if they are well-educated, they often find difficulty in acquiring a suitable job

Secondly, Americans are more religious than Europeans and therefore, have greater respect for religious piety, unlike Europeans who are in most cases strongly anti-religious and have a hard time accepting Muslims' religiosity. However there is one issue Christian and Muslim Americans definitely do not see eye-to-eye on: the Middle East. This is causing a great rift between the Muslim and the non-Muslim community in Europe too, particularly the question of Palestine.

"If you look at the people who campaign to defame Islam, you almost always end up in the pro-Israel camp," Omar notes. Pro-Israeli forces try to win support by defaming Islam while at the same time, the victims of Israel's actions resort to their faith. "Islam gives dignity to the people of the Mideast. This is why it is growing stronger", argues Omar.

But perhaps the most damaging event was the 9/11 attacks, and since then the climate has become tougher and tougher – and the United States did not make things easier by launched its war against Iraq.

"Christians have lived side-by-side with Muslims in Iraq for 1400 years. The United States is indirectly responsible for ruining this. Some Christian papers write all the time about how minorities are forced out of Iraq, which they are. But most of the millions of refugees the war has created are in fact Muslim," according to Omar.

We finally end up talking about the future. What is to be expected? Will Europe come to terms with its Muslim inhabitants? Mohammed Omar is sceptical. "I don't think the situation will improve, there are people set out to demonise Islam. It is being portrayed as a threat to Europe," he concludes.

"The biggest menace is not the Nazis—they are not that many and not very active—but the so-called Liberals [which in a Swedish context denotes ring-wingers who are behind the Americans and the Israel]. They use people of Muslims origin, like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, as alibis," Mohammed Omar says. "That way they can go after Islam without being overtly racist, as that is not accepted. They hide it by saying they are merely criticising certain features. This is a 'legitimate' way of being racist."

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From Islam of Immigrants to Islam of Citizens

Konrad Pedziwiatr

The Muslim populations in Western Europe (circa 15 million) have been undergoing profound transformations, so too their religion. Islam which was brought to Western Europe[50] by immigrants from almost all over the Muslim world, thus contributing to one of the most important religious changes in this part of the continent since the Reformation (Lewis 2005) and significantly increasing its cultural diversity, is a faith which is very closely linked with the allochtones' ethnicity, private sphere of life and one that possess many features of a so-called 'low Islam'. The faith of their children who were born or spent their formative years in Europe is, on the other hand, characterised by weakening ties with the ethnic background of their parents. It is also increasingly becoming a matter of public sphere and acquiring a growing number of features of a 'high Islam'. This paper will attempt to briefly elaborate on key differences between Islam of immigrants and Islam of citizens, and thus shed some light on the main processes within a wider transition from the 'transplanted' to the 'implanted' Islam, to use the poetics of Felice Dassetto (2004).

First of all, it is the faithful of the two types of Islam that needs to be portrayed, that is those who have spent their formative years outside the continent, and brought Islam to Western Europe as part of their 'cultural luggage', and their children whose process of socialisation took place in non-Muslim European countries. Several researchers have shown that despite the passage of time, Muslim immigrants like many other immigrants who left their home countries to improve their living conditions, do not fully discard the prospect of return. Even if they do not manage to turn this into reality during their lifetime, many still manage to 'realise it' after their deaths, as the practice of sending deceased abroad among the Muslim populations in Europe, although this is less so these days. As Mohammed Anwar points out, the plan of return to enjoy the fruits of their labour back home, or 'the myth of return', fulfils several social functions, among which the economic and cultural ones seem to be the most important.

The 'mythologization of return' ensures the immigrants in their willingness to endure hardship in work and living conditions in order to generate as much savings as possible that could be later invested back home, or send in the form of remittances to the members of their families who did not manage to migrate. It also legitimises continued adherence to the norms and values of their home countries and condemns assimilation into the culture of the host society. Thus, the immigrants who cherish the hope of return are less inclined to take actions in order to integrate with their new societies than those who have completely abandoned this hope. The first group of immigrants probably more than the second are also characterised by the phenomenon described by the Algerian student of migrations, Abdelmalek Sayad, as 'la double absence' (Sayad 1999).

Analysing the Maghrebian (North African) migration to France at the point of their departure and arrival[51], which is one of his key contributions to migration studies, Sayad noticed that immigrants neither fully belong to the receiving society nor to the sending one which they have left. The immigrant as he points out, is "atopos, a quaint hybrid devoid of place, displaced, in the twofold sense of incongruous and inopportune, trapped in that 'mongrel' sector of social space betwixt and between social being and nonbeing" (Sayad 1988). Further, he points out that they are "neither citizen nor foreigner, neither on the side of the

Same, nor on that of the Other, s/he exists only by default in the sending community and by excess in the receiving society, and s/he generates recurrent recrimination and resentment in both" (ibid). The key dilemma of immigrants can be summed up in the questions, 'how to be here (abroad) while at the same time mentally being there (in the home country)?' and 'how to be there, while physically being here?'. Out-of-place in the two social systems which define their (non)existence, the migrants force us, as Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant rightly point out, "through the obdurate social vexation and mental embarrassment they cause, to rethink root and branch the question of the legitimate foundations of citizenship and of the relationship between citizen, state and nation" (2000).

The foundations of citizenship are being questioned by the children of immigrants, those who were born or has been living in Europe since very early age and yet they have been perceived by the majority groups as the others, or to use the words of George Simmel, as those who "come today and stay tomorrow" (1971: 143). The only problem is that the offspring of Muslim immigrants did not come to Europe today, but it has been living on the continent for more than 20, 30 and sometimes even 50 years.

In contrast to their parents, children of Muslim immigrants do not think about moving to their parents' countries of origin. Their usual answer to the calls of the European Far Right parties 'to go back home' is 'this is our home!' Their geographical contact[52] with Turkey or Morocco, to mention only the countries of origin of the largest Muslim groups in Europe, is usually limited to short holiday visits. Even if Muslim citizens in some of the countries might not identify strongly with the nation-states within which they are living (e.g. the Netherlands – Entzinger 2003: 108) they are frequently characterised by firm local identifications (e.g. Babès 1997: 165, Tietze 2002, Entzinger 2003: 108). They feel strong attachment to certain districts of their cities or to the whole cities and happily describe themselves as Londoners, Berliners, Parisians, etc. Their local identities bear not only many cultural marks, as they often speak European languages with strong local accents, but also participatory ones, as it is not uncommon to see them getting involved in projects of the local civil societies. While they often lack sufficient cultural capital to feel at ease in their parents countries of origin, they possess numerous tools that enable them to get involved much more fully than their parents in the European public spheres.

Speaking and writing skills, basic working knowledge of the social and political systems, skills in accessing and processing information, and interpreting political talk are only some of the tools that enable citizens to make use of their rights. These 'tools' are part of the civic skills that a great majority of poorly educated Muslims immigrants (with exception of minority of business people and professionals) who lived their formative periods outside Europe very often lack. Those born in Europe or who arrived in their early childhood, on the other hand, even if they have not managed to gain substantial amounts of cultural capital in the form of educational qualifications (institutionalised cultural capital), still posses much wider knowledge than their parents of the mechanisms through which the European societies work (embodied cultural capital[53]), acquired during the process of socialisation. The members of the new Muslim elites – on which this research focuses – posses in fact not only substantial amounts of the embodied cultural capital, but also the institutional form of it, as the vast majority of persons interviewed finished universities and sometimes very prestigious ones.

Having pointed out the main differences between the Muslim immigrants and the Muslim citizens, it is time to move to present the key features of their religiosity. As mentioned above, one of the attributes of Islam as it is practiced by the immigrants is its profound ethnicisation. For the vast majority of Muslims who spent formative years outside Europe religion is inseparably linked with ethnicity. To be a Moroccan, Turk, Pakistani or Bangladeshi, hence ex definition means for them that one is a Muslim[54] . Thus, Islam of immigrants has

been functioning largely within the ethnic symbolic boundaries. By attaching religious meaning to certain ethnic practices, Islam has been sacralising[55] ethnicity, giving these practices additional importance. For example, by proclaiming such South Asian marriage customs like dowry and wearing of regional dress to the mosque to be Islamic, the Muslim immigrants in Leeds researched by Ron Geaves, have been bolstering their ethnic identity (Geaves 1995: 13). Religion has been not only protecting ethnic practices from change but also if necessary, legitimising the changes that have already taken place[56] (Pedziwiatr 2003).

A crucial role in reinforcing ethnic boundaries have been playing also religious institutions, and amongst them Mosques. As a symbolic representation of 'the land of Islam' in Europe, they have also been to a great extent representation of the immigrants' countries of origin. Like other religious institutions functioning within immigrant groups, Mosques perform two key functions: integrating - they have been "assuring the group of the ability to sustain itself under the new conditions" - and expressive - they have been "easing living together with 'others'" (Kubiak 1982: 49).

Muslims born in Europe easily distinguish between the realm of religion and the one of ethnicity.

They serve as a refuge for the immigrants from the receiving societies and as a focal point for the recollection of a personal and corporate identity that is rooted in their countries of origin. This recollection has been facilitated by the recruitment of Imams from the same area from where the particular Muslim community originated. Similarly to Italian Catholic congregations in the USA, as analysed by Andrew Greeley (1972: 90), Moroccan, Turkish, Pakistani or other mosques are thus community centres that help members preserve their cultural and social roots. Not only the religious but also the social lives of different Muslim groups revolve around their Mosques. This is because European Mosques are not merely places of worship, but to a greater extent than in Muslim world, also places of social gatherings. The fact that the vast networks of Muslim organisations have been built along the ethnic lines is yet another aspect of ehnicisation of Islam amongst immigrants.[57]

Although the relationship between ethnicity and religion in the Islam of citizens does not disappear, it significantly weakens. Muslims born in Europe easily distinguish between the realm of religion and the one of ethnicity. They sometimes call upon religion to question the legitimacy of certain ethnic customs and practices, which appear to be highly dysfunctional in the European social environment, and with its help try to reshape them so as they become more compatible with the surrounding reality[58]. Thus Islam of citizens functions not only within the symbolic boundaries of specific ethnic communities, but also beyond these boundaries. It draws its own symbolic boundaries which are the basis of the new forms of self-descriptions alternative to ethnic identity.

As numerous studies have shown, the religious identification amongst the second and third generations appear more widespread than the ethnic one (e.g. Cesari 1994, Modood and Berthoud 1997, Peach and Vertovec 1997). Why 'a Muslim' took the place of 'a dead beur'[59], as Xavier Ternisien (2005) has put it? Or to put it differently, why religion as a source of identity becomes more popular amongst children of the Muslim immigrants than ethnicity? There is no room here to account at length for possible explanations, suffice to mention the ones provided by the prominent Belgium and British scholar and anthropologist Eugeen Roosens. Religious identification, explains Eugeen, is subsuming the ethnic (and the class one) because Islamic membership is 'more prestigious' than the ethnic one. The author of "Creating ethnicity" sees the sources for it in the fact that "Islam is still a world power, whereas the Turkish or Moroccan proletariat are not. Thus, emphasising Islamic membership becomes a means of social promotion for immigrant workers and their families" (1989:145). He

also aptly notes that "at present-day (that is at the end of the 80s in Belgium – KP) Turks and Moroccans are voiceless because they have no muscle" and adds "ironically, claims must be formulated by people who are already equals in some way and who have power" (1989: 154). Interestingly, claims do not have to be made necessarily by people who have power as this research will demonstrate, but by people who have some means of attaining power.

A different explanation proposed by Jessica Jacobson, argues that a beur looses its battle with a Muslim or that the ethnic identity is subsumed by the religious one, because the last one is firstly more universal. Claiming to be part of the world-wide Muslim community gives the offspring of the Muslim immigrants an opportunity to belong not only to the community that is larger than the ethnic minority to which they belong, but also bigger than the surrounding majority. Thus it offers the possibility of a wider world in which to live (Jacobson 1997b). The membership in the Muslim ummah, which is an important aspect of self-definition for European-born Muslims is thus more 'rewarding', to use Barth's (1969) category, than belonging merely to the ethnic minority. At the same time, the reference to the religious identity allows a person who bears various marks of identity to unite all of them in one. Jacobson argues also that Islam is more significant source of identity for the British-born Pakistanis than ethnicity because it delineates very clearly the boundary between them and the rest of society and thus, it enables them to easily locate themselves within a wider social milieu. Ethnic boundaries have on the other hand lost their lucidity and ability to generate social distance between the ethnic minority and the majority (Jacobson 1997a: 127).

As discussed above, yet another feature of 'transplanted Islam' is its limitation to the private sphere. Although, the 'public visibility' of Islam has been steadily growing since the petrol crisis of the 1970s, and acceleration of the processes of family reunification that significantly widened the scope of immigrants interactions with the receiving societies, for the majority of Muslims situated in the lowest social strata of European societies the natural place of religion was home. They did not openly claim the recognition of their religion in the public sphere, being quite comfortable with the freedoms that European democracies had to offer them. The formal recognition of Islam in Belgium in 1974 as a faith of its citizens, was for example not a consequence of the social mobilisation of the Muslim immigrants, but a result of the diplomatic negotiations in the centre of which there was an issue of the oil supply for the country (Panafit 1997)[60]. Growing visibility of Islam until the end of the 80s was an outcome of the international events such as Iranian revolution or the war between Iran and Iraq and national ones such as opening of new Mosques. Although they were rarely purposed-build edifices[61] and usually opened in the converted houses, warehouses, parking space, and so on, from the very beginning have met with a great deal of contention. Thus Islam of immigrants had its public face mainly due to more or less distinguishable places of Muslim worship.

Islam has become a permanent element of public debates and fully entered into the public sphere only from the end of the 1980s, which saw the outbreak of the Salman Rushdie affair and the Hijab debate. At this time European Muslims consisted of substantial number of members who were socialised in Europe, and began to ask for their rights which were already being enjoyed by other religious groups. In France, young Muslim women began to call for the permission to wear Hijab in school, as the Jewish pupils were allowed to wear the kippahs. In Britain, Muslims demanded an expansion of law on blasphemy which would apply not only to the Christian God (and more specifically the Anglican one) but also to God of other religious groups. Islam has gained a public face not only thanks to various Muslim political demonstrations but also due to numerous examples of active involvement of Muslims in European societies. From early 1990, one may observe a growing number of representatives of the new Muslim elites starting to dynamically shape the politics of the state at both local

and national level. At the same time they have been increasingly influencing the growing number of Muslim organisations created by their fathers or setting up their own organisations and in this way giving a new character to the Muslim civil society.

With the generational passage, Muslim communities are losing at least part of their ethnic features and identification with their countries of origin, but they are not autochthonous yet, at least not as communities.

The final key feature of Islam of the first generation is its strong folk character. In order to fully comprehend this, one needs to remember that Muslim immigrants who settled in Europe after WWII were often not only moving from one continent to the other, but what is even more important, from little towns and villages to large cities and metropolises. The religion that was transplanted by immigrants to Europe has been to a large extent a religion of the rural areas. It is characterised among others by saint veneration, presence of black magic and countless superstitions. This kind of Islam in which the faithful's attitudes towards the main religious dogmas are more emotional than rational was named by E. Gellner as 'low Islam' (Gellner 1968). In this kind of Islam an important role is played by the Sufi tariqas (orders). In Britain for example, the institutional base for Sufism is made up of the largest network of Mosques in the country that are affiliated to the the Barelwi movement.[62] One of the distinguished Sufi leaders whose arrival had a great impact on the revival of Barelwi traditions was Pir Maroof. Between 1987 and 1988, for example, he organised under the World Sufi Council umbrella, celebrations of the Prophet's Birthday (milad) in Hyde Park, which attracted 25,000 people from over the country (Lewis 1994: 25).

The European-born and educated Muslims, in contrast to their parents are largely an urban religion. As such it possesses numerous features of the 'high Islam' generally oriented in Gellner's definition towards puritanical and scriptural. For young European Muslims religion is usually not a matter of ethnicity, but of identity, ethics and spirituality. Their Islam acquires the features of the 'high Islam' inter alia through the process of intellectualisation of faith which commonly takes place outside their family home, at conferences and seminars organised by Muslim associations, meeting of religious study groups, and more. Leila Babes very convincingly argues for example that the young Muslims cut off from the traditional basis of religious culture of their parents, have very little chances of rediscovering low Islam, and are somehow predestined to rediscover High Islam (1997: 137). Their approach to the faith that they have inherited from their parents is often deeply reflexive. This is not only a consequence of the fact that they are part and parcel of the societies which, as Giddens points out, "are characterised by a growing capacity of active engagements with diverse sources of incoming knowledge" (1996: 216), but also because being a Muslim in a non-Muslim country is not as straightforward as being a Muslim in the place where Islam is a religion of the majority.

During the process of socialisation Muslims born in Europe are being presented with divergent sets of allegiances and ideals. Religious and ethnic allegiances are just two out of many identity options. Thus the way of being a Muslim and of practicing Islam is for the Muslim citizens a matter of private choice to a much greater extent than it was for the Muslim immigrants (Tietze 2002). The individualisation of religiosity of European born Muslims manifests itself not only in the personal tint of their religious practice (individualisation of religious practice), but also in their own interpretation of religious beliefs (individualisation of religious beliefs). However as Brigitte Maréchal observes, the individualisation of religious

beliefs does not necessarily need to result in questioning of the key religious dogmas, but only in the critical analysis of the traditional religious interpretations (2003: 13). The same point is made by Nilufer Göle, when she says that "although there is a strong individualist component to the religious experience in modern times, this does not necessarily mean that the content will be individuating" (2003: 814).

The students of the individualisation processes within European Muslim populations advance two opposing theses. While some argue that religious individualisation and related to it fragmentation of religious authority is leading to the 'liberalisation of Islam' and emergence of 'critical Islam' (e.g. Schiffauer 2000, Mandaville 2004), others claim that in spite of individualisation and the diversification of authority structures, the current situation is characterised by a relative stability of dogma and in any case, not by a liberalisation of Islam (e.g. Roy 1999, 2002, Wiktorowicz 2005). The proponents of the first thesis argue that the emergence of the critical Islam is to a large extent a reaction to the heightened intra-Islamic pluralism of the diaspora, which is increasingly valorized by Muslims in Europe, and that the main actors behind this development are young European Muslims 'dissatisfied with the Islam of their parents' (Mandaville 2004: 121) and highly skeptical about the ability of the 'ulama to re-articulate the Islamic tradition in the vernacular (ibid: 124). Its opponents, on the other hand, believe that the individualised Islam only rarely brings forth a 'critical discourse' and instead remains tightly linked to the 'dogmatic affirmation of immutable principles' (Roy 2002: 90). While the careful observation of processes within the Muslim communities seems to suggest that both theses are actually to some extent valid, further research on these issues is definitely needed.

Reflections on different features of Islam of immigrants and Islam of citizens (as well as the transition from the former to the latter, which are at the background of the new Muslim claims of difference and sameness), and although there is no European Islam yet, the processes of construction of such Islam especially in France and Britain are well advanced. Stefano Allievi is correct to argue that the European Muslim world is living through a process of extremely rapid transformation and that it will be of strategic interest to see how the process of restructuring of Muslim communities continues when they are no longer ethnic communities arriving from somewhere else (Allievi 2003). With the generational passage, Muslim communities are losing at least part of their ethnic features and identification with their countries of origin, but they are not autochthonous yet, at least not as communities. In France, Britain, Belgium and a few other European countries in which Muslims started to settle in large numbers in the 1950s and 1960s, the majority are however autochthonous, as they were born in Europe, and it is them who are most dynamically advancing changes within their religious communities and developing a distinctive French, British and Belgian way of living Islam.

	Islam of immigrants	Islam of citizens
Religion and Ethnicity	- Strong relationship	- Weakening relationship
Place of religion	- Mostly in the private sphere	- Increasingly in the public sphere
Character of religiosity	- Largely 'low Islam'	- Increasingly 'high Islam'

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END NOTES

50. Note the presence of Islam in this part of the continent is not completely a new phenomenon as Muslims ruled in Sicily (827-1091) and on Iberian Peninsula (711-1492) and have been living in (with interruptions) and travelling throughout the geographical region practically since the beginning of historical Islam itself. (see for example Lapidus 1988: 378 – 389 or Fletcher 1998)

51. Sayad famously emphasized that the sociology of migration must start, not from the receiving society, but from the structure and contradictions of the sending communities or that the sociology of immigration cannot do without the sociology of emigration.

52. I use the category of 'geographical contact' so as not to confuse it with other channels of communication through which the Muslim immigrants, as well as, Muslim citizens keep themselves informed about the situations in different parts of the Muslim world. This translocal politcs is analysed in depth by Peter Mandaville in his 'Transnational Muslim Politics: Re-imaging the Umma' (2004).

53. Both terms are used in the sense given them by Pierre Bourdieu (1986) that is as "long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; individual's 'culture' or 'cultivation' assimilated or acquired over a long period" (embodied cultural capital p. 243-245), and as "educational qualifications" (institutionalized cultural capital p. 248).

54. Here it has to stressed that being a Muslim does not necessarily imply that a certain person is a devout believer. On different ways of being a Muslim see for example Maréchal 2003: 5-18 or Pedziwiatr 2007: 42-45.

55. By 'sacralisation' it is meant after Hans Mal "the process by means of which man has pre-eminently safeguarded and reinforced this complex of orderly interpretations of reality, rules, and legitimations" (Mol 1976: 15)

56. This role of religion in reinforcing ethnic boundaries have been also noticed by researchers studying non-Muslim immigrant communities (See Marzec 1998 or Rutledge 1985).

57. In Islam of citizens this has been considerably changing inter alia as a result of the accession of the young people born in Europe to the position of leadership in mosques and community centres.

58. This has been done particularly often by young Muslim women who strive to redefine the role of woman within the highly patriarchal Muslim communities (P_dziwiatr 2006).

59. A French slang term for a descendant of immigrants of North African origin living in France, Belgium or Spain. The word is a reversal of the word "Arab".

60. For this reason Panafit has pointed out that at this period (the 1970s) one had to do in Belgium with 'Islam without Muslims' (2003: 60)

61. On average there are no more than 10 percent of purpose-build mosques in Europe. (see Peach 2000, Gale and Nylor 2002)

62. Barelwis are named after a village in India where the sect's founder Ahmad Raza Khan was born. Their teachings combine the fundamental tenets of Islam with the teaching of the international Sufi Orders. Their members for example believe in intercession with God through pirs - holy men - both living and dead. In this tradition the person of the prophet Muhammad is extremely important. The great veneration for the Prophet Muhammad among the Barelwis is, inter alia, based on the belief in his miraculous powers. More information about Barelwis and other Muslim movements in the UK see for example Rex 1991 .

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The Jama'ati-Ikhwani Traditions in British-Based Islamic Organisations

Rosa Álvarez Fernández

Since the tragic events of September 11, the Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 London tube attacks, we have witnessed the move from casting blame on Islam as a religion to blaming Islam as an ideology of political violence. Similar neo-orientalist[63] perceptions and constructions of Islamism[64] in the Muslim World have been applied to the Islamic tenets of Muslim organisations in Britain, belonging to the Muslim Council of Britain[65], the so called pro-Jama'ati-Islami (Mawdudist) and pro-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) networks. Among these are the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE), Da'watul Islam, Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), Young Muslims UK (YMUK), Young Muslim Organisation UK (YMO UK), Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), British Muslim Initiative (BMI) and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS). Behind the accusation of not doing enough to tackle Muslim extremism and in defending Western values lies the assumption that their Jama'ati-Ikhwani credentials are in themselves extremist and encourage violent radicalism.

At the same time the discourse on "good Muslim and bad Muslim"[66] is taking place in Britain. Accordingly, the Islam of the MCB is portrayed as an anomalous and exogenous Islam, mere appendance of the "islamist malady" affecting the Muslim world, versus the natural and authentic British Islam of the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC)[67], because of its apolitical attitude. If in the colonial discourse of the nineteenth century traditional Sufi-oriented Islam was perceived as backward and irrational, the cause of stagnation and the main obstacle to modernity, surprisingly in the 21st century, the West has re-discovered this branch of Islam not just as the only vehicle for integration of Muslims in British society but also as the panacea for all existing troubles between Islam and the West.

This battle for true Islam in Britain entails old Western anxieties, distrust and fears. The simple invocation of, or reference to, the Jama'ati-Ikhwani influences came together with the distortion of Islam and the connection with terrorism, despite the fact that in their long and diverse trajectories in the Muslim World, they have demonstrated strongly a stance against violence and a commitment to a reformist approach using political means. Nevertheless, these intellectual and cultural affiliations of some British Muslims organisations to the Jama'at-e-Islami and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun are viewed as sinister and coded strategy to "infiltrate" Europe – ultimately seeking the conquest and Islamisation of Europe as a whole[68]. Indeed, this contemporary account shows an interesting resemblance to the mediaeval narrative of the Arab hordes invading Spain and threatening the "supposed" genuine European Christian roots. The purpose of this false dichotomy is to establish the validity and legitimacy of traditional Islam versus the invalidity and illegitimacy of Islamism and therefore the refusal to accept them as part and parcel of Islam in Britain.

Studies carried out recently have validated the relevance of the Ikhwani and the Jama'ati traditions in Britain as an intellectual source to providing guidance and the intellectual underpinning for British Muslims to be active in their commitment to civic society and shared values. They not only intermingled in the Muslim world but also in Britain, where both ideological influ-

ences are being developed and contextualised.[69] However, the recognition of these inspirations and values does imply neither the existence of an organisational link nor a strict following of the religious and ideological tenets, political agenda and modes of activism of the mother organisations in the Muslim World, which in themselves are very diverse in approaches according the their specific contexts.

Islamism, as another symbolic framework encompassing identity and culture, socioeconomics and politics, is changing and constantly undergoing adjustments and modifications according to the specific political and socio-economic realities of the British society. In this process, ideological frames of the Jama'ati-Ikhwani traditions in Britain are being re-interpreted with new connotations, whilst others are rendered irrelevant or dated according to[70] specific and different approaches that define these organisations.

A deep interest and a constant thread can be ascertained within these organisations creating greater awareness and rescuing the Islamic heritage, considered a cornerstone of a self-perceived "awakening"[71]. This can be observed when glancing at the numerous educational and training activities provided by these organisations where alongside Arabic language, Tafsir, Shari'a, Fiqh, and classical Islamic History, focus is placed on modern and intellectual, cultural, religious and socio-political ramifications of Islamism as a living phenomenon.

However, the publication and dissemination of the works of Al-Banna, Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Al-Ghazzali, Al-Qaradawi among other thinkers – give rise to strong suspicions in some sections of the British society. By depicting them as "foreign" and dismissing them as "godfathers of terror", the vast, diverse and rich works of these figures are criminalised and condemned in blanket fashion.

Here, two interrelated acts of denial are at work. First, Muslims are denied the process inherent in all civilisations, of re-reading, adapting and re-elaborating their cultural traditions. Secondly, in this ethnocentric vision the West and the Muslim World are essentially made into separated entities, not subjected to cultural osmosis. Paradoxically, the West finds it very valid and legitimate to export its ideas and values (as it has been the case since the major "encounter" in the 19th century), such as nationalism, secularism, Marxism, Western life-styles, technologies and so on in the Muslim World. However the same West is unable to stomach cultural permeation from others. Moreover, if we are still at pains to fully accept the heritage of Al-Andalus (Andalucia) and the fruitful transfer of classical Islamic culture to Europe, how are we going to accept the modern and contemporary Islamist influences that could be a part of the cultural European landscape?

Ironically, if the emergence of Islamism in the Muslim world was a reaction and a response to foreign colonial domination and to the repressive and exclusive nature of the post-colonial nation-state, in Britain the revitalisation of this tradition has been forged as an important element in the crystallisation of the British Muslim identity in response to national and international issues. On the international level, the neo-colonial enterprise inaugurated with the "New International Order" in the First Gulf War. At the European level, the Bosnian conflict, the Rushdie Affair and the problems of isolation, racism, discrimination and socio-economic disadvantages of the neo-liberal era inaugurated by Margaret Thatcher and continued by Blair's New Labour. Thus the long standing tradition of anti-imperialism and socio-political involvement in domestic issues have been transferred by British Muslim citizens from the "colonized" Muslim world to the "colonial" metropolis, as part of their cultural resources to engage with British domestic and foreign policies.

These perspectives illuminate strong presence of three inter-related symbols of Islamism[72], belonging to Jama'ati- Ikhwani traditions through the British-based Islamic organisations. "Islam as a way of life", Islamic Social Justice" and Islam as the middle, balanced path or "al-Wasatiyya", reinvented to respond to both the international and national challenges experienced by British Muslims. The all encompassing Islamic way of life derives from the Qutbi-

Mawdudi concept of a dynamic and active Islam (haraki and 'amali), derived from the Qur'an, the Shari'a and Islamic Fiqh. This spirit imbued in Muslim organisations brings about, in turn, a set of correlations: the interconnectivity between acts of worship "ibadaat" and social relations "mu'amalaat", between faith and practical life, and the translation of religious beliefs into social action. Within this notion of an Islam "applicable" in the daily lives of Muslims, "Shari'a", the straight path, can not be simply reduced to the law of the state, nor the penal or private but a broad code of ethics and moral principles which vertebrate and instruct all aspects of one's life. This extends from the individual relations with God and the spiritual development "tazkiyya", connected to "tarbiya" – the comprehensive cultural formation and education of Muslims, helping them to interact in the different realms of society including political, social and economical.

What is the intersection of Islam and politics in these Muslim organisations that raises so many fears? Indeed it is not a rigid ideological system with a political manifesto based on what is seen from outside as the fusion, in the sense of confusion, of religion and politics. The more salient features are the interest in and the exercise of politics that Muslims see as an inseparable dimension of the human being and the notion of a citizen politically aware and socially engaged. If, in this sense, Islamism is about political activism seeking changes in existing policies in the national and international arena, is this Islamic perspective of the MAB and the BMI, by essence, confrontationally opposite to the secular perspective of the concept "Homo politicus" which vertebrates the political activism of Stop the War Coalition?

"Social Justice" is probably one of the pivotal old frames in Islamism, sophisticatedly elaborated by Sayyid Qutb in the pre-confrontation phase with the Nasserist-state against the background of the interrelated issues of colonialism and capitalism. All the Islamic organisations in Britain inspired by the Jama'ati-Ikhwani traditions, view social justice as Qutb understood it, as a comprehensive concept encompassing social, economic, educational and political issues. Young Muslims point out to mutual responsibility in society, equality of all citizens, freedom of religious consciousness and individual and collective wellbeing. Moreover, when these Muslim organisations explain their support and cooperation with "Respect" or the "old Labour" political activists, they bring the frame of social justice as the common ground.

Islamism,…is changing and constantly undergoing adjustments and modifications

From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand the socio-political activism and involvement of leaders of the IFE, YMO UK, ISB and YMUK in social work to combat Muslim ghettos with high unemployment rate, educational underachievement, drug abuse and crime. British Muslims do not necessarily find contradictions between the principles of Islam and British liberalism, social democracy and leftist postulates, regarding their modes of "contentious politics". This extends to their critique of capitalism and neo-liberalism and the adherence to the tenets of the welfare system, against the retreat of the state, the privatisation of public services, education and heath care, and in favour of a more just taxation according to income and a fairer redistribution of national wealth.

Interestingly, "al-Wasatiyya", the social project based on civilisational Islam, "Islam al-Hadhari", believed to be coined in Egypt by a group of intellectuals led by Al-Qaradawi[73] and Muhammad Al-Ghazzali, have arrived and rooted in Britain. The twin objectives of these "New Islamists"[74] was on the one hand, to tackle extremism and violence among the Egyptian youth trapped between state violence and the unofficial violence of some Islamic groups, by looking into the causes of extremism. On the other, it was a response to the increasing Egyptian polarisation between Islamists and secularists.

Since 2001, the project of "moderate Islam"

has been successfully adopted in Britain by the MCB to counteract the literalist salafi-jihadi reading by some young Muslims and to empower their associations in order to democratically channel youth frustrations in the socio-economic, political and cultural-identity spheres. However, like in the Muslim Word, the project of revival entails not only the irradiation of an enlightened Islam but also a close examination of the political roots of the phenomenon. From this perspective, we have to understand the assumed responsibility of these Muslim associations towards extremism and the critique of British foreign policy.

The three cultural frames which could have been elaborated in the Muslim world to establish the incompatibility of Islam and the West in terms of an indigenous system versus an imported and alien one, traced in the British context, reveals that Islamist tenets are not fully at odds with secularism, democracy and Western values.

To fully understand the nature of the Muslim organisations in Britain, it is necessary that the West accepts the legitimate right of British Muslims to re-elaborate and incorporate the broad Jama'ati-Ikhwani tradition and the positive intellectual legacy of the great figures of the Islamic movements into their own cultural spaces. In turn, it implies the acceptance of the diverse manifestations of Islam: as a religion that belongs to the private sphere with its spiritual-mystical dimension and its secularised trend as well as an identity-cultural and socio-political phenomenon.

All these manifestations must be seen as valid strategies for the integration and as complementary parts of the vast tree of the Islamic heritage. They are open to serious debate and criticism without stereotypical assumptions about an inherently irrational and violent Islamism. Ultimately, this means the importance of recognising that theses multi-vocal heritages will be part and parcel of the future of Islam in Europe and therefore an integral component of the European civilisation.

END NOTES

63. If Orientalism, coined by E. Said, refers to a cultural and political phenomenon whereby the production of knowledge about the Middle East, Islam and Muslims was used to justify Colonialism, Neo-orientalism refers nowadays to the continuity of these discourses on Islam and Islamism as essentialist, monolithic and anomalous phenomena, which still serves as an instrument of political power.

64. Islamism is not just the politicization and ideologization of religion or "Political Islam", but a more complex phenomenon entailing also the adherence to Islam as a source of identity and culture. See the excellent studies by François Burgat on Islamism.

65. The academic field has shown great deal of maturity in the study of Islam in Britain by contrast to sectors of policymakers, mass media, intellectuals and terrorist experts.

66. Expression taken from Mahmud Mamdani referring to pro and anti America Muslims.

67. SMC was launched in 2006 with the backing of the British government in order to counteract the MCB by putting in question its representation and credibility among Muslims. They claim to represent the spiritual, mystical and apolitical branch of Islam in opposition to what they consider the extremist Political Islam of the MCB.

68. Whine, Michael "The Advance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK" Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 2 (Hudson Institute, September 12, 2005); Lorenzo Vidino "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe". Middle East Quarterly Winter 2005; Winston Pickett and Mark Gardner "the Book and the Sword: the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe" Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia Today Institute for Jewish Policy Research London 2005

69. Anthony McRoy From Rushdie to 7/7: the Radicalization of Islam in Britain (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2006)

70. See constructivist approaches to ideology in the works of Fred Halliday and James Galvin

71. Awakening understood as the expression of the renaissance and revitalization of Islam in the Muslim world since the seventies but intellectually rooted in the XIX century. It has been applied to the re-discovered of Islam by British Muslims, as a powerful cultural identity re-affirmation to face contemporary challenges. It emerged with the institutionalization process in the 80s and 90s and has taken new impetus since 11/S.

72. Abu Rabi', Ibrahim, The Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (New York: State University New York Press, 1996)

73. See the seminal book of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening: between Rejection and Extremism (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, Second Revised Edition 1991)

74. See the in-depth study about this trend in Raymond William Baker, Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Harvard University Press, 2003)

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The Politics of Anti-Muslim Racism

Arun Kundnani

Speaking at a Fabian Society conference in January 2006, Gordon Brown announced that he would make the re-articulation of 'Britishness' the guiding idea of any future premiership. In the past, he argued Britishness could be taken for granted as an authentic feeling of belonging but now, it needed the State to intervene to positively produce a new sense of nationhood. Being sure about what it meant to be British would help the nation 'champion democracy' globally and be a 'beacon' for freedom, while domestically it would allow a better response to the issues of asylum and immigration and improve community relations. The 7/7 terrorist attacks, he added, highlighted the need for more integration in British society. Britain therefore, needed to rediscover from history the 'golden thread' of shared values that binds it together: liberty, responsibility and fairness. There needed to be a new emphasis on this national story in the teaching of history in schools and a Britishness day should be introduced in which these shared values should be celebrated. Behind the podium from which Brown delivered his speech, a flag pole help up the Union Jack.

The noun 'Britishness' has only entered the political lexicon relatively recently but it has come to be seen as central to the future of the centre Left, a fact reflected in the Fabian Society's decision to dedicate a conference to the subject. British nationality had historically been complicated both by the absence of a clear idea of what it meant to be a citizen of Britain and by the fact that it was a State made up of multiple nations (England, Scotland and Wales). However, New Labour's politics of national identity harboured no ambition to genuinely reform Britain's obscure sense of citizenship through the introduction of a codified framework of rights and obligations. Neither could national identity any longer be, as conservatives had traditionally held, a reflection of a singular unchanging ethnicity. Rather, the new conventional wisdom is that a set of 'core values' is the glue that must hold Britishness together. According to this 'third way on identity', it was now vital that a 'national story' be developed by the State to bind the nation together. That national story had to show how a set of core values were embedded in what it meant to be British and new symbols were needed with which the State could celebrate Britishness defined in this way. These core values would also be the mechanism by which limits could be set on multiculturalism, while allegiance to these values would be a factor in assessing the merits of different categories of migration as well as a necessary condition for the settlement of immigrants.

It has long been the contention of those on the right of British politics that cultural diversity is a threat to national cohesion and security. For the New Right ideologues of the 1980s, a non-white presence in Britain was conditional on its assimilating to a national culture, which they took to be an unchanging set of norms running through the history of English political life. It was no surprise to find right-wing newspaper columnists advocating a new emphasis on assimilation after 7/7, calling on the Government to 'tear into those Muslim ghettos' and to 'acculturate' Muslims to 'our way of life'. Like many others, Melanie Phillips in the Daily Mail blamed a 'lethally divisive' multiculturalism, while Anthony Browne of The Times thought that political correctness had 'allowed the creation of alienated Muslim ghettoes which produce young men who commit mass murder against their fellow citizens'.

However, since the riots in Oldham, Burnley

and Bradford in the summer of 2001 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks shortly afterwards, cultural diversity has been attacked equally vigorously by liberals and by those on the centre Left. They have argued that an over-tolerance of cultural diversity has allowed Asians in northern towns to 'self-segregate', resulting in violent tensions on the streets of Britain. They have argued that public confidence in the welfare state is being undermined by the presence in Britain of immigrants of a different culture. And they have argued that multiculturalism has encouraged Muslims to separate themselves and live by their own values, resulting in extremism, and ultimately, the fostering of a mortal home-grown terrorist threat. As a leading liberal commentator Hugo Young wrote, soon after 9/11, multiculturalism 'can now be seen as a useful bible for any Muslim who insists that his religio-cultural priorities, including the defence of jihad against America, override his civic duties of loyalty, tolerance, justice and respect for democracy'.

Since 2001, therefore, the existing right-wing critics of multiculturalism have found new allies from the centre and left of the political spectrum; all agree that 'managing' cultural diversity is at the root of many of the key problems facing British society.

Furthermore, in the cacophony of voices that make up this new media-driven 'integration debate', it is Muslims who are routinely singled out: it is their cultural difference which needs limits placed on it; it is they who must subsume their cultural heritage within 'Britishness'; it is they who must declare their allegiance to (ill-defined) British values. By 2004, the liberal intelligentsia as a whole seemed to have abandoned its earlier tolerance of cultural diversity and adopted this new 'integrationism', which redefined integration as effectively, assimilation to British values rather than, as Roy Jenkins had stated in 1966, 'equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'. A coterie of New Labour-friendly intellectuals and commentators, such as David Goodhart of Prospect magazine and Trevor Phillips, former Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, acted as outriders for this new position. After 7/7, integrationist demands reached a new intensity. Trevor Phillips spoke of Britain as 'sleepwalking to segregation'. Tolerance of diversity, he argued, had led to isolated communities, 'in which some people think special separate values ought to apply'. The response to 7/7, he added, ought to be a reminder of 'what being British is about'.

It mattered little that segregation, in those parts of Britain where it existed, such as Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, was not the result of a liberal over-emphasis on diversity but an interaction between industrial decline, 'white flight' and institutional racism. After 2001, that history had been forgotten and its causality reversed so that it was 'Muslims' who were held responsible for refusing to mix, while 'multiculturalism' was blamed for allowing their 'self-segregation'. A new doctrine of 'community cohesion' was introduced which focused on the need to integrate Muslims. Thereafter, individual and institutional racisms which remained the principal barriers to the creation of a genuinely cohesive society, received little attention. The integrationists made much of the need to correct the errors of an earlier politics of ethnic difference. But rather than challenging the underlying assumptions of that politics, they merely reversed its one-sidedness. Whereas the politics of ethnic difference held that any kind of solidarity automatically diluted ethnic identity, the politics of integrationist held that any kind of ethnic identity undermined solidarity. Both shared the dystopian and dangerous New Right assumption that there was a necessary trade-off between solidarity and diversity and neither could imagine how solidarity and diversity could co-exist.

The same assumption encouraged the thesis of a slippery slope from segregation to extremism to terrorism, which was widely accepted despite its inconsistency with the actual biographies of terrorists. Of those involved in terrorism who grew up in Britain, most have lived lives that involved a large degree of interaction with people from other backgrounds and seemed to have been comfortable in the mixed neighbourhoods where they lived. Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the 7/7 bombers, was a gradu-

ate who mixed freely with fellow teachers and students from all backgrounds at the primary school in Leeds where he worked. Friends described him as 'Anglicised'. Khan's accomplice, Shehzhad Tanweer, helped his father in his fish and chip shop in a mixed area of Leeds. Omar Khan Sharif, who attempted to detonate a bomb in a Tel Aviv bar in 2003, was educated at a private school in Derbyshire. The most plausible explanation for these individuals' actions is a sense of injustice that morphed into an apocalyptic and pathological form through the ideology of global jihad. There is no doubt that part of the appeal of that ideology is its MAnchaean vision of a 'them and us' militancy. However, those whose lives are rigidly divided on racial or religious lines do not seem to be any more or less susceptible to it than those whose lives are more mixed. There is no reason to believe that the reach of this ideology is somehow linked to ethnic segregation.

In short, a whole raft of problems to do with segregation, immigration and terrorism are lumped together and misdiagnosed by the integrationists as resulting from an 'excess' of cultural diversity. This integrationist agenda is now increasingly not only a pre-occupation of New Labour but also of David Cameron's Conservative Party. 'We need to re-assert faith in our shared British values which help guarantee stability, tolerance and civility', Cameron said in 2005. He added that teaching history, especially in relation to empire, should avoid politically correct criticisms of empire so that all children are taught to be proud of British history and values.

The fault line of this new agenda is the perceived incompatibility between British society and Muslim communities in which supposedly alien values are embedded. While the anti-terrorist legislation of the 'war on terror' institutionalised anti-Muslim racism in the structures of the state, integrationism has normalised an anti-Muslim political culture. This anti-Muslim discourse in Britain preceded 9/11 and emerged, in particular, in the wake of the Rushdie affair. It was the same discourse that Edward Said spoke of as based on 'an unquestioned assumption that Islam can be characterised limitlessly by means of a handful of recklessly general and repeatedly deployed clichés'. Since 9/11, however, it has become a regular refrain from high-profile 'muscular liberal' columnists such as Rod Liddle, Niall Ferguson and Melanie Phillips, who harangue Muslims for a supposed failure to share in the values around which Britishness is thought to coalesce: sexual equality, tolerance, freedom of speech and the rule of law. Without confronting this reality, they suggest Europe faces a gradual 'Islamicisation' as increasing Muslim immigration creates Islamic ghettoes across the continent. The new integrationists of the Left rarely challenge such views and start from the same point – the perception that there is a threat from Muslim values embedded in 'alien' communities. Their only difference with the Right is that, whereas the Right is pessimistic about the possibilities of absorbing this alien population into modern Britain, the Left integrationists feel that Muslims can be assimilated through suitably aggressive policies.

This anti-Muslim political culture has very little to do with the ways in which Muslims actually live their lives or practise their faith. The complexity of faith identity and the different levels on which it operates, comprising belief, practice and affiliation, is easily belittled. Nor is there a recognition of the multi-faceted identity that a British Muslim citizen of Pakistani heritage, for example, holds in which faith, heritage and cultures are separable and potentially conflicting. Instead, to be 'Muslim' in the 'war on terror' is to belong to a group with common origins, a shared culture and a monolithic identity that can be held collectively responsible for terrorism, segregation and the failure of multicultural Britain.

The 'Muslim community' becomes effectively an ethnicity rather than a group sharing a religion. Politicians and journalists often confuse religious and ethnic categories by referring to relations between 'Muslims' and 'whites', as if one is the opposite of the other. At the same time, anti-Muslim sentiment rationalises itself as no more than criticism of an 'alien' belief system – hostility to religious beliefs rather than to a racial group – and therefore entirely distinct from racism.

However, such distinctions are undermined by the fact that religious belonging has come to act as a symbol of racial difference. The new official language of 'faith communities' largely takes faith to be, like race, a destiny set at birth and something that someone can observe about you from your appearance. There is a truth to this of course faith is not just a matter of private contemplation but also to do with belonging to a community, which more often than not one joins at birth and identifiable through distinctive forms of dress. Nonetheless, in blurring the distinction between faith and ethnicity the already impoverished language for describing racial, ethnic and cultural differences is further deprived of substance.

The model for this kind of racial ideology is modern European anti-Semitism. The twentieth century European anti-Semites hated Jews, not because of their lack of Christian religious beliefs, but because they were like Muslims today regarded as an alien intrusion into the national homogeneity that modern Europeans sought. No matter how much they integrated themselves into gentile society, they continued to be perceived as a threat to a cohesive national identity because their affiliation to a trans-national religious identity had become the marker of a racial difference. Today, a similar exaggerated dividing line between an 'alien' Islamic identity and modern Britishness serves as the basis for dividing communities into fixed, immutable 'natural' identities – the hallmarks of a process of racism. Those who were once abused as 'Pakis' are now also abused as 'Muslims'. What had before been interpreted as a problem of Asians living in separate cultures has, since 9/11, been taken to be a problem of Muslims living by separate values. The solution to these problematic values is always found to lie in the use of coercive force by the State indicating that they have been made into symbols of racial difference and that those groups who are perceived as holding them are not being accorded their own rationality and citizenship.

The role of the State's own policies and pronouncements under the banner of the 'war on terror' is crucial in legitimising this anti-Muslim Racism. While the State's official language of race relations prohibits hostility to persons defined by their (say, Pakistani) ethnicity, the language of the 'war on terror' legitimises hostility to the same persons defined by their Muslim faith. What is being produced are new stigmatising discourses that bypass and undermine existing structures of official acceptability. The shift in perceptions brought about by this process has been felt intensely and immediately by British Muslims in their everyday interactions, not just in terms of an increase in physical and verbal abuse but also in the way that a whole set of mistaken integrationist assumptions about their very presence in Britain is now aired publicly. People who had been British citizens, occasionally labelled 'coloured', 'black' or 'Pakistani', are now an 'enemy within'. Every Muslim in Britain has come to be perceived as a potential terrorist and has had to explain themselves to the rest of the country, as if what happened on 9/11 was somehow their doing. Ultimately, the impact of this stigmatising discourse is to be measured in the numbers of racially motivated attacks. Reported racist attacks on Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim increased six fold in the weeks after 7/7, and in all eight Muslim men have been killed in racist attacks in Britain since 9/11. The anti-Muslim dimension to such attacks is often overt: the gang of youths who murdered a Pakistani man, Kamal Raza Butt, in Nottingham just days after 7/7 taunted him with the word 'Taliban' during the attack.

Extract from 'The End of Tolerance: racism in 21st-century Britain' by Arun Kundnani, published by Pluto Press (see www.endoftolerance.com).

Arun Kundnani is a commentator and activist on issues to do with racism, immigration and multiculturalism in the UK. He is deputy editor of the journal Race & Class, published by the Institute of Race Relations.

FREE MEDIA & PUBLIC RELATIONS TRAINING

For Young Muslims

The Muslim Media Empowerment Project (joint initiative of The Cordoba Foundation and Tower Hamlets council) is offering a series of free professional media courses to young Muslims in Tower Hamlets. Individuals trained through these courses will be expected to help local organisations and Mosques by offering voluntary media guidance and liaison

REGISTRATION

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Saturday 19 January 2008

Practical training on how to react and proactively engage with the media

TRAINER: Andrew Carapiet has worked on the BBC's Six O'clock and Nine O'clock News with Michael Buerk and Peter Sissons also worked with late Jill Dando.

MEDIA INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES

Tuesday 5 February 2008

Practice radio, press and TV interviews in front of a camera with microphone analysis and professional feedback.

TRAINER 1: Ernie Rea, a full-time broadcaster (incl. 'Beyond Belief' on Radio 4), headed a government-commissioned project to look into reporting of the Burnley and Oldham disturbances in the summer of 2001.

TRAINER 2: Gaynor Vaughan-Jones is a media professional of more than 25 years, especially in freelance radio and television production. Both Ernie and Gaynor trained representatives from The King's Fund, Lancashire Council of Mosques, UK Skills, Barclays Bank, Muslim Hands, Free Trade and others.

MARKETING & PUBLIC RELATIONS

Saturday 16 February 2008

Basic skills of marketing, to engage effectively with the media and create business opportunities.

TRAINER: Geoff Deehan has over 3 decades of broadcasting experience, now helping the Third Sector to work more effectively with the media.

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