

# Collaborative Planning with Privacy

Protocol eXchange

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# Context

- Many examples of collaboration
  - Between distributor and retailer
  - Between hospitals and insurance companies
  - Distributed databases
  - Social networking sites (MySpace, Facebook)
- *Temporary* alignment of interests
- Information sharing is necessary to collaborate, but full disclosure is not desired.

# Our Work

- We provide a model of collaboration at an abstract level.
- We can model a large class of collaborations while being able to make conclusions about privacy.
- Focus is on the interplay between protecting and releasing information.

# Our Work

- We draw on
  - Planning from AI literature
  - State transition systems and multiset rewriting
- We consider systems with well-balanced actions
- It is PSPACE-complete to decide the existence of a collaborative plan, and if the system preserves the privacy of all agents.


# Outline

- Motivations from Classical Planning
- Our formalism: Local state transition systems
- Privacy in collaboration
- Complexity results and foundation in logic
- Related and future work

# Classical Planning

- A robot manipulating its environment
- Description of the environment
  - Objects
  - Relations between the objects
- Actions
- Initial configuration
- Goal configuration

# Initial State




{*ONTABLE(A),  
ON(B,A), CLEAR(B),  
ONTABLE(C),  
CLEAR(C),  
HANDEEMPTY*}

# Actions

- $\text{take}(x)$ :  $\{\text{HANDEEMPTY}, \text{CLEAR}(x), \text{ONTABLE}(x)\}$   
→  $\{\text{HOLDS}(x)\}$
- $\text{remove}(x,y)$ :  $\{\text{ON}(x,y), \text{HANDEEMPTY}, \text{CLEAR}(x)\}$   
→  $\{\text{HOLDS}(x), \text{CLEAR}(y)\}$
- $\text{stack}(x,y)$ :  $\{\text{HOLDS}(x), \text{CLEAR}(y)\}$   
→  $\{\text{HANDEEMPTY}, \text{CLEAR}(x), \text{ON}(x,y)\}$
- $\text{put}(x)$ :  $\{\text{HOLDS}(x)\}$   
→  $\{\text{ONTABLE}(x), \text{CLEAR}(x), \text{HANDEEMPTY}\}$

# Blocks World: Plan



`remove(B,A)`

`put(B)`

`take(A)`

`stack(A,C)`

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# Collaboration and Planning

- Multiple agents:  $A_1, \dots, A_n$
- Each has private data  $P_A(t)$  and public data  $P'(u)$
- Each has a set of actions
- Initial state
- Goal state
- Find a sequence of actions leading from initial state to goal state

# Local State Transition Systems

- A local state transition system is a triplet

$T = (\Sigma, I, R_T)$  where

- $\Sigma$  is a signature of predicate symbols and terms  
(currently only constants and variables)
- $I$  is a set of agents
- $R_T$  is a set of (local) actions

# Local State Transition Systems

- A *fact* is a closed atomic predicate over multi-sorted terms
- A syntactic convention distinguishes between private and public facts:


Private

$P_A(t)$

Public/Group

$P'(u)$

# Security Labels



# System Configurations

- A state or configuration of the system is a multiset of private and public facts

$$X_{A_1}, X_{A_2}, \dots, X_{A_n}, X'$$

- Each agent can affect only their own private data and the public data.

# Actions

- Replace  $X_A$  and  $X'$  by  $Y_A$  and  $Y'$

$$r : X_A X' \rightarrow_A Y_A Y'$$

Transforms  $W = V X_A X'$  into  $U = V Y_A Y'$

- System transformation is written as

$$W \xrightarrow[r]{} U$$

- Reachability from a set  $R$  of actions is denoted by

$$W \xrightarrow[R^*]{} U$$

# Partial Goals

- The goal need not describe the complete configuration.
- Partial reachability is defined by

$$W \stackrel{\bar{A}}{R}^* Z \quad \text{iff} \quad W \stackrel{\mathbb{B}}{R}^* ZU \text{ for some } U$$

So with  $r : X_A X' \rightarrow_A Y_A Y'$  we find that

$$UX_A X' \stackrel{\bar{A}}{r} Y_A Y'$$

# Collaborative Plans

A collaborative plan based on the action set  $R$  which leads from  $W$  to the partial goal  $Z$  is a labeled, non-branching tree satisfying:

- Edges are labeled with actions from  $R$ , and nodes are labeled with states
- The label of each node enables the label of the outgoing edge
- The label of the root is  $W$
- The label of the leaf is  $ZU$  for some  $U$

There exists a collaborative plan based on  $R$ , leading from  $W$  to the partial goal  $Z$  if and only if  $W \stackrel{*}{\rightarrow}_R Z$

# Abstract Example

- Alice's actions include

$$r_1 : P_A(t) \rightarrow_A P_A(t)P'(t')$$

$$r_2 : P_A(t) \rightarrow_A P_A(t)P''(t'')$$

- Bob's actions include

$$r_3 : Q_B(u)Q'(v)P'(t')P''(t'') \rightarrow_B Q_B(t)Q'(v')$$

- When  $R = \{r_1, r_2, r_3\}$  then

$$P_A(t)Q_B(u)Q'(v) \stackrel{\tilde{A}}{\sim}_R^* Q_B(t)$$

# An Example

## ■ Example:

$$\blacksquare r_1 : P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) \rightarrow_A$$

$$P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share)$$

$$\blacksquare r_2 : Q_B(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) \rightarrow_B Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$$

# An Example

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$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share)$$

# An Example

- Example:

- $r_1 : P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) \rightarrow_A$

$$P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share)$$

- $r_2 : Q_B(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) \rightarrow_B Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \cdot r_1$$

$$P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share)$$

# An Example

- Example:

- $r_1 : P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) \rightarrow_A$

$$P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share)$$

- $r_2 : Q_B(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) \rightarrow_B Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \cdot r_1$$

$$P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \cdot r_2$$

$$P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$$

# An Example

- Example:

- $r_1 : P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) \rightarrow_A P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share)$
- $r_2 : Q_B(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) \rightarrow_B Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$

$$\begin{array}{l}
 P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \xrightarrow{r_1} \\
 P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \xrightarrow{r_2} \\
 P_A(21\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)
 \end{array}$$

- In this case we see

$$\begin{array}{l}
 P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \\
 \xrightarrow{R^*} Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)
 \end{array}$$

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- Motivations from Classical Planning
- Our formalism: Local state transition systems
- *Privacy in collaboration*
- Complexity results and foundation in logic
- Related and future work

# Privacy Concerns

- If Alice starts with a secret term  $t$ , she wants to make sure it stays secret.
- Protect the secret from all possible behavior of other participants.
- Requires a global condition on reachable configurations.

# Privacy Condition

- Local state transition system in initial configuration  $W$ , protects the privacy of agent  $A$  if every term  $t$  which, in the initial configuration  $W$ , occurs only in private predicates of  $A$ , also occurs only in private predicates of  $A$  in any reachable configuration.
- Partial goals of the form  $Q'(t)$  or  $Q_B(t)$  are not reachable from the initial configuration.

# Remarks on Privacy

- Local state transition systems define a space of plans or protocols.
- Privacy condition is global condition on entire space.
- Other participants may be viewed as a type of adversary.
- Provides a guarantee that if others don't follow plan, or perform extra local computations then secrets are not revealed.

# Remarks on Privacy

- Can express notions of knowledge of *current* information.
- Alice's action may change her password, rendering the old password obsolete.
- Knowledge of old password without knowledge of current password may be useless.

# The Collaborative Planning Problem with Privacy

Given a local state transition system, and given an initial state  $W$  and a partial goal  $Z$ , does there exist a plan which leads from  $W$  to  $Z$ , and does the system protect the privacy of all agents?

# Well-Balanced Actions

- Actions are restricted to have the same number of facts in the pre- and post-conditions.
- Intuitively, actions serve to update fields and they do not create new ones.
- Introduce a special constant symbol to indicate an empty field:  $P(*)$
- Not as restrictive as it seems.

# Example Revisited

- Example:

- $r_1 : P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(*) \rightarrow_A$

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share)$$

- $r_2 : Q_B(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) \rightarrow_B Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd) P'(*)$

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(*) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \cdot r_1$$

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(8\_A\_Share) Q_B(7\_B\_Share) \cdot r_2$$

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(*) Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$$

- We still find that

$$P_A(15\_A\_Pwd) S_A(7\_B\_Share) P'(*) Q_B(7\_B\_Share)$$

$$\cdot R^* Q_B(15\_A\_Pwd)$$

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# Complexity Results

- The Collaborative Planning Problem with Privacy, with well-balanced actions, is **PSPACE-complete**.
  - It is polynomial with respect to the following parameters:
    - The size of a program recognizing the actions
    - The number of facts in the initial configuration
    - The number of closed facts in the (finite) signature

# Complexity Results

- For a *fixed* finite signature, the Collaborative Planning Problem with privacy, with well-balanced actions, is solvable in **polynomial time**.
  - It is polynomial with respect to the parameters:
    - The size of a program recognizing the actions
    - The number of facts in the initial configuration

(The number of closed facts in the signature is now viewed as a constant.)

# Logical Foundation

- **Linear logic** is a resource-sensitive refinement of traditional logic.
- Linear implication mimics actions well by “consuming” antecedents.
- We translate local state transition systems into a variant of linear logic called **affine logic**.

# Logical Foundation

- Theorem: Local state transition systems are sound and complete with respect to (our translation into) affine logic.
- Benefits include:
  - Possible insights from well established formalism
  - Use of already existing tools

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# Related Work

- **Multiset Rewriting and the Complexity of Bounded Security Protocols** [N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, A. Scedrov 2004]
- **A Linear Logic of Authorization and Knowledge** [D. Garg, L. Bauer, K. D. Bowers, F. Pfenning, M. K. Reiter 2006]
- **Security Policies and Security Models** [J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer '82]
- **Conditional Rewriting Logic as a Unified Model of Concurrency** [J. Meseguer '92]

# Related Work

- **Enforcing Robust Declassification and Qualified Robustness** [A. C. Myers, A. Sabelfeld, S. Zdancewic 2004]
- **ORCHESTRA: Rapid, Collaborative Sharing of Dynamic Data** [Z. G. Ives, N. Khandelwal, A. Kapur, M. Cakir 2005]

# Future Work

- Extend to a richer language of functional terms.
- Explore the use of existentials in affine logic to model fresh values.
- Investigate behavior in the presence of actions with nondeterministic effects.
- Determine if our formalism provides traceability.

# Future Work

- Investigate more completely the ability to distinguish between obsolete and current secrets.
- Explore the use of utility functions weighing the relative importance of protecting or releasing information.
- Explore a more complicated structure for security labels.

# Summary

- Introduced local state transition systems
- Discussed notions of privacy in collaboration
- Formalized the collaborative planning problem with privacy
- Determined PSPACE-completeness in the well-balanced case
- Discussed foundation in logic

Thank You!

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