A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

U.S. House of Representatives
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Report by the
Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response
to Hurricane Katrina


February 15, 2006. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
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TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO HURRICANE KATRINA

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DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, I submit herewith the committee’s report to the 109th Congress.

Tom Davis,
Chairman.
“Pandemonium did not reign. It poured.”

JOHN KENDRICK BANGS
American author and satirist

“Five frogs are sitting on a log. Four decide to jump off.
How many are left?
Answer: five.
Why? Because there’s a difference between deciding and doing.”

MARK L. FELDMAN and MICHAEL F. SPRATT
American businessmen
Five Frogs on a Log

“Don’t find a fault. Find a remedy.”

HENRY FORD
American automobile manufacturer

“Hurricane Katrina was a force of Nature.
What we’ve done after it is an Act of God.”

Banner hanging in Harrison County, MS, Emergency Operations Center

In-i-tia-tive, n.
The power or ability to begin or follow through energetically with a plan or task;
enterprise and determination.
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PREFACE

On September 15, 2005, the House of Representatives approved H. Res. 437, which created the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina ("the Select Committee").

According to the resolution, the Committee was charged with conducting "a full and complete investigation and study and to report its findings to the House not later than February 15, 2006, regarding— (1) the development, coordination, and execution by local, State, and Federal authorities of emergency response plans and other activities in preparation for Hurricane Katrina; and (2) the local, State, and Federal government response to Hurricane Katrina."

The Committee presents the report narrative and the findings that stem from it to the U.S. House of Representatives and the American people for their consideration. Members of the Select Committee agree unanimously with the report and its findings. Other Members of Congress who participated in the Select Committee’s hearings and investigation but were not official members of the Select Committee, while concurring with a majority of the report’s findings, have presented additional views as well, which we offer herein on their behalf.

First and foremost, this report is issued with our continued thoughts and prayers for Katrina’s victims. Their families. Their friends. The loss of life, of property, of livelihoods and dreams has been enormous. And we salute all Americans who have stepped up to the plate to help in any way they can.

It has been said civilization is a race between education and catastrophe. With Katrina, we have had the catastrophe, and we are racing inexorably toward the next. Americans want to know: what have we learned?

Two months before the Committee was established, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich testified before a Government Reform subcommittee about the need to move the government to an “entrepreneurial” model and away from its current “bureaucratic” model, so that we can get government to move with Information Age speed and effectiveness.

“Implementing policy effectively,” Speaker Gingrich said, “is ultimately as important as making the right policy.”

The Select Committee first convened on September 22, 2005, understanding, like Speaker Gingrich, that a policy that cannot be implemented effectively is no policy at all.

The Select Committee was created because, in the tragic aftermath of Katrina, America was again confronted with the vast divide between policy creation and policy implementation. With the life-and-death difference between theory and practice.

The Select Committee has spent much of the past five months examining the aftermath of this catastrophic disaster. It has become increasingly clear that local, state, and federal government agencies failed to meet the needs of the residents of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. It has been our job to figure out why, and to make sure we are better prepared for the future.

Our mandate was clear: gather facts about the preparation for and response to Katrina, at all levels of government.

Investigate aggressively, follow the facts wherever they may lead, and find out what went right and what went wrong. Ask why coordination and information sharing between local, state, and federal governments was so dismal.

• Why situational awareness was so foggy, for so long.
• Why all residents, especially the most helpless, were not evacuated more quickly.
• Why supplies and equipment and support were so slow in arriving.
• Why so much taxpayer money aimed at better preparing and protecting the Gulf coast was left on the table, unspent or, in some cases, misspent.
• Why the adequacy of preparation and response seemed to vary significantly from state to state, county to county, town to town.
• Why unsubstantiated rumors and uncritically repeated press reports – at times fueled by top officials – were able to delay, disrupt, and diminish the response.
• And why government at all levels failed to react more effectively to a storm that was predicted with unprecedented timeliness and accuracy.
We agreed early on that the task before us was too important for carping. This was not about politics. Katrina did not distinguish between Republicans and Democrats.

This was about getting the information we need to chart a new and better course for emergency preparation and response. The American people want the facts, and they’ve been watching. They alone will judge whether our review has been thorough and fair. Our final exam is this report.

Our report marks the culmination of 9 public hearings, scores of interviews and briefings, and the review of more than 500,000 pages of documents.

Our investigation revealed that Katrina was a national failure, an abdication of the most solemn obligation to provide for the common welfare. At every level – individual, corporate, philanthropic, and governmental – we failed to meet the challenge that was Katrina. In this cautionary tale, all the little pigs built houses of straw.

Of all we found along the timeline running from the fictional Hurricane Pam to the tragically real devastation along the Gulf coast, this conclusion stands out: A National Response Plan is not enough.

What’s needed is a National Action Plan. Not a plan that says Washington will do everything, but one that says, when all else fails, the federal government must do something, whether it’s formally requested or not. Not even the perfect bureaucratic storm of flaws and failures can wash away the fundamental governmental responsibility to protect public health and safety.

Still, no political storm surge from Katrina should be allowed to breach the sovereign boundaries between localities, states, and the federal government. Our system of federalism wisely relies on those closest to the people to meet immediate needs. But faith in federalism alone cannot sanctify a dysfunctional system in which DHS and FEMA simply wait for requests for aid that state and local officials may be unable or unwilling to convey. In this instance, blinding lack of situational awareness and disjointed decision making needlessly compounded and prolonged Katrina’s horror.

In many respects, our report is a litany of mistakes, misjudgments, lapses, and absurdities all cascading together, blinding us to what was coming and hobbling any collective effort to respond.

This is not to say there were not many, many heroes, or that some aspects of the preparation and response were not, by any standard, successful. We found many examples of astounding individual initiative that saved lives and stand in stark contrast to the larger institutional failures. Nor do we mean to focus on assigning individual blame. Obtaining a full accounting and identifying lessons learned does not require finger pointing, instinctively tempting as that may be.

There was also an element of simple bad luck with Katrina that aggravated the inadequate response. The hurricane arrived over a weekend, at the end of the month. People on fixed incomes had little money for gas or food or lodging, making them more likely to remain in place and wait for their next check. Communicating via television or radio with families enmeshed in their weekend routines was difficult at best, as was finding drivers and other needed volunteers.

Over the past several months, we have become more than familiar with the disaster declaration process outlined in the Stafford Act. We understand the goals, structure and mechanisms of the National Response Plan. We’ve digested the alphabet soup of “coordinating elements” established by the Plan: the HSOC (Homeland Security Operations Center) and RRCC (Regional Response Coordination Center); JFOs (Joint Field Offices) and PFOs (Principal Federal Officials); the IIMG (Interagency Incident Management Group); and much more.

But the American people don’t care about acronyms or organizational charts. They want to know who was supposed to do what, when, and whether the job got done. And if it didn’t get done, they want to know how we are going to make sure it does the next time.

This report is a story about the National Response Plan, and how its 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) were implemented with Katrina. We offer details on how well the ESFs were followed. Where there were problems, we’ve asked why. Where even flawless execution led to unacceptable results, we’ve returned to questioning the underlying plan.

We should be clear about the limitations of our investigation and the parameters of this report. We focused on the preparation for and response to Katrina, for the most part paring down the timeline to one week before and two weeks after the storm. We did not, at
least intentionally, delve into important, longer-term rebuilding and recovery issues that will continue to have a central place on the congressional agenda for months and years to come. In many areas — housing, education, health, contracting — “response” bleeds into “recovery,” and the distinctions we’ve made are admittedly difficult and somewhat arbitrary.

Further, this report is only a summary of our work. We are hopeful that – indeed, certain that – more information will arise. The Select Committee has constrained its narrative and findings to those that can shed the most light, make the biggest difference, and trigger the most obvious near-term actions. Readers will note that we focus considerable attention on a handful of “key events” – evacuation plans and the execution of them; conditions and events at the Superdome, Convention Center, and highways; nursing homes and hospitals – as a means of illustrating what went right and wrong in countless other locales.

What this Select Committee has done is not rocket science.

We’ve gathered facts and established timelines based on some fairly rudimentary but important questions posed to the right people in both the public and private sectors.

- What did you need and what did you get?
- Where were you in the days and hours right before, during, and after the storm?
- Who were you talking to?
- What were you doing?
- Does that match what you were supposed to be doing? Why or why not?

In other words, the Select Committee has matched what was supposed to happen under federal, state, and local plans against what actually happened.

Our findings emerged from this process of matching. Too often there were too many cooks in the kitchen, and because of that the response to Katrina was at times overdone, at times underdone. Too often, because everybody was in charge, nobody was in charge.

Many government officials continue to stubbornly resist recognizing that fundamental changes in disaster management are needed. This report illustrates that we have to stop waiting for the disaster that fits our response plan and instead design a scalable capacity to meet whatever Mother Nature throws at us. It’s not enough to say, “We wouldn’t be here if the levees had not failed.” The levees did fail, and government and other organizations failed in turn – in many, many ways.

It remains difficult to understand how government could respond so ineffectively to a disaster that was anticipated for years, and for which specific dire warnings had been issued for days. This crisis was not only predictable, it was predicted.

If this is what happens when we have advance warning, we shudder to imagine the consequences when we do not. Four and a half years after 9/11, America is still not ready for prime time.

This is particularly distressing because we know we remain at risk for terrorist attacks, and because the 2006 hurricane season is right around the corner. With this report we hope to do our part to enhance preparation and response.

With Katrina, there was no shortage of plans. There were plans, but there was not enough planning.

Government failed because it did not learn from past experiences, or because lessons thought to be learned were somehow not implemented. If 9/11 was a failure of imagination, then Katrina was a failure of initiative. It was a failure of leadership.

Tom Davis
Harold Rogers
Christopher Shays
Henry Bonilla
Steve Buyer
Sue Myrick
Mac Thornberry
Kay Granger
Charles W. “Chip” Pickering
Bill Shuster
Jeff Miller
The Select Committee identified failures at all levels of government that significantly undermined and detracted from the heroic efforts of first responders, private individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and others.

The institutional and individual failures we have identified became all the more clear when compared to the heroic efforts of those who acted decisively. Those who didn’t flinch, who took matters into their own hands when bureaucratic inertia was causing death, injury, and suffering. Those whose exceptional initiative saved time and money and lives.

We salute the exceptions to the rule, or, more accurately, the exceptions that proved the rule. People like Mike Ford, the owner of three nursing homes who wisely chose to evacuate his patients in Plaquemines Parish before Katrina hit, due in large part to his close and long-standing working relationship with Jesse St. Amant, Director of the Plaquemines Office of Emergency Preparedness.

People like Dr. Gregory Henderson, a pathologist who showed that not all looting represented lawlessness when, with the aid of New Orleans police officers, he raided pharmacies for needed medication and supplies and set up ad hoc clinics in downtown hotels before moving on to the Convention Center.

But these acts of leadership were too few and far between. And no one heard about or learned from them until it was too late.

The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina show we are still an analog government in a digital age. We must recognize that we are woefully incapable of storing, moving, and accessing information – especially in times of crisis.

Many of the problems we have identified can be categorized as “information gaps” – or at least problems with information-related implications, or failures to act decisively because information was sketchy at best. Better information would have been an optimal weapon against Katrina. Information sent to the right people at the right place at the right time. Information moved within agencies, across departments, and between jurisdictions of government as well. Seamlessly. Securely. Efficiently.

Unfortunately, no government does these things well, especially big governments.

The federal government is the largest purchaser of information technology in the world, by far. One would think we could share information by now. But Katrina again proved we cannot.

We reflect on the 9/11 Commission’s finding that “the most important failure was one of imagination.” The Select Committee believes Katrina was primarily a failure of initiative. But there is, of course, a nexus between the two. Both imagination and initiative – in other words, leadership – require good information. And a coordinated process for sharing it. And a willingness to use information – however imperfect or incomplete – to fuel action.

With Katrina, the reasons reliable information did not reach more people more quickly are many, and these reasons provide the foundation for our findings.

In essence, we found that while a national emergency management system that relies on state and local governments to identify needs and request resources is adequate for most disasters, a catastrophic disaster like Katrina can and did overwhelm most aspects of the system for an initial period of time. No one anticipated the degree and scope of the destruction the storm would cause, even though many could and should have.

The failure of local, state, and federal governments to respond more effectively to Katrina — which had been predicted in theory for many years, and forecast with startling accuracy for five days — demonstrates that whatever improvements have been made to our capacity to respond to natural or man-made disasters, four and half years after 9/11, we are still not fully prepared. Local first responders were largely overwhelmed and unable to perform their duties, and the National Response Plan did not adequately provide a way for federal assets to quickly supplement or, if necessary, supplant first responders.

The failure of initiative was also a failure of agility. Response plans at all levels of government lacked flexibility and adaptability. Inflexible procedures often
delayed the response. Officials at all levels seemed to be waiting for the disaster that fit their plans, rather than planning and building scalable capacities to meet whatever Mother Nature threw at them. We again encountered the risk-averse culture that pervades big government, and again recognized the need for organizations as agile and responsive as the 21st century world in which we live.

One-size-fits-all plans proved impervious to clear warnings of extraordinary peril. Category 5 needs elicited a Category 1 response. Ours was a response that could not adequately accept civilian and international generosity, and one for which the Congress, through inadequate oversight and accounting of state and local use of federal funds, must accept some blame.

In crafting our findings, we did not guide the facts. We let the facts guide us. The Select Committee’s report elaborates on the following findings, which are summarized in part here, in the order in which they appear:

The failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief

- Evacuations of general populations went relatively well in all three states.
- Despite adequate warning 56 hours before landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall.
- The failure to order timely mandatory evacuations, Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining population, and decisions of individuals led to an incomplete evacuation.
- The incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and horrible conditions for those who remained.
- Federal, state, and local officials’ failure to anticipate the post-landfall conditions delayed post-landfall evacuation and support.

Critical elements of the National Response Plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all

- It does not appear the President received adequate advice and counsel from a senior disaster professional.
- Given the well-known consequences of a major hurricane striking New Orleans, the Secretary should have designated an Incident of National Significance no later than Saturday, two days prior to landfall, when the National Weather Service predicted New Orleans would be struck by a Category 4 or 5 hurricane and President Bush declared a federal emergency.
- The Secretary should have convened the Interagency Incident Management Group on Saturday, two days prior to landfall, or earlier to analyze Katrina’s potential consequences and anticipate what the federal response would need to accomplish.
- The Secretary should have designated the Principal Federal Official on Saturday, two days prior to landfall, from the roster of PFOs who had successfully

The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life

The Hurricane Pam exercise reflected recogntion by all levels of government of the dangers of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans

- Implementation of lessons learned from Hurricane Pam was incomplete.

Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes

- Responsibilities for levee operations and maintenance were diffuse.
- The lack of a warning system for breaches and other factors delayed repairs to the levees.
- The ultimate cause of the levee failures is under investigation, and results to be determined.
completed the required training, unlike then-FEMA Director Michael Brown. Considerable confusion was caused by the Secretary’s PFO decisions.

- A proactive federal response, or push system, is not a new concept, but it is rarely utilized.
- The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex to direct the federal response posture to fully switch from a reactive to proactive mode of operations.
- Absent the Secretary’s invocation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, the federal response evolved into a push system over several days.
- The Homeland Security Operations Center failed to provide valuable situational information to the White House and key operational officials during the disaster.
- The White House failed to de-conflict varying damage assessments and discounted information that ultimately proved accurate.
- Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System.
- Once activated, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact enabled an unprecedented level of mutual aid assistance to reach the disaster area in a timely and effective manner.
- Earlier presidential involvement might have resulted in a more effective response.

### DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event

- While a majority of state and local preparedness grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this does not preclude a dual use application.
- Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina.
- DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced staff for the Katrina response.
- The readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response.

### Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness

- Massive inoperability had the biggest effect on communications, limiting command and control, situational awareness, and federal, state, and local officials’ ability to address unsubstantiated media reports.
- Some local and state responders prepared for communications losses but still experienced problems, while others were caught unprepared.
- The National Communication System met many of the challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina, enabling critical communication during the response, but gaps in the system did result in delayed response and inadequate delivery of relief supplies.

### Command and control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief

- Lack of communications and situational awareness paralyzed command and control.
- A lack of personnel, training, and funding also weakened command and control.
- Ineffective command and control delayed many relief efforts.

### The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking

- The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex as written would have delayed the active duty military response, even if it had been implemented.
- DOD/DHS coordination was not effective during Hurricane Katrina.
- DOD, FEMA, and the state of Louisiana had difficulty coordinating with each other, which slowed the response.
- National Guard and DOD response operations were comprehensive, but perceived as slow.
The Coast Guard’s response saved many lives, but coordination with other responders could improve.

The Army Corps of Engineers provided critical resources to Katrina victims, but pre-landfall contracts were not adequate.

DOD has not yet incorporated or implemented lessons learned from joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed for a more effective response to Katrina.

The lack of integration of National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response.

Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response.

Even DOD lacked situational awareness of post-landfall conditions, which contributed to a slower response.

DOD lacked an information sharing protocol that would have enhanced joint situational awareness and communications between all military components.

Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked joint training, which contributed to the lack of coordination between active duty components.

Joint Task Force Katrina, the National Guard, Louisiana, and Mississippi lacked needed communications equipment and the interoperability required for seamless on-the-ground coordination.

EMAC processing, pre-arranged state compacts, and Guard equipment packages need improvement.

Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected the National Guard response.

Search and rescue operations were a tremendous success, but coordination and integration between the military services, the National Guard, the Coast Guard, and other rescue organizations was lacking.

The collapse of local law enforcement and lack of effective public communications led to civil unrest and further delayed relief

A variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence in hurricane stricken areas.

The New Orleans Police Department was ill-prepared for continuity of operations and lost almost all effectiveness.

The lack of a government public communications strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated public concerns and further delayed relief.

EMAC and military assistance were critical for restoring law and order.

Federal law enforcement agencies were also critical to restoring law and order and coordinating activities.

Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and difficulties coordinating efforts

Deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not proactive.

Poor planning and pre-positioning of medical supplies and equipment led to delays and shortages.

New Orleans was unprepared to provide evacuations and medical care for its special needs population and dialysis patients, and Louisiana officials lacked a common definition of “special needs.”

Most hospital and Veterans Affairs Medical Center emergency plans did not offer concrete guidance about if or when evacuations should take place.

New Orleans hospitals, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, and medical first responders were not adequately prepared for a full evacuation of medical facilities.

The government did not effectively coordinate private air transport capabilities for the evacuation of medical patients.
■ Hospital and Veterans Affairs Medical Center emergency plans did not adequately prepare for communication needs.

■ Following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans Veterans Affairs Medical Center and hospitals’ inability to communicate impeded their ability to ask for help.

■ Medical responders did not have adequate communications equipment or operability.

■ Evacuation decisions for New Orleans nursing homes were subjective and, in one case, led to preventable deaths.

■ Lack of electronic patient medical records contributed to difficulties and delays in medical treatment of evacuees.

■ Top officials at the Department at Health and Human Services and the National Disaster Medical System do not share a common understanding of who controls the National Disaster Medical System under Emergency Support Function-8.

■ Lack of coordination led to delays in recovering dead bodies.

■ Deployment confusion, uncertainty about mission assignments, and government red tape delayed medical care.

Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing

■ Relocation plans did not adequately provide for shelter. Housing plans were haphazard and inadequate.

■ State and local governments made inappropriate selections of shelters of last resort. The lack of a regional database of shelters contributed to an inefficient and ineffective evacuation and sheltering process.

■ There was inappropriate delay in getting people out of shelters and into temporary housing – delays that officials should have foreseen due to manufacturing limitations.

■ FEMA failed to take advantage of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s expertise in large-scale housing challenges.

FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities

■ FEMA management lacked situational awareness of existing requirements and of resources in the supply chain. An overwhelmed logistics system made it challenging to get supplies, equipment, and personnel where and when needed.

■ Procedures for requesting federal assistance raised numerous concerns.

■ The failure at all levels to enter into advance contracts led to chaos and the potential for waste and fraud as acquisitions were made in haste.

■ Before Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals. DHS procurement continues to be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach, and its procurement office was understaffed given the volume and dollar value of work.

■ Ambiguous statutory guidance regarding local contractor participation led to ongoing disputes over procuring debris removal and other services.

■ Attracting emergency contractors and corporate support could prove challenging given the scrutiny that companies have endured.

Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process
"We were abandoned. City officials did nothing to protect us. We were told to go to the Superdome, the Convention Center, the interstate bridge for safety. We did this more than once. In fact, we tried them all for every day over a week. We saw buses, helicopters and FEMA trucks, but no one stopped to help us. We never felt so cut off in all our lives. When you feel like this you do one of two things, you either give up or go into survival mode. We chose the latter. This is how we made it. We slept next to dead bodies, we slept on streets at least four times next to human feces and urine. There was garbage everywhere in the city. Panic and fear had taken over."

PATRICIA THOMPSON
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 2005

[Image: Photo of two children in distress, taken by Eric Gay]
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border on the morning of August 29, 2005, it set in motion a series of events that exposed vast numbers of Americans to extraordinary suffering. Not only would Katrina become the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history, it would also prove to be one of the deadliest.

From the marshes of Louisiana’s Plaquemines Parish to the urban center of New Orleans to the coastal communities of Mississippi and Alabama, Katrina cut an enormous swath of physical destruction, environmental devastation, and human suffering.

With the overtopping and breaching of the New Orleans levees, the vast majority of the city became submerged, requiring the emergency evacuation of tens of thousands of residents who had not left prior to the storm. Lifted off roofs by helicopters or carried to safety in boats, they were taken to the Superdome, the Convention Center, a piece of high ground known as the Cloverleaf, or any other dry spot in the city.

At these locations, they were subjected to unbearable conditions: limited light, air, and sewage facilities in the Superdome, the blistering heat of the sun, and in many cases limited food and water. They feared for their safety and survival — and the survival of their city.

“You had people living where people aren’t supposed to live,” said Dr. Juliette Saussy, Director of New Orleans Emergency Medical Services, referring to the dire situations in the Superdome and Convention Center. “In general, people were just trying to survive. Some people acted badly. But most just wanted something to eat and drink, and wanted to feel safe.”

At least 1,100 Louisianans died as a result of Katrina.

Mississippians have understandably felt slighted that the devastation to their state has received less national public attention than New Orleans. Mississippi experienced a different storm than Louisiana — in essence, a massive, blender-like storm surge versus the New Orleans flooding caused by breached and overtopped levees.

By the end of the day on August 29, due largely to a storm surge that reached 34 feet in the western parts of the state — and extended inland as far as 10 miles — more than half of Mississippi was without power and had suffered serious wind and water damage. In addition to the surge, high winds and tornadoes left thousands of homes damaged and destroyed, and as many as 66,000 Mississippians were displaced from their homes.
Katrina completely flattened entire neighborhoods in communities such as Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Pass Christian, but its damage was not limited to those who lived closest to the Gulf of Mexico. Even well inland, there is no debate over whether homes may be habitable or not. They just aren’t there anymore. In these towns, brick walkways and front porches lead up to . . . nothing. Just a concrete slab where a house used to stand.

The storm careened upwards through the entire state with hurricane force winds and tornados, reaching Jackson, the state capital, and its northern most counties, and transforming 28,000 square miles — or 60 percent of the state — into a catastrophic disaster area. By the time the storm had passed, at least 230 people were dead and nearly 200,000 people were displaced from their homes. Agricultural, forestry, gaming, and poultry industries were severely damaged. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports estimate Veterinary Medical Assistant Teams disposed of over three million chickens that were destroyed by the storm.

While winds upon landfall were not as powerful as those of Hurricane Camille in 1969, Katrina was in many ways the “perfect storm” for coastal Mississippi. The combination of high winds, extraordinarily low barometric pressure, and arrival during a high tide resulted in a storm surge nearly twice that of Camille’s. Wind-whipped water flooded towns not only from the south, but from the north — not just from the Gulf, but from the bayous.

This was not a tsunami-like, single wave of destruction. This was a sustained, ever-growing high tide, one that kept coming for hours. And when the water did roar back toward the Gulf, it took everything with it — furniture, pool tables, refrigerators, 30-foot boats, countless household items. Everything that was once inside was suddenly outside.

“Even the very accurate forecasts didn’t capture the magnitude and devastation,” said Eddie Favre, Mayor of Bay St. Louis. “It was the in and out of the surge that killed us. The out, in particular. It carried everything away.”

“Our infrastructure was devastated,” Gulfport Mayor Brent Warr said. “The water came in, blew off manhole covers, then receded and caused a vacuum, sucking gators and DVD players and lots and lots of sand into water and sewer pipes. You couldn’t have backed a truck up to a manhole cover and dumped it in more effectively.”

Out on his converted shrimp boat on the evening following Katrina’s landfall, Rep. Gene Taylor, whose home was destroyed, recalls seeing complete and utter devastation on the ground and a telling sight in the air. “Birds were so tired all they could do was hold their wings out and soar on the wind,” he said. “Our seagulls, if I had to guess, ended up in Arkansas.”

Very little wildlife remains evident in the storm-ravaged areas. National Guardsman stationed in Louisiana said they rarely see any pelicans or alligators any more. There are few shrimp boats working the Gulf, and elected officials in Mississippi guess it will take two years for the state’s oyster industry to begin to recover.

Areas presumed to be flood-proof, like the Diamondhead community — built after Hurricane Camille, miles north Bay of St. Louis — suffered flood damage.

Wind shifts “caused a lot of areas considered safe to be flooded, like the town of DeLisle, where my district director’s brother lives,” Taylor said on a tour bus with Select Committee Members in January. “His house was pancaked. When he came home and tried to crawl in to see what he could salvage, he ended up face to face with an alligator. He ended up shooting the thing. People got mad because they were hungry and he let the alligator rot in his front yard.”
While only two hurricane-related deaths were reported in Alabama, Katrina caused significant damage along its coast with a wave surge of 13.5 feet, exceeding the 100-year flood level of 12 feet, despite the fact that the state did not suffer a direct hit from the hurricane. Bayou La Batre and Dauphin Island received the brunt of the storm in Alabama, losing 800 and 200 homes, respectively. The storm caused wind damage as far north as Tuscaloosa County. Mobile Bay spilled into downtown and flooded large sections of the city, destroying hundreds of homes. The sheer power of the storm dislodged a nearby oil drilling platform, which became caught under the U.S. Highway 98 bridge.

The overall toll from the devastation is still being tallied. At the time this report was issued, more than 3,000 people from storm-affected states remained unaccounted for.

During the most recent fact-finding trip to the Gulf coast in late January 2006, Members and staff of the Select Committee were shocked by the level of devastation and slow pace of cleanup. So many towns, cities, and parishes remain almost entirely empty.

A throbbing metropolis of 470,000 before the storm, New Orleans had become at the time of our writing a struggling city that is home to barely 100,000 people—although officials say that figure almost doubles for now during the daytime, when contractors and employees come into the city to work.

Significant portions of the city and region remain uninhabitable. In St. Bernard Parish, a few miles east of downtown New Orleans, only four houses did not suffer catastrophic damage from wind, rain, or the sudden flood that resulted from the breaking of the levees of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal (MR-GO). The parish, once home to nearly 70,000 people, has seen its population dip to about 7,000, with nearly all of those people living in temporary housing.

In all of the affected communities, the local economies remain on the brink of disaster, fearful of another punch that would surely be the knockout blow. In Mississippi, Hancock County lost 64 percent of its real property value. In Bay St. Louis and Waveland, the figure is estimated to be closer to 90 percent.

Investigative context: an overview

It’s been said that experience is the best teacher. The unfortunate thing is that the learning process is sometimes such a painful one.

This report is the result of a five-month journey by the Select Committee to gather information from all those who learned painful lessons during Katrina. It examines how well local, state, and federal officials worked with each other and with private entities to alleviate the suffering of so many of our fellow citizens.

In crafting an investigative plan, the Select Committee faced and overcame several challenges. We had to appoint Members quickly and rely on other committees to detail staff to the Select Committee. We had to move quickly; while memories and evidence were fresh. We had to gather as much information as we could while leaving time to write and design a consensus report before our February 15, 2006 deadline. We had to remain focused on our prescribed “right-before-and-right-after-the-storm” timeframe, despite significant interest in longer-term issues and challenges. Like juggling with knives, we had to keep multiple investigative elements in play simultaneously — preparing for and holding high-profile public hearings; requesting, receiving, and reviewing documents; and conducting interviews and briefings.

And all this had to be done in a less-than-ideal political atmosphere.
The Select Committee remains grateful to those Democrats who chose to participate in our investigation in defiance of their leadership’s decision not to appoint Members officially to the panel. The refusal by the Minority Leader was self-defeating, given that the Select Committee’s composition and minority subpoena authority would have given the Democrats more clout than they enjoy on any standing committee of the House.

Despite this strategy, the Select Committee’s review and the creation of this report have been bipartisan endeavors in spirit and in fact.

On September 15, before the Select Committee was established by a bipartisan House vote, the Government Reform Committee held a hearing on the early lessons learned from Katrina. At that hearing, the Committee’s Ranking Member, Rep. Henry Waxman, said there were “two steps we should take right away.”

First, he said, we should request basic documents from the agencies. And second, he said, “We need to hear from Michael Brown and Michael Chertoff. These are the two government officials most responsible for the inadequate response, and the Committee should call them to testify without delay.”

The Select Committee did not delay. We met and exceeded those goals. While many who so urgently called on Congress to swiftly investigate refused to participate and instead prejudged our efforts, we investigated aggressively what went wrong and what went right.

In addition to direct member participation, Democratic Members and staff were assigned to travel with Republican Members and staff to the affected locales, and Rep. Waxman’s top Government Reform Committee investigative staff assisted Democratic participants. Finally, Democratic members were repeatedly invited to offer narrative text and findings for inclusion in this report.

The Select Committee continuously invited any and all interested Democrats to join our hearings, giving them full and equal opportunity to make statements and question witnesses and help guide the direction of our inquiry, including identifying and inviting witnesses. Five Democratic members did just that: Representative Charlie Melancon, Representative Gene Taylor, Representative Bill Jefferson, Representative Cynthia McKinney, and Representative Sheila Jackson Lee. Document requests submitted to federal, state, and local agencies were signed by both Chairman Davis and Rep. Melancon.

News reports and other statements suggested many Democrats felt the same. For example, Bloomberg News reported in November that “Some House Democrats Want [a] Larger Role in Katrina Investigation.” In that report,
Rep. Gene Taylor said, “It’s really important that we’re there. I certainly wish more of my colleagues who are interested in this would participate . . . . Mr. Davis, to his credit, has been extremely fair.”

Rep. Maxine Waters, who had told Chairman Davis she wanted to participate but later said she could not, told Bloomberg, “I feel a certain void and a great absence from these discussions. I was hoping that our leaders could find a way . . . so we could participate.”

Rep. Neil Abercrombie said he unsuccessfully expressed interest in serving on the committee. “The position of Ms. Pelosi and the leadership is pretty clear,” he said. “I have a different view.”

Democrats who did buck their leadership have acknowledged both the value of their participation and the eagerness of the Select Committee to have them participate. Rep. Cynthia McKinney expressed her regret about the Democrats’ failure to officially appoint Members to the Committee while thanking Chairman Davis for convening a hearing on December 6th featuring testimony from African-American residents and evacuees:

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to have this day. Because were it left up to — I will get in trouble now. But were it left up to the Democratic leadership, we would not have had this day, because we wouldn’t be here. The Democratic leadership has instructed us to boycott this panel…. So I would like to thank my Chairman for giving us the opportunity to invite people who don’t have the opportunity to come and testify before Congress…. We are here to serve all of the people of this country, and too rarely do we hear from all of the people.

Regardless of who did or did not participate in our investigation, the Select Committee had a job to do, and we were determined to do it right.

Hearing chronology: an overview

The Select Committee held nine hearings over the course of approximately three months. Select Committee Members and staff simultaneously conducted scores of interviews and received dozens of briefings from local, state, and federal officials; non-governmental organizations; private companies and individuals who provided or offered external support after Katrina; and hurricane victims. Select Committee Members and staff traveled numerous times to the Gulf Coast. The Select Committee also requested and received more than 500,000 pages of documents from a wide array of sources.

The information gleaned from our investigation is provided in detailed, narrative form in subsequent chapters. What follows here is a brief synopsis of the topics, questions, and themes raised at each of our hearings:

“Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina and When”
September 22, 2005 Select Committee hearing

The Select Committee began at a logical place: a hearing to establish a record of who was told what, and when, about the nature of the hurricane in the days immediately before the storm. We explored the timeline of Katrina progressing from a tropical depression to a major hurricane, and asked when warnings were issued to the public and to federal, state, and local officials. We reaffirmed what we already suspected — at least two federal agencies passed Katrina’s test with flying colors: the National Weather Service (NWS) and the National Hurricane Center.

Many who escaped the storm’s wrath owe their lives to these agencies’ accuracy. This hearing provided a backdrop for the remainder of our inquiry. We repeatedly tried to determine how government could respond so ineffectively to a disaster that was so accurately forecast.

How accurately?

- Storm-track projections released to the public 56 hours before Katrina came ashore were off by only 15 miles. The average 48-hour error is 160 miles, and the average 24-hour error is 85 miles.
- The Hurricane Center’s predicted strength for Katrina at landfall, two days before the storm hit, was off the mark by only 10 miles per hour.
NWS Director Max Mayfield personally spoke by telephone with the governors of Mississippi and Louisiana and the mayor of New Orleans two days prior to landfall to warn them of what was coming. He also gave daily pre-storm video briefings to federal officials in Washington, including top Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DHS brass.

The day before Katrina hit, the NWS office in Slidell, Louisiana issued a warning saying, “MOST OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR WEEKS…PERHAPS LONGER…HUMAN SUFFERING INCREDIBLE BY MODERN STANDARDS.”

The Select Committee determined — despite more recently revised reports that Katrina was actually a strong Category 3 storm at landfall, not a Category 4 — that Katrina’s strength and the potential disaster it could bring were made clear well in advance through briefings and formal advisories. Inadequate response could not be blamed on lack of advance warning.

We repeatedly tried to determine how government could respond so ineffectively to a disaster that was so accurately forecast.

Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

September 27, 2005 Select Committee hearing

This hearing featuring former FEMA Director Michael Brown attempted to construct a timeline of what FEMA did and did not do before, during, and after Katrina made landfall.

Fair or not, by the time of this hearing, FEMA in general and Brown in particular had become the symbol of all that went wrong with the government’s response to Katrina.

By the September 27 hearing date, with the emergence of Hurricane Rita, the Select Committee had the ability to compare and contrast disaster response actions after the two storms. While Rita was predicted to be a very different storm from Katrina — a mere size Large compared to a size XXXL, and a storm that struck a far less densely populated area — it was immediately clear that governments at all levels did things differently this time around.

More supplies were stockpiled on the ground prior to Rita’s arrival. The federal government declared Rita an “incident of national significance” two days before landfall, triggering our most thorough response, and named a federal officer in charge. These steps occurred two days after Katrina. Ten thousand National Guardsmen were called to Texas in advance of Rita; Louisiana summoned 1,500
before Katrina. Search and Rescue operations were far better coordinated.

Even if a little rough around the edges, the massive pre-storm evacuation of Houston and surrounding locales showed improved foresight from state and local officials — and how lives can be saved when people pay attention to a coordinated message from their government.

We also attempted to clarify FEMA’s role in disaster response. We were faced with the problematic reality that many Americans — and perhaps even some state and local officials — falsely viewed FEMA as some sort of national fire and rescue team. An important task for the Select Committee moving forward was defining what FEMA is — what it can and cannot do based on what it is actually charged with doing by statute.

We noted that FEMA is not a first responder agency with the resources to assume principal responsibility for overwhelmed state and local governments during a disaster. This is the real world, not the reel world. There is no Tommy Lee Jones character that comes in and takes charge of...well...everything.

But we also attempted to contextualize that discussion. In other words, before getting to what FEMA cannot do, we wanted to understand what they simply did not do. Just because they are not “first responders” does not mean they should be a second thought.

We explored the possible causes of FEMA’s inadequate response, which are covered exhaustively in subsequent chapters. Among those discussed at the hearing: Inadequacies in the Stafford Act. Organizational or budgetary or grant-making shortcomings. State and local governments that didn’t know how to ask for help, or simply didn’t. A bureaucratic mindset that now emphasizes terrorism to the exclusion of natural disaster planning. We looked at these possibilities, and more.

We also examined why FEMA seemed unable to implement lessons that should have been learned well in advance of Katrina. There were the lessons of previous hurricanes. Further, FEMA officials participated in the now-widely-known exercise called Hurricane Pam in July 2004, an exercise that predicted with eerie similarity Katrina’s impact on New Orleans, including an evacuation of a million people, overflowing levees, and the destruction of hundreds of thousands of buildings.

“Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security” October 19, 2005 Select Committee hearing

Although by this date FEMA and Michael Brown had received the most attention from Members of Congress, state and local officials, and the news media in Katrina’s wake, the Select Committee sought to recognize that DHS and Secretary Michael Chertoff have primary responsibility for managing the national response to a catastrophic disaster, according to the National Response Plan (NRP).

Therefore, three weeks after hearing from Michael Brown, we turned to his boss, the man who ultimately fired him.

We needed to find out if Michael Brown had it right when he testified that FEMA had been under-funded and under-staffed, that it had become “emaciated,” and that Congress had undermined FEMA’s effectiveness when the agency was folded into DHS.

Michael Brown testified that he asked the Department for funding to implement the lessons learned from the Hurricane Pam exercise and that those funds were denied. He also testified about brain drain, diminished financial resources, and “assessments” of $70 to $80 million by DHS for department-wide programs. He said he had written memos to Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff regarding the inadequacy of FEMA’s resources. We asked Secretary Chertoff about those assertions.

We also sought to establish the Department’s role and responsibilities in a disaster. What resources can the Secretary bring to bear? What triggers the decision to
deploy those resources? During Katrina, how personally involved was Secretary Chertoff in seeking, authorizing, or deploying specific resources?

Under the National Response Plan, the DHS Secretary is the federal official charged with declaring an Incident of National Significance. Part of that declaration entails naming a Principal Federal Official (PFO), to manage the response.

The government’s pre-landfall decision to declare an Incident of National Significance with Rita suggested awareness that the call came too late with Katrina. And, based on some of Brown’s emails, we knew that he resented being named the PFO by the Secretary. We needed to ask Secretary Chertoff what he thought about that, and what those comments said about the underlying NRP.

Finally, we asked Secretary Chertoff what we asked all officials during our investigation: Where were you in the days and hours right before, during, and after the hurricane? What were you doing? Who were you talking to?

New York University Professor Paul Light wrote shortly after Katrina that, “Mr. Chertoff is just about the only official in Washington who can say ‘I told you so’ about FEMA,” based on some of the reforms he outlined in July 2005 in his Second Stage Review. We asked Secretary Chertoff if he believed FEMA’s response to Katrina would have been better if the reforms had been in place on August 29.

“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama”
October 27, 2005 Select Committee hearing

At this hearing we examined Department of Defense responsibilities, procedures, and coordination with the Department of Homeland Security in the event of a catastrophic disaster.

We looked at the roles of the National Guard and U.S. Northern Command in disaster response as the operational arms of DOD and the states, and we reviewed the role of the Coast Guard, a unique national asset with both military capabilities and domestic law enforcement authorities.

We sought to establish a timeline of the military’s actions — what they were asked to do, when they were asked, and whether the jobs actually got done.

We acknowledged the heroic efforts that DOD, National Guard, and Coast Guard personnel made, efforts that saved many, many lives. The mobilization was massive and, at least once the call went out, swift and effective.

But we also discussed problems with the military response. The Select Committee believed even some of the successes occurred despite less-than-optimal planning, and too often officers were planning in a crisis environment.

There were problems: With situational awareness and damage assessments. With coordinating search and rescue operations. With the effective use of Defense Coordinating Officers by FEMA. With an early and persistent disconnect between DOD and state and local authorities. With inadequate telecommunications that prevented effective coordination. And, once again, with failing to learn as much as possible from previous disasters.

While we continued to emphasize that local first responders are best suited for handling local emergencies, the recurring question was: What happens when first responders are overwhelmed, as they clearly were in Katrina?

As a result, we asked whether DOD anticipated these circumstances, what preparations were made, and what actions were taken with regard to the National Response Plan’s “Catastrophic Incident Annex” — the annex that authorizes federal agencies to act when state and local capacity even to know what they need is compromised by the sheer size of the calamity.

Our hearing came amid growing debate over an expanded military role in future disasters. President Bush prompted the discussion in a nationally televised address from New Orleans on September 15, saying, “It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces — the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s notice.”

Two witnesses — Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command — had indicated prior to the hearing that DOD was considering
training and equipping an active duty force specifically for disaster response.

Those remarks led to some confusion over specifics, and even to some outright opposition.

On October 13, the National Governors Association issued a statement reasserting their authority. “Governors are responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters,” the association wrote.

An October 21 statement by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, who is leading President Bush’s examination of the federal response to Katrina, also spawned negative reactions from state officials. Townsend reportedly said she was considering whether there is “a narrow band of cases” in which the President should seize control when a disaster strikes. A spokesperson for Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco responded by saying she could not think of an instance in which the President should be able to unilaterally take control. “We don’t believe Katrina was the time, and I don’t know what another time would be,” Denise Bottcher told the Times-Picayune.

The Select Committee, therefore, began addressing this basic tension. On the one hand, we heard understandable caution from our Members and witnesses against overreacting to Katrina with sweeping changes to laws or processes, caution against deviating too wildly from the locals-as-first-responders paradigm. None of us believed the best lesson to be learned from Katrina was that all answers can be found in Washington.

On the other hand, the call for increasing the military’s role in domestic affairs is easy to grasp. Who else can respond the way the military can? Who else can stand up when others have fallen?

This tension was reflected in the National Response Plan before Katrina. The Catastrophic Incident Annex assumes that local response capabilities may be “insufficient,” as they will be “quickly overwhelmed.” But the NRP plan states federal resources will only be integrated into the response effort upon a request by state and local authorities and assumes state and local officials will be able to do the integrating themselves.

The Select Committee was left wondering if the plan as written tried to have its cake and eat it too. How can we rely on the overwhelmed to acknowledge they are overwhelmed, and then expect them to direct and manage the process of coming to their rescue?

We agreed we needed a closer evaluation of existing procedures for DOD under the National Response Plan, paying particular attention to DOD’s role when first responders are wiped out or otherwise incapable of providing the initial response.

We agreed that Incidents of National Significance require a response on a national scale. But we also agreed the devil is in the details. We cannot expect the Marines to swoop in with MREs every time a storm hits. We train soldiers to fight wars. You can’t kill a storm.

So what is the threshold? When can or should the Stafford Act’s assumption that states will be able to “pull” needed federal resources to meet their needs give way to the operational imperative that federal agencies “push” assets to those who need them? What would spur the kind of enhanced or heightened military role that some have been promoting in the aftermath of Katrina? When would we pull that trigger? And finally, would it have made a difference in the response to Katrina?

The fact is, military resources are not infinite. It seems the kind of standing humanitarian force that would be needed to provide this sort of immediate assistance at a moment’s notice would either threaten readiness or require an expansion of the active force and a significant boost in how well they are equipped.

Legal questions also arose. Were we talking about statutory changes? Should we revisit Posse Comitatus, the 127-year-old law that bars federal troops from
Do we need a larger DOD role — or just a smarter one?

assuming domestic law enforcement duties? Did Katrina demonstrate a need for a new exception to Posse Comitatus, one to be utilized after major disasters?

The Select Committee ultimately refocused the discussion by simplifying the question: Do we need a larger DOD role — or just a smarter one?

The Select Committee tried hard to acknowledge at this hearing what an incredible job the Coast Guard did, and recognize the National Guard’s clear sense of urgency. We noted for the record that Northern Command had prepared for this storm, deploying Defense Coordinating Officers to the three states before landfall and placing units on alert.

But we also had to recognize that it was unclear how much “real” support was in place before the storm arrived, and that Secretary McHale himself had acknowledged prior to our hearing the DOD response was too slow.15

“A Hurricane Katrina: The Federal Government’s Use of Contractors to Prepare and Respond”
November 2, 2005 Select Committee hearing

A great deal of taxpayer money went out the door to private firms to help prepare for and respond to Katrina. Part of our job was to ask whether it’s been money well spent. And part of that inquiry was asking what contracts should have been in place before the storm arrived, based on what everyone knew — or should have known — would be needed.

Was the contracting system up to the task? Were we able to get what we needed, when and where we needed it? By any measure, this was an enormous storm, described as one of “Biblical” proportions. In the face of the massive destruction caused by Katrina, acquisition personnel acted to meet pressing humanitarian needs, contacting firms in an effort to provide immediate relief to survivors and to protect life and property. And thankfully, many firms responded.

Local, state, and federal governments rely heavily on contractor support to prepare for and response to disasters. This hearing examined the contracts in place prior to Katrina’s landfall, and procurement planning efforts that took place in anticipation of a large-scale catastrophic event. We also reviewed the rationale and process for awarding disaster relief and recovery contracts in the immediate aftermath of Katrina.

The Select Committee asked about the internal controls in place to ensure that federal acquisition laws were followed; the terms and performance of Katrina relief contracts; and the ways in which the management and oversight of disaster-related contracting can be strengthened.
It is true that several companies were called into action on a sole-source basis under acquisition provisions that allow the government to acquire urgently needed goods and services in emergency situations. It’s also true that, contrary to many media reports, some of the immediate response efforts were provided through existing contracts that had been previously awarded through full and open competition.

Nevertheless, concerns were raised with respect to how FEMA awarded contracts in Katrina’s immediate aftermath and regarding what contract vehicles were in place before landfall. These were legitimate concerns that affect not only our findings relative to the preparation for and response to Katrina, but also how well prepared we’ll be the next time — and how willing contractors will be to step up to the plate the next time they’re called.

The indirect result of inefficient contracting and misdirected, even baseless charges against contractors could be a government left with more than it can manage in-house.

In the weeks following Katrina, more than 80 percent of the $1.5 billion in initial contracts awarded by FEMA were awarded on a sole-source basis or pursuant to limited competition. Many of the contracts awarded were incomplete and included open-ended or vague terms. In addition, numerous news reports questioned the terms of disaster relief agreements made in haste.

Under the Stafford Act, prime contractors are to give preference to local subcontractors, but reports indicated that not enough local businesses were being hired. Questions were also raised about the Corps of Engineers’ use of a limited competition to award contracts for debris removal and clean up.

Undoubtedly, FEMA before Katrina suffered from something Congress has grappled with government-wide for many years: a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the DHS Office of Inspector General (IG) had repeatedly cited the lack of consistent contract management for large, complex, high-cost procurement programs. DHS procurement continues to be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach. DHS has seven legacy procurement offices that continue to serve DHS components, including FEMA. Notably, FEMA was not reporting or tracking procurements undertaken by disaster field offices, and the procurement office remains to this day understaffed given the volume and dollar value of its work.

The Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) had established an eighth office called the Office of Procurement Operations to meet the procurement needs of the rest of DHS. After Katrina, however, the CPO reassigned its staff to assist FEMA’s procurement office.

At this hearing, we learned errors were made in the contracting process before and after Katrina. The contract oversight process is not always pretty, and decisions made under life-and-death pressure are not always as lucid as those made under less complicated conditions. But there are lessons to be learned about efficient and effective contracting, even from this, hopefully, once in a lifetime event.

That there were and will be disagreements with contractors over pricing and payment schedules should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the administration of complex contracts in difficult circumstances.

The good news is, DHS has begun establishing a rigorous oversight process for each and every federal contract related to Katrina. Now the process needs to be fully implemented.

Shortly after the emergency needs arose, DHS’s Chief Procurement Officer asked the DHS Inspector General’s Office to begin overseeing the acquisition process. The DHS IG assigned 60 auditors, investigators, and inspectors and planned to hire thirty additional oversight personnel. The staff is reviewing the award and administration of all major contracts, including those awarded in the initial efforts, and will monitor all contracting activities as the government develops its requirements and as the selection and award process continues to unfold.
To further ensure that any payments made to contractors are proper and reasonable, FEMA engaged the Defense Contract Audit Agency to help monitor and oversee any payments made — and pledged not to pay on any vouchers until each one is audited and cleared.

The Select Committee has no patience with waste, fraud, or abuse. We expect that any such instances that are proven will result in harsh punishment for the perpetrators. We also expect that, as the conditions on the ground have improved, the next generation of contracts have been and will be awarded and administered in accordance with standard acquisition procedures.

Emergency procedures are for emergencies only. FEMA said it continues to revisit non-competitive arrangements made immediately after the storm.

"Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama"
November 9, 2005 Select Committee hearing

"Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi"
December 7, 2005 Select Committee hearing

"Hurricane Katrina: Preparation and Response by the State of Louisiana"
December 14, 2005 Select Committee hearing

The three state-focused hearings we held were arguably the most important in terms of fact-gathering. After all, we understood that in the event of an emergency, state and local government officials bear primary responsibilities under both the National Response Plan and their own laws and directives. Throughout federal, state and local planning documents the general principle is for all incidents to be handled at the lowest possible organizational and jurisdictional level. Police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel are responsible for incident management at the local level.

For federally declared emergencies or major disasters, DHS provides operational and/or resource coordination for federal support to on-scene incident command structures.

Our goal was to better understand the responsibilities and actions of state and local officials before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. We explored state laws, policies, procedures, and how state and local officials interfaced with DHS and FEMA when they confronted Katrina — and how DHS interfaced with them.

The National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System were crafted to provide the framework and template, respectively, for the federal government to work with state and local authorities to prepare for and respond to crises. In turn, states, localities, tribal governments, and nongovernmental organizations are asked to align their plans and procedures with federal guidelines and procedures.

Did this coordinated alignment occur? By the time of these hearings, we knew in large part it had not. We sought to understand, from a state and local perspective, why.

"Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm"
December 6, 2005 Select Committee hearing

In mid-November, Rep. Cynthia McKinney asked Select Committee Chairman Tom Davis to focus a hearing on the “African-American voice” related to Hurricane Katrina. With that request in mind, and having already planned a hearing featuring testimony from storm victims, the Select Committee sought to better understand the experiences of Gulf coast residents, including those forced
to evacuate, during the catastrophe. Only by hearing from those most directly affected by Katrina could we determine where, how, and why the government response at all levels was so terribly inadequate.

There was little question that Katrina had sparked renewed debate about race, class, and institutional approaches toward vulnerable population groups in the United States. In the aftermath of the storm, a wide array of media reports, public statements, and polls underscored this reality.

In his September 15 speech to the nation, President Bush touched on the issue. “As all of us saw on television, there is also some deep, persistent poverty in this region as well. And that poverty has roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the opportunity of America,” the President said.

Since then the debate had become increasingly heated. In media interviews, Jesse Jackson compared New Orleans’ shelters to the hold of a slave ship, and Louis Farrakhan suggested New Orleans’ levees were intentionally blown up to destroy primarily African-American neighborhoods.

While not all the commentary has necessarily been constructive, substantiated, or fair, the Select Committee believed the issue warranted further discussion, especially within the context of understanding the experiences of those caught inside the storm, and in hopes of making sure the governmental response is more effective the next time.

We knew from government e-mails and other documents that officials were almost immediately sensitive to public perceptions of race as a factor in the inadequate response. An aide to Louisiana Governor Blanco cautioned colleagues about how to respond to a request from Rep. Maxine Waters, an African-American, for security escorts in New Orleans shortly after the storm. “Please handle and racial politics. And Alabama officials discussed similar sensitivities about a proposal to conduct background checks on out-of-state evacuees being housed in state parks.

A CNN-Gallup poll from September 8 to 11 reported 60 percent of African-Americans, but only 12 percent of whites, believed race was a factor in the slow response to Katrina. Another poll by the Pew Research Center found that 7 in 10 blacks believed the disaster showed that racial inequality remains a major problem in America. A majority of whites disagreed.

A November survey of 46 Katrina evacuees published by the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado-Boulder concluded that “issues of race and class were central to evacuation experiences.”

For many, the evacuation process was complicated by age, mental or physical disability, the need to care for dependents, or material possessions they were trying to take with them.

The Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University also conducted face-to-face interviews with 680 randomly selected adult evacuees residing in Houston. When asked, “Has your experience made you feel like the government cares about people like you, or has it made you feel like the government doesn’t care?” 61 percent reported they felt the government doesn’t care. Additionally, the evacuees suggested an intersection between race and class: 68 percent of respondents thought the federal government would have responded more quickly if more people trapped in the floodwaters were “wealthier and white rather than poorer and black.”

At an early November forum at Emerson College, Louis Elisa — a former regional director for the Federal Emergency Management Agency under President Clinton — reportedly suggested that race had to be a factor in the
inadequate response. "I am telling you, as a professional, that you could not have had a mistake of this nature...if something else was not afoot," the Boston Globe quoted Elisa.19

Whether or not one believed racist charges were well-founded (and clearly a majority of our members did not), the Select Committee agreed it should recognize and discuss the socioeconomic and racial backdrop against which Katrina unfolded.

As the Brookings Institution reported in October, New Orleans, which once had economically and demographically diverse neighborhoods, had grown extremely segregated by both race and income by the time of the storm. "As a result," Brookings concluded, "blacks and whites were living in quite literally different worlds before the storm hit." 20

At the very least, the Select Committee determined it should further explore at this hearing how socioeconomic factors contributed to the experiences of those directly affected by the storm. The UIC-Boulder survey found that "almost all interviewees described the evacuation process as disorderly and disorganized, with minimal communication about where evacuees were heading and when the next transportation would arrive. This created a state of uncertainty and insecurity... [P]redominantly working-class African-Americans did not evacuate because they did not have the financial resources to do so."21

The Select Committee sought to learn more about whether government messages to Gulf coast residents regarding the dangers of the coming hurricane could have been presented in a more effective manner, a question which also carried racial and socioeconomic implications.

“If you don’t hear the message from someone you trust, you tend to be skeptical,” Margaret Sims, vice president of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, told Public Relations Strategist magazine. “If you get conflicting information from people you’re not sure of, then inaction may be, from your perspective, the most prudent form of action.” 22

The same magazine article noted that disaster response may have been hampered by not taking the “circumstances” of area residents fully into account. “The people creating the verbal or image measures don’t take into account access or physical barriers to opportunities in certain communities,” said Linda Aldoory, director of the Center for Risk Communication Research at the University of Maryland. “With Katrina, people knew the importance of storm warnings and the need to evacuate, but didn’t have the physical access to do so.”23

In other words, the Select Committee agreed it should examine to what extent response inadequacies stemmed from the messengers — and the message. We wanted to further explore the possibility that different people may hear different things when their elected officials are telling them to evacuate.

Document request, production, and review: an overview

Within a week of its September 15, 2005 creation, the Select Committee held its first hearing. By the end of the month, Chairman Davis and Rep. Charlie Melancon, on behalf of the Select Committee and in cooperation with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, had submitted 19 official and comprehensive requests for documents to relevant federal agencies and state governments.

By the beginning of January 2006, 67 formal requests for documents had been issued by the Select Committee and the Senate Committee to 29 federal agencies as well as the governments of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana and their subdivisions.
In response to those formal requests and numerous other staff requests, the Select Committee received hundreds of thousands of documents.

The responses by the federal agencies and state governments inundated the Select Committee. A constant stream of boxes containing responsive documents arrived daily at the Select Committee’s door. Select Committee staff worked around the clock to organize and review this stream of documents. Aggressive follow-up by the Select Committee, detailed below, ensured the document production was responsive to the Select Committee’s requests.

To fulfill its mission, the Select Committee needed to do more than hold hearings. We requested and received more than half a million pages of documents from governmental organizations at all levels: federal, state, and local. The information gleaned from these documents played a critical role in helping the Select Committee paint a picture of what happened and why.

Below is a brief overview of what was requested and what was received. Most of the governmental organizations complied with our requests in a timely and complete fashion. Efforts by others to comply unfortunately were neither timely nor complete. This is discussed below as well.

In September 2005, the Senate Committee, chaired by Senator Susan Collins, began its Katrina investigation. In many cases, the two committees desired the same or similar information. To facilitate both investigations, and to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication of efforts, the Select Committee simply asked to receive all documents requested by the Senate.

**Federal**

The Select Committee sent request letters to all 15 cabinet-level departments as well as many independent federal departments including: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the United States Postal Service (USPS), the Agency for International Development (AID), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Social Security Administration (SSA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We also requested information from the White House and the Office of the Vice President.

In particular, the Select Committee requested extensive information from the Department of Homeland Security, particularly from two of its constituent agencies, FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard. We requested documents and communications from before August 23 related to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. We also sought documents and communications from between August 23 and August 29 related to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. And we requested documents and communications from between August 29 and September 15 related to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In addition, we requested information about the different elements of DHS and individuals holding key positions. We wanted to know the different roles and responsibilities of those components, as well as the actions they took before, during, and after Katrina. We asked for information regarding the activation of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System, and any discussions about the use of the armed forces. We also requested relevant communications, specifically any requests for assistance, communications with local and state authorities, and communications that revealed any plans to prepare for the hurricane, or communications that demonstrated possible vulnerabilities to a hurricane. We also wanted any documents containing authorities, regulations, plans, and
procedures of the agency, weather reports, information about medical response assets, and information about DHS and FEMA funding and budgeting.

We requested an employee directory and organization chart for FEMA, as well as the individuals in key position during the hurricane in the affected regions. We asked for documents referring to risks posed by hurricanes or flooding of New Orleans, and documents indicating whether officials knew of those risks. We also requested documents and communications regarding the levee system in New Orleans, including plans, risk assessments, and knowledge of the levees’ failure, particularly documents and communications with the Army Corps of Engineers.

We sought documents and names of key individuals related to the Hurricane Pam exercise, and information about FEMA’s chain of command during the storm and FEMA’s authorities, plans, and policies relevant to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, we requested after-action reports for past hurricanes; information about the activation of the National Response Plan; qualifications of key FEMA personnel; and contributions of contractors and subcontractors.

Finally, we requested a description of the Coast Guard’s role with respect to the National Response Plan and other domestic emergencies, specifically Hurricane Katrina. We wanted to know what components will act, who they will cooperate with, and in what capacity. We also requested information about search and rescue, such as command structures, regulations, and assets available. We also requested details about when the Coast Guard learned of certain key information before, during, and after Katrina.

DHS responded to most of these requests from the Select Committee, including requests addressed to Secretary Chertoff, Acting Undersecretary Paulison, and Assistant Secretary Robert Stephan. The Department produced in total well over 200,000 pages of documents including:

- (1) Briefing books, reports and communication from the Secretary’s office;
- (2) Communications from the Deputy Secretary’s office;
- (3) E-mails from Undersecretary Brown’s office;
- (4) E-mails from FEMA personnel involved in planning and response efforts;
- (5) the National Response Plan, Hurricane plans, New Orleans and Mobile area plans, Incident Action Plans, Operation Manuals and planning worksheets, and Katrina specific plans;
- (6) Mission assignments, task requests and logs, action requests, tracking reports, and situation reports;
- (7) tasking logs and requests;
- (8) briefings;
- (9) grant program documents;
- (10) planned shipments; resource tracking reports, commodity maps, and staging areas;
- (11) audits;
- (12) Katrina maps and graphics; and
- (13) organizational charts.

The Select Committee sent specific requests to the Department of Defense as well. We sent request letters to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), and Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Specifically, we requested documents and communications from before August 23 by officials of the Department of Defense or any constituent agencies related to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. We requested documents and communications from between August 23 and August 29, by officials of the Department of Defense or any constituent elements related to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. And, we requested documents and communications, including internal communications from between August 29 and September 15 by officials of the Department of Defense or any DOD elements related to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

We also requested information about DOD’s role and legal authority with respect to domestic emergencies and Hurricane Katrina. We wanted organizational charts, after-action reports, and plans with respect to national catastrophes. We requested information about DOD and the events of Hurricane Katrina, such as any guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense before landfall, the preparations made, specific actions taken, and personnel involved. We asked for information about Joint Task Force Katrina and on actions taken during Hurricane Katrina, specifically those of active duty troops and National Guard units; requests for assistance; and information on DOD’s chain of command during the incident.

The Select Committee initially received responses from the Department of Defense on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld that only partially complied with the various requests. On November 18, the Select Committee received a production from the Department containing: execution orders; requests for forces; correspondence regarding National Guard authorization; daily update briefings; and
daily executive summaries. On December 14, the Select Committee received further production containing the Joint Staff Director of Operations’ (J-3) Redacted Timeline, outlining the Department’s response actions to Hurricane Katrina and the Joint Task Force Katrina Commander’s Assessment Briefings.

In further response to the letter requests, on December 22 the Select Committee received: the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Homeland Defense’s Smart Book; responses to Senate interrogatories of September 28; National Guard and Northcom timelines; Execute and Deployment orders; NORTHCOM teleconference minutes; Captain Rick Snyder’s, XO USS Bataan, Lessons Learned Package; Vice Admiral Fitzgerald’s e-mails, timelines, and notes; 2nd Fleet Lessons Learned; Records of Annual Hurricane exercises; memo to Admiral Starling regarding Naval assets in the region; information regarding helicopter assets; Rear Admiral Kilkenny’s Lessons Learned brief to the Chief of Naval Operations; Northcom requests for forces; Northcom deployment orders; Northcom timeline; and twice-daily Joint Operations Center emails.

In addition the Department produced: Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) timeline and logs of verbal orders; JFCOM Standard Operating Procedures; Unified Command Plan; TOPOFF exercise paperwork; Commander Fleet Forces command general requirement for Humanitarian Response/Disaster Relief; National Guard Bureau Readiness Documents; National Guard Bureau Senior Leadership Questions; and Katrina effects on National Guard Bureau readiness.

Despite these significant productions, Chairman Davis was concerned that the communications of senior Defense Department officials — a priority in the first request to the Department — had not been produced. Consequently, after discussions with Rep. Melancon, he issued a subpoena to the Department of Defense on December 14. The subpoena required the production of the correspondence of senior DOD officials related to Hurricane Katrina.

On December 22, the Select Committee received documents responsive to the subpoena, including official correspondence from Assistant Secretary Paul McHale, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Verga, Admiral Keating, Lieutenant General Honoré, Lieutenant General Blum, and Colonel John Jordan. On December 30, the Select Committee received more documents responsive to the subpoena, including DOD official correspondence from Secretary Rumsfeld, Acting Deputy Secretary England, Colonel Daskevich, Brigadier General Scherling, Colonel Roberson, Colonel Chavez, Colonel Young,
Admiral Keating, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Verga. On January 13, the Select Committee received further submissions of correspondence from Department officials including Brigadier General Graham, Major General Young. And on January 17, the Select Committee received the emails of Major General Grass and Lieutenant General Vaughn.

The Select Committee also requested information from the White House. Specifically, the Select Committee requested documents and communications from before August 23 related to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. We requested documents and communications from between August 23 and August 29 related to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. And we requested documents and communications from between August 29 and September 15 related to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. Initially, the White House produced more than 4,000 documents in response to these requests; however, the Select Committee was not satisfied with this initial production of documents.

In a December 6 letter, William Kelly, White House Deputy Counsel, said the September 30 and December 1 requests were too broad and asked the Select Committee to narrow the request. In response, the Select Committee insisted on briefings by senior administration officials and the production of certain items, including e-mails and documents from the White House Situation Room. As a result of our demands, a briefing was provided and more than 12,000 pages of documents from the Executive Office of the President on the response to Hurricane Katrina were delivered on December 16. The Select Committee made similar requests to the Vice President’s office, which responded with almost 6,000 pages of documents.

While the Select Committee was disappointed and frustrated by the slow pace and general resistance to producing the requested documents by the White House and the Department of Defense, at the end of the day, the Select Committee believes it received enough information through documents, briefings, and interviews to understand the actions and decisions of those entities, and reach sound findings on them, without implicating executive privilege.

That’s what this was about: obtaining sufficient information. Getting the documents and testimony we needed to make sure Americans are better prepared the next time. Ultimately, our public criticism of the Administration’s slow pace did the job. At our insistence, the White House provided Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Ken Rapuano for a briefing with staff and Members. With the President in Texas, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend out of the country, and Chief of Staff Andrew Card in Maine at the time of the storm, Rapuano offered the best view of White House knowledge and actions right before and right after Katrina. In fact, his briefing included more acknowledgements of institutional failure than any we had received previously.

The agreement with the White House gave us an opportunity to understand the White House role in Katrina while keeping the Select Committee on a parallel track with the Senate, which had not pursued White House subpoenas, and had not even subpoenaed DOD. A subpoena for White House documents would have simply derailed and delayed our inquiry, with the likelihood of a lengthy and unproductive court battle over executive privilege to follow.

State

The Select Committee sent request letters to governmental components in the three states hit hardest by Hurricane Katrina: Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In each state, we requested information from both the office of the governor and the state’s respective agency in charge of homeland security or emergency management.

Specifically, the Select Committee asked each state’s governor’s office for documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent up to the date of September 15 by state officials related to the threat posed by a hurricane, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses. Also, for each state’s office in charge of homeland security or emergency management, the Select Committee requested: information about that organization, including organization charts; the agency’s responsibilities with respect to emergencies; regulations and procedures; after action reports for past hurricanes; past requests for federal grants; budgets for the agencies;
contractors and subcontractors that assisted with Katrina; a detailed chronology of events and actions taken during, before, and after the hurricane; key state personnel involved with Katrina; and all communications to and from the agencies relevant to the disaster.

The Select Committee also requested any state, county, and local emergency plans, and the identity of state and local agencies involved in those plans. Finally, the Select Committee asked for documents from the past five years that evaluate the threats posed by hurricanes and any information about exercises to prepare for hurricanes.

The Select Committee sent request letters to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security (ADHS), as well as the office of Governor Bob Riley. The State of Alabama answered all questions and replied to all requests. The state provided the Alabama Emergency Management Plan, 26 different situation reports, the Governor's proclamations, a timeline, and four Incident Action Plans. The state also provided communications such as MOU with Mississippi, Alabama county emergency management standards, and state emergency procedures. In answering the Select Committee's questions, the state provided organization charts, key personnel, the roles and responsibilities of ADHS and the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA), state and county emergency plans and the state and local agencies involved in the response to Katrina. The state also provided risk assessments and after action reports and information on exercises to prepare for disasters. Alabama also provided information on budgets for the past five years. The state also provided timelines, a list of actions taken by state agencies in response to Katrina and a complete set of AEMA internal communications and action tracking system (EM 2000) messages.

The Select Committee sent requests to both the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) and to the office of Governor Kathleen Blanco. After asking for a 90 day extension on October 26 due to the need to address immediate hurricane relief, the Governor fully responded on December 1 with tens of thousands of documents on their response and preparation for Hurricane Katrina including: an overview of the Governor's actions, Executive Orders and declarations, emergency preparedness plans, the LA Citizen Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guide, official correspondence, organization charts, notes and internal communications. Included was the response of the Acting Deputy Director of LOHSEP based on “the best available information” in that agency's possession at that time, including specific responses to the committee’s questions in the original Senate Committee letter.

The Select Committee sent request letters to both the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the Office of Governor Haley Barber. MEMA provided organization charts, and a listing of key personnel. MEMA produced state plans including the MS Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP Vol. II), Contra-Flow Plan of August 2005, as well as many inter-agency state plans such as plans from Louisiana, transportation evacuation plans, and parish/city plans. MEMA provided risk assessments for hurricanes, floods, surges, and economic impacts. MEMA also included all Emergency Operations Center (EOC) maps of the state and local jurisdictions. MEMA provided information on plans and training exercises such as Hurricane Pam and Lifesaver 2004. Other items provided: timeline of events and communications such as director briefs, news releases, media advisories, MEMA situation reports, Incident Action Plans, EM 2000 messages, and mission assignments.

The documents produced by all three states and the federal government allowed the Select Committee to gain important insights into the workings of government entities stressed to the breaking point by a terrible disaster. They helped reveal the true nature of the relationship of state emergency management operations to the system of federal emergency management support. These documents allowed the Select Committee to reach conclusions about what worked well and what did not. Those conclusions will help improve preparation and response for the next disaster, protect the public, save lives, and reduce suffering. We don't pretend to have the entire universe of information related to the preparation for and response to Katrina. But we had more than enough to do our job.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from inside the Storm Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2005), at 28 (statement of Patricia Thompson) [hereinafter Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
2 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Juliette Saussy, Director, New Orleans Emergency Medical Services, in New Orleans, LA (Jan. 19, 2006).
3 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Eddie Favre, Mayor of Bay St. Louis, in Waveland, MS (Jan. 20, 2006).
4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Brent Warr, Mayor of Gulfport, in Waveland, MS (Jan. 20, 2006).
9 Nicholas Johnston, Some House Democrats Want Larger Role in Katrina Investigation, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2005.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voice from Inside the Storm Before the Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2005).
13 Bill Walsh, Plan would let president take control in disasters; Proposal may be seen as slap at Blanco, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 22, 2005 [hereinafter Plan Article].
14 Plan Article.
15 See, e.g., George C. Wilson, Suiting Up for the Next Katrina, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 17, 2005, at 5.
16 E-mail correspondence from Johnny Anderson, aide to Gov. of LA, to other aides (Sept. 2, 2005) (11:56 p.m.).
17 John Barnshaw, Continuing Significance of Race and Class among Houston Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER (Natural Hazards Center), Nov. 2005, at 2.
18 Wash. Post Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, Survey of Hurricane Katrina evacuees (2005).
19 Christine MacDonald, Months After Katrina, a Local Storm Surge on Race and Class, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2005, at 4.
21 John Barnshaw, Continuing Significance of Race and Class among Houston Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER (Natural Hazards Center), Nov. 2005, at 3.
23 Strategist Article.
“The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina is like nothing I have witnessed before. It is catastrophic. Words cannot convey the physical destruction and personal suffering in that part of the nation.”

Dr. Max Mayfield  
Director, National Hurricane Center  
Select Committee hearing, September 22, 2005
This report is a story about federal, state, and local emergency response plans, and how they were or were not implemented before and after Katrina. Where there were problems, we asked why. Where even flawless execution led to unacceptable results, we returned to questioning the underlying plans.

What this Select Committee has done is not rocket science. We’ve gathered facts and established timelines based on some fairly rudimentary but important questions posed to the right people in both the public and private sectors. What did you need and what did you get? Where were you in the days and hours right before, during, and after the storm? Who were you talking to? What were you doing? Does that match what you were supposed to be doing? Why or why not?

In other words, the Select Committee has matched what was supposed to happen under federal, state, and local plans against what actually happened. Our findings emerged from this process of matching. In this lengthy Background chapter, we beg your indulgence. We know that most readers do not care about acronyms or organizational charts, about authorities and capabilities or the concepts of “push” versus “pull.” We know you simply want to know who was supposed to do what, when, and whether the job got done. And if it didn’t get done, you want to know how we are going to make sure it does the next time.

We provide this background on the framework for emergency management to set the stage for the story we will tell. To understand the failure of initiative, we need to first explain the tools that were available to so many.

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### National framework for emergency management

#### General role of FEMA, creation of DHS, and FEMA’s absorption into the department

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1979 in an effort to consolidate many of the federal policies related to the management of emergencies, including **preparedness, mitigation, disaster response, and recovery.** Prior to FEMA’s creation, through a mix of legislation and executive decisions, responsibility for federal emergency assistance as well as the types of assistance and eligibility underwent numerous changes. For example, administrative responsibility for assistance was shifted among a variety of federal departments, agencies, and the White House. In addition, the kinds of assistance the federal government provided and the types of organizations eligible were increased a number of times by, for example, adding provisions for disaster relief to small businesses and agricultural producers. By the late 1970s, these authorities and administrative changes had “developed into a complex mix of federal emergency management missions” with which state, local, and federal officials were dissatisfied, characterizing the situation as an inefficient maze of federal policies and responsible administrative entities.

In 1978, following the incident at Three Mile Island, President Carter proposed reorganizing many of the emergency operational and coordination functions that had become dispersed throughout the federal government. In a reorganization plan submitted to Congress, the President proposed creating FEMA to administer many of the federal policies related to disasters, doing so based on a number of key principles:

- **Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official responsible to the President and given attention by other federal officials at the highest levels;**

- **An effective civil defense system requires the most efficient use of all available resources (later embodied in the “all hazards” approach, through which civil defense capabilities would be available for any disaster, regardless of cause);**

- **Whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of the regular missions of federal, state, and local agencies (later embodied in federal response plans through which FEMA coordinates and plans the assistance other federal agencies provide rather than providing the assistance directly);**

- **Federal intervention should be minimized by emphasizing hazard mitigation and state and local preparedness; and,**
Federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely linked with emergency preparedness and response functions.

The President’s reorganization plan took effect in April 1979 through two executive orders which created FEMA and assigned the various responsibilities previously dispersed throughout a number of other agencies. These included, among others, the coordination of civil defense, civil emergency planning, and federal disaster relief; federal disaster preparedness; federal flood insurance authorities; dam safety; natural and nuclear disaster warning systems; and, coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents. To meet these responsibilities, FEMA focused on (1) enhancing the capability of state and local governments to respond to disasters; (2) coordinating with other federal agencies that provide resources to respond to disasters; (3) giving federal assistance directly to citizens recovering from disasters; (4) granting financial assistance to state and local governments; and, (5) providing leadership for hazard mitigation through grants, flood plain management, and other activities.

FEMA’s transfer to the Department of Homeland Security and role in disaster response

In 2002, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and placed FEMA within the new department. Specifically, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) established in DHS the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate, placing FEMA (except for its terrorism preparedness functions) into EPR along with a number of additional entities and functions. For example, EPR also assumed responsibility for the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Emergency Preparedness, which manages the National Disaster Medical System, a network of federal, state, local, private sector, and civilian volunteer medical and support personnel who augment local medical providers during disasters. In addition to these functional responsibilities, the HSA assigned to EPR responsibility for:

- promoting the effectiveness of emergency responders;
- supporting the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) through standards, training exercises, and funding;
- managing, overseeing, and coordinating federal response resources;
- aiding disaster recovery;
- creating an intergovernmental national incident management system;
- consolidating existing federal response plans into one plan;
- ensuring emergency responders have interoperable communications technology;
- developing a coordinated strategy for public health-related activities; and
- using private sector resources.

Federal vs. state and local roles

Pull vs. push system

The federal government responds to most natural disasters when the affected state(s) requests help because the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that an effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and local governments. This system in use for most disasters — providing federal assistance in response to requests of the states (or local governments via the states) — is often referred to as a “pull” system in that it relies on states to know what they need and to be able to request it from the federal government.

In practice, states may make these requests before disasters strike because of the near certainty that federal assistance will be necessary after such an event (e.g., with hurricanes) or, afterwards, once they have conducted preliminary damage assessments and determined that their response capabilities are overwhelmed. In either case, the resources the federal government provides in any disaster response are intended to supplement state
and local government resources devoted to the ongoing disaster relief and recovery effort.\textsuperscript{12}

In certain instances, however, the federal response may also be considered a “push” system, in which federal assistance is provided and/or moved into the affected area prior to a disaster or without waiting for specific requests from the state or local governments.\textsuperscript{13} As discussed below, DHS’s National Response Plan includes a component — the Catastrophic Incident Annex — that outlines the kinds of events that can cause damage so massive that first responders, local governments, and state governments are unable to request — or “pull” — federal assistance in the immediate aftermath of the incident, creating a situation in which “pushing” the federal resources might be necessary.

**EMAC system to supplement state and local capabilities**

Prior, or in addition, to seeking assistance from the federal governments, states are set up to help each other when disasters or emergencies overwhelm their capacity. States do so through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), an interstate mutual aid agreement among member states to provide assistance after disasters overwhelm the affected state’s capacity. Congress approved the creation of EMAC in 1996, building on the earlier efforts of the Southern Regional Emergency Compact that Florida and 16 other states created in 1993 after experiencing dissatisfaction with the state and federal response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992.\textsuperscript{14} EMAC provides the legal structure for states to request assistance from one another as well as a menu of resources, such as temporary shelters and cargo aircraft, which may be available from other member states. Importantly, this assistance can, and often does, come from participating states’ National Guards.\textsuperscript{15} The National Emergency Management Association, the professional association of state emergency managers, administers the compact.\textsuperscript{16}

**Federal authorities and capabilities**

When an incident overwhelms, or is likely to overwhelm, state and local resources, the Stafford Act authorizes the President, in response to a request from the governor of the affected state, to issue two types of declarations—emergency or major disaster.

**Emergency declaration**

The Stafford Act defines an emergency as “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.”\textsuperscript{17} An emergency declaration is more limited in scope than a major disaster declaration; generally, federal assistance and funding for emergencies are provided to meet a specific need or to help prevent a major disaster from occurring.\textsuperscript{18} Emergency assistance under such a declaration may include: grants to state and local governments for debris removal; direct assistance (grants) to individuals and households for temporary housing and other needs; and, assistance to states in distributing medicine and food.\textsuperscript{19}

**Major disaster declaration**

A major disaster can result from a hurricane, earthquake, flood, tornado or other incident that clearly overwhelms the ability of state or local governments to respond on their own. A presidential declaration of a major disaster usually occurs after local and state governments have responded with their own resources (such as the National Guard), conducted damage assessments to determine losses and recovery needs, and determined that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that an effective response is beyond

In certain instances, the federal response may be considered a “push” system, in which federal assistance is provided into the affected area prior to a disaster or without waiting for specific requests from the state or local governments.
the capabilities of the state and local governments. Such a declaration sets into motion federal assistance to and support of state and local response efforts as well as long-term federal recovery programs.

Principles of the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System

Broadly speaking, the overall structure for the federal response to most disasters consists of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System. The President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 in February 2003, directing DHS to develop a new plan for responding to emergencies (regardless of cause). Specifically, HSPD-5 required DHS to establish a single, comprehensive approach to the management of emergency events, whether the result of terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or accidental disasters. According to DHS, the intent of this plan is to align federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.

To implement HSPD-5, DHS developed the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). In short, the NRP defines what needs to be done in a large-scale emergency event and the NIMS defines how to manage it:

- The NRP describes the structure and mechanisms for coordinating federal support during emergencies (or exercising direct federal authority). It uses the framework of the NIMS to integrate federal government domestic prevention, protection, response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan for all hazards and all emergency response disciplines. The NRP describes operational procedures for federal support to state, local, and tribal emergency managers and defines situations in which federal authorities are to provide support and when federal authorities are to assume control. The NRP organizes capabilities, staffing, and equipment resources in terms of functions that are most likely to be needed during emergencies, such as communications or urban search and rescue, and spells out common processes and administrative requirements for executing the plan. DHS issued the NRP in December 2004 and used it for the first time in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

- NIMS consists of six major components of a systems approach to domestic incident management: command and management, preparedness, resource management, communications and information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing management and maintenance. According to DHS, NIMS “aligns the patchwork of federal special-purpose incident management and emergency response plans into an effective and efficient structure.” To do so, it defines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local first responders during emergencies and establishes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative emergency event management at all levels. The concepts, principles, and processes underlying the NIMS are intended to improve the ability of different jurisdictions and first-responder disciplines to work together in various areas, such as command and communications. NIMS, according to DHS, is based on an “appropriate balance of flexibility and standardization.” It allows government and private entities to use an adjustable national framework to work together managing domestic incidents, no matter their cause, size, location, or complexity and, while doing so, provides a set of standardized organizational structures to improve interoperability among jurisdictions. Beginning in federal fiscal year 2005, state and local governments were required to adopt NIMS in order to receive federal (DHS) preparedness grants or contracts.

The NRP consists of 5 components:

1. The base plan describes the overall structure and processes of a national approach to domestic incident management that integrates the efforts and resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and non-governmental organizations. It includes planning assumptions (e.g., state and local capabilities may be overwhelmed), roles and responsibilities, a concept of operations, incident management actions, and instructions for maintaining and periodically updating the plan.

2. Appendices provide relevant, detailed supporting
information, such as statutory authorities and a compendium of national interagency plans.

3. **Support Annexes** provide guidance and describe the functional processes and administrative requirements for meeting various plan objectives, such as logistics management and coordination with the private sector (including representatives of critical infrastructure resources).

4. **Emergency Support Annexes** spell out in detail the missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of federal agencies for coordinating resource and programmatic support to state, local, and tribal governments as well as other federal agencies. Each Emergency Support Function (ESF) has a coordinator with ongoing responsibilities throughout the incident as well as one or more primary agencies responsible for accomplishing the ESF mission. Most ESFs also have support agencies responsible for assisting the primary agency or agencies.

5. **Incident Annexes** address contingency or hazard situations requiring specialized application of the NRP for seven different types of incidents: biological; catastrophic; cyber; food and agriculture; nuclear/radiological; oil and hazardous materials; and, terrorism.

**Emergency Support Functions**

The ESFs are the primary vehicle through which DHS directly responds to disasters and coordinates the direct responses of other federal agencies as well as groups like the American Red Cross (Red Cross). For each of the 15 ESFs, DHS identifies a primary federal agency (or, in one case, a lead organization, the Red Cross. For most ESFs, DHS also identifies one or more support agencies. Primary agencies’ responsibilities include orchestrating federal support for their ESF, managing mission assignments and coordinating with state agencies, and executing contracts and procuring goods and services as needed. Support agencies’ responsibilities include conducting operations at the request of DHS or the ESF primary agency, assisting with situation (or damage) assessments, and participating in training or other exercises having to do with their prevention, response, and recovery activities.

The 15 ESFs, their overall purpose, primary and support agencies are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Support Function</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Primary Agency</th>
<th>Support Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1—transportation&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To support DHS, other federal agencies, state, and local responders requiring transportation.</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Transportation</td>
<td>Agriculture (Forest Service); DOD; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DHS; Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2—communications&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To ensure the provision of federal communications support to federal, state, local, private sector response efforts during an Incident of National Significance; supplement the National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-wartime Emergencies (NTSP).</td>
<td>DHS/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/National Communications System</td>
<td>Agriculture (Forest Service); Interior; FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3—public works and engineering&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To coordinate and organize the capabilities and resources of the federal government to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support relative to the condition of (or damage to) public works infrastructure and facilities.</td>
<td>DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (during response); FEMA (during recovery)</td>
<td>USDA; HHS; Interior; EPA; American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4—firefighting&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To detect and suppress fires resulting from an Incident of National Significance by providing personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of state, local, and tribal agencies involved in firefighting operations.</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture/Forest Service</td>
<td>Commerce; DOD; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5—emergency management&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To support the overall activities of the federal government for domestic incident management by providing the core management and administrative support functions in support of the NRCC, RRCC, and JFO&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt; operations; ESF 5 is the “support ESF for all federal departments and agencies...from prevention to response and recovery.”</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6—mass care, housing, and human services&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To support the state, regional, local and tribal government and non-governmental efforts to address the nonmedical mass care, housing, and human services needs of individuals affected by Incidents of National Significance. Mass care includes organizing feeding operations and coordinating bulk distribution of emergency relief items; housing involves providing short- and long-term assistance with housing needs; and, human services includes counseling and identifying support for special needs populations.</td>
<td>FEMA American Red Cross</td>
<td>Agriculture (Food and Nutrition Service; Forest Service); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DHS/National Disaster Medical System; Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7—resource support&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To assist DHS and supporting federal, state, and local agencies prior to, during, and after incidents of national significance with emergency relief supplies, facility space, office equipment, office supplies, telecommunications and others services.</td>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>DHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8—public health and medical services&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>To provide coordinated federal assistance to supplement state and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs for incidents of national significance. Federal support can consist of assessment of public health needs, public health surveillance, medical care personnel, and medical equipment and supplies.</td>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>DOD; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DHS; DOT; American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
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<td>9—urban search and rescue</td>
<td>To rapidly deploy the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&amp;R) response system to provide specialized life-saving assistance to state and local authorities during an incident of national significance. US&amp;R activities include locating and extracting victims and providing onsite medical assistance.</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Agriculture (Forest Service); DOD; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DHS/ U.S. Coast Guard; DHS/ Border and Transportation Security Directorate; DOT; U.S. AID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10—oil and hazardous materials response</td>
<td>To provide a coordinated response to actual or potential oil and hazardous materials discharges or releases during incidents of national significance. ESF 10 operates by placing the mechanisms of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) within the broader NRP coordination structure. The NCP describes the National Response System—an organized network of agencies, programs, and resources with authorities and responsibilities in oil and hazardous materials response.</td>
<td>EPA DHS/U.S. Coast Guard</td>
<td>Commerce/NOAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11—agriculture and natural resources</td>
<td>To support state, local tribal and other federal agencies’ efforts to (1) address the provision of nutrition assistance, including determining needs, obtaining appropriate food supplies, and arranging for delivery of the supplies; (2) control and eradication of disease outbreaks and plant infestations; (3) assurance of food safety and security; and (4) protection of natural and cultural resources and historic (NCH) properties.</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture Department of the Interior (NCH properties)</td>
<td>DOD; American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12—energy</td>
<td>To restore damaged energy systems and components during a potential or actual Incident of National Significance; collect, evaluate, and share information on energy system damage and estimations on the impact of energy system outages within affected areas.</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>Agriculture/Rural Utilities Service; Commerce/NOAA; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DHS; Interior; Department of Labor; Department of State; EPA; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13—public safety and security</td>
<td>To provide via federal to federal support or federal support to state and local authorities a mechanism for coordinating and providing non-investigative/ non-criminal law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities and resources.</td>
<td>DHS Department of Justice</td>
<td>Agriculture (Forest Service); DHS/Border and Transportation Security Directorate; DHS/Customs and Border Protection; DHS/ Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14—long-term community recovery and mitigation</td>
<td>To provide a framework for federal support to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of an Incident of National Significance.</td>
<td>Agriculture Commerce DHS/FEMA HUD Treasury SBA</td>
<td>Commerce; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Department of Energy; HHS; DHS; Interior; Department of Labor; DOT; EPA; TVA; American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15—external affairs</td>
<td>To provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace.</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Commerce/NOAA; Department of Justice; Corporation for National and Community Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Catastrophic disasters and incidents of National Significance (INS)

Recognizing that certain disasters are so different in terms of size, scope, and damage that they require a response above and beyond the normal procedures for “emergencies” and “major disasters,” DHS defines and has distinct plans for the federal response to “catastrophic” disasters. Specifically, DHS defines a catastrophic event as:

Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.

Using this definition, DHS makes a number of assumptions about the scenarios that will unfold before, during, and after a catastrophic disaster and attempts to structure the federal response to address those assumptions (and their ramifications). DHS assumes:

- A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of casualties and/or displaced persons;
- The incident may cause significant disruption of the area’s critical infrastructure, including transportation, telecommunications, and public health and medical systems;
- Response activities may have to begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and needs assessment because a detailed, credible operating picture may not be possible for 24 to 48 hours or longer after the incident;
- The federal government may have to mobilize and deploy assets before local and state governments request them via normal protocols because timely federal support may be necessary to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate severe damage; and,
- Large numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and require temporary or longer-term interim housing.

Consequently, in anticipation of or soon after a catastrophic incident, DHS is expected to rapidly — and proactively — provide critical resources to assist and augment the ongoing state and local responses. To do so, when the Secretary of DHS declares a disaster to be “catastrophic,” the department also implements the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Plan. DHS characterizes this annex as establishing the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to certain catastrophic disasters. When this annex is implemented, all federal agencies and others with responsibilities under the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of the National Response Plan are supposed to immediately begin operations. Specifically, DHS expects the federal government and others will need to provide expedited help in one or more of the following areas:

- Mass care (shelter, food, emergency first aid, etc.), housing, and human services;
- Urban search and rescue, such as locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment;
- Decontamination in incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
- Public health and medical support;
- Medical equipment and supplies;
- Casualty and fatality management and transportation for deceased, injured, or exposed victims; and,
- Public information when state and local public communications channels are overwhelmed.

When the Secretary of DHS declares a disaster to be “catastrophic,” the Department implements the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Plan.
Because of fundamental and time-critical differences in catastrophic disasters, FEMA has established protocols to pre-identify and rapidly deploy essential resources. Among other things, FEMA assumes the demands of responding to a catastrophic disaster may mean it has to expedite or even temporarily suspend normal operating procedures for state and local governments to request assistance, doing so proactively rather than in response to things like specific requests based on detailed damage assessments.54 For catastrophic incidents, DHS is supposed to activate and deploy DHS-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in order to accelerate the timely provision of critically skilled resources and capabilities.55 These can include medical and search and rescue teams, transportable shelters, and preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches that may be necessary to save lives and contain damage.

Incidents of National Significance

DHS defines incidents of national significance (INS) as “those high-impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities.” All catastrophic incidents are also “incidents of national significance.”56 DHS bases this definition of an INS on criteria drawn from HSPD-5:57

- A federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security;
- The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities in response to major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act or catastrophic incidents (as defined by DHS, above);
- More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an incident, for example, in response to credible threats or warnings of imminent terrorist attacks; and,
- The President directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident.

Managing the federal response to emergencies and disasters and implementing the National Response Plan

To respond to a disaster or a potential situation that is likely to require a federal response, DHS (on its own or acting via FEMA) uses existing homeland security monitoring operations; creates or activates operational components to manage the federal response; and, designates one or more officials to coordinate. The operational components DHS uses or which can be activated (or take on situation-specific duties) include the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), a National or Regional Coordination Center (NRCC or RRCC), Emergency Response Teams (an Advance Element, ERT-A; and a National team, ERT-N), and, the Joint Field Office (JFO), which can have one or two high-level officials directing and coordinating the federal response.

Homeland Security Operations Center

The Homeland Security Operations Center, which represents over 35 agencies, including state and local law enforcement as well as federal intelligence agencies, is always in operation. It provides situational awareness, and monitors conditions in the United States, and, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Information Analysis, issues advisories and bulletins concerning specific threats to the nation.58 The HSOC continually monitors potential major disasters and emergencies and, when such an event occurs (or is likely) provides primary situational awareness to the Secretary and the White House. Depending on the nature of the incident and the response it demands, the HSOC may activate the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).59

Interagency Incident Management Group

DHS is supposed to convene the IIMG when it declares a situation to be an Incident of National Significance. In addition, DHS should convene the IIMG when it determines there is a need to do so in response to incidents such as major disasters, a heightened threat situation, or, high-profile, large-scale events that present...
high-risk targets, such as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The IIMG is comprised of senior representatives from other DHS agencies, other federal departments and agencies, and non-governmental organizations, such as the American Red Cross, as needed. When activated, the IIMG (1) maintains strategic situational awareness of threat assessments and ongoing incident-related operations and activities; (2) provides decision-making support for incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts; (3) synthesizes key intelligence, frames issues, and makes recommendations with respect to policy, operational courses of action, and resource allocation; (4) anticipates evolving federal resource and operational requirements; and, (5) maintains ongoing coordination with the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the Joint Field Office (JFO) Coordination Group.

Regional Response Coordination Center, National Response Coordination Center

For most major disasters, incidents, or emergencies, DHS (via FEMA) establishes a Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) using staff from regional offices. The RRCC coordinates the initial regional and field activities, such as deployment of advance teams of FEMA and other agencies’ staff, and implements local federal program support until a multi-agency coordination center can be established. Depending on the scope and impact of the event, DHS (via FEMA) may also establish a National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) comprised of ESF representatives and FEMA support staff to carry out initial activation and mission assignment operations from FEMA headquarters. The NRCC supports the operations of the RRCC.

Emergency Response Team-Advance Element, National Emergency Response Team

FEMA’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) is the principal interagency group that staffs the multi-agency coordination center where federal, state, and local officials coordinate and direct response and recovery operations. Each FEMA region maintains an ERT ready to deploy in response to threats or incidents. Before a disaster or incident (when there is warning) or soon thereafter, the RRCC typically deploys an Emergency Response Team-Advance Element (ERT-A) to the affected area(s). The ERT-A conducts preliminary damage and needs assessments and begins coordinating with the state as well as any federal resources that may be part of the initial deployment. For large-scale, high-impact events or when FEMA otherwise determines it is needed, FEMA also deploys a National Emergency Response Team (ERT-N), which is a national-level field response team. FEMA currently has 2 ERT-Ns.

Joint Field Office

The Joint Field Office (JFO) is a multiagency coordination center that FEMA establishes locally to serve as the central point for coordinating and directing the efforts of the federal, state, and local officials involved in the response effort. Often, FEMA establishes the JFO at the state’s emergency operations center or other locations from which the affected state is directing response efforts. For a Stafford Act emergency or major disaster declaration, the President must designate a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to direct all federal assistance in the disaster area.
During an incident of national significance, which may or may not involve a Stafford Act declaration, the Secretary of DHS may designate a Principal Federal Official (PFO) to act as the secretary’s representative in overseeing and executing incident management responsibilities.

The FCO is responsible for managing and coordinating federal assistance in response to declared disasters and emergencies. The FCO has the authority under the Stafford Act to request and direct federal agencies to use their authorities and resources to support or conduct response and recovery operations. The FCO provides overall coordination for the federal components of the JFO and works in partnership and support of the state officials to determine and meet state and local needs for assistance.

The PFO is the primary point of contact and source of situational awareness for the Secretary of DHS for incidents of national significance. The PFO is expected to facilitate federal support to the unified command structure that is set up in conjunction with state and local officials. Also, PFOs coordinate the overall federal incident management and assistance activities throughout all of the phases of emergency management—prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. In carrying out this coordination role, the PFO does not have direct authority over the FCO or other federal and state officials.

The Role of DOD, the National Guard, and the U.S. Coast Guard

The Department of Defense (DOD) makes a distinction between “homeland security” and “homeland defense” in defining mission responsibilities. Whereas homeland security refers to a concerted national effort to secure the homeland from threats and violence, including terrorism, homeland defense refers to military protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. In the context of homeland security, DOD operates only in support of a civilian-led federal agency, referred to as Civil Support (CS). In the area of homeland defense (HD), however, DOD is the lead agency. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASDHD) is charged with leading the Department’s activities in homeland defense, and serves as DOD’s interagency liaison.

Under the National Response Plan (NRP) and the recently released DOD Joint Doctrine on Homeland Security, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) is normally provided only when local, state and other federal resources are overwhelmed and the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) responding to an incident or natural disaster requests assistance. This is a fundamental principle of DOD’s approach to civil support: “It is generally a resource of last resort.”

An exception is in cases of immediate response authority, a scenario entailing imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack requiring immediate action, where local military commanders may take such actions as necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.

The federal military role described in the NRP and the MSCA is apart from National Guard resources available to governors of affected states. Governors may utilize their own National Guard units, as well as other National Guard units made available by state EMAC compacts. In most circumstances, National Guard troops fall under the command of the Governor and the state Adjutant General, and they follow state emergency procedures.

When in state active duty status, the National Guard remains under the command of the governor, not DOD. The National Guard can also be “federalized” by the President to be placed under the command of DOD. As discussed below, a governor may also seek “Title 32 status” for the National Guard, which leaves the governor and the state Adjutant General in command, but provides federal funding and benefits.

Natural disasters and man-made disasters

In the event of a natural disaster or emergency the NRP stipulates that DOD may be asked to provide assistance to DHS and FEMA in an attempt to save lives, protect
property, and lessen the threat of catastrophe in the United States. When disasters occur and a military response is anticipated, DHS/FEMA will request a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to serve as the single DOD point of contact within the disaster area. The DCO will be the operational contact to the designated combatant commander and designated Joint Task Force (JTF) commander.75

In situations when a disaster is anticipated and DOD wants to be forward leaning, Northern Command has designated a DCO prior to a DHS/FEMA request. This is done informally and is intended to allow the DCO to integrate into the state emergency operations center (EOC) as early as possible to begin assessing the needs of the affected area. This has been done in the absence of a Presidential directive and before state authorities have made specific requests for DOD support via FEMA. Additionally, the doctrine of immediate response is a DOD directive which allows deployment of some DOD resources prior to receiving formal requests from the lead federal agency.76

Northern Command

Within the DOD Joint Staff, civil support responsibilities reside with the Joint Director of Military Support. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the DOD coordinating command for domestic terrorist and natural disaster incidents. Northern Command carries out civil support missions with forces assigned as required from all the armed services, typically through the creation of a joint task force.77 NORTHCOM has a permanently assigned Joint Interagency Coordination Group, comprised of liaison officers from other DOD components and other federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security.

As discussed above, unless there is specific direction from the President, requests for military assistance must originate from a lead federal agency. Typically, this falls to FEMA in natural disasters. Requests are submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where they are evaluated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASDHD) according to the following criteria: legality, readiness, lethality, risk, cost, and appropriateness.78

Once the requests are approved by OSD, they are forwarded to the Joint Director of Military Support within the Joint Staff, who in turn provides the appropriate orders to Northern Command. A Defense Coordinating Officer is designated and deployed to the area of incident.

When the size of the response is of a greater scale, a joint task force will be created, with the DCO normally serving as task force commander. The DCO then serves as the single point of contact for DOD resources, but does not have operational control of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or National Guard personnel operating in state active duty or Title 32 status.79

The process for requesting DOD active duty forces has several layers of review. Requests for DOD assistance are to be generated at the state level. These go from the state to FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer, who in turn requests assistance from the DCO. The DCO passes these requests on to the joint task force, which routes it through NORTHCOM to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretariat, to the Joint Directorate of Military Support.80

At each stage, the requirement is validated to ensure that the request can be met and that it is legal to provide the requested assets. Once vetted, the request is tasked to the services and coordinated with Joint Forces Command and forces or resources are then allocated to the joint task force, which in turn gets the support down to the user level by way of the DCO. This process is in place not only to satisfy DOD internal requirements, but to ensure maximum coordination with both FEMA and state governments.

National Guard Bureau

The National Guard is the nation’s first military responder to events within the United States. Governors historically rely on the Guard to assist civilian authorities during times of natural or manmade disasters. In particular, the National Guard is a major asset in responding to any catastrophic incident within the United States. The National Guard is a reserve component of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, at times, called in to support federal operations. The National Guard is also a force for each state, deploying for state duty status under the control of the governor. Only the National Guard has the unique dual mission of providing forces at both the state and federal levels and is the only service that abides by two oaths-of-office, one to the governor and one to the President of the United States.81
The governor has command and control of the National Guard, either in state active duty or Title 32 status, unless units are federalized. If federalized under Title 10, the Guard falls under the command and control of the President. While on state active duty status, the Guard’s mission is to serve its state or territory during times of crisis, disaster, civil disturbance or other threats to life and property as directed by the governor. They are funded by state dollars and are entitled to state benefits and compensation. Under Title 32 status, the National Guard is trained and resourced to support federal war-fighting operations, yet remains under control of the governor, while supported by federal funds with Secretary of Defense approval.

During Hurricane Katrina, the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana requested that all National Guard forces deployed to their states operate under Title 32 status. This request was granted retroactively to August 29 by the Secretary of Defense. Under Title 32, the governors were in command of all National Guard assets and actions during Hurricane Katrina.

The National Guard may also be called up by a governor at his or her own initiative, paid by the state, to respond to a state emergency or protect state facilities. Many states do not have the fiscal resources to use the National Guard extensively in this manner.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is the home of the leadership of the National Guard, headed by a Chief, who is supported by the Director of Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard. These positions, filled by military Guard personnel, are Title 10 positions. The current chief of the National Guard Bureau is Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, and although he is the senior Guard officer, he does not command National Guard forces. Lieutenant General Daniel James, III is the Director of the Air National Guard and Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn is Director of the Army National Guard.

Under the National Response Plan, the role of the National Guard Bureau is not defined. However, in roughly 50 percent of the states and territories, the Adjutant General also serves as the state’s senior emergency management official, responsible for coordinating and integrating all response agencies. The National Guard Bureau and the National Guard of the individual states and territories work on a daily basis with local, state, and federal civilian agencies in various communities in all of the states and territories.

United States Coast Guard

The Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service within the Department of Homeland Security and one of the nation’s five armed services. Since its founding as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has provided maritime safety and security capabilities, and is renowned worldwide for its search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, whether near the shore or hundreds of miles at sea. Title 14 of the United States Code requires the Coast Guard to develop, establish, maintain and operate rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Additionally, with the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002, the Coast Guard was given added responsibilities for the enforcement of port safety, security, and marine environmental regulations including the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities, deepwater ports and waterways safety.

The Coast Guard has a longstanding history in the Gulf of Mexico region. The current Eighth Coast Guard District, headquartered in New Orleans, covers all or part of 26 states throughout the Gulf coast and heartland of America. It stretches from the Appalachian Mountains and Chattahoochee River in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west, and from the U.S.-Mexico border and the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border in North Dakota, which
includes 15,490 miles of coastline and 10,300 miles of inland navigable waterways.\textsuperscript{88}

Within the Coast Guard’s District boundaries, the operational Coast Guard is organized into Sectors which oversee response, prevention, and logistics units, and coordinate Coast Guard operations within the Sector’s geographic boundaries. The areas most affected by Hurricane Katrina are those that fall within the boundaries of Sector New Orleans and Sector Mobile, Alabama.

Private authorities and capabilities — role of the American Red Cross

The American Red Cross (Red Cross) is the only nongovernmental organization with lead agency responsibilities under the NRP. The Red Cross is an independent, non-governmental organization (NGO)\textsuperscript{89} that operates as a nonprofit, tax-exempt, charitable institution pursuant to a charter granted by the United States Congress.\textsuperscript{90} It has the legal status of a “federal instrumentality” due to its charter requirements to carry out responsibilities delegated by the federal government. Among those responsibilities are:

- to perform all duties incumbent upon a national society in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the Geneva Conventions to which the United States is a signatory, to provide family communications and other forms of assistance to members of the U.S. military, and to maintain a system of domestic and international disaster relief, including mandated responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).\textsuperscript{91}

The Red Cross is not a federal agency, nor does it receive federal funding on a regular basis to carry out its services and programs.\textsuperscript{92} It receives financial support from voluntary public contributions and from cost-recovery charges for some services.\textsuperscript{93} Its stated mission is to “provide relief to victims of disasters and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.”\textsuperscript{94}

To meet its mandated responsibilities under the NRP, the Red Cross functions as an ESF primary organization in coordinating the use of mass care resources in a presidentially declared disaster or emergency.\textsuperscript{95} As the lead agency for ESF #6, dealing with Mass Care, Housing and Human Services, the Red Cross assumes the role of providing food, shelter, emergency first aid, disaster welfare information and bulk distribution of emergency relief items.\textsuperscript{96} ESF #6 includes three primary functions: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services.\textsuperscript{97}

- Mass Care involves the coordination of nonmedical care services to include sheltering of victims, organizing feeding operations, providing emergency first aid at designated sites, collecting and providing information on victims to family members, and coordinating bulk distribution of emergency relief items.

- Housing involves the provision of assistance for short- and long-term housing needs of victims.

- Human Services include providing victim-related recovery efforts such as counseling, identifying support for persons with special needs, expediting processing of new Federal benefits claims, assisting in collecting crime victim compensation for acts of terrorism, and expediting mail services in affected areas.

Function 1: Mass Care

- The NRP describes the Mass Care function as comprised of six elements: coordination, shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, Disaster Welfare Information (“DWI”), and bulk distribution.\textsuperscript{98}

- The coordination element relates to assisting victims obtain various forms of available federal assistance, as well as gathering information about shelters and food kitchens for victims.

- The shelter element includes the use of pre-identified shelters, creating temporary facilities capable of housing victims, and coordination of obtaining shelters outside of the immediate incident area.

- The feeding element includes a variety of food distribution sites, from mobile food carts, to kitchens, to bulk distribution of food.

- The emergency first-aid element consists of assisting victims with the most basic first-aid needs, as well as, coordinating the referral of victims to local hospitals, if needed, and other appropriate medical treatment options.

- The Disaster Welfare Information (“DWI”) element provides for family connectedness services. It aims
to re-connect families displaced or separated by the incident, as well as assist victims of the incident to connect with family or friends located outside the area of the incident.

■ The bulk distribution element provides emergency relief items, principally ice, water and food, at specific sites to meet the urgent needs of victims within the affected area.

Function 2: Housing

The housing function addresses both the short and long-term housing needs of victims affected by an incident. It is effectuated through programs designed to meet the individualized needs of victims and includes a variety of options, including provision of temporary housing, rental assistance, or financial assistance for the repair or replacement of original residences.

Function 3: Human Services

The human services function implements programs and services to assist victims restore their livelihoods. It acts as a broad-based, multipurpose effort to support divergent needs such as re-routing of mail, assistance with processing federal benefits-related paperwork, assuring the provision of necessary mental health services, and providing other important, sometimes victim-specific services. The wide range of services may include support for victims with disabilities and victims who do not speak English.

With its shelters, feeding kitchens, and blood distribution capabilities, the Red Cross has long played an important role in assisting those affected by natural disasters — especially hurricanes. Due to the frequency of hurricanes in the United States, the Red Cross has developed an expertise in deploying its resources and operational capabilities to help those affected by hurricanes. In its 23-page Tropical Storm and Hurricane Action Plan, the Red Cross outlines its systematic approach to preparing for and responding to tropical storms and hurricanes. “The objective of this plan is to enable the Red Cross to be ready to deliver immediate services and assistance needed by those threatened and affected by such storms at an appropriate scope and scale,” the report says.

Additionally, as the NRP-model to disaster planning takes shape, the Red Cross’ preparation regime is being bolstered with a Standard Operating Procedure Document for ESF #6. Although not formally adopted and still in the draft stage, the document identifies the procedures, protocols, information flows and organizational relationships for the activation, implementation and operation of the Red Cross’ responsibilities under ESF #6. There is also an interim Shelter Operations Management Tool Kit, which provides Red Cross chapters and shelter managers with resources to plan, open, operate, and close shelters.

Adhering to the concept of all disasters being local, the Red Cross relies on its field chapters to act as first responders in opening shelters and providing for the feeding of those in need. The first 48 hours of a disaster are usually handled by the local Red Cross chapters, and thereafter by national-level support, as both the federal government (FEMA), and the Red Cross National Headquarters, begin to reach the affected area. The national Red Cross is structured to provide relief (mostly shelter and feeding) from days two through 30 of a disaster. The local chapter ultimately is supported by its service area, of which there are eight in the United States, followed by support from the National Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
For disasters such as hurricanes, the Red Cross’ actions prior to landfall typically begin with activating the chapter response plans in all of the areas threatened by the storm. Simultaneously, the jurisdictional service areas move into the Service Area Major Disaster Response Structure (“Disaster Response Structure”). At this time the service areas establish their contacts with the affected state’s emergency operations center (“EOC”). This often involves positioning a Red Cross official at the state EOC. The service area then begins deploying resources to the threatened areas as called for under the chapters’ planning requirements. Also, at this pre-landfall time, a disaster relief operations headquarters is established.

During the pre-landfall stage, the local chapter is to focus on several key activities: sheltering, feeding, public information, fundraising and maintaining contact with government officials, specifically emergency management officials. While the chapter response operation is arming itself with the necessary resources, the service areas shift into their Disaster Response Structure. The service area personnel are responsible for implementing the necessary facility arrangements so that storm victims can be sheltered and fed. The service area also deploys additional personnel to the chapter regions. Once the Disaster Response Structure is opened, the national headquarters shifts its Disaster Operations Center into hurricane response mode. At this point, personnel from Headquarters’ Preparedness and Response division are able to monitor developments and deploy additional resources as necessary.

Following landfall of a hurricane, the affected chapters continue their focus on the key activities of sheltering, feeding, disaster assessment, providing public information and liaising with government officials. After the shelters and feeding kitchens are opened, the chapters expand their role to include bulk distribution of supplies. Supplies include toiletries packages, clothing and blankets, and as the storm passes, clean-up supply packs, including mops, rakes, trash bags, and cleaning supplies to assist storm victims clean their residences and neighborhoods.

As the impact of the disaster becomes better understood, a Disaster Relief Operation Headquarters is established in the region. The operations headquarters is activated, meaning operational oversight and direction of Red Cross relief activities is transferred to the on-site headquarters. As the disaster headquarters staffs up, the service area’s role decreases.

Outside of the affected region, other service areas and the national headquarters remain poised to assist as necessary. The main opportunities for other service areas involve shifting resources, such as cots, blankets, and other warehoused supplies, to the affected region. Personnel at national headquarters monitor events in the field and leverage relationships with national agreements with suppliers, partner groups and agencies.

**Service area major Disaster Response Structure**

Upon the approach of a threatening hurricane, “the service area reconfigures its structure, priorities and actions to provide support, guidance and resource assistance to its threatened chapters.” The Disaster Response Structure, led by a response manager, is comprised of four departments or cells. These are the planning cell, forward headquarters cell, information and resource management cell, and the service area response operations.

**Planning cell**

The planning cell is focused on ensuring adequate services and logistics support. “The planning cell develops an anticipated service delivery plan and deploys the forward headquarters cell, which enables the relief operation to begin service delivery immediately after the storm makes landfall.” The planning cell is tasked with determining the necessary scope of Red Cross service delivery, an estimated budget and the estimated length of time needed to serve the affected area. The planning cell is the heart of decision making as it relates to what people need, where they need it, and, based on a damage assessment, how long will services be necessary.

**Response manager**

The response manager oversees the disaster response. The manager’s responsibilities include ensuring adequate levels of staffing throughout the response organization, conducting staff meetings with the Disaster Response team, leading conference calls with the affected chapters, ensuring that adequate reports are compiled for coordination with state and federal emergency
management officials, and assuring the sufficient movement of assets, both human and material, to the affected region.\textsuperscript{121}

**Forward headquarters cell**

The forward headquarters cell is “the deployed unit of the planning cell.”\textsuperscript{122} Its most important task is to establish a relief operation headquarters and to receive Red Cross personnel, both paid Red Cross employees and volunteers, and material resources.\textsuperscript{123} Essentially this group serves as the advance team prior to the opening of a headquarters operation near the affected area.

**Information and resource management cell**

The information and resource management cell is a tactical team that concentrates on gathering information and supporting the local chapters in the evacuation of people.\textsuperscript{124} While the Red Cross does not physically transport evacuees, it is often the recipient of a large percentage of evacuees, as shelters are established. This group establishes reporting requirements, coordinates data gathering (such as shelter tallies), monitors the inbound flow of resources to shelters, helps acquire vehicles, and handles all issues related to the immediate deployment of resources, including maintaining computer systems, managing supply warehouses, and ensuring all invoices are properly processed.\textsuperscript{125}

**Service area response operations**

The day-to-day paid operations staff of the service area coordinate fundraising and communications and provide the institutional knowledge of the affected area.\textsuperscript{126} Armed with the right data, and knowledge of the area, the information and resources management cell can help provide essential services to those in need.\textsuperscript{127}

**State, local, and private authorities and capabilities**

**Typical local and state emergency management responsibilities**

Whether the response is coming from local or state officials—or both—most emergency management agencies and government plans assume it may take 24 to 72 hours to get assistance to individuals, particularly those who remain in affected areas. Consequently, successful emergency management can, in part, depend on individuals’ willingness to evacuate to places where more immediate assistance may be available (when time and circumstances permit) and/or their preparedness to survive independently for the 24 to 72 hours that responders expect it will take to first deliver assistance.

Nonetheless, as discussed elsewhere in this report, primary responsibility for the first response to any potential or imminent incident or disaster begins — and often stays — at the local and state levels. In most situations, emergency management in the U.S. envisions a process of escalation up from the local level as incidents grow or as it becomes known that an incident has overwhelmed local and state capabilities.\textsuperscript{128}

**Local emergency management**

First responders — local fire, police, and emergency medical personnel who respond to all manner of incidents such as earthquakes, storms, and floods — have the lead responsibility for carrying out emergency management efforts. Their role is to prevent, protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery from emergencies, including natural disasters. Typically, first responders are trained and equipped to arrive first at the scene of an incident and take action immediately, including entering the scene, setting up a command center, evacuating those at the scene, tending to the injured, redirecting traffic, and removing debris.\textsuperscript{129}
Local governments — cities, towns, counties or parishes — and the officials who lead them are responsible for developing the emergency operations and response plans by which their communities respond to disasters and other emergencies, including terrorist attacks. Local emergency management directors are also generally responsible for providing training to prepare for disaster response and they seek assistance from their state emergency management agencies when the situation exceeds or exhausts local capabilities. In many states, they may also negotiate and enter into mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions to share resources when, for example, nearby jurisdictions are unaffected by the emergency and are able to provide some assistance.

Particularly relevant to the preparation for Hurricane Katrina, local officials have significant responsibilities for either setting evacuation laws and policies or working with their state government to enforce state laws pertaining to evacuations. According to the National Response Plan, depending on the terms of the state or local laws, local officials have “extraordinary powers” to, among other things, order evacuations. In addition, local officials may suspend local laws and order curfews.

State emergency management

As the state’s chief executive, the governor is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the state’s citizens and generally has wide-ranging emergency management responsibilities, including requesting federal assistance when it becomes clear the state’s capabilities will be insufficient or have been exhausted. Governors are responsible for coordinating state resources to address the full range of actions necessary to prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents such as natural disasters.

Upon their declaration of an emergency or disaster, governors typically assume a variety of emergency powers, including authority to control access to an affected area and provide temporary shelter. Also, in most cases, states generally authorize their governors to order and enforce the evacuation of residents in disaster and emergency situations. The federal government generally defers to the states to enact laws dealing with evacuation, with local officials—as mentioned earlier—typically responsible for working with state officials to enforce those laws.

Governors also serve as the commanders-in-chief of their state military forces, specifically, the National Guard when in state active duty or Title 32 status. In state active duty — to which governors can call the Guard in response to disasters and other emergencies — National Guard personnel operate under the control of the governor, are paid according to state law, and can perform typical disaster relief tasks, such as search and rescue, debris removal, and law enforcement. Most governors have the authority to implement mutual aid agreements with other states to share resources with one another during disasters or emergencies when, for example, others (particularly nearby states) are unaffected by the emergency and able to provide assistance. Most states request and provide this assistance through the EMAC.

State emergency management agencies — reporting to their respective governors — have primary responsibility for their states’ disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. These agencies typically coordinate with other state agencies as well as local emergency response departments to plan for and respond to potential or imminent disasters or emergencies. Among other things, state emergency management agencies are responsible for developing state emergency response plans, administering federal grant funding, and, coordinating with local and federal agencies to provide training and other emergency response-related activities. Some states, such as Louisiana and Mississippi, spell out specific tasks or preparatory steps emergency management agencies must take to meet their responsibilities.

Governors are responsible for coordinating state resources to address the full range of actions necessary to prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents such as natural disasters.
Specific state and local emergency management and homeland security laws and roles and responsibilities—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans

Alabama

Governing statutes

Two Alabama statutes address how the state prepares for and responds to emergencies and disasters: the Alabama Emergency Management Act of 1955 (EMA) and the Alabama Homeland Security Act of 2003 (HSA). The EMA authorizes the state to prepare for and manage disasters and emergencies. It also authorizes the state to make grants to local governments to assist their emergency management activities and improve preparedness. The HSA established a state Department of Homeland Security (and other entities) to coordinate and undertake state homeland security preparedness, planning, and response activities.141

Roles and responsibilities

State documents detail the specific options and steps available to the chief executive, including an analysis of gubernatorial prerogatives, including:142

First and foremost, the governor must understand and accept the fact that he/she is the primary person responsible for response and crisis management within his/her state. All citizens look to their governor as the person ultimately responsible. That is not to take away from the local responsibility of mayors, city councils, and county commissions, but, in truth and fact, “the buck stops at the governor.” Secondly, although the governor must be the leader of his/her state, the governor must also be prepared to delegate. This statement may seem rather simplistic since every governor in the United States is confronted with so many governmental and administrative decisions, on a daily basis, that they obviously need to be able to delegate. On the other hand, in the case of an emergency catastrophe situation, the number of issues that arise are exponentially greater than ordinary day-to-day issues of government, they are unusual, sometimes technical in nature, they require instantaneous decisions, as opposed to general governmental issues which commonly allow for consideration and even collaboration among advisors and affected entities. In these regards, in order to delegate, it is extremely important that the governor has surrounded himself/herself with an outstanding group of cabinet officials who are not only qualified but who are both qualified and capable of responding in emergency situations. This is most particularly true of the adjutant general of the state’s National Guard, the director of the state’s Department of Homeland Security, and the office of the director of the state’s office of Emergency Management. Obviously each of these positions is a key appointment for every governor, but when confronted with a catastrophic emergency, the importance of the quality and qualifications of the persons holding these positions becomes extraordinarily important. Thirdly, an emergency operations center and a communications system which are capable of and designed to operate under emergency conditions become a key element of the governor’s ability to communicate, manage, and lead through the crisis. Finally, there must be pre-planning (“emergency operations plan”) that sets out clearly policies, procedures, and responsibilities that will be required to meet all known emergency catastrophe situations. These must be coordinated with local emergency management officials and local government officials.143

Consistent with the National Response Plan and the practices of other states, in Alabama responsibility for emergency preparedness and response begins at the local level and escalates as the emergency exceeds the capabilities of each level of government. The state’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) spells this out, specifying that, “When a disaster is imminent or has occurred, local governments have the primary
responsibility and will respond to preserve life and property. . . . When disaster conditions appear likely to exceed the combined capabilities of a local jurisdiction and mutual aid compact signatories, local governments will request the support of the state…. If the capabilities (financial or operational) of state government are exceeded, the governor can request federal disaster emergency assistance.”

Alabama’s statutes authorize and direct local governments to establish emergency management organizations (agencies), appoint directors for these organizations, and confer police officer powers on their officials. In addition, local directors of emergency management may develop mutual aid agreements with public or private agencies (such as nearby counties) for emergency aid and assistance during disasters and emergencies. These local directors and some of their personnel must, if they choose to receive state funding, meet state-set performance and competence standards for their positions.

Alabama’s statutes outline specific responsibilities of the state’s Emergency Management Agency as well as its Department of Homeland Security. The state EMA has overall responsibility for preparing for and managing disasters and emergencies. Its director is appointed by the governor and also serves as an assistant director for the state’s Department of Homeland Security. To meet its obligations, the state EMA promulgates a statewide Emergency Operations Plan with policy and guidance for state and local disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery operations. The plan also outlines state and local government responsibilities in relation to federal disaster assistance programs under the Stafford Act.

Alabama’s Director of Homeland Security, also appointed by the governor, heads the state’s Department of Homeland Security and has overall responsibility for the state’s homeland security preparedness and response activities. Specific state Department of Homeland Security responsibilities include: receiving and disseminating federal intelligence; planning and executing simulations; ensuring cooperation among public officials and the private sector; coordinating receipt and distribution of homeland security funding; and coordinating state strategy and standards for homeland security efforts.

**Mississippi**

**Governing statutes**

The Mississippi Emergency Management Law outlines the specific responsibilities of key state entities and emergency responders and provides for the coordination of emergency preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation activities among state agencies, local and federal governments, and the private sector. The law establishes the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA); confers emergency powers on the governor, MEMA, municipal and county governments; and, authorizes the establishment of the Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan (MEOP).

**Roles and responsibilities**

Consistent with the National Response Plan and the practices of other states, in Mississippi responsibility for emergency preparedness and response begins at the local level and escalates as the emergency exceeds the capabilities of each level of government. Among other things, Mississippi’s governing statute spells out that “state policy for responding to disasters is to support local emergency response efforts,” but it also recognizes that catastrophic disasters can overwhelm local resources and that, as a result, the state “must be capable of providing effective, coordinated, and timely support to communities and the public.”

The state’s statute authorizes (but does not direct) counties and municipalities to create emergency management organizations, which are in turn authorized to do the various things necessary to handle emergency management functions in a disaster. Local governments are also authorized to enter into mutual aid agreements within the state (for example, with nearby counties) for emergency aid and assistance during disasters and emergencies. If a disaster or emergency “exceeds the capability of local resources and personnel, state resources may be made available through coordination” with MEMA. Local authorities are mandated to “recognize the severity and magnitude” of the emergency by (1) declaring a local emergency, (2) utilizing the localities own resources and (3) Designating one capable person to make requests to MEMA for additional resources.
The governor of Mississippi is granted broad powers to deal with a natural disaster and may assume direct operational control over all state emergency management functions. For example, the governor is authorized to “determine needs for food, clothing or other necessities in the event of attack, natural, man-made or technological disasters and to procure supplies, medicines, materials, and equipment.” As commander-in-chief of the state militia, the governor may order the Mississippi National Guard into active state service.

The MEMA director, appointed by the governor, is responsible for, among other things: working with the governor to prepare and implement an emergency management plan that is coordinated with federal and state plans to the fullest extent possible; adopting standards and requirements for local emergency management plans; determining needs for equipment and supplies; planning for and procuring supplies, medicine and equipment; and, assisting political subdivisions with the creation of urban search and rescue teams. In addition, the MEMA director is authorized to create mobile support units to reinforce disaster organizations in stricken areas. MEMA’s director also serves as a liaison to the emergency management agencies of other states and the federal government.

Louisiana

Governing statutes

The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act outlines the specific responsibilities of key state entities and emergency responders and provides for the coordination of activities among state agencies and local and federal governments. The law establishes the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), confers emergency powers on the governor and parish and municipal governments, and requires the establishment of the Louisiana Emergency Management Plan (EOP).

Roles and responsibilities

In Louisiana, parish and municipal governments’ chief executives by law have overall responsibility for the direction and control of emergency and disaster operations and are assisted by a local homeland security and emergency preparedness director. Their responsibilities include the development and implementation of emergency management programs to provide for rapid and effective action to “direct, mobilize, staff, train and coordinate use of local resources.”

Louisiana’s governor has overall responsibility for emergency management in the state and is assisted in these duties by the LOHSEP director in meeting dangers to the state and people presented by emergencies or disasters. The governor is authorized, for example, to declare a disaster or emergency if she or he finds that one has occurred (or the threat is imminent) and coordinate delivery of all emergency services (public, volunteer, and private) during a natural disaster.

By making a disaster or emergency declaration, the governor activates the state’s emergency response and recovery program (which is under the command of the LOHSEP director). This authorizes the governor to, among other things: (1) utilize all available resources of the state government and of each political subdivision of the state as reasonably necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency; (2) direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened areas within the state if deemed necessary for the preservation of life; and, (3) prescribe routes, modes of transportation, and destination in connection with evacuation.

The LOHSEP, within the Military Department and under the authority of the governor and the adjutant general, is responsible for emergency preparedness and homeland security in the state. The LOHSEP prepares and maintains a homeland security and state emergency operations plan (EOP), which establishes the policies and structure for the state’s management of emergencies and disasters. The EOP prescribes the phases of emergencies and disasters—preparedness, response, recovery and prevention (mitigation)—and outlines the
roles and responsibilities of the state’s Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), which mirror those in the National Response Plan. The EOP is an all-hazards plan, assigning responsibilities for actions the state will take to provide for the safety and welfare of its citizens against the threat of natural and man-made emergencies and disasters. The EOP is designed to coordinate closely with the federal National Response Plan as well as parish Emergency Operations Plans.

New Orleans

The City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (“New Orleans Plan”) is consistent with the State of Louisiana Emergency Management Plan. The plan reflects the principle that “City government bears the initial responsibility for disaster response and relief.” It is therefore the Mayor of the City of New Orleans who must initiate, execute, and direct the operations during any emergency or disaster affecting the City of New Orleans.

According to the New Orleans Plan, “If it becomes clearly evident that local resources are inadequate to fully manage the effects of an emergency or disaster, the Mayor may request state and/or federal assistance through [LOHSEP].” The New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness (“NOOEP”) will coordinate with the LOHSEP to assure the most effective management of such assistance.

The plan also says, “The authority to order the evacuation of residents threatened by an approaching hurricane is conferred to the Governor by Louisiana statute.” But this power “is also delegated to each political subdivision of the State by Executive Order.” “This authority empowers the chief elected official of New Orleans, the Mayor of New Orleans, to order the evacuation of the parish residents threatened by an approaching hurricane,” according to the plan.

For example, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, according to the plan, is responsible for giving the order for a mandatory evacuation and supervising the actual evacuation of the population. The city’s Office of Emergency Preparedness “must coordinate with the state on elements of evacuation” and “assist in directing the transportation of evacuees to staging areas.”

The New Orleans Plan states, “The safe evacuation of threatened populations . . . is one of the principle reasons for developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.” The city’s evacuation plan states, “The city of New Orleans will utilize all available resources to quickly and safely evacuate threatened areas.”

The plan also directs “[s]pecial arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves or who require specific life saving assistance. Additional personnel will be recruited to assist in evacuation procedures as needed.” The evacuation plan further warns that “[i]f an evacuation order is issued without the mechanisms needed to disseminate the information to the affected persons, then we face the possibility of having large numbers of people either stranded and left to the mercy of the storm, or left in areas impacted by toxic materials.”

Threats and vulnerabilities related to hurricanes

General threats — frequency of hurricanes and vulnerable coastal areas in the U.S.

Hurricanes threaten the United States, particularly the coastal areas along the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean, virtually every year. While Florida is the state most frequently hit, other states — particularly Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina — have frequently been struck by hurricanes, according to the records of the National Hurricane Center (NHC). The coastal areas of these and other states are among the most vulnerable to storm surge, which carries the greatest potential for loss of life in a hurricane. Storm surge is the water that swirling hurricane force winds push toward the shore as the storm advances. Combined with normal tides, this can increase the average water level by 15 feet or more.

Flooding is also a serious threat to lives and property in a hurricane. The NHC reports that, although storm surge has the greatest potential to take lives, in the last 30 years, more people have died from hurricane-induced inland flooding.
flooding.\textsuperscript{181} Tornadoes can also add to the destructive power of a hurricane. While not all hurricanes produce them, according to the NHC, studies have shown that more than half of the hurricanes that reach landfall produce at least one tornado.

Specific vulnerabilities of New Orleans— inherent vulnerability to flooding

Metropolitan New Orleans is built on subsiding swampland on the delta of the Mississippi River, which makes the city inherently vulnerable to flooding.\textsuperscript{182} The City of New Orleans is shaped like a bowl, with an average elevation of 6 feet below sea level.\textsuperscript{183} Some elevations are as high as 12 feet above sea level, and some elevation are as low as 9 feet below sea level.\textsuperscript{184} The Mississippi River, which flows through the middle of New Orleans, is on average 14 feet above sea level, and Lake Ponchartrain, which establishes the northern border of New Orleans, is on average one foot above sea level.\textsuperscript{185}

New Orleans and its surrounding areas have experienced numerous floods from both the Mississippi River and hurricanes.\textsuperscript{186} A major flood on the Mississippi River completely inundated New Orleans in 1927, and others following severe rainstorms damaged parts of the city in 1979 and 1995.\textsuperscript{187} Several hurricanes have hit New Orleans, including Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, Hurricane Georges in 1998, and Hurricane Lilli in 2002.\textsuperscript{188} The greatest threat from hurricanes is not wind, but storm-surge, which accounts for most of the damage and deaths caused by hurricanes.\textsuperscript{189}

Levees designed, built to address vulnerabilities

After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, federal and state governments proposed a number of flood control projects to deal with the threat of hurricanes and the flooding they might cause in New Orleans.\textsuperscript{190} These included a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and levees along Lake Pontchartrain and several other waterways.\textsuperscript{191} One of the major projects is formally called the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project.\textsuperscript{192} This project included levees along the Lake Pontchartrain lakefront, the 17th Street Canal, the London Avenue Canal, the Orleans Avenue Canal, the Intercoastal waterway, the Industrial Canal, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and others.\textsuperscript{193} Although the project was federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with shared costs.\textsuperscript{194}
3 See Id. at App. B; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO/T-RCED-93-46, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation’s Response Strategy (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter GAO, Recent Disasters].
6 See Bea, \textit{Transfer of FEMA}; GAO, \textit{Disaster Management}.
9 See Bea, \textit{Transfer of FEMA}.
11 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with City of New Orleans officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005) [hereinafter Select Comm. New Orleans Interviews].
12 See Elizabeth B. Bazan, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 33090, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act: \textit{Legal Requirements for Federal and State Roles in Declarations of an Emergency or a Major Disaster} (Sept. 16, 2005).
13 Select Comm. New Orleans Interviews.
15 See Id. at 1-5.
16 See Id. at 1-2; http://www.emacweb.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
20 See FEMA, \textit{Disaster Process} [FEMA allows that, when an obviously severe or catastrophic event occurs, Governors may request a major disaster declaration prior to conducting a damage assessment].
21 See FEMA, \textit{Disaster Process} [Specifically, FEMA provides three categories of disaster assistance: (1) individual assistance; (2) public assistance; and (3) hazard mitigation assistance. Individual assistance is a combined FEMA-State program that provides money and services to people in the affected area whose property has been damaged or destroyed and whose losses are not covered by insurance. Individual assistance from FEMA can consist of funds to rent temporary housing, grants to repair damage that is not covered by insurance, and grants for “necessary and serious needs” such as medical or funeral expenses. Individual assistance can also include federally subsidized loans from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to repair or replace homes, personal property or businesses that sustained damages not covered by insurance]; See FEMA, \textit{Disaster Process} at 4 (Public assistance funds, through grants or SBA loans, the repair, restoration, reconstruction or replacement of public facilities or infrastructure damaged or destroyed by a disaster. Eligible recipients include state and local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations, such as educational, medical, rehabilitation or permanent custodial care facilities. Recipients may use their public assistance funds for projects such as debris removal and repair of road systems, bridges, and/or water control facilities); See FEMA, \textit{Disaster Process} at 4-5 (Hazard mitigation assistance supports measures to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards and their effects. For eligible projects, the federal government pays up to 75 percent of the costs with states providing a 25 percent match. Eligible mitigation measures under this program include buying or relocating property located in high hazard areas (such as flood plains); elevating flood-prone structures; and, seismic rehabilitation of existing structures].
25 See NRP at 1.
26 See Id. at 11.
28 Id. at ix, 1-4.
29 See NRP at xi-xiii.
30 Id. at 11.
31 See Id. at ESF-i-iv.
32 Id. at ESF#1-1-5.
33 Id. at ESF#2-1-12.
34 Id. at ESF#3-1-8.
35 Id. at ESF#4-1-5.
36 Id. at ESF#5-1-5.
37 National Response Coordination Center (NRCC); Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC); Joint Field Office (JFO).
38 NRP at ESF#6-1-8.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE


NRP at 42.

Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at IV-1.


Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at vii, IV-10-IV-15; NRP at 37.

Bowman, Katrina: DOD Response at 3, 4.

Civil support for incidents in Hawaii and the Pacific territories is provided by U.S. Pacific Command.

Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at IV-12; Bowman, Katrina: DOD Response at 3, 4.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

54 Bowman, Katrina: DOD Response at 3, 4.
54 Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at IV-10-12.
54 Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Types of Duty, 1 (undated) (on file with the Select Comm., No. MMTF 00415-05).
54 Id.
80 Id.

84 Letter from Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 2, 2005) (on file with the Select Comm.); Letter from Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 4, 2005) (on file with the Select Comm.); Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 5, 2005) (on file with the Select Comm.); Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army and Acting Secretary of the Air Force (Sept. 7, 2005) (authorizing Title 32 status for Katrina Disaster Relief activities, on file with the Select Comm.).

85 Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Army Regulation 130-5 AFMD 10, Organization and Functions of the National Guard Bureau (Dec. 30, 2001).


89 See Debra Spar and James Dail, Essays: The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations: Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 171, 180 note 1 (“Strictly defined, NGO stands for “non-governmental organization” and would thus include any group that does not fall under the purview of the government. Taken to the extreme, this would include private companies, religious congregations, and trade unions. For the most part, however, the term NGO is used to refer to organizations that (1) are tax exempt, (2) have a decisionmaking body separate from the government, (3) consist, at least in part, of volunteers and donations, (4) have a charter or mandate within a specific development arena, and (5) consist of a formal organization (in other words, are registered as organizations)”.


92 Id.
93 Id.


95 NRP at 3.
96 Id. at 12, ESF #6-5.
97 Id. at ESF #6-5.
98 Id. at 2
99 Id. at ESF #6-3.
100 Id.

101 American Red Cross, Tropical Storm and Hurricane Action Plan, 1 (undated) [hereinafter American Red Cross, Storm Action Plan].

102 Id.

103 American Red Cross, American Red Cross Responsibilities Under the Federal Response Plan (Aug. 2001) (Internal Red Cross planning document on file with the Select Comm.).

104 American Red Cross, Interim Shelter Operations Management Toolkit, iii (Sept. 2005) (It is not clear to what extent this document was utilized in the Red Cross’s response to Hurricane Katrina).

105 American Red Cross Storm Action Plan at 2 (“The chapters serving the affected area provide the initial incident response in their respective communities, report their activities and assessments and are augmented by human and material resources and guidance, in a coordinated manner, from the service area or national headquarters”).


107 Id.


109 Id. at 3.
110 Id. at 3
111 Id. at 4.
112 Id. at 5.
113 Id.


115 American Red Cross Storm Action Plan at 3.

116 Id. at 7.
117 Id. at 9.
118 Id. at 9-18.
119 Id.

120 Id. at 9.
121 Id. at 9.
122 Id. at 12.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 15.
126 Id. at 16.
127 Id.
128 See NRP at 6 (incidents typically managed at the lowest possible level); FEMA supra note 10; DHS supra note 27 at ("most incidents are managed locally"); Bazan supra note 12 (summary—federal resources supplement state and local).
129 See GAO: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance Capabilities at 7-8.
131 See Bea, Disaster Evacuation Policy 132 at 1-2.
132 See Bea, Statutory Authorities at 4.
133 See Bea, Disaster Evacuation Policy 132 at 1-2.
134 See Bea, Statutory Authorities at 10.
135 See Bea, Disaster Evacuation Policy 132 at 1-2.
136 See Bea, Statutory Authorities at 4.
137 See Bea, Disaster Evacuation Policy 132 at 1-2.
138 Id. at 5-6.
142 State Chief Executives Emergency Response: Hurricanes & Other Disaster Emergencies: State Of Alabama Experience (on file with the Select Comm., Nos. 000659AL-000666AL).
143 Id.
145 Id. at 2-3.
146 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, State of Alabama Emergency Management Agency, in AL (Oct. 11-12, 2005).
147 See Bea, Alabama Authorities at 2.
149 Id. at 1.
150 See Bea, Alabama Authorities at 2.
152 Id.
153 Id. at § 33-15-2.
154 See Bea, Mississippi Authorities at 2.
155 Id. at 3.
158 See Bea, Mississippi Authorities at 1; Bea, Alabama Authorities at 4.
160 See Bea, Louisiana Authorities at 1-3.
162 Id. at 7.
163 Id. at 9.
165 Id. at §§ 724-725.
166 LA Emergency Operations Plan at 1.
168 Id. at 4.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 51.
172 Id.
173 Id.


New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Un-Watering Plan Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1 (Aug. 18, 2000) (While we use the term “sea level,” the technical measurement used by the Corps is National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) which was developed by observing the mean sea level height at various locations around North America).


Mittal, Testimony at 2.


Mittal, Testimony at 2.


Dec. 15, 2005 Senate Hearing (written statement of Max. L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District at 2); R.B. Seed, et al. at 1-3.

Mittal, Testimony at 2.


Dec. 15, 2005 Senate Hearing (written statement of Col. Richard P. Wagenaar) at 1-2; Mittal, Testimony 182 at 3; The Industrial Canal is also known as the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal.

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Pezza, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Dec. 9, 2005); Mittal, Testimony at 3.
“Preparing for an event like Hurricane Katrina or any natural disaster, we should never feel like we are completely prepared. We can always do better.”

Robert R. Latham Jr.
Executive Director,
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
Select Committee hearing, December 7, 2005
As Hurricane Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico, Gulf coast states and the federal government prepared for landfall in the region.

Pre-landfall preparation by FEMA

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) positioned an unprecedented number of resources in affected areas prior to Katrina’s landfall. Indeed, FEMA’s efforts far exceeded any previous operation in the agency’s history. A staggering total of 11,322,000 liters of water, 18,960,000 pounds of ice, 5,997,312 meals ready to eat (MREs), and 17 truckloads of tarps were staged at various strategic locations in and near the Gulf region prior to Katrina’s landfall. FEMA also pre-positioned 18 disaster medical teams, medical supplies and equipment, and nine urban search and rescue task forces (US&R) and incident support teams. Rapid Needs Assessment Teams also were deployed to Louisiana on the Saturday before landfall. In Louisiana alone, on August 28, a total of 36 trucks of water (18,000 liters per truck) and 15 trucks of MREs (21,888 per truck) were pre-staged at Camp Beauregard. FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team, which consists of FEMA, the National Weather Service, and state and local emergency management officials and is tasked with coordinating closely with FEMA Headquarters staff by phone and video conferencing systems, was activated and deployed to the National Hurricane Center on August 24 in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina’s making landfall. FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments were pre-positioned in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to provide emergency satellite communications capability.

According to former FEMA Director Michael Brown, prior to landfall, FEMA reached out to other agencies for assistance, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) for potential movement of strategic airlift support.

By 10 a.m. on Monday, August 29, the morning Katrina made landfall, 31 teams from the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) had been deployed to staging areas in Anniston, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Houston, Dallas; and New Orleans, including 23 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams. The teams, trained to handle trauma, pediatrics, surgery, and mental health problems, brought truckloads of medical equipment and supplies with them. By September 1, 72 hours after landfall, FEMA had deployed more than 57 NDMS teams and 28 US&R teams with nearly 1,800 personnel to save lives and render medical assistance. FEMA had also supplied generators and thousands of cots and blankets.

Pre-landfall preparation in Mississippi

Preparations for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi involved an array of actions, including county and state preparedness and disaster response training in the months leading up to the storm; the establishment of local, state, and federal command structures by way of emergency proclamations; activation of emergency operations centers (EOCs); evacuations, many of them mandatory, of the areas and types of homes most in danger from a hurricane; and, the opening of emergency shelters to which those evacuating could flee. Preparation by the military in Mississippi largely took place through activation of the state’s National Guard and some initial requests for Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) assistance with security, engineering support, and helicopters.

Following a request from Governor Haley Barbour, on Sunday, August 28, President Bush issued an emergency declaration for Mississippi. Following a further request from Barbour, on Monday, August 29, President Bush declared a major disaster in Mississippi.

Disaster preparedness training — Mississippi

For several years, Mississippi’s Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) has been using federal emergency preparedness grant funds to improve its counties’ abilities to prepare for and respond to disasters. In 2000, 43 of Mississippi’s 82 counties had active county emergency management programs; MEMA used DHS emergency
management performance grant funds, including a $1.3 million allocation in fiscal year 2005, to increase this to 79 active county programs in 2005. In addition, the MEMA reported that, as of early 2005, over 1,200 first responders had received training in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). During the summer of 2005, the director of MEMA, Robert Latham, his key staff, and most of Mississippi's county emergency management directors underwent training in NIMS and the NIMS Incident Command System (ICS). At approximately the same time, the FEMA officials who would later lead the federal response in Mississippi (Bill Carwile and Robert Fenton) also participated in extensive ICS training. Fenton was described by Carwile as having been involved for a long time in developing training for subjects such as the ICS and as an expert in how to adapt it for large scale operations, such as the response to Katrina. Carwile and Latham said they believe their training in the ICS and the ability it gave them to quickly establish a unified command were positive elements of the state's preparation for and response to Katrina.

Establishment of command structures in Mississippi

Mississippi issued its first Hurricane Katrina situation report on August 23 and, through Thursday, August 25, continued monitoring the storm. According to this situation report, during these three days, MEMA conducted executive planning sessions to develop an EOC activation timeline as well as plans for protective actions and a proactive response. It also established contact with a FEMA logistics cell and began encouraging the public to prepare for the storm.

On Friday, August 26, Mississippi activated its National Guard, and MEMA activated its EOC on Saturday, August 27. At that time, it also deployed County Liaisons to six counties (Jackson, Harrison, Hancock, Pearl River, Stone, and George) and activated its State Emergency Response Team (SERT) for deployment to Camp Shelby the next day, August 28. The SERT established forward operations at Camp Shelby at 3 p.m. on August 28. According to the MEMA Director's brief, as of about 7 p.m. on August 28, 18 counties and 11 cities and towns had issued local emergency proclamations; by early morning of August 29, this had increased to 41 counties and 61 cities and towns.

FEMA's liaison arrived at the state's EOC on Saturday, August 27. FEMA's Emergency Response Team-A (ERT-A) arrived the same day, August 27, when the state activated its EOC. On August 28, MEMA reported that FEMA was deploying resources to a Regional Mobilization Center in Selma, Alabama, and that FEMA's ERT-A would be able to supply large quantities of water and ice to the hardest hit areas.

Evacuations in Mississippi

Although the governor could order mandatory evacuations, longstanding practice in Mississippi rests that authority with local governments. However, the state is generally included in any discussions about evacuation orders because, once a city or county chooses to make such an order, state responsibilities for managing traffic (including contra flow) and opening shelters can come into play. In preparing for Hurricane Katrina, the state worked through the MEMA liaisons it dispatched to the counties along or near the Gulf coast as well as a representative it had stationed in Louisiana's EOC (because of contra flow agreements between Mississippi and Louisiana that provide for evacuations out of southeast Louisiana through Mississippi).
Emergency shelters—Mississippi

On August 27, MEMA urged Mississippi’s coastal counties not to open local shelters in order to encourage people to evacuate north.23 MEMA described coastal county shelters as an option of “last resort.” On Sunday, August 28, MEMA reported that Red Cross shelters were open and on standby in the coastal counties.

Mississippi began opening shelters as early as August 28. MEMA reported 51 shelters open with 475 persons registered at that time and 36 additional shelters available on standby as needed.24 In addition, MEMA indicated the Jackson Coliseum had been open as a shelter (and individuals were authorized to bring pets) and three special needs shelters had been established.25 According to the Director’s brief, also on August 28, MEMA reported the Red Cross had begun opening shelters that morning, bringing the total available shelters to 68 prior to the opening of the Jackson Coliseum.26

By August 29, just prior to landfall, MEMA reported 57 shelters were open with 7,610 persons registered in them. An additional 31 shelters were available on standby to open based on need.27 The Jackson Coliseum opened as expected the day before and by early morning August 29 was reported by MEMA to be at capacity. Similarly, all Red Cross central Mississippi shelters were reported to be full as of 4:30 a.m. on August 29.28 Two additional special needs shelters opened, bringing their total to five.29

Military preparation in Mississippi

Military preparation in Mississippi began as early as August 26 when, as noted earlier, the Governor activated the state’s National Guard.30 Mississippi’s National Guard has over 12,000 troops, with Army and Air National Guard components, both under the direction of the Adjutant General (TAG), Major General Harold A. Cross.31 Throughout the preparation and response to Katrina, Mississippi’s Guard reported to and received taskings (or mission assignments) from MEMA.32 The Mississippi National Guard has an Operations Plan, (OPLAN MSSTAD) on top of MEMA’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, that was used during Hurricane Katrina.33 Refined and updated in an order issued to Mississippi Guard on June 1, 2005, this operations plan was validated during Hurricane Dennis, July 7 to 10, 2005.34

On August 27, Mississippi’s Guard accelerated its preparations by alerting state emergency personnel to assemble for hurricane operations on the Mississippi Gulf coast under Joint Task Force Magnolia.35 In doing so, Mississippi’s National Guard assembled and pre-positioned at all three coastal county EOCs its special “hurricane strike” squads; each squad consisted of 10 military police (MPs), 15 engineers and five trucks.36 In addition, the Guard placed on alert the following units from throughout the state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>223rd EN BN</td>
<td>Camp McCain, MS (Grenada, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>890th EN BN</td>
<td>Home Station Armories (located in the coastal region)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112th MP BN</td>
<td>Camp Shelby, MS (Hattiesburg, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>367th MAINT. CO</td>
<td>Home Station (Philadelphia, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687th TRANS CO</td>
<td>Home Station (Southaven, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387th QM WATER</td>
<td>Home Station (Leland, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th FINANCE</td>
<td>Home Station (Jackson, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172nd AW</td>
<td>Home Station (Jackson, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186th ARW</td>
<td>Home Station (Meridian, MS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cross noted that these assets “were sufficient for a Category II storm, but as Katrina approached the Gulf coast on August 28, it became apparent that additional forces from outside the state would be required.”38 As a result, that afternoon, he initiated requests for assistance via the EMAC. The first such request, relayed to the on-site National Guard Bureau Liaison Officers (LNO) was for an additional MP Battalion, two more Engineering Battalions, and 3 CH-37 helicopters.39 That same day, August 28, the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center in Washington, D.C., sent LNOs to Mississippi, with the first going to Mississippi’s Joint Force Headquarters, followed by officers sent to the three coastal county EOCs and to MEMA’s Operations Cell to facilitate out of state National Guard assets.40

In addition, Cross established at Gulfport a Forward Operations Center that eventually combined state and federal (including active duty) logistics support personnel.41 In response to questions regarding the Guard’s preparations, including the EMAC assistance it received, Cross said, “This greatly assisted in the command and control and situational awareness of all operations. As forces flowed into the state, more liaison teams were established in each county EOC that had Guard operations...
in that county. This was a very efficient system since the National Guard headquarters was linked directly with each county for coordination of relief efforts.\textsuperscript{42}

The Guard’s preparation in Mississippi was not, unfortunately, without incident. Prior to the storm’s landfall, Sgt. Joshua Russell, Detachment 1, Company A, 89th Engineers, was killed when attempting to rescue an elderly couple in Harrison County.\textsuperscript{43}

Pre-landfall preparation in Alabama

Final preparation for Katrina in Alabama began in earnest four days prior to landfall when it became evident the path of the storm pointed towards the Gulf coast. Three days prior to landfall, the Governor’s staff participated in frequent videoconference calls with personnel from FEMA, the National Hurricane Center, including its director Max Mayfield, senior staff at the White House, and senior staff from the Governors’ offices from Louisiana and Mississippi.\textsuperscript{44} The Governor’s staff indicated they were satisfied with the federal support they received and that Max Mayfield’s briefings were particularly valuable.\textsuperscript{45}

In Alabama’s southernmost counties, Baldwin and Mobile, preparations began five days before the storm, when they started regular consultations with the National Hurricane Center, the State of Alabama Emergency Management Agency, and the National Weather Service in Mobile to discuss the storm’s likely path and strength.\textsuperscript{46} Information was then disseminated to all local officials and first responders and staff prepared to activate the EOCs.\textsuperscript{47}

On August 28, 2005, Governor Riley wrote to President Bush, asking that he “declare an emergency disaster declaration for the State of Alabama as a result of Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing.”\textsuperscript{48} That same day President Bush “declared an emergency . . . for the State of Alabama.”\textsuperscript{49}

The next day, Monday, August 29, Riley wrote to President Bush again, this time asking him to "declare an expedited major disaster . . . as a result of Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing."\textsuperscript{50} That same day, President Bush issued a major disaster declaration for Alabama.\textsuperscript{51}

Establishment of command structures in Alabama

On Friday, August 26, Riley declared a state of emergency to handle what was then thought would be a surge of evacuees from the Florida panhandle. The state went into what they call Level II response and expected to receive 10 to 15 percent of Florida’s evacuees.\textsuperscript{52} A Level II response activates the Alabama EOC on a 24-hour basis, and all relevant agencies are activated and necessary personnel are assigned to staff the EOC.

One day later, on Saturday, August 27, a Level I response was activated.\textsuperscript{53} The EOC was operating in full force, with desks staffed for each ESF. A FEMA Emergency Response Team - Advance (ERT-A) was on site late in the day. An ERT-A team is a small FEMA contingent with capabilities for planning, operations, communications, and logistics. A total of five to eight people from the Atlanta-based FEMA region IV were on site at the EOC. The Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) expressed some frustration with FEMA’s late arrival. AEMA officials believed that had FEMA been on site sooner with a larger contingent, Alabama may have been able to acquire needed resources and commodities more quickly.

President Bush spoke to Riley on Saturday, August 27, two days prior to landfall, to ensure the Governor had everything he needed. The Governor’s staff indicated they felt they were better prepared for Katrina than they were for Hurricanes Dennis and Ivan.\textsuperscript{54} In addition to implementing many of the lessons learned from previous hurricanes, the Governor’s staff believes one key element of the state’s response to Katrina was the state’s proactive communications strategy.

On Friday, August 26, as the storm gathered in the Gulf, the Governor personally visited all of the counties in the Gulf, holding numerous press conferences to urge local residents to evacuate pursuant to the mandatory evacuation orders.\textsuperscript{55} In Alabama, the failure to obey a mandatory evacuation order is a misdemeanor enforced by county or municipal police.\textsuperscript{56}

The Alabama EOC is divided into five clusters of desks, and each desk is equipped with computers, telephony and other management tools.\textsuperscript{57} The five clusters are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency services</td>
<td>ESF #s 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human services</td>
<td>ESF #s 6, 8, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure and support</td>
<td>ESF #s 10, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations support</td>
<td>ESF #s 14, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and planning</td>
<td>ESF #s 5, 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is a station for each ESF function and stations for all of the involved agencies, federal and state, including FEMA, EMAC, Army Corps of Engineers, National Guard, Alabama State Police, among others.58

One of the tools Alabama uses to respond to local disaster needs is the EM-2000 incident log, a Lotus Notes-based system which captures, in log book fashion, emergency events and requests from each of the 67 counties.59 Each activity or request logged into the system gets assigned to one of the desks in the EOC for attention.

If a report comes in regarding individuals who are trapped and in need of rescue, the event will be assigned to the personnel in the emergency services cluster. Multi-ESF teams involving state police (ESF #13), transportation (ESF #1), and urban search and rescue (ESF #9) huddle to coordinate the optimal response. Events can be reported and tracked by ESF, by status, by county, and by a number of other custom data elements. Documents related to information requests, as opposed to action requests, are later scanned and attached. The EM-2000 data files appear to serve as the central universe of actions and documents related to the state’s response to the storm.

Applying the lessons learned from Hurricane Ivan, the state upgraded the tracking system used to determine hospital bed vacancies, giving state officials real-time visibility of surge capacity and making it possible to better direct those with special medical needs to appropriate sites.60 The state health office also has the capability to conduct daily conference calls with county health staff to assess status and needs. Health officials staff their own emergency operations center, linked by computer and phone to the main state EOC in Clanton.

Evacuations in Alabama

Even before any evacuations began, AEMA and state transportation officials participated in the FEMA regional Evacuation Liaison Team conference calls, during which emergency managers from Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi shared information on the status of evacuation routes, road closures, traffic volumes, hotel availability, and other interstate implications of significant population migrations in the region.61

On the morning of August 29, Shelby County, Alabama, posted a message on the statewide EM2000 system saying the “Shelby County Humane Society will house animals during the emergency. Can house small animals as well as farm animals for a short duration.”62 More than 50 pets were evacuated from Mississippi and brought to Maxwell Air Force Base, where they were taken in by families on the base until the pet owners could be located.63

Pre-landfall preparation in Louisiana

On Saturday, August 27, Louisiana Governor Blanco wrote to President Bush, requesting that he “declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina for the time period beginning August 26, 2005, and continuing.”64 Later that same day, President Bush declared an emergency for the state of Louisiana.65 William Lokey was named Federal Coordinating Officer.66

On Sunday, August 28, in recognition of the potential catastrophic impact of Hurricane Katrina, Blanco asked President Bush, prior to landfall, to “declare an expedited major disaster for the State of Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina, a Category V Hurricane approaches our coast . . . beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing.”67 The next day, President Bush declared a major disaster for Louisiana.68
Establishment of command and safeguarding of assets

The State of Louisiana took a number of steps to prepare for the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, including getting the EOC up and running with its full staff complement by the afternoon of Friday, August 26. The EOC conducted communications checks with all the state agencies and parishes on Thursday, August 25 – four days before landfall.

The state EOC then began holding regular conference calls with all state agencies, key parishes, federal agencies, other states, and the Red Cross to coordinate pre-landfall activities among all the different authorities. These calls began at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 26, with five calls on Saturday, four calls on Sunday, and a final call Monday morning as the storm hit but before communications went out. In addition, several state agencies moved key assets northward, stockpiled critical supplies, positioned teams to do post-landfall damage assessments, or otherwise prepared for the hurricane.

The Louisiana Department of Fish and Wildlife coordinated with the Louisiana National Guard in advance to get boats placed on trailers and pre-positioned at Jackson Barracks in New Orleans in anticipation of flooding and the need for waterborne search and rescue.

There were also preparations at the parish level. As noted, the parishes participated in conference calls with the state. Plaquemines Parish, one of the southern parishes most exposed to the storm, parked vehicles on high ground, gathered administrative records and moved them north, transferred prisoners to upstate facilities, and set up an emergency command post in a local high school.

Jefferson Parish, part of metropolitan New Orleans, also took a number of preparatory steps. According to Emergency Management Director Walter Maestri, they implemented their "Doomsday Plan" to hunker down in their EOC with a skeleton crew to minimize the number of people exposed to the hurricane's damage.

The Louisiana National Guard (LANG) and other state agencies went on alert and began staging personnel and equipment. By Saturday, August 28, the day prior to landfall, the LANG had pre-positioned 9,792 MREs and 13,440 liters of water at the Superdome, the "shelter of last resort." The state also had positioned teams north, out of harm's way, prior to landfall, and the first requests for EMAC teams were issued as well.

On Saturday, August 28, the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) fueled up its fleet based at its Eastern New Orleans facility and moved buses not providing service to higher ground on a wharf near downtown New Orleans. Buses that were providing regular service were also eventually moved to the wharf as well.

Evacuations in Louisiana

The state was actively involved in executing the Southeast Louisiana evacuation plan, with the Department of Transportation and Development and the Louisiana State Police working to manage traffic and implement "contraflow" — making all highway lanes outbound to maximize traffic flow and minimize traffic jams.

The Governor was personally involved in monitoring contraflow, which ran from Saturday at about 4:00 p.m. to Sunday at about 6:00 p.m.

State officials coordinated the contraflow with the states of Mississippi and Texas, since Louisiana interstates fed into these states. In a conference call at 6:30 a.m. Saturday morning, it was recommended that the evacuation plan for southeast Louisiana be implemented.

The state began staging assets necessary to execute an evacuation, including alerting and activating National Guard troops, pre-deploying traffic cones and barriers to key locations, and coordinating plans among all of the parishes. Some parishes had already begun evacuation proceedings. By 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, August 28, traffic was light, so contraflow was halted, but residents could still evacuate on the outbound lanes once the highways were returned to their normal configuration.

Up to 1.2 million Louisiana residents followed the evacuation orders and evacuated themselves in their private vehicles. However, it later became apparent that thousands of residents, particularly in New Orleans, did not evacuate or seek shelter, but remained in their homes.

The parishes began declaring evacuations on Saturday, August 27 at 9:00 a.m. These declarations had been coordinated among the state and parishes in advance as part of Louisiana’s emergency evacuation plan, which calls for the most southern parishes to evacuate first so that, as
they drive north, they do not encounter traffic bottlenecks in New Orleans or Baton Rouge. While some parishes (e.g., Plaquemines and St. Charles) began the process with “mandatory” evacuation orders, most parishes began with “recommended” evacuation orders and upgraded these to “mandatory” orders later on Saturday or Sunday. Some of the parishes farther north (e.g., St. Tammany, Tangipahoa) declared mandatory evacuation orders only for residents living in low-lying areas or manufactured homes.

Some parishes also asked nongovernmental organizations to help evacuate those residents that did not have their own vehicles. Both New Orleans and Jefferson Parish have a program called “Brother’s Keeper” run by the parishes in conjunction with local churches and the Red Cross. According to Maestri, the parish had a phone bank in the EOC manned by volunteers that help take the calls and match up riders with drivers once the evacuation was announced. By Sunday evening, most of the parishes reported empty streets and had declared dusk-to-dawn curfews.

Emergency shelters in Louisiana

Louisiana also set up shelters as part of its evacuation plan. A “Sheltering Task Force” led by the Department of Social Services and the Department of Health and Hospitals, coordinated its activities with the state EOC and parishes through the aforementioned conference calls. Specific shelters were designated along the main evacuation routes, including both general population shelters and special needs shelters. These efforts were coordinated with both Mississippi and Texas, which set up shelters once Louisiana shelters began to fill.

Several parishes also established “shelters of last resort” for residents that could not evacuate or had delayed leaving. Parish officials Ebbert and Maestri told Select Committee staff they purposefully designate these shelters at the last minute so people will not use them as an excuse to avoid evacuation. New Orleans, which had already designated the Superdome as a shelter for the special needs population, also designated that facility as a “shelter of last resort” on Sunday, August 28. The Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned 9,792 MREs and 13,440 liters of water at the Superdome.

The RTA also ran at least 10 paratransit vehicles to the Superdome and then on to the Baton Rouge area for “special needs” citizens; each of these vehicles made at least two trips. All service ceased at approximately 7:00 p.m. Sunday night, approximately 10 hours before Katrina was due to make landfall and as conditions worsened. Jefferson Parish also designated four facilities as “shelters of last resort.” According to Maestri, unlike the Superdome, these locations in Jefferson Parish did not have any prepositioned medical personnel or supplies but they did have pre-positioned food and water.

Pre-landfall preparations by DOD, the National Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Coast Guard

DOD

In preparation for the last part of the 2005 hurricane season, the Secretary of Defense approved a standing order on August 19 that allowed the commander, U.S. Northern Command, to use military installations and
deploy Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) as needed to coordinate directly in support of FEMA in affected states. As the force provider to Northern Command, the U.S. Joint Forces Command issued general instructions on August 20 on how it would task units in support of any Northern Command requests to support FEMA.99

On August 23, Northern Command began tracking the tropical depression that became Hurricane Katrina. On August 24, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Northern Command, and the National Guard Bureau participated in a teleconference with FEMA on what would be needed to respond to Katrina. Joint Forces Command issued a warning order to military services to be ready to support requests for assistance. Northern Command issued a similar warning order on August 25, the day Katrina struck Florida as a category 1 storm.100

On August 26, Northern Command issued an execute order, setting initial DOD relief actions into motion. The initial response was focused on Florida, but DCOs were also activated for Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.101

On August 27, Northern Command received its first mission assignment from FEMA, to provide Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana as a federal operational staging area. The same day, the Corps of Engineers positioned teams and supplies in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In New Orleans, the commander of the Corps’ New Orleans District evacuated most of his staff to alternate locations to be ready to respond when the storm passed. Other active military units ordered similar evacuations of personnel and equipment. In addition, the Louisiana National Guard aviation officer requested helicopter support from the National Guard Bureau, and support was coordinated through the EMAC.102

On August 28, DCOs were deployed to Mississippi and Louisiana. Northern Command took several additional steps to organize military assets that might be needed, including deployment of Joint Task Force-Forward (eventually Joint Task Force-Katrina) to Camp Shelby, Mississippi and a general alert to DOD assets potentially needed, particularly aviation assets.103

On the day Katrina made landfall, August 29, the Deputy Secretary of Defense led an 8:30 a.m. meeting to get damage assessment for DOD facilities and review resources that might be required from DOD to support hurricane relief. The Secretary of Defense was briefed on DOD’s readiness and Northern Command issued several more alerts in anticipation of requests for assistance.104

National Guard
At the beginning of each hurricane season, National Guard Bureau (NGB) personnel participate in an interagency conference to assess potential response shortfalls and identify potential solutions that could be resolved through EMAC requests.105 NGB planners conducted this EMAC conference in the spring of 2005 with participants from Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, and South Carolina. The Joint Staff J3 Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) also participated. The participants in these conferences believe that EMAC is capable of providing most military capabilities needed by states for hurricane disaster relief operations.

The role of the NGB grew in preparation for Guard response to Hurricane Katrina. On August 24, it issued an executive order calling on its Joint Staff to provide proactive planning and staffing support to states potentially affected by then-tropical storm Katrina. NGB Liaison Teams (LNOs) were sent to Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.106 On Wednesday, August 24, the first teleconference between NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, Guard Headquarters, and FEMA was held to discuss DOD support to federal authorities.

The Joint Operations Center at the NGB geared up as the operations center for Katrina response.107 The heads of the Army and Air National Guard also use this center for coordination of effort. During Hurricane Katrina preparation and response, the Joint Operations Center provided daily intelligence updates, logs of current operations, daily teleconferences, and coordination with states on logistical assistance; maintained communications with states and other agencies; and, coordinated Guard aviation assets.

On August 25, the NGB began hosting daily teleconferences with the operations officers of the Gulf states’ Adjutant Generals. The Adjutant Generals reported their preparations to respond, and were asked if they needed out of state assistance.108 Some of them had already contacted or were contacted by other nearby states to arrange for assistance via the EMAC in the form of personnel and equipment that might be needed.109

On Sunday, August 28, reports into NGB by state Adjutant Generals indicated that 4,444 Army National Guard and 932 Air National Guard in Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana were ready to respond. Both General Bennett C. Landreneau of Louisiana and Cross of Mississippi requested additional aircraft from EMAC via NGB. Consequently, these requests were considered state-to-state requests for assistance, not federal requests involving FEMA or OSD, even though NGB facilitated the assistance. On Monday, August 29, NGB noted that 65 Army National Guard aircraft were in position in Florida, Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

The Louisiana National Guard
The Louisiana National Guard is an integral part of managing emergencies in the state. The Adjutant General, Landreneau, wears two hats, as he is head of both the National Guard and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). The National Guard plays a significant role in emergency command and control because of the dual role of the Adjutant General. Also, many of the personnel who staff the state’s EOC are guardsmen.

On Friday, August 26, Blanco authorized the mobilization of 2,000 Louisiana guardsmen. The next day, Landreneau called an additional 2,000 to active duty. By the end of the day on Saturday, 3,085 Louisiana National Guard troops had been fully activated. Coordination also began with other states for additional aviation assets for search and rescue and EMAC support, if needed.

Before Katrina hit, Louisiana National Guard soldiers screen residents entering the Superdome.

The Louisiana National Guard participated in a number of preparation missions, including law enforcement, traffic control, shelter support and security, and securing operations at the Superdome. Many guardsmen were also embedded with state and parish officials and later used their radios to help these officials reestablish some minimal level of communications. Before Katrina hit, guardsmen provided support for general purpose shelters and special needs shelters by providing medical personnel.

The Alabama National Guard
The Alabama National Guard has 13,200 troops, with Army and Air National Guard components falling under its Adjutant General, Major General Mark Bowen. The Adjutant General is also a member of the Governor’s Cabinet, but is not dual-hatted as the emergency response coordinator. Although he participates in the state’s EOC, Bowen’s chain of command is a direct line to the governor. The Alabama Guard has developed and is organized around mission-oriented joint force packages, (i.e., hurricanes, snow and ice storms). Task forces typically include security forces, engineers, medical, communications, special operations forces, logistics and a command and control cell. Alabama also has a voluntary state militia that is administered by the National Guard. They are used to augment the Guard force and have approximately 2,000 to 3,000 members.

During the Alabama National Guard’s preparation phase, which began six days before Katrina hit, Guard assets monitored the storm track and began discussions with the NGB. By August 26, Riley ordered 3,000 Alabama National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty and requested Secretary of Defense approval of 180 days of military duty. Approval was granted by DOD on September 7 and was retroactive to August 29.

Two days before the storm, a National Guard liaison officer was dispatched to the state EOC in Clanton. On August 28, two National Guard Task Forces were formed, gathered pre-positioned supplies (food, water, ice, gas) from Maxwell Air Force Base, and equipment, including generators,
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

fuel trucks, and aviation assets. Guard assets also began deployment to assist Mobile and Baldwin County Emergency Management activities.

Mississippi National Guard

The Mississippi National Guard has 12,041 troops, with Army and Air National Guard components falling under Adjutant Major General Harold A. Cross. The Adjutant General reports directly to the Governor, but is not dual-hatted as the state emergency management officer. Mississippi’s emergency response is handled by the state’s emergency management agency, MEMA.

On August 28, 2005, the Mississippi National Guard alerted state emergency personnel to assemble for hurricane operations on the Mississippi Gulf coast under Joint Task Force Magnolia. National Guard special “hurricane strike” squads were pre-positioned at all three coastal county EOCs. Recommended but voluntary evacuation of civilians brought bumper-to-bumper traffic along Highway 49 northbound, from the beach in Gulfport to Jackson. By Sunday evening, numerous mandatory evacuation orders were in effect, and Mississippi National Guard Soldiers took shelter at Camp Shelby, 62 miles north of the predicted landfall area. These Guard personnel moved south after the storm had passed to begin assisting with response and recovery efforts.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), another active duty military unit, provided substantial resources to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Under the National Response Plan, the USACE, as the lead federal agency for public works and engineering (ESF #3), provides relief and response support to FEMA. To meet these responsibilities, USACE has pre-awarded competitively bid contracts for all of these functions to allow quick deployment of resources prior to and immediately after an event. These pre-awarded contracts are part of USACE’s Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI), which has been in place for about six years.

USACE took a number of preparatory steps in anticipation of the hurricane season in general and for Hurricane Katrina specifically. Over the summer, the USACE New Orleans District participated in an annual hurricane preparedness exercise conducted by the regional headquarters. In July 2005 the district sponsored a hurricane preparedness conference for federal, state, and local emergency managers.

In addition, USACE had equipment and supplies, including those needed to repair levees, pre-positioned in various locations along the Gulf of Mexico. When Katrina approached, the New Orleans District monitored the situation and evacuated most staff, establishing a temporary district headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The district commander and eight staff remained in New Orleans, retreating to a bunker designed to withstand a category 5 hurricane. Their objective was to monitor the levee system, stay in contact with local officials, and provide post-storm assessments to the USACE chain of command.

U.S. Coast Guard

Well before arriving in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina was closely watched by Coast Guard officials as the storm approached and eventually passed through southern Florida. By Thursday, August 25, the Seventh Coast Guard District, based in Miami, had prepared for Katrina’s arrival by partially evacuating Coast Guard boats, aircraft, and personnel, and closely monitoring Katrina’s progress across the Florida peninsula. As Katrina cleared the Seventh District, the Eighth District was busy executing hurricane plans in anticipation of Katrina’s arrival.

On August 27, the Eighth Coast Guard District’s Incident Management Team (IMT), based in New Orleans, relocated to St. Louis in accordance with Coast Guard hurricane plans. The Eighth District set heightened readiness for all units, ordered the evacuations of personnel and dependents from units along the Gulf coast in the anticipated impact zone, and closed the entrance to the lower Mississippi river to all commercial maritime traffic.

On August 28, the Coast Guard activated personnel to support air and swift boat operations under ESF-1, and positioned liaison officers at FEMA regions IV and VI, and to state EOCs in Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi. The Coast Guard’s computer hub in New Orleans dropped off-line, resulting in no computer or internet connectivity to all coastal ports within the Eighth District. Coast Guard units resorted to using phone and fax machines to communicate.
The Eighth District Commander requested additional Coast Guard air assets and personnel to support rescue and recovery operations. Coast Guard aircraft and crews from Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, New Jersey, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas were pre-staged to provide rapid support. Eighth District Commander Rear Admiral Robert Duncan contacted Blanco to discuss damage assessments and response efforts.

Sector New Orleans operations and critical communications personnel evacuated to Alexandria, Louisiana. Non-essential Coast Guard personnel and dependents in the New Orleans area evacuated to the Naval Air Station in Meridian, Mississippi. Coast Guard helicopters originally located in New Orleans relocated to Houston and Lake Charles, Louisiana to avoid Katrina’s path, and prepared to begin rescue operations. All Coast Guard cutters and small boats relocated to safe locations, or traveled out to sea to avoid the storm.

In Mississippi, a Coast Guard Incident Management Team was established in Meridian. Duncan contacted Barbour to discuss damage assessments and response efforts. Non-essential personnel and dependents from the Gulfport and Lockport areas relocated to Naval Air Station Meridian. In Alabama, helicopters from Aviation Training Center Mobile deployed to Shreveport and Jacksonville for storm avoidance, and prepared to respond. Also, a Transportable Multi-mission Communications Center was pre-staged at Sector Mobile to provide temporary communication support. Non-essential Coast Guard personnel and dependents relocated to Maxwell Air Force Base.

On August 29, the day Katrina made landfall, the Sector New Orleans Incident Management Team was established in Alexandria, LA. Outside of the forecasted area of impact, Coast Guard Disaster Assistance Teams from Ohio, Kentucky, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Miami were pre-positioned to the region to respond as soon as conditions permitted.

During normal conditions, there are 15 helicopters assigned within the Eighth Coast Guard District, along with four fixed-wing aircraft and 16 cutters. Within 12 hours of Hurricane Katrina making landfall, the Coast Guard assigned 29 helicopters, eight fixed-wing aircraft, and 24 cutters to the area to support rescue operations.

Pre-landfall preparations by the American Red Cross

The Red Cross’ Gulf coast-area preparation was far along two days before Katrina made landfall in the Gulf coast. As of 2:00 p.m. on August 27, Carol Hall of the Red Cross reported to the White House and the Department of Homeland Security, among other governmental organizations that it “has every resource at its disposal on alert/moving in anticipation of this event to include personnel, equipment, and materials.” According to Hall, key aspects of this preparation included:

- Chapters across the region opened shelters in support of evacuations in all states.
- 275,000 HeaterMeals were staged in Baton Rouge, LA.
- 225,000 HeaterMeals were staged in Montgomery, AL.
- 15 sites were identified to bring in big kitchens with the support of Southern Baptists to provide 300,000-meals-per-day feeding capability.
- All 14 Disaster Field Supply Center warehouses loaded supplies, including 50,000 cots, 100,000 blankets, comfort and clean-up kits.
- All vehicles in the Red Cross fleet across the country were placed on alert for possible deployment and were dispatched to staging areas.
- All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles (ECRVs) deployed to staging areas.
- Red Cross staff deployed to NRCC, Region VI RRCC, Region IV RRCC, ERT-As and other ESF #6 posts.

Red Cross volunteers unload supplies in preparation for Katrina.
By August 28, the Red Cross started to understand the magnitude of Katrina. One of its Disaster Operations Reports remarked, if Katrina makes landfall at its current pressure, “it will be the most intense storm to hit the US mainland.” On the same day it was reported, “For the first time ever, an ESF6 coordination center will be set up tomorrow at American Red Cross national headquarters to coordinate the deliver [sic] mass care services with our governmental and non-governmental organization partners.”

As Katrina made landfall on August 29, the Red Cross was fully staffing all of the relevant state and federal EOCs, including Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, FEMA Regions IV and VI's RRCC, FEMA's NRCC, as well as ERT-A teams in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Sites for 25 kitchens to feed as many as 500,000 people were identified and pre-staged.

Trajectory and impact of Hurricane Katrina

Finding: The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life

Timeline of Hurricane Katrina and NWS Warnings to Federal, State and Local Officials

At 5:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) (4:00 Central Daylight Time (CDT), the National Weather Service (NWS) reported that Katrina’s projected path had shifted 150 miles to the west (toward Mississippi) and projected that Katrina would make landfall as a category 4 storm. By 10:00 p.m. CDT that same night, the NWS projected that landfall was most likely at Buras, Louisiana, 65 miles south-southeast of New Orleans. NWS proved extremely accurate; the final landfall location was only 20 miles off from Friday’s forecast. Since meteorological conditions that affect the track and intensity of the storm were relatively stable, NWS was especially certain of the accuracy of its prediction, even 56 hours from landfall.

At 10:00 a.m. CDT, on Saturday, August 27, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) issued a hurricane watch for southeast Louisiana, including New Orleans, which was extended to Mississippi and Alabama later that afternoon. Later that evening, between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. CDT, 35 hours before landfall, Max Mayfield, the director of the NHC called state officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to inform them of the storm’s intensity and its potential to be devastating and catastrophic. At Governor Blanco’s urging, Mayfield also called Ray Nagin.

Despite media reports indicating Mayfield encouraged Nagin to immediately order a mandatory evacuation, Mayfield “just told [officials] the nature of the storm [and that he] probably said to the Mayor that he was going to have some very difficult decisions ahead of him.” Similarly, Mayfield said that the “purpose of [his] calls there to the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi was really just to make absolutely sure that they understood how serious the situation was . . . ”

In public advisories issued at 10:00 p.m. CDT Saturday, 32 hours before prior to landfall, NHC warned of storm surge forecasts. At 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 28, NWS advisories characterized Katrina as a “potentially catastrophic” storm. Additionally, at 4:00 p.m. CDT on Sunday, the storm surge was predicted to be 18 to 22 feet, and locally as high as 28 feet with “large and battering” waves on top of the surge, meaning “some levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped.”

Although it was reported that Mayfield cautioned the levees would be breached, no such warning was issued. “What I indicated in my briefings to emergency managers and to the media was the possibility that some levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped, depending on the details of Katrina’s track and intensity,” Mayfield said.

Also on Sunday, August 28, the NWS office in Slidell, Louisiana, which is responsible for the New Orleans area, issued warnings saying, “most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks…perhaps longer” and predicting “human suffering incredible by modern standards.” Ultimately, NWS and NHC proved remarkably accurate in capturing Katrina’s eventual wrath and destruction.

It is important to note, the hurricane risk to New Orleans and the surrounding areas was well-recognized and predicted by forecasters long before Hurricane Katrina. “The 33 years that I’ve been at the Hurricane Center we have
always been saying — the directors before me and I have always said — that the greatest potential for the nightmare scenarios, in the Gulf of Mexico anyway, is that New Orleans and southeast Louisiana area,” Mayfield said.\footnote{161}

The NWS and NHC are not without critics though. AccuWeather Inc., a private weather service company, has said the public should have received earlier warnings that Gulf coast residents, and New Orleans residents in particular, were directly in Katrina’s path.\footnote{162} AccuWeather issued a forecast predicting the target of Katrina’s landfall nearly 12 hours before the NHC issued its first warning, and argued the extra time could have aided evacuation of the region.\footnote{163}

Responding to this criticism, Mayfield said premature evacuation can lead too large of an area to evacuate, causing unnecessary traffic and congestion on the roads.\footnote{164} As Mayfield testified, “the mission here of the National Hurricane Center and then the National Weather Service, is to provide the best forecast that we possibly can, and then the emergency managers at the local and state levels will use that, then they will call for evacuations.”\footnote{165}

Ultimately, as Mayfield tried to convey, NHC and NWS can only forecast, issue warnings, and provide timely information to the state and local decision-makers who determine who and when to evacuate. The timeliness and accuracy of the forecasts saved lives. No government can blame inadequate response or lack of advanced warning.

**Katrina makes landfall**

Hurricane Katrina made landfall at Buras, Louisiana on the southeast corner of Louisiana, at 6:10 a.m. CDT, on Monday, August 29.\footnote{166} Katrina had maximum sustained winds of 121 mph and was unusually large, measuring approximately 400 miles across. Its eye was at least 30 miles wide. Though it had weakened from a category 5 to a strong category 3 storm by landfall, the damage and loss of life from the storm was staggering, with effects extending from Louisiana through Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and the Florida panhandle.\footnote{167} The three states most directly affected — Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana — each suffered significant damage, with NHC noting that many of the most severely affected areas along the Gulf coast could take years to completely rebuild.\footnote{168}

**Alabama — impact of Hurricane Katrina**

Though Alabama was not where Hurricane Katrina made landfall, damages there were substantial. According to the NHC, “despite being more distant from the eye of Katrina, the storm surge over Dauphin Island, Alabama destroyed or damaged dozens of beachfront homes and cut a new canal through the island’s western end.”\footnote{169} Two deaths were reported during Hurricane Katrina in Alabama. However, these deaths were the result of an auto accident and unrelated to the Hurricane.\footnote{170}

Katrina caused significant damage along its coast with a wave surge of 13.5 feet, exceeding the 100-year flood level of 12 feet.\footnote{171} Bayou La Batre and (as noted above) Dauphin Island received the brunt of the storm in Alabama, losing 800 and 200 homes, respectively.\footnote{172} The storm caused wind damage as far north as Tuscaloosa County. Mobile Bay spilled into downtown and flooded large sections of the city, destroying hundreds of homes. The sheer power of the storm dislodged a nearby oil drilling platform, which became caught under the U.S. Highway 98 bridge.\footnote{173}

As of early January 2006, federal assistance to Alabama had exceeded $500 million.\footnote{174} Specifically, FEMA reported
that, to date, it had provided $117 million in assistance to individuals and families (for housing and rental assistance) and $348 million for public assistance, crisis counseling, disaster unemployment assistance, and various mission assignments to other federal agencies during the disaster response. The public assistance funds were provided for, among other things, infrastructure costs, debris removal, and road and bridge repair. The costs for mission assignments to other federal agencies included the use of military aircraft for rapid needs assessments, shipments of ice (280 truckloads), water (186 truckloads), MREs (103 truckloads), generators (11 truckloads), cots (27 truckloads), and blankets (32 truckloads). The Small Business Administration (SBA) has approved over $68 million in loans to homeowners, renters, and businesses.

Mississippi — impact of Hurricane Katrina

In reporting casualty and damage statistics for Hurricane Katrina, NHC noted that “the storm surge of Katrina struck the Mississippi coastline with such ferocity that entire coastal communities were obliterated, some left with little more than the foundations upon which homes, businesses, government facilities, and other historical buildings once stood.” According to the NHC, the Hancock County EOC recorded a storm surge of as high as 27 feet; this surge likely penetrated at least six miles inland in many portions of the Mississippi coast and up to 12 miles inland along bays and rivers. Even in areas that may have been spared the destruction of the storm surge, hurricane force winds wreaked havoc—according to Pearl River County EMA Director Bobby Strahan, for example, his EOC (one county inland) twice registered wind speeds of 135 miles per hour.

All told, at least 231 Mississippians died during Hurricane Katrina. In the three coastal counties alone, 66,000 may have been displaced from their homes due to flooding and/or structural damage to their homes. At peak levels on August 31, Mississippi’s power companies reported 958,000 customers were without power and that over 19,000 households were still powerless as of the end of September.

Damages to Mississippi’s economy were also substantial—the state’s agricultural, forestry, gaming, maritime, and poultry industries all suffered extensive damages. For example, the state reported that its two biggest crops—poultry and forestry—were very hard hit, with at least two years’ worth of timber destroyed (worth $1.3 billion) and the value of the poultry industry dropping by six percent due to hurricane damage (including the estimated loss of 8 million birds and damage to 2,400 of the state’s 9,000 poultry houses, 300 of which were totally devastated). The state’s dairy industry suffered losses estimated to exceed $6 million, and 20 percent of the expected rice and corn harvests may have been lost.

The costs and volume of response and clean-up activity in Mississippi reflect the enormous damage Katrina left behind. For example, a month and a half after landfall, the state reported the total cost of assistance it received via EMAC was over $327 million ($176 million in civilian costs and $151 million in National Guard expenses).

According to the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA, which administers the EMAC), commonly requested resources included firefighters, search and rescue personnel, HAZMAT personnel, emergency medical technicians, state police, sheriffs, fish and wildlife personnel, corrections personnel, livestock inspectors, bridge inspectors, airport maintenance personnel,
ambulances, medical doctors, registered nurses and National Guard Troops. In total, at least 33 states aided the law enforcement response effort in Mississippi through the EMAC.

Federal costs in Mississippi have also been substantial. FEMA reports that, as of January 4, 2006 it had disbursed in Mississippi just over $1 billion in assistance via its Individuals and Households Program and obligated to the state and local governments $666 million in public assistance to repair things like roads and bridges. SBA, FEMA reports, has approved home, business, and economic injury loans totaling over $529 million. USACE has installed nearly 50,000 temporary roofs through its Operation Blue Roof program (making that effort 99 percent complete) and, in addition to the efforts of local governments and contractors, removed more than 23 million cubic yards of debris. While just over 30,000 FEMA travel trailers and mobile homes are now occupied in Mississippi, four shelters housing 759 people remained open at year’s end.

Louisiana — impact of Hurricane Katrina

On August 28, at 10 a.m. CDT, the NWS field office in New Orleans issued a bulletin predicting catastrophic damage to New Orleans, including partial destruction of half of the well-constructed houses in the city, severe damage to most industrial buildings rendering them inoperable, the creation of a huge debris field of trees, telephone poles, cars, and collapsed buildings, and a lack of clean water. As previously noted, NWS predicted the impact on Louisiana would be a human suffering incredible by modern standards.” Unfortunately, much of what the NWS predicted came to pass.

With intense gale-force winds and massive storm surge, the effect of Hurricane Katrina on Southeast Louisiana was indeed catastrophic. After 11:00 a.m. CDT on August 29, several sections of the levee system in New Orleans breached, and 80 percent of the city was under water at peak flooding, which in some places was 20 feet deep. The extensive flooding left many residents stranded long after
Hurricane Katrina had passed, unable to leave their homes. Stranded survivors dotted the tops of houses citywide. Flooding in the 9th Ward sent residents onto rooftops seeking aid. Many others were trapped inside attics, unable to escape. Some chopped their way to their roofs with hatchets and sledge hammers, which residents had been urged to keep in their attics in case of such events. Clean water was unavailable and power outages were expected to last for weeks.

Katrina took approximately 1,100 lives in Louisiana, most due to the widespread storm surge-induced flooding and its aftermath in the New Orleans area. Fatalities included some of those widely seen on the media — bodies at refugee centers, such as an old woman in a wheelchair who had been covered with a cloth, and a man dead on the interstate. In addition to flooding, contaminated water also caused deaths — on September 6, E. coli was detected in the water supply and, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), five people died from bacterial infections caused by the toxic waters.

The economic and environmental ramifications of Katrina have been widespread and could in some respects be long-lasting due to effects on large population and tourism centers, the oil and gas industry, and transportation. The hurricane severely damaged or destroyed workplaces in New Orleans and other heavily populated areas of the northern Gulf coast, resulting in thousands of lost jobs and millions of dollars in lost tax revenues for the affected communities.

All told, 41 of Louisiana’s 64 parishes suffered serious damage. Thousands of homes and businesses throughout entire neighborhoods in the New Orleans metropolitan area were destroyed by the flood. Strong winds also caused damage in the New Orleans area, including downtown, where windows in some high rise buildings were blown out and the roof of the Louisiana Superdome partially peeled away.

As of mid-January, 2006, the federal costs FEMA reported for Louisiana were enormous. Specifically, FEMA said it had provided $4 billion directly to Katrina victims for financial and housing assistance through its Individuals and Housing Program, an amount it projected will eventually grow to a total of $7.7 billion (including costs from Hurricane Rita in late September 2005). FEMA had paid out an additional $3.1 billion in housing assistance to victims of Katrina and Rita and projected it will pay $17 billion in claims under the National Flood Insurance Program to policyholders in Louisiana.

Likewise, loan activity in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has been substantial. FEMA has approved $539 million in Community Disaster Loans in Louisiana for essential public services in hard-hit communities, including a $120 million loan to the city of New Orleans, and SBA has approved $1.3 billion in loans to homeowners and renters and $252 million in disaster assistance loans to businesses.
Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Maestri Interview].

E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:26 a.m.); see also, E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré; see also, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 4:42 a.m.).

E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:26 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from Lt. Col. Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré; see also, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 4:42 a.m.).

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Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General Joseph B. Veillon, Louisiana National Guard Commander for Task Force Minnow, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Veillon Interview].

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Rex McDonald, Information Technology and Communications Director, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter McDonald Interview].

Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug 26-28, 2005). See Ballou Interview; see also, Doran Interview.

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General Joseph B. Veillon, Louisiana National Guard Commander for Task Force Minnow, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Veillon Interview].

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Maestri Interview].
123 Id.
125 Id.
129 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing, at 4 (statement of USACE/Col Wagenaar).
130 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 270024Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000006) (Aug. 26, 2005; 8:24 p.m. EDT). Note: the Atlantic Area is the Portsmouth, Virginia Command. Note: this report was created at 0024 Zulu Time. Zulu Time is the same as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). During the summer months, the time in Portsmouth is GMT-4 hours.
131 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 270024Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000006) (Aug. 26, 2005; 8:24 p.m. EDT).
132 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation eight report, 271638Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000003) (Aug. 27, 11:38 AM CDT). Note: District Eight is the New Orleans, Louisiana Command, which was relocated to St. Louis, Missouri during Hurricane Katrina. Note: This report was created at 1638 Zulu Time. Zulu Time is the same as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). During the summer months, the time in St. Louis is GMT-5 hours.
133 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 11:13 p.m. CDT).
134 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 29, 2005; 12:13 a.m. EDT).
135 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:13 p.m. EDT).
136 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
137 See generally, Hurricane Katrina: Always Ready: The Coast Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina Before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement of Rear Admiral Robert Duncan) [hereinafter Nov. 9, 2005 Senate Hearing].
138 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 290900Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004053) (Aug. 29, 2005; 05:00 a.m. EDT).
139 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 281534Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000008) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. EDT).
140 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 281534Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000008) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
141 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 291541Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004058) (Aug. 29, 2005; 10:41 a.m. CDT).
143 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 270024Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000006) (Aug. 26, 2005; 8:24 p.m. EDT). Note: the Atlantic Area is the Portsmouth, Virginia Command. Note: this report was created at 0024 Zulu Time. Zulu Time is the same as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). During the summer months, the time in Portsmouth is GMT-4 hours.
144 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 281534Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000008) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
145 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 281534Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000008) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
146 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:13 p.m. EDT).
147 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 29, 2005; 12:13 a.m. EDT).
148 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:13 p.m. EDT).
149 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
150 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 29, 2005; 12:13 a.m. EDT).
151 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 29, 2005; 11:13 p.m. CDT).
152 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report #7, Aug. 28, 2005; update as of 5:00 pm, at 2.
153 Id., at 3.
154 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report #9, Aug. 28, 2005; update as of 3:00 p.m. at 3.
155 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report #9, Aug. 28, 2005; update as of 3:00 p.m. at 2.
156 National Hurricane Center, Nat’l Weather Serv., Hurricane Katrina Discussion No. 14, (Aug. 26, 2005) (5:00 p.m. EDT).
157 National Hurricane Center, Nat’l Weather Serv., Hurricane Katrina Probabilities No. 15, (Aug. 26, 2005) (11:00 p.m. EDT).
159 Id., at 3 (written statement of Max Mayfield).
160 Id., at 5 (statement of Max Mayfield).
161 Id., at 51-52 (statement of Max Mayfield).
162 Id., at 52 (statement of Max Mayfield)
163 Id., at 51 (statement of Max Mayfield).
164 Id., at 3 (written statement of Max Mayfield).
165 Id., at 59-60 (statement of Max Mayfield)
166 Id., at 3 (written statement of Max Mayfield).
167 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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146 Id.
148 Id., at 12 (written statement of Max Mayfield) (reporting that Katrina made landfall as a Category 4 storm with 140 mph winds. The NHC’s final report on Katrina, released Dec. 20, revised this information. Regardless, “it was the costliest and one of the five deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United States,” the NHC report said); Richard D. Knabb, et al, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 Aug. 2005, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter NHC Katrina Report].
149 NHC Katrina Report, at 3, 7-9.
150 Id., at 11.
151 Id.
152 EM 2000 Message no. 05-1878, (Bates no. AL002716); Nov. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing, at 30 (statement of Governor Bob Riley).
154 Id.
157 NHC Katrina Report, at 11.
159 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Director, River County EMA, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Latham Interview].
161 See, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Situation Report #22 (Aug. 31, 2005; see, 12:00 p.m.); FEMA-MEMA, Joint Field Office Situation Report SITREP 30 / FEMA-1604-DR-MS (Sept. 25, 2005 07:00 a.m. – Sept., 26, 2005 06:59 a.m.
162 NHC Katrina Report, at 11.
167 See, Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), EMAC Request, MS: Katrina (unaudited draft), Nov. 3, 2005 [hereinafter EMAC Requests].
168 See, EMAC Requests.
171 NHC Katrina Report, at 10-11.
“[Hurricane Exercise] Pam was so very prescient. And yet Katrina highlighted many, many weaknesses that either were not anticipated by Pam, or were lessons learned but not heeded.

“That’s probably the most painful thing about Katrina, and the tragic loss of life: the foreseeability of it all.”

Chairman Tom Davis
Select Committee Hearing, December 14, 2005
The Hurricane Pam exercise reflected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a catastrophic hurricane striking New Orleans

One of the key planning and preparedness steps many of the local, state, and federal officials involved in the response to Katrina in Louisiana took part in was the July 2004 exercise commonly known as “Hurricane Pam.” FEMA funded and participated in this disaster simulation exercise in which a fictional, strong category three — with qualities of a category four — hurricane named Pam hit the New Orleans area. Emergency officials from 50 parish, state, federal, and volunteer organizations faced this scenario during the five-day exercise held at the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge.

The purpose of the exercise was to help officials develop joint response plans for a catastrophic hurricane in Louisiana. While many found the Pam exercise to be useful in executing a better response to Katrina, the exercise also highlighted lessons learned that were not implemented and did not anticipate certain weaknesses that Katrina exposed.

The Hurricane Pam scenario focused on 13 parishes in southeast Louisiana — Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Terrebonne. Representatives from outside the primary parishes, including officials from Mississippi’s Emergency Management Agency (EMA), participated because hurricane evacuation and sheltering involve communities throughout Louisiana and into Arkansas, Mississippi, and Texas.

The Hurricane Pam exercise scenario was prescient. The virtual storm brought sustained winds of 120 mph, up to 20 inches of rain in parts of Southeast Louisiana, and storm surges that topped the levees and flooded the New Orleans area. The exercise assumed that:

- 300,000 people would not evacuate in advance;
- 500,000 to 600,000 buildings would be destroyed;
- Phone and sewer services would be knocked out and chemical plants would be flooded;
- 97 percent of all communications would be down;
- About 175,000 people would be injured, 200,000 would become sick, and more than 60,000 would be killed;
- About 1,000 shelters would be needed for evacuees;
- Boats and helicopters would be needed for thousands of rescues because many residents would be stranded by floodwaters;
- A catastrophic flood would leave swaths of southeast Louisiana uninhabitable for more than a year.

The Pam simulation was designed and run by a private contractor, Baton Rouge-based Innovative Emergency Management Inc. (IEM). FEMA issued the Request for Proposal in 2004 asking for speedy execution of the catastrophic planning project. IEM was awarded the contract for more than a half million dollars in May 2004 and was told by FEMA it had 53 days to mount the exercise. As it can take up to eight months to write an emergency plan, 6 to 12 months to train on the plan, and about one year to issue the report, Pam was clearly a different type of plan in scope, execution, and timing. According to IEM President Madhu Beriwal, Hurricane Pam was a “planning exercise” designed to develop usable information in a much shorter timeframe. FEMA and Louisiana officials accelerated the planning process because of the overwhelming consensus that a category five hurricane hitting New Orleans was one of the most likely and devastating disaster scenarios our nation faced, Beriwal explained.

This effort was part of FEMA’s larger initiative for conducting catastrophic disaster planning, in which it chose 25 disaster scenarios based on priority of risk. A hurricane hitting New Orleans was picked as the first scenario to be studied. According to Beriwal, “We were still fairly early in the process” of developing a formal response plan for New Orleans when Katrina made landfall. In July of 2004, IEM held its first workshop. The initial eight day workshop had over 300 participants from federal, regional, and local agencies. The first three days were dedicated to establishing the specifics of the disaster.
scenario and pre-landfall planning, the remaining five days to post-landfall logistics.

Officials were presented with a hurricane scenario designed by Louisiana State University (LSU) researchers, Ivor Van Heerden, an LSU professor who used computer modeling to help create a realistic hurricane, said, “It was a slow moving category three storm, something that could quite easily happen, and designed so that it totally flooded the city, so that the participants could try to understand the full impacts of a flooded New Orleans.” Indeed, experts involved in the Hurricane Pam exercise were struck by the similarity of the simulation to the actual destructive conditions wrought by Katrina. According to Beriwal, Pam’s slow-moving category three “made it virtually equal in force and devastation to Katrina’s category four based on its surge and wind capacity.” And, of course, Katrina itself was later recategorized as a strong category 3.

During the Pam simulation, participants broke into groups and devised responses as the disaster scenario unfolded. The workshop focused on issues ranging from search and rescue and temporary sheltering to unwatering, debris removal, and medical care. Not all issues, however, were covered in the workshop. Beriwal said while issues related to security and communications were on the agenda, the development of a plan to coordinate the displacement of school children took precedence. Beriwal also said the issue of pre-landfall evacuation was not addressed, although Exercise Pam did make the basic presumption that the state and locals were responsible for pre-landfall evacuations. Apparently FEMA directed IEM to emphasize post-landfall and recovery issues in the Pam exercise as pre-landfall evacuation had always been a focal point in prior emergency disaster planning sessions.

The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan was the product of these series of workshops. The Plan was “designed to be the first step toward producing a comprehensive hurricane response plan, jointly approved and implemented by federal, state, and city officials.” By January 2005, IEM sent a draft planning document to the state and localities based on the planning derived from the July workshop. The delivery of the draft was expedited to give the Southeast Louisiana emergency management planners time to prepare for the 2005 hurricane season. Indeed, IEM scurried to make the plan available at this early date so officials could use it and translate it into individual detailed operational plans. Beriwal noted the plan was not meant to provide operational detail but rather was designed to provide general guidance, a sort of “to do list” for state and localities. Beriwal further characterized the exercise as a “work in progress.” She described IEM’s role as “facilitator and assessors of consequences.”

The plan itself outlines 15 subjects that emergency managers should address during and after a catastrophic storm hitting New Orleans. The report is detailed in certain respects. It includes diagrams for makeshift loading docks to distribute water, ice, and food to storm victims — color-coded to show where pallets, traffic cones, and trash bins would be placed. Yet in other places the report is less specific; it does not identify, for example, what hospitals or airports would be used.

Numerous action plans ranging from debris removal, to sheltering, to search and rescue were developed. For example, state transportation officials took the lessons learned from the Pam exercise and previous hurricanes and revised the state’s contraflow plan. The revisions included making adjustments to traffic lights, cessation of construction, and greater coordination with the private sector. State officials reported that Hurricane Pam greatly improved the state’s contraflow evacuation plan. In fact, federal, state, and local officials across the board agreed the contra flow plan was a success story of Katrina’s emergency response. Over 1.2 million were evacuated in the 48 hours prior to landfall.

As part of the Pam exercise, planners also identified lead and support agencies for search and rescue and established a command structure that would include four areas with up to 800 searchers. For example, “[t]he search and rescue group developed a transportation plan for getting stranded residents out of harm’s way.” The medical care group reviewed and enhanced existing plans. The medical action plan included patient movement details and identified probable locations, such as state university campuses, where individuals would receive care and then be transported to hospitals, special needs shelters or regular shelters as necessary.

Workshops subsequent to the initial five-day Hurricane Pam exercise were held in November 2004 and August 2005. A second Hurricane Pam Exercise was planned for the summer of 2005, but did not take place, apparently due to lack of funding. Agencies had anticipated expanding on aspects of response and recovery that were not explored in the 2004 exercise.
Finding: Implementation of lessons learned from Hurricane Pam was incomplete

While state and local officials turned some lessons from the Hurricane Pam exercise into improvements of their emergency plans, other important changes were not made. State health officials said the exercise had helped them better prepare for evacuation of hospital patients and special needs people. Since Pam was a catastrophic hurricane with flooding of New Orleans, it required them to consider the issue of evacuating New Orleans hospitals and the Superdome’s special needs shelter. Subsequent to the exercise, medical officials held planning sessions focused on post-landfall care and evacuation. The contingency plan for the medical component was almost complete when Katrina made landfall. Officials said although the plan was not yet finalized, it proved invaluable to the response effort.

Further, in the aftermath of Katrina, varying opinions have surfaced as to the roles and responsibilities established during the Hurricane Pam exercise. Some state and parish officials said they saw Pam as a “contract” of what the various parties were going to do, and the federal government did not do the things it had committed to doing. According to Dr. Walter Maestri, the Jefferson Parish Director of Emergency Management, he understood that FEMA may not provide help until 48-72 hours later—but then he expected help. That is, once the state cleared the roads, he anticipated that FEMA trucks would arrive with large quantities of water, food, and ice. Although these were the parish’s planning assumptions, he said FEMA did not get substantial relief to the parish until 11 days after landfall. Dr. Maestri also said the Hurricane Pam documentation makes it clear what FEMA was supposed to do, but FEMA did not do those things.

Beriwal said, however, the plan derived from the Pam exercise was intended as a “bridging document” designed to serve as a guide and roadmap to be used by emergency operational officials at the state and local level. In other words, it was up to state and local officials to take the Plan and turn it into more detailed individual operational plans. Yet, according to Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer from FEMA, there were several Hurricane Pam Exercise “to do” items state or local governments did not complete. For example, the state was supposed to develop more detailed concepts and plans in several areas: (1) search and rescue, (2) rapid assessment teams, (3) medical evacuation, (4) sheltering and temporary housing, (5) commodity distribution, and (6) debris removal. The state’s previous Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Deputy Director had laid these six areas out as priorities for the state to work on. In Wells’s view, the only one of these where the state made some progress was medical evacuation.

Wells also said, however, that the need to shelter special needs people in the Superdome showed the state and city had not taken steps (which they had agreed to do after the Pam Exercise) to coordinate the movement and sheltering of these people further north, away from the Gulf. As a result of the exercise and subsequent planning workshops, the state was supposed to develop “hasty plans” to address all these areas. He said although he had tried to get state officials to focus on these hasty plans just before landfall, they would not do so. According to Wells, the state had also agreed to learn and exercise a unified command through the incident command system. Wells said the state did not do so, which led to major command and control problems during Katrina.

Conclusion

Hurricane Katrina highlighted many weaknesses that either were not anticipated by the Pam exercise or perhaps were lessons learned but simply not implemented. For example, Hurricane Pam has been criticized for its emphasis on managing the aftermath of the catastrophe and not creating initiatives that would diminish the magnitude of the catastrophe. Indeed, much of the recrimination over the Hurricane Katrina response came because government authorities apparently failed to have a plan in place to assist in evacuating individuals without transportation. Nor did they appear to have an adequate sheltering plan in place. With Hurricane Pam’s striking resemblance to Katrina in force and devastation, many have been left wondering at the failure to anticipate, and plan for, these essentials. Is a plan that leaves 300,000 in a flooded city and results in 60,000 deaths acceptable?
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Interview by Select Comm. staff with Madhu Beriwal, IEM, Inc., in Wash., DC (Jan. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Beriwal Interview].

John McQuaid, Hurricane Pam Exercise Offered glimpse of Katrina Misery, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 9, 2005.

Interview by Select Comm. staff with Gordon Nelson, LA Dep’t of Trans., in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005).


Beriwal Interview.


Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Walter Maestri, Dir. of Emer. Mgmt., Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005).

Beriwal Interview.

Interview with Select Comm. Staff, Scott Wells, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Officer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).


Beriwal Interview.

Id.

Sept. 10, 2005 Fournier Article.

Id.

Beriwal Interview.

Id.

Interview by Select Comm. staff with Gordon Nelson, LA Dep’t of Trans., in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005).

Id.

Id.


Id.

Id.

Beriwal Interview.


Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Walter Maestri, Dir. of Emer. Mgmt., Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005).

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Beriwal Interview.

Interview with Select Comm. Staff, Scott Wells, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Officer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.
“What happened to us this year, however, can only be described as a catastrophe of Biblical proportions. We in Louisiana know hurricanes and hurricanes know us. We would not be here today if the levees had not failed.”

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor, State of Louisiana
Select Committee Hearing, December 14, 2005
Summary

The levees protecting New Orleans were not built to survive the most severe hurricanes. It was a well-known and repeatedly documented fact that a severe hurricane could lead to overtopping or breaching of the levees and flooding of the metropolitan area. In fact, for years the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has had a written plan for unwatering (i.e., draining) New Orleans in such a contingency. This well-known threat was the motivation for FEMA to sponsor the “Hurricane Pam” exercise. The potential for Katrina to be “the Big One” and breach the levees was also the key reason for the National Weather Service, Governor of Louisiana, and Mayor of New Orleans to issue such dire warnings.

Once construction of the levees was completed by USACE, the responsibilities for operating and maintaining the levees were split among many local organizations, which is the standard cooperation agreement for carrying out flood control projects nationwide. The costs of constructing these projects are shared, with operation and maintenance being a 100 percent local responsibility. These include levee boards in each parish, as well as separate water and sewer boards. The number of organizations involved, and disagreements among them, makes accountability diffuse and creates potential gaps and weaknesses in parts of the flood protection system. In one case, improvements to levee strength which may have mitigated or prevented some of the critical breaches that flooded downtown New Orleans were rejected by the competing local organizations. There also appear to have been lapses in both maintenance and inspections of selected levees, including those that breached. Also, prior to Hurricane Katrina, residents along those same levees reported they were leaking, another potential lapse in maintenance.

Despite the well-known importance of the levees, and the consequences of failure, the local levee boards responsible for maintaining and operating the levees did not have any warning system in place. While federal regulations require that they monitor levees during periods of potential flooding, the requirement is impractical to implement during a hurricane. In addition to no warning system, the loss of communications and situational awareness, and only sporadic reports of flooding from a variety of sources, made it difficult to confirm that there were breaches in the levees and then to assess the damage. These factors, as well as physical difficulties of getting to the breach sites, combined to delay repair of the levee breaches.

The ultimate causes of the levee breaches, and subsequent flooding of New Orleans, are yet to be determined. At least four forensic investigations are under way to examine scientific evidence and determine the reasons for levee breaches. These include investigations by USACE’s Engineer Research and Development Center, the National Science Foundation (NSF), the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and Louisiana State University (LSU). Possible causes include (1) the design was not appropriate for the purpose, (2) the storm exceeded levee design standards, (3) the levees were not actually built to the original design standards, (4) the levees were not properly maintained, or (5) a combination of these and other factors.

Finding: Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes

New Orleans is protected from flooding by a system of levees

As noted in the BACKGROUND chapter, hurricanes threaten the Gulf coast every year, and New Orleans is particularly vulnerable because of its location and topography. The majority of the metropolitan area is below sea level. Over the years, the city has continued to sink, due to drainage, subsidence, and compaction of the soils. As an example of previous damage, Hurricane Betsy brought extensive destruction to New Orleans when it made landfall in Louisiana in September, 1965. Unfortunately, many of the descriptions and
photos from Hurricane Betsy sound and look familiar to our nation as it considers the damage from Hurricane Katrina, forty years later. According to USACE’s after action report on Hurricane Betsy…

- She left in her wake a path of devastation unparalleled by any other storm in the recorded history of Louisiana.  
- Betsy inundated over 5,000 square miles in Louisiana, including highly populated urban areas in Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes.  
- Extensive flooding was caused by overtopping and breaching of existing protection levees in Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes.  
- As Betsy’s winds and tidal surge rolled inland, entire buildings were swept away from their foundations and floated as far as 10 miles away.  
- Betsy left 81 dead, over 17,600 injured, and caused the evacuation of 250,000 to storm shelters.  
- Betsy left thousands homeless in south Louisiana. Returning refugees often found only a pile of debris where their homes had stood just days before.  
- Betsy left numerous towns in south Louisiana with no means of communication.  

After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, federal and state governments proposed a number of flood control projects to deal with the threat of hurricanes and the flooding they
Levees were designed for a “standard” hurricane, not the most severe hurricanes

The levees protecting New Orleans were not designed to withstand the most severe hurricanes. According to USACE’s plans for unwatering New Orleans, “the hurricane protection system is not designed for the largest storms and as a result, the metropolitan area is vulnerable to flooding from hurricane storm surges.” USACE originally designed the levees around New Orleans to protect against a hurricane intensity that might occur once every 200-300 years. One of the major projects is formally called the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project. This project included levees along the Lake Ponchartrain lakefront, the 17th Street Canal, the London Avenue Canal, the Orleans Avenue Canal, the Intercoastal waterway, the Industrial Canal, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and other areas. Although the project was federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with shared costs.

Levees were designed for a “standard” hurricane — the actual forces that levees need to withstand are a function of several factors. According to the preliminary NSF study, “the actual wind, wave and storm surge loadings imposed at any location within the overall flood protection system are a function of location relative to the storm, wind speed and direction, orientation of levees, local bodies of water, channel configurations, offshore contours, vegetative cover, etc. They also vary over time, as the storm moves through the region.” Similarly, USACE documents indicate that “[o]vertopping will depend upon the intensity of the storm, the track that the center or “eye” of the storm follows and the speed at which it travels along the track.”

Although the Lake Ponchartrain project is named a hurricane “protection” project, a number of factors other than saving lives and property are included in the design of such projects. For example, in addition to protecting urban and community lives and health, the design of such projects must include environmental and economic effects, and ensure that benefits of the completed project outweigh its cost of construction. In discussing the design of the Lake Ponchartrain project in a 1978 hearing, USACE District Commander for New Orleans, Colonel

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**Table 1: Comparison of “Standard Project Hurricane” with Saffir Simpson Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Standard Project Hurricane</th>
<th>Saffir-Simpson Category 2 Hurricane</th>
<th>Saffir-Simpson Category 3 Hurricane</th>
<th>Saffir-Simpson Category 4 Hurricane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central pressure (1)</td>
<td>27.6 Hg</td>
<td>28.50-28.91 Hg</td>
<td>27.91-28.47 Hg</td>
<td>27.17-27.88 Hg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind speed (2)</td>
<td>100 mph</td>
<td>96-110 mph</td>
<td>111-130 mph</td>
<td>131-155 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radius of maximum winds (3)</td>
<td>30 miles</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average forward speed (3)</td>
<td>6 knots</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storm surge</td>
<td>11.2-13 feet (4)</td>
<td>6-8 feet</td>
<td>9-12 feet</td>
<td>13-18 feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of USACE and NOAA data.

Table Notes: The shaded areas indicate those parameters with the closest match between the standard project hurricane and the Saffir-Simpson Scale.

(1) Central pressure is measured in inches of mercury (Hg) or millibars.
(2) Wind speed for the standard project hurricane was measured as the maximum 5-minute average wind speed. The Saffir-Simpson Scale uses the maximum 1-minute average wind speed, a lower threshold.
(3) USACE estimated the radius of maximum winds and the average forward speed for a standard project hurricane, and the Saffir-Simpson Scale does not take either of these parameters into account.
(4) The standard project hurricane calculated maximum surge heights for different geographic areas within the Lake Ponchartrain area. The maximum surge height for the South Shore of Lake Ponchartrain—where the 17th Street, London Avenue, and Industrial Canals are located—was estimated at 11.2 feet.
Early Rush, stated “Even though economists may, and in this case did, favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of benefits to projected costs, the threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard project hurricane.”

Potential for Katrina to breach levees was well-known, leading to urgent warnings

Even with its hurricane protection system, it was common knowledge that New Orleans was susceptible to hurricane-caused flooding. The risks of a major hurricane and flooding in New Orleans had been covered in the general media — by Scientific American (October 2001) and National Geographic (October 2004) — as well as in emergency management literature. A recent article in the Natural Hazards Observer stated:

When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, she ended decades of anticipation. There were few hazards in the United States more studied by scientists and engineers and there was ample warning that a strong storm could cause the City of New Orleans to flood.

Emergency planners in the local area were particularly knowledgeable about this potentiality. A November 2004 article in Natural Hazards Observer — written by Shirley Laska, of the Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology, at the University of New Orleans — laid out the hypothetical case that Hurricane Ivan had hit New Orleans. The article cites a fictional situation that is now all too real to the nation.

New Orleans was spared, this time, but had it not been, Hurricane Ivan would have... caused the levees between the lake and the city to overtop and fill the city “bowl” with water from lake levee to river levee, in some places as deep as 20 feet... Recent evacuation surveys show that two thirds of non-evacuees with the means to evacuate chose not to leave because they felt safe in their homes. Other non-evacuees with means relied on cultural traditions of not leaving or were discouraged by negative experiences with past evacuations. Should this disaster become a reality, it would undoubtedly be one of the greatest disasters, if not the greatest, to hit the United States, with estimated costs exceeding 100 billion dollars. Survivors would have to endure conditions never before experienced in a North American disaster. Hurricane Ivan had the potential to make the unthinkable a reality. Next time New Orleans may not be so fortunate.

Because of the well-known potential for flooding, USACE has had a plan for several years for draining New Orleans — Unwatering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, Louisiana, dated August 18, 2000. This plan provides details on the hurricane protection system and describes methods to get the water out after catastrophic flooding from a hurricane. The premise of the plan is that a category 4 or 5 hurricane may produce storm surge water levels of sufficient height to overtop the existing protection system. The plan lays out a series of scenarios that could occur, and suggests appropriate emergency responses to unwater the area. For example, in one case...

There is catastrophic flooding due to complete overtopping of the levees and floodwalls and inundation of the protected area. There will be extensive and severe erosion of levees and perhaps complete breaches. Due to the high water levels, all of the pumping stations will probably be flooded with major damages... The levee districts and drainage departments may be dysfunctional to some degree.

In more recent years, well before Hurricane Katrina, questions were raised about the ability of the Lake Ponchartrain project to withstand more powerful hurricanes than the "standard project hurricane," such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. USACE had discussed undertaking a study of modifications needed to increase the strength of the existing levees, but no formal study was undertaken.

As discussed earlier in the HURRICANE PAM chapter, FEMA sponsored the “Hurricane Pam” exercise to look at the response to and recovery from a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans and flooding the city. In that scenario, “It was a slow moving Category three storm, something that could quite easily happen, and [the exercise scenario was] designed so that it totally flooded the city, so that the
participants could try to understand the full impacts of a flooded New Orleans,” according to Ivor Van Heerden, the LSU professor who used computer modeling to help create a realistic hurricane for the exercise. Again, the key reason for that exercise was the well-known potential for levee failure and catastrophic flooding in the metropolitan area.

As Katrina turned and began its track toward New Orleans, the potential for the levees overtopping or breaching and flooding New Orleans resulted in a number of dire warnings from federal, state, and local officials. As also discussed in the EVACUATION chapter, the National Weather Service issued a warning on Sunday, August 28, stating that Katrina was “a most powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength,” that “devastating damage” was expected, that “most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks,” and that there will be “human suffering incredible by modern standards.” Governor Blanco also made dire predictions, stating in several interviews on Saturday and Sunday that flooding in New Orleans was a major concern. On Saturday at approximately 8:00 p.m., she appeared on CNN and said that in New Orleans “[t]he storm surge could bring in 15 to 20 feet of water. [People in the city of New Orleans] will not survive that if indeed that happens.” Similarly, in a news conference on Sunday morning, Mayor Nagin said, “The storm surge most likely will topple our levee system.”

Finding: Responsibilities for levee operations and maintenance were diffuse

**USACE oversee design and construction then turns levees over to local sponsors**

Several organizations are responsible for building, operating, and maintaining the levees surrounding metropolitan New Orleans. USACE generally contracts to design and build the levees. After construction, USACE turns the levees over to a local sponsor. USACE regulations state that once a local sponsor has accepted a project, USACE may no longer expend federal funds on construction or improvements. This prohibition does not include repair after a flood. Federally authorized flood control projects, such as the Lake Ponchartrain project, are eligible for 100 percent federal rehabilitation if damaged by a flood. The Mississippi River levees are the exception to the arrangement just described. USACE operates and maintains these levees. These levees generally withstood Hurricane Katrina, except for a breach south of New Orleans in Plaquemines Parish—the parish that took the full force of Hurricane Katrina at landfall.

The local sponsor has a number of responsibilities. In accepting responsibilities for operations, maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation, the local sponsor signs a contract (called a Cooperation Agreement) agreeing to meet specific standards of performance. This agreement makes the local sponsor responsible for liability for that levee. For most of the levees surrounding New Orleans, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development was the state entity that originally sponsored the construction. After construction, the state turned over control to local sponsors. These local sponsors accepted completed units of the project from 1977 to 1987, depending on when the specific units were completed. The local sponsors are responsible for operation, maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of the levees when the construction of the project, or a project unit, is complete.

Local sponsors do not have control over all factors that could affect their parts of the levee system.

The local sponsors include a variety of separate local organizations. For example, different parts of the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project, were turned over to four different local sponsors — to include the Orleans, East Jefferson, Lake Borgne, and Ponchartrain levee districts. In addition, there are separate water and sewer districts that are responsible for maintaining pumping stations. The USACE unwatering plan notes these arrangements by stating that, among other factors, “the political boundaries with internal local levees have resulted in this series of loops or bowls of low lying ground encircled by levees and floodwalls. Each of these areas is served by its own drainage collection and pumping stations.”

The different local organizations involved had the effect of diffusing responsibility and creating potential weaknesses. For example, levee breaches and distress were repeatedly noted at transition sections, where different organizations were responsible for different pieces and
thus two different levee or wall systems joined together. According to USACE, “[a]t sections where infrastructure elements were designed and maintained by multiple authorities, and their multiple protection elements came together, the weakest (or lowest) segment or element controlled the overall performance.”\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, a scientist working on the NFS study, Raymond Seed, stated there needs to be better coordination of these transition sites.\textsuperscript{56} Peter Nicholson, head of an ASCE team investigating the levees, said in response to a question of whether transition sections mattered:

Well, certainly we find that each individual organization will do as they see fit, and when the two sections of the flood control system operated or owned, designed, maintained by each of those different organizations come together, they may be in two different manners. They may have two different heights. They may be two different materials.\textsuperscript{57}

The different organizations also have different agendas, and sometimes these can thwart efforts to improve the safety of the overall system. Seed also provided an example where USACE had suggested improvements to the strength of the system that were rejected by the competing organizations. According to Seed:

No one is in charge. You have got multiple agencies, multiple organizations, some of whom aren’t on speaking terms with each other, sharing responsibilities for public safety. The Corps of Engineers had asked to put flood gates into the three canals, which nominally might have mitigated and prevented the three main breaches that did so much destruction downtown. But they weren’t able to do that because, unique to New Orleans, the Reclamation Districts who are responsible for maintaining the levees are separate from the Water and Sewage District, which does the pumping. Ordinarily, the Reclamation District does the dewatering pumping, which is separate from the water system. These guys don’t get along.\textsuperscript{58}

While required inspections of levees were done, some deficiencies in maintenance were not fully addressed

Both USACE and the local sponsors have ongoing responsibility to inspect the levees. Annual inspections are done both independently by USACE and jointly with the local sponsor.\textsuperscript{59} In addition, federal regulations require local sponsors to ensure that flood control structures are operating as intended and to continuously patrol the structure to ensure no conditions exist that might endanger it.\textsuperscript{60}

Records reflect that both USACE and the local sponsors kept up with their responsibilities to inspect the levees. According to USACE, in June 2005, it conducted an inspection of the levee system jointly with the state and local sponsors.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, GAO reviewed USACE’s inspection reports from 2001 to 2004 for all completed project units of the Lake Ponchartrain project. These reports indicated the levees were inspected each year and had received “acceptable” ratings.\textsuperscript{62}

However, both the NSF-funded investigators and USACE officials cited instances where brush and even trees were growing along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals levees, which is not allowed under the established standards for levee protection.\textsuperscript{63} Thus, although the records reflect that inspections were conducted and the levees received acceptable ratings, the records appear to be incomplete or inaccurate. In other words, they failed to reflect the tree growth, and of course, neither USACE nor the local sponsor had taken corrective actions to remove the trees.

In addition, there was apparently seepage from one canal before Hurricane Katrina, indicating problems had developed in the levee after construction. Specifically, residents of New Orleans who live along the 17th Street Canal said water was leaking from the canal and seeping into their yards months before Hurricane Katrina caused the levee system to collapse. The leaks, they said, occurred within several hundred feet of the levee that later failed.\textsuperscript{64}

National Public Radio, which reported the story, said:

State and federal investigators say that a leak may have been an early warning sign that the soil beneath the levee was unstable and help explain why it collapsed. They also say if authorities had investigated and found that a leak was
undermining the levee, they could have shored it up and prevented the catastrophic breach.\textsuperscript{65}

National Public Radio also reported that work orders confirm that the Sewerage and Water Board had visited the location of the seepage a number of times. However, both USACE and the Orleans Levee District, with shared responsibilities for inspecting the levees, reported that they had not received any reports of seepage at the site.\textsuperscript{66}

**Finding: The lack of a warning system for breaches and other factors delayed repairs to levees**

Actual levee breaches caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans

Katrina made landfall as an “extraordinarily powerful” hurricane.\textsuperscript{67} Katrina was expected to be a category 4 or 5 storm, although a recent updated analysis from the National Weather Service concluded it made landfall at the upper end of a category 3 hurricane (with estimated maximum sustained winds of 110 knots) near Buras, Louisiana.\textsuperscript{68} While Katrina had weakened from its peak intensity of category 5, it remained a very large hurricane — the extent of tropical-force and hurricane-force winds were as large as predicted when Katrina was at maximum intensity.\textsuperscript{69} Due to Katrina’s large size, it is possible that sustained winds of category 4 strength briefly affected the extreme southeastern tip of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{70} However, the sustained winds over all of metropolitan New Orleans and Lake Ponchartrain likely remained weaker than category 3 strength.\textsuperscript{71}

The storm surge, not the winds, is the most destructive part of a hurricane,\textsuperscript{72} and Katrina produced a massive storm surge. A precise measurement of Katrina’s storm surge in the New Orleans area is difficult to measure, in part because of the widespread failures of tide gauges. However, various efforts are under way to make a definitive determination, particularly near the levees.\textsuperscript{73} While the surge varied by location, some preliminary estimates are that the storm surge off Lake Borgne, which abuts New Orleans, was approximately 18-25 feet.\textsuperscript{74}

One of the highest credible reports of storm surge came from the Hancock County, Mississippi, emergency operations center, where the storm surge was 27 feet.\textsuperscript{75} One reason for the large size of the storm surge was that Katrina, although making landfall as a strong category 3, had already generated large northward propagating swells when it was a category 4 and 5 hurricane during the 24 hours before landfall.\textsuperscript{76} One of the instrument buoys
located south of Dauphin Island, Alabama, measured a wave height of 55 feet — which matches the largest significant wave height ever measured by such a buoy.77

Because the eye of Katrina passed just slightly to the east of New Orleans, the hurricane threw unusually severe wind loads and storm surges on the flood protection systems.78 The surge overtopped large sections of the levees during the morning of August 29 east of New Orleans, in Orleans and St. Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the Intercoastal waterway and into the Industrial Canal. The water rise in Lake Ponchartrain strained the floodwalls along the canals adjacent to its southern shore, including the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal.79 Breaches along all of these canals led to flooding of 80 percent of New Orleans to depths up to 20 feet.80 The flooding of central New Orleans led to the most widespread and costly damage of the hurricane. It also led to the difficulties encountered by emergency responders that are documented elsewhere in this report.

The lack of warning systems and degraded communications prevented situational awareness of the breaches in the levees, and delayed repairs

Despite the well-known importance of the levees, and the consequences of failure, the local levee boards responsible for maintaining and operating the levees do not have any warning system in place.81 Federal regulations require local sponsors to ensure that flood control structures are operating as intended and to continuously patrol the structure during flood periods to ensure that no conditions exist that might endanger it.82 However, it would be impractical to monitor the levees during a hurricane. The Executive Director of the Orleans Levee District, Max Hearn, stated:

As the hurricane approached, and as water levels began to rise, District employees monitored the water levels and patrolled the flood control system. As weather conditions deteriorated and became unsafe, the District’s employees were pulled into sheltered areas to ride out the storm.83

Again, with the large number of local organizations involved, it was not always clear who would be responsible for monitoring the levees and sounding the alarm if there was a breach. According to one scientist, “If the lines of responsibility and who is in charge aren’t clear, it is very hard to decide who needs to be issuing warnings and public notices…”84

Given that Hurricane Katrina led to the loss of power and severely degraded communications, as discussed in the COMMUNICATIONS and COMMAND AND CONTROL chapters, it is not clear that any warning system would have survived or have been effective. In the absence of communications that would have provided situational awareness, there were many rumors of flooding and its causes that had to be confirmed before assessment teams and repair teams could be dispatched. There were many sources of these reports of flooding.

■ Monday August 29, at 6:00 a.m., floodwaters began flowing into Jackson Barracks, according to Louisiana National Guard officers. Jackson Barracks is near the Orleans Parish – St. Bernard Parish line, and the floodwaters were determined later to be from the Industrial Canal breach. By late Monday morning, the floodwaters were 8-10 feet deep at Jackson Barracks, requiring the Louisiana National Guard to abandon their operations center and re-establish it at the Superdome.85

■ Monday, August 29, at 7:30 a.m., the state Emergency Operations center (EOC) received reports of flooding in the last conference call before communications were lost. Jefferson Parish relayed unconfirmed reports of significant flooding in the east bank. New Orleans reported extensive flooding in the east and on the lake front. St. Bernard Parish reported “overtopping” of the Industrial Canal and 3 feet of water in Arabi. When the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) Jeff Smith asked if those flooding rumors were confirmed, the parish deputy sheriff said they were confirmed and noted that his building was surrounded by white caps. Smith also stated he was aware of 3-4 feet of floodwaters at Jackson Barracks.86

■ Monday, August 29, morning (exact time unknown), USACE district commander first heard sporadic reports about levee overtopping and breaches.87 The sources of these early reports included local radio stations and a USACE employee reporting overtopping at the Industrial Canal.88 Later that day, the USACE district commander issued a situation report, noting flooding
with 4-5 feet of water in Kenner (Jefferson Parish); flooding with 10 feet of water in Arabi (St. Bernard Parish); and water coming into Lakeview (New Orleans) from the 17th Street Canal. The report also said that there was a one-block section of the Industrial Canal that had breached.89

Monday, very late evening (exact time unknown), off duty police officers began calling their police stations from their residences to report flooding near the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, according to the New Orleans Police Department. Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain said that these reports were the department’s first knowledge that flooding was moving into central New Orleans — they had been aware of flooding in East New Orleans (from Lake Ponchartrain) and the Lower Ninth Ward (from the Industrial Canal).90

Beyond these reports known to the National Guard, the EOC, and the New Orleans Police Department, USACE was trying to determine the detailed status of the levee system. However, the USACE district commander in New Orleans also suffered from a lack of communications capabilities.91 As noted earlier, there is no early warning system for levee breaches in New Orleans.92 On Monday at about 3:00 p.m., the commander and a team ventured out to conduct early assessments of the situation. They were unable to conduct a thorough review because of the high winds, debris, and flooding. Although they had to return to the bunker, it was clear to them at that point that New Orleans had suffered catastrophic flooding and they began to review plans for unwatering New Orleans.93

On Tuesday, August 30, at about 9:00 a.m., the USACE district commander was able to get a helicopter and see the extent of the flooding from the air.94 The USACE district office began to develop more detailed plans for repairing the levees after the airborne reconnaissance on August 30.95 USACE has authority to provide a variety of emergency response actions when levees fail or are damaged.96 Any repairs to federally constructed levees are funded 100 percent by the federal government.97

There were also physical barriers that made assessments and repair difficult. Specifically, emergency repair operations to close some of the breaches were seriously hampered by lack of access roads. USACE regulations generally require access roads on top of levees to allow for inspections, maintenance, and flood-fighting operations, and most USACE levees built in the United States meet this requirement.98 However, in New Orleans, exceptions were made to these regulations because of its highly urban nature. Access roads were foregone when it was decided to use I-walls in the levee crowns to minimize right-of-ways into surrounding neighborhoods.99 When Hurricane Katrina led to the breaches in the levees, the lack of access roads atop the levees resulted in very significant increases in time and cost to repair the damaged areas.

Poor communications, difficulties in doing assessments, and physical barriers all served to delay efforts to repair the levees. Levee repairs did not begin until Wednesday, when USACE began marshalling resources — such as contractors, materials, and equipment — at the 17th Street Canal site.100 The Louisiana National Guard was also involved in these early efforts to conduct emergency repairs of the 17th Street Canal. That afternoon, USACE began dropping 3,000 pound sandbags into the breach.101 The next day contractors started delivering sand, gravel, and rock to the breach site on a newly-built access road. At both the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal, Army Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters dropped 7,000 pound sandbags—an average of 600 per day—into the breaches. One breach took over 2,000 sandbags before engineers could see the bags under the water surface. According to one witness before the Select Committee, the need for sand was so great that USACE broke into a local business and “took” $580,000 worth of sand.102 One week later, the 17th Street Canal breach was closed.103

Once the levee repairs were underway, USACE turned its attention to unwatering New Orleans and other flooded areas.104 Since at least 2000, USACE has had a detailed plan for unwatering greater New Orleans in
the event of flooding. These unwatering plans were also
discussed in the “Hurricane Pam” exercise (discussed
previously). The exercise assumed the levees did not
breach, however there was flooding due to overtopping
which inundated New Orleans with at least 10 feet of
water. The purpose of the USACE unwatering mission was
to remove water from flooded areas (New Orleans), seal
off canals from Lake Ponchartrain, repair breaches, create
a series of deliberate breaches in the levee system (to help
drain them), and pump out final excess with existing and
temporary pumps.106

Through an emergency contracting process, USACE
contacted four companies to complete the unwatering
activities and, according to USACE, only one company—
Shaw Environmental of Baton Rouge—could respond in
a timely manner.107 Projections made prior to Hurricane
Katrina that it would take nine weeks to unwater New
Orleans proved unfounded.108 On October 11 (43 days
after Katrina landfall) USACE reported that all floodwaters
had been removed from the city of New Orleans.109

Finding: Ultimate cause of levee
failures is under investigation,
results to be determined

Several investigations are under way to assess
causes of levee failure

There are at least four ongoing “forensic” investigations
to determine the cause of the levee breaches around
New Orleans. These are being done by USACE's Engineer
Research and Development Center; the Center for the
Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, LSU;
the National Science Foundation, and ASCE. Each of
these investigations has somewhat similar charters and
overlapping membership.110

■ Interagency Performance Evacuation Task Force (IPET).
The USACE Chief Engineer appointed the IPET, headed
by the Engineer Research and Development Center, to
examine and analyze data in a variety of areas (e.g.,
Geodetic Reference Datum, Storm and Surge Wave
Modeling, Hydrodynamic Forces). At the request of
the Secretary of Defense, the results will be analyzed
independently by ASCE and the National Research
Council.111

■ Louisiana State University (LSU). The Hurricane Center
was appointed by the State of Louisiana to lead the
state’s forensic investigation of the Hurricane Katrina
levee failures. The investigation team includes engineers
and coastal scientists conducting analysis of the storm
surge levels, levee construction, and levee failures.112

■ National Science Foundation (NSF). NSF assembled
a Levee Investigation Team consisting of leading
national and international experts in major disasters.113
Participating teams of scientists are from the University
of California, Berkeley; the Geo-Institute of ASCE; the
Coasts, Oceans, Ports and Rivers Institute of ASCE; and
the Hurricane Research Center of LSU.114

■ American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). ASCE
assembled an independent team of experts, consisting
of professional engineers with a wide range of
geotechnical engineering expertise in the study, safety,
and inspection of dams and levees. The purpose of
the team is to collect data and make observations to
determine why certain sections of the levee system
failed and others did not.115

Preliminary results suggest some levees did not
withstand forces they were designed to withstand

Some of the investigators testified or released reports on
their preliminary findings. For example, at a November
2, 2005, Senate Hearing, witnesses included Paul Mlakar,
of IPET; Ivor Van Heerden, of LSU; Raymond Seed of
the University of California, Berkeley, representing the
NSF; and Peter Nicholson of the University of Hawaii,
representing the ASCE.116 These witnesses (except
Mlakar) testified on the preliminary findings from their
investigations. In addition, the NSF and ASCE investigators
released a joint interim report, with initial findings, at that
hearing.117 A month after the Senate Hearing, IPET released
an interim report with a summary of its field observations,
which generally concurred with the NSF/ASCE interim
report.118 In evaluating the causes of levee and floodwall
failure, these preliminary reports indicated the impact of
the hurricane, and thus the potential causes of the breaches,
varied by location.119

According to preliminary information from NSF, ASCE,
and LSU, most of the levees and floodwall breaches on
the east side of New Orleans were caused by overtopping,
as the storm surge rose over the tops of the levees and/or their floodwalls and produced erosion that subsequently led to breaches.120 A variety of factors led to overtopping of the Industrial Canal and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO). An LSU Scientist, Hassan Madhriqui, said that MR-GO worked as a funnel which increased the height of the storm surge and "caused floodwaters to stack up several feet higher than elsewhere in the metro area and sharply increased the surge's speed as it rushed through the MR-GO and into the Industrial Canal."121 The overtopping eroded the backside of the canals, scoured out the foundations, and led to their collapse and thus major flooding of adjacent neighborhoods. According to Seed, "A majority of them [levee breaches] were the result of overtopping, and that simply means that the hurricane was bigger than the levees were built to take…." 122

In contrast, there was little or no overtopping along most of the levees in the vicinity of Lake Ponchartrain. The only breach along Lake Ponchartrain was in New Orleans East, which was probably due to overtopping. But in the drainage canals that feed into Lake Ponchartrain — the 17th Street and London Avenue Canal — there was no overtopping, and the failures were likely caused by weaknesses in the foundation soil underlying the levees, the weakness in the soils used to construct the earthen levee embankments themselves, or weaknesses caused by vegetation growing along the levees. These were the most costly breaches, leading to widespread flooding of central New Orleans — to include the downtown area and several large residential neighborhoods.123 According to Van Heerden of LSU, "the surge in Lake Ponchartrain wasn’t that of a category 3 storm, and nor did it exceed the design criteria of the standard project hurricane."124 Nicholson of ASCE concurred with this assessment, adding, "If the levees [on Lake Ponchartrain] had done what they were designed to do, a lot of the flooding of New Orleans would not have occurred, and a lot of the suffering that occurred as a result of the flooding would not have occurred."125

However, these findings are preliminary.126 Most of the investigations will not issue their final reports until the spring or summer of 2006. For example, the USACE IPET report is scheduled to be completed in June 2006.127 Possible causes of the levee breaches include a design not appropriate for the actual application (indicating a shared deficiency), storm conditions simply too overwhelming for the designed levees to withstand (indicating an act of nature); levee walls not secured deeply enough into the soil or otherwise improperly constructed (indicating a USACE deficiency); improper maintenance of the levees (indicating a local deficiency); or a combination of factors.

**Conclusion**

Hundreds of miles of levees were constructed to defend metropolitan New Orleans against storm events. These levees were not designed to protect New Orleans from a category 4 or 5 monster hurricane, and all the key players knew this. The original specifications of the levees offered protection that was limited to withstanding the forces of a moderate hurricane. Once constructed, the levees were turned over to local control, leaving the USACE to make detailed plans to drain New Orleans should it be flooded.

The local sponsors — a patchwork quilt of levee and water and sewer boards — were responsible only for their own piece of levee. It seems no federal, state, or local entity watched over the integrity of the whole system, which might have mitigated to some degree the effects of the hurricane. When Hurricane Katrina came, some of the levees breached — as many had predicted they would — and most of New Orleans flooded to create untold misery.

The forces that destroyed the levees also destroyed the ability to quickly assess damage and make repairs. The reasons for the levee failures appear to be some combination of nature’s wrath (the storm was just too large) and man’s folly (an assumption that the design, construction, and maintenance of the levees would be flawless). While there was no failure to predict the inevitability and consequences of a monster hurricane — Katrina in this case — there was a failure of initiative to get beyond design and organizational compromises to improve the level of protection afforded.


A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

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[72x29]100

A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

[72x717]92 Pezza Interview.

93 Senate Hearing: Who's in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar).

94 Id. at 5.

95 Id. at 6.

96 Flood Control Act of 1941 § 5, 33 U.S.C. § 701n (2005) (Authorizes USACE to conduct emergency operations and rehabilitation activities when levees fail or are damaged and allows USACE to provide emergency operations to include technical assistance and direct assistance—providing sandbags and pumps, emergency contracting, and levee reinforcement. USACE administrative policies, guidance, and operating procedures for natural disaster preparedness, response, and recovery activities are set out in 33 C.F.R. Part 203 (2005)); see Senate Hearing: Who's in Charge of Levees, at 3 (written statement of Col. Wagenaar); also GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework, at 14-15.


101 Id.


103 Senate Hearing: Who's in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar).

104 Id.

105 See Un-Watering Plan; SE LA Functional Hurricane Plan, at 6-7.


109 NHC: Hurricane Katrina, at 9; see SE LA Functional Hurricane Plan, at 6.

110 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman).

111 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (written statement of Paul F. Mlakar, Ph.D., P.E., Senior Research Scientist, U.S. Army Research and Development Center).


113 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Peter Nicholson).

114 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed).


116 See Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail.


119 Report on Levee Performance, at v; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (written statement of Paul F. Mlakar).

120 Report on Levee Performance, at iv; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden, Ph.D., Deputy Director, LA State U. Hurricane Center).

121 Report on Levee Performance, at 1-5; Matthew Brown, Katrina may mean MR-GO has to go, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 24, 2005, at 1; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden).

122 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed).

123 Report on Levee Performance, at 1-5; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (written statement of Paul F. Mlakar) and (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden).

124 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden).

125 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Peter Nicholson).


“At the local level, I think the biggest failure was leadership didn’t take into account the fact that poor residents had no way of evacuating. I also think Governor Blanco should have called for a mandatory evacuation sooner and that Mayor Nagin should have coordinated better with Amtrak.”

Terrol Williams
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 2005

“We estimate that over 1 million people, or approximately 90 percent of the affected parishes’ populations, evacuate[d] in about a 40-hour period. I don’t know of any other evacuation that has occurred with that many people under these circumstances with that high of percentage of people being evacuated in that short of a time period.”

Colonel (Ret.) Jeff Smith
Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
Select Committee Hearing, December 14, 2005
Failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief

Summary

Evacuation is a critical part of emergency preparation for a hurricane. Such preparation includes both detailed evacuation planning and implementation of the evacuation plan in potentially affected areas once a hurricane is projected to make landfall. The states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and many of their localities (e.g., New Orleans) have hurricane evacuation plans and years of experience implementing them.

In Alabama and Mississippi, the state or localities declared mandatory evacuations as Hurricane Katrina approached, and implementation of their evacuation plans went relatively well. In Louisiana, the state and local implementation of evacuation plans for the general population also went well, resulting in one of the largest emergency evacuations in history.

Two of Louisiana’s most populous localities, New Orleans and Jefferson Parish, declared mandatory evacuations late or not at all. While the definition of “mandatory” evacuation and the associated obligations and liabilities that local governments assume are still being debated, early designation of the evacuation of New Orleans as mandatory could have increased the number of people that left, resulting in a more complete evacuation, saving lives, and reducing suffering. New Orleans city officials, who were responsible for executing an evacuation plan and who had the authority to commandeer resources to assist in the evacuation, failed to evacuate or assist in the evacuation of more than 70,000 individuals who did not leave either before the announcement of the mandatory evacuation or before the storm hit. Those who did not evacuate included many who did not have their own means of transportation. Despite the declaration of a mandatory evacuation on Sunday before landfall, New Orleans officials still did not completely evacuate the population. Instead, they opened the Superdome as a “shelter of last resort” for these individuals.

Problems sheltering this population, beyond emergency planners’ general preference for evacuation, were exacerbated by inadequate preparations for a large population at the Superdome. For those with medical or special needs, New Orleans and other institutions also failed to evacuate them, but instead sheltered them — a decision that also had negative consequences and is discussed in detail in the MEDICAL CARE chapter. Those individuals in all states who had the means to evacuate, but did not do so, must also share the blame for the incomplete evacuation and the difficulties that followed.

The failure of a more complete evacuation led to catastrophic circumstances when Katrina made landfall, particularly in New Orleans where the force of the hurricane breached the levee system in multiple locations throughout the metropolitan area. As the resulting floodwaters spread through low lying urban areas,
thousands of people who were trapped in their homes climbed to their roofs or fled into flooded streets. Fortunately, thousands of these people were saved by a massive and heroic search and rescue effort. But many were not as fortunate, and hundreds of people died in their homes or other locations, presumably from drowning. Those who were in the Superdome, or those that found shelter and high ground at other locations, suffered horrible conditions. The floodwaters, which had been anticipated and even predicted from a large hurricane such as Katrina, furthered the misery and delayed the immediate relief of the remaining population.

The incomplete evacuation and floodwaters also required a post hurricane evacuation, for which federal, state, and city officials had not prepared. Because of a lack of preparations, planning had to be accomplished in emergency circumstances, where communications and situational awareness were in short supply. Requirements for buses kept growing as a lack of willing drivers and diversions of buses continued to delay the evacuation of the Superdome and other locations. Finally, the combination of more buses and supplemental airlifts resulted in a complete evacuation of New Orleans.

Finding: Evacuations of general populations went relatively well in all three states

Evacuation is a critical part of emergency preparation for a hurricane

Because of the destructive forces of hurricanes, evacuation planning is very important. Preparation for an approaching hurricane includes both detailed evacuation planning and implementation of that plan in potentially affected areas once a hurricane is projected to make landfall. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials told Select Committee staff that emergency planners prefer evacuation to sheltering people within affected areas because the sheltered population is subject to the most intense dangers of the storm and because it may be a slow and difficult operation to get relief personnel and supplies back into hurricane ravaged areas.

The state of Louisiana has an evacuation plan, which was revised following Hurricane Ivan in 2004. The evacuation for that storm had caused massive traffic jams leading out of New Orleans. Those traffic jams were the result of the southernmost parishes trying to evacuate at the same time as Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, the two most populous parishes. The new plan called for a staged evacuation with the southernmost parishes evacuating first, followed by Lower Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, and then Upper Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, facilitated by the implementation of contraflow (one-way outbound traffic) on the highways leading out of New Orleans.

In addition to the Louisiana state plan, local governments have emergency evacuation plans. The City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan ("New Orleans Plan") provides: “The authority to order the evacuation of residents threatened by an approaching hurricane is conferred to the Governor by Louisiana statute.” But this power “is also delegated to each political subdivision of the State by Executive Order.”

The New Orleans Plan further explains: “This authority empowers the chief elected official of New Orleans, the Mayor of New Orleans, to order the evacuation of the parish residents threatened by an approaching hurricane.” Under this authority, the Mayor of New Orleans is responsible for giving the order for a mandatory evacuation and supervising the actual evacuation of his population. The Mayor’s Office of Emergency Preparedness must “[c]oordinate with the State . . . on elements of evacuation”
and “[a]ssist in directing the transportation of evacuees to staging areas.”

The importance of evacuations is expressed in the New Orleans Plan: “The safe evacuation of threatened populations . . . is one of the principle reasons for developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.” In furtherance of that goal, “[t]he city of New Orleans will utilize all available resources to quickly and safely evacuate threatened areas.”

Mississippi also has a state evacuation plan, one that takes account of local plans because of the key role that counties play in declaring evacuations. According to the testimony of the Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Robert Latham, the authority to make decisions about mandatory evacuations in Mississippi rests with local governments. However, the state is generally included in any discussions about evacuation orders because, once a city or county chooses to make such an order, state responsibilities for managing traffic (including contraflow) and opening shelters can come into play. In preparing for Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi officials worked through the MEMA liaisons it dispatched to the counties along or near the Gulf Coast as well as a representative it had stationed in Louisiana’s emergency operations center (because of contraflow agreements between Mississippi and Louisiana that provide for evacuations out of southeast Louisiana through Mississippi).

Alabama also has an evacuation plan and recently revised it. Lessons learned during Alabama’s response to Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis helped refine the state’s actions as Katrina neared. Having been criticized for triggering evacuations that turned out to be unnecessary, Alabama officials practiced to reduce the time required to reverse traffic flows on the major routes and encouraged county and local officials to define smaller evacuation zones within their jurisdictions to better target evacuation actions. According to Governor Riley:

On Katrina there was an evacuation plan that was a little more moderate than I had hoped for, and we convinced everyone in the room to expand it. The time before, as I said earlier, we got some criticism because we may have expanded it too much. We have gone back and built a zone type process. But we take all of the local team, because you have to have local buy-in because it won’t work if you don’t.

Alabama state and county officials testified that one of their difficulties in planning evacuations is that Army Corps of Engineers data used as the basis for evacuation plans and models is outdated. According to Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) Director Bruce Baughman:

The two coastal counties have had studies done by the [Army] Corps of Engineers. Those studies were about five years old. In the case of Mobile County, the data did not include the windfields. So it doesn’t give you complete information when you are trying to make decisions on clearance times . . . . It is based upon dated information. Baldwin County has grown by leaps and bounds so that you have got a higher population. And not only that, before Labor Day, you have got probably 100,000 people . . . as far as outside individuals that are tourists down in that area, and that is not computed into your clearance.
times. What we have done is we have taken the data that is available that is between 22 and 24 hour clearance times for those two counties, and generally we allow 26 to 28 hour clearance times. But that is a best guess. What we need to do is based upon some real time data, so other studies need to be done in that particular area. That used to be funded out of the Hurricane Preparedness Program, and those studies are lagging way behind.12

Mississippi declared mandatory evacuations which generally went well

Mississippi evacuations were generally mandatory and went relatively well. Five Mississippi counties — Hancock, Jackson, Harrison, Stone, and Pearl River — issued mandatory evacuation orders on or before August 28 for specific areas or zones of their counties and/or those living in mobile homes.13 For example, Harrison County first issued a mandatory evacuation order for its zones A and B, which include all of its Gulf-front and low-lying areas, at 10 a.m. on August 28; it strongly advised, but did not mandate, that residents in its highest elevations (zone C) evacuate the county.14 According to Governor Haley Barbour, he has the authority to usurp county officials’ decisions — that is, order a mandatory evacuation if they have not — but he chose not to do so because county officials are closer to the situation than he is.15

During the evacuation, Mississippi Department of Transportation personnel collected and reported traffic flow information along evacuation routes, including areas where contraflow was in place for those evacuating Louisiana. At 7 p.m. on August 28, traffic counts were “consistently high” and the contraflow areas showed a continuous increase in traffic.16 According to traffic counts, by 11 p.m. that evening, traffic along the evacuation/contraflow routes had decreased substantially.17

Rep. Gene Taylor asserted, however, that evacuation planning ought to include providing people with gasoline, especially at the end of the month:

The other thing that I find interesting is that in all these scenarios that I’m sure you’ve thought out, did FEMA bother to realize that it is the 28th of the month, a lot of people live on fixed income, be it a Social Security check or a retirement check, they’ve already made their necessary purchase for the month. What they couldn’t envision is having to fill up their gas tank one more time, at almost 3 bucks a gallon just to get the heck out of there. What I think no one is really focused on is a heck of a lot of people who stayed behind were people with limited means.18

Former Undersecretary Brown strongly opposed the suggestion that FEMA should have supplied gasoline:

Congressman, FEMA is not there to supply gasoline, transportation; it is not the role of the federal government to supply five gallons of gas for every individual to put in a car to go somewhere. I personally believe that is a horrible path to go down. And while my heart goes out to people on fixed incomes, it is primarily a State and local responsibility.19

Whether providing gasoline should be a federal or state and local responsibility, there may very well have been victims of Hurricane Katrina who did not evacuate because at the end of the month they had run out of money for gasoline and found no other way to get gasoline or evacuate.
Alabama mandatory evacuations also went relatively well

Alabama began implementing the evacuation early, and its evacuation also went well. Even before any Alabama evacuations began, AEMA and state transportation officials participated in the FEMA regional Evacuation Liaison Team conference calls during which emergency managers from Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi shared information on the status of evacuation routes, road closures, traffic volumes, hotel availability, and other interstate implications of significant population migrations in the region.20

As it became clear Katrina would have a significant impact on the Alabama coast, Baldwin County emergency management officials called for a voluntary evacuation of all coastal, flood-prone, and low lying areas at 5 p.m. on Saturday, August 27.21 State emergency management officials asked the Governor to declare a mandatory evacuation for threatened areas of Baldwin and Mobile Counties on Sunday, August 28.22 According to the announcement released by the Governor’s office, "In Baldwin County, the order calls for the evacuation of those on Plash Island, the Fort Morgan peninsula, and all areas south of Fort Morgan Road for Gulf Shores. The order also calls for the evacuation of those living in Perdido Key and south of Perdido Beach Boulevard. Those in all low lying and flood-prone areas south of I-10 in Baldwin County and those living along the Mobile Bay Area and other water inlets also fall under the evacuation order."23 Governor Riley testified:

. . . [W]e made it voluntary 36 hours out, and then shortly thereafter we made it mandatory. As it comes closer, as the cone begins to funnel in and we have a higher likelihood that it is going to happen, we make it mandatory. We ask people to leave. We do everything we can to encourage them to leave. But, again, the limiting factor is the amount of time. The difference between trying to evacuate our beaches before Labor Day and after Labor Day is like daylight and dark, because we have so many more vacationers there. And then when you layer on top of that the number of people that will be coming out of the Florida panhandle that will come through Alabama, if we don’t start it three days early, you just physically do not have the capacity to take care of it.24

Alabama did not implement reverse lane strategies (i.e., contraflow) in response to Hurricane Katrina, as road closures were limited and traffic volume never warranted it. The state reported 118,900 applications for evacuation assistance by Alabama residents, of which 23,853 were by out of state residents.25

Louisiana evacuation of general population was very successful

The Louisiana evacuation for the general population, including contraflow, worked very well. Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco and other state officials labeled the implementation of this evacuation as “masterful” and as one of the most successful emergency evacuations in history.26 Based on National Weather Service reports of Katrina’s “dramatic shift” toward Louisiana on Friday, the state had less time than planned to prepare for contraflow and had to implement it in a compressed timeframe.27

Nevertheless, the contraflow planning and implementation went smoothly. The state effectively used conference calls to coordinate among the parishes. Some parishes declared some level of evacuation for the entire parish as early as Saturday morning, August 27, at 9:00 a.m. These were generally the lower parishes (LaFourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Charles), which was consistent with the Louisiana state plan for getting these populations to evacuate ahead of the metropolitan New Orleans population.

The parishes generally started with the declaration of a “recommended” evacuation and changed these to a “mandatory” evacuation as Katrina got closer. The state also coordinated closely with Mississippi and Texas on traffic and/or sheltering issues. For example, Friday afternoon Blanco called Barbour to coordinate that portion of the contraflow plan that involved highways leading out of Louisiana into Mississippi, and Governor Barbour agreed to the contraflow plan.28
Finding: Despite adequate warning 56 hours before landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall.

Terms for voluntary and mandatory evacuations lack clear definitions

A wide variety of terms were used to describe the levels of evacuation orders, indicating a lack of clarity and a potential point of confusion for the resident population. For example, the different parishes used a wide variety of terms to describe the level of evacuation imposed before declaring a mandatory evacuation. These terms included a “precautionary” evacuation, a “voluntary” evacuation, a “recommended” evacuation, a “highly recommended” evacuation, and a “highly suggested” evacuation. It appeared many of these officials were bending over backward to avoid using the term mandatory.

Throughout our discussions in all three states, Select Committee staff were unable to find a clear and consistent definition of mandatory evacuation. However, there was a consensus among almost all officials in all three states that even under a mandatory evacuation, authorities would not forcibly remove someone from their home. For example, in the case of Louisiana, both Blanco and LOHSEP Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith emphatically rejected the idea that people could be forcibly removed from their homes even under a mandatory evacuation order. Blanco said, “Well, in the United States of America you don’t force people [out of their homes], you urge them.” Smith said: “It is America. You can’t force people on to buses; you can’t go into their houses at gunpoint and leave [sic].”

Under Alabama state law, a mandatory evacuation declaration by the Governor is required before counties can take certain actions to ensure maximum compliance with local orders by those at risk. But, regarding the practical meaning and effect of “mandatory” versus “voluntary” evacuations, Riley said:

We probably need to come up with a better definition of what mandatory is. We call it a mandatory evacuation because everyone else calls it a mandatory evacuation. But do we arrest anyone? No. Do we send people door to door? Absolutely. We have a phone system, that they can explain to you in just a moment, where we have an automated system that calls every resident, asks them to leave, advises them with a phone message of how important it is. We keep doing it until we get in touch with everyone. Do you ever get to the point that everyone is going to leave? I don’t think so.

Nevertheless, it is clear to the Select Committee that declaring a mandatory evacuation delivers a more powerful statement to the public than declaring a voluntary or similarly worded evacuation. A mandatory evacuation implies that individuals do not have a choice, that the government will not be able to protect them and provide relief if they remain, and it generally conveys a higher level of urgency.

Federal, state, and local officials recognized the potential for catastrophe and flooding and communicated that potential among themselves and to the public.

Regardless of the various terms used for evacuations, federal officials fully informed Blanco and New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin about the threat to New Orleans. On the evening of August 27, National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield called Blanco and later spoke to Nagin about the power of Hurricane Katrina. Also on Sunday, President Bush called Blanco to express his concern for the people of New Orleans and the dangers they faced and urged a mandatory evacuation. On Sunday, the Slidell Office of the National Weather Service, issued a very strongly worded warning at approximately 10:00 a.m.: 

Devastating damage expected . . . Hurricane Katrina . . . a most powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength . . . rivals the intensity of Hurricane Camille of 1969 . . . Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks . . . perhaps longer. At least half of well constructed homes will have roof and wall failure. All gabled roofs will fail . . . leaving those homes severely damaged or destroyed . . . Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern standards.
State and local officials also urged the public to evacuate by foretelling the potentially catastrophic consequences. For example, beginning on Saturday, August 27, Blanco publicly urged citizens to evacuate the city, expressing her concern for the strength of the levees against at least a Category 4 storm. In several interviews on Saturday and Sunday, Blanco stated that flooding in New Orleans was a major concern. On Saturday at approximately 8:00 p.m., she appeared on CNN and said that in New Orleans “[t]he storm surge could bring in 15 to 20 feet of water. [People in the city of New Orleans] will not survive that if indeed that happens.” In the Sunday morning papers, it was reported that she had said the water levels could reach as high as 20 feet. In a television interview on Sunday, Blanco was asked if the 15 foot levees could survive the storm, and she replied: “I don’t think anything can tolerate a storm surge of 15-20 feet.”

In a Fox News interview on Sunday, Nagin was very specific about the threat. He said whether the levees would hold was the “big question.” He said he hoped people who stayed in the French Quarter would go up to their homes’ second or third story and bring something to chop through their roofs. He expressed his worry that “[t]he levees have never truly been tested the way they’re getting ready to be tested. If there’s a breach and if they start to fail, it probably will create somewhat of a domino effect which would pour even more water into the city.”

Blanco’s staff also called ministers on Saturday to urge them to tell their congregations to get out. And apparently, the Mayor and his staff did similar things. But these steps were clearly insufficient.

The declarations of a “mandatory” evacuation were delayed or never made in metropolitan New Orleans

Neither Blanco nor Nagin, however, ordered a mandatory evacuation until Sunday morning. According to the Saturday newspapers, Nagin said “he will make a decision about evacuations and other emergency procedures [Saturday] about noon.” At a news conference on Saturday, Nagin announced: “Ladies and Gentlemen, this is not a test. This is the real deal.” But as late as Saturday afternoon, according to news reports, Nagin was consulting city lawyers about legal liability to the city’s businesses for lost revenue from evacuating customers.

In addition, despite express authority to commandeer resources and enforce or facilitate the evacuation of the City of New Orleans and despite recognition of the probability that Hurricane Katrina would cause breaches of the levees and flooding of the city, Blanco and Nagin did not exercise those authorities by declaring a mandatory evacuation and enforcing it or using state and city resources to facilitate the evacuation of those who could not or would not, absent extraordinary measures and assistance, evacuate. This extraordinary storm required extraordinary measures, which the Governor and Mayor did not take.

Finally, on Sunday morning at around 11:00 a.m. central time — 19 hours before projected landfall, Nagin announced the issuance of a mandatory evacuation order. According to the New Orleans Plan, that gave the Mayor the authority to “direct and compel, by any necessary and reasonable force, the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the City if he deems this action necessary for the preservation of life, or for disaster mitigation, response, or recovery.” As previously noted, the New Orleans Plan also recognizes that “[t]he safe evacuation of threatened populations when endangered by a major catastrophic event is one of the principle reasons for developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan” and that “[s]pecial arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves or who require special life saving assistance.”

In a joint news conference on Sunday morning, Blanco and Nagin continued to express their concerns and explain the reason for the Mayor’s issuing a mandatory evacuation order. Their comments raise the question as to why, given the severity of the predicted catastrophe, the mandatory evacuation was not ordered sooner.

Mayor Nagin: Ladies and gentlemen, I wish I had better news for you. But we are facing a storm that most of us have feared. I do not want to create panic. But I do want the citizens to understand that
this is very serious, and it’s of the highest nature. And that’s why we are taking this unprecedented move.

The storm is now a Cat 5, a Category 5, as I appreciate it, with sustained winds of 150 miles an hour, with wind gusts of 190 miles per hour.

The storm surge most likely will topple our levee system. So we are preparing to deal with that also. So that’s why we’re ordering a mandatory evacuation . . . .

. . . .

This is a once in probably a lifetime event. The city of New Orleans has never seen a hurricane of this strength to hit it almost directly, which is what they’re projecting right now.²²

During the press conference Blanco stated:

I want to reiterate what the mayor has said. This is a very dangerous time. Just before we walked into this room, President Bush called and told me to share with all of you that he is very concerned about the citizens. He is concerned about the impact that this hurricane would have on our people. And he asked me to please ensure that there would be a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.

The leaders at the highest ranks of our nation have recognized the destructive forces and the possible awesome danger that we are in. And I just want to say, we need to get as many people out as possible. The shelters will end up probably without electricity or with minimum electricity from generators in the end. There may be intense flooding that will be not in our control, which would be ultimately the most dangerous situation that many of our people could face.

Waters could be as high as 15 to 20 feet. That is what the Miami National Weather Service, the National Hurricane Center, has shared with us. That would probably be ultimately the worst situation. We’re hoping that it does not happen that way. We need to pray, of course, very strongly, that the hurricane force would diminish. But just remember, even if it diminishes to 1, there were six people lost in Florida when it was a Category 1 hurricane. So there’s still imminent danger. There seems to be no real relief in sight, and it has been startling to see how accurate the path was predicted, and how it is following the predicted path.

So we have no reason to believe right now that it will alter its path.

Hopefully, you know, it could move just a little bit in one direction or another and not keep New Orleans in its sights. But we don’t know that that would happen. That would be — we would be blessed if that happened.²³

Jefferson Parish — the other major component of metropolitan New Orleans — never did declare a mandatory evacuation, except for the lower parts of the parish on the Gulf Coast. In a conference call among parish officials, Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard said he did not have the “resources to enforce” a mandatory evacuation.²⁴ Resource or enforcement issues, however, were not raised by any of the other parishes that declared mandatory evacuations. In addition, no one requested that the state or federal government provide resources to supplement those of the parish to implement a more complete evacuation.
Finding: The failure to order timely mandatory evacuations, Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining population, and decisions of individuals led to incomplete evacuation

Earlier mandatory evacuation could have helped get more people out

While the Mayor and the Governor recognized the dangers and expressed them to the public, they did not implement evacuation procedures for all of the citizens of New Orleans that reflected the seriousness of the threat. The results demonstrate the flaw of the evacuation — tens of thousands of citizens did not get out of harm’s way.

Specifically, the failure to order a mandatory evacuation until Sunday, the decision to enforce that order by “asking” people who had not evacuated to go to checkpoints for bus service, and then using that bus service to take people only as far as the Superdome did not reflect the publicly stated recognition that Hurricane Katrina would “most likely topple [the] levee system” and result in “intense flooding” and “waters as high as 15 or 20 feet,” rendering large portions of the city uninhabitable. As a result, more than 70,000 people remained in the City to be rescued after the storm.

While Blanco, Nagin, and Broussard, and leaders from other parishes carefully managed the phased contraflow evacuation, that only facilitated the evacuation of those who had the means to evacuate the city. Nagin testified that, on Saturday, August 27, he “called for a strong voluntary evacuation, urging all citizens that were able to evacuate the city.” Although Nagin was rightly proud of the achievement of thecontraflow evacuation of the region, he also conceded that “it probably wasn’t as good as we — all of our citizens needed.”

Some citizens of New Orleans believed that a mandatory evacuation should have been called earlier and that the government needed to assist people to evacuate. New Orleans citizen and evacuee Doreen Keeler testified, “If a mandatory evacuation [order] would have been called sooner, it would have been easier to move seniors out of the area and many lives would have been saved.” She further testified that “[g]oing to [senior citizens] with, yo, this is a mandatory evacuation, you do not have a choice, you have to leave, I feel would definitely help me to get my senior citizens out without waiting as long as I did in order to leave. And I think that if by some miracle there was any type of evacuation plan available, it could have been put into play earlier if a mandatory evacuation had been called.”

New Orleans citizen and community leader Dyan French asked: “Why would you get in the public media and ask a city, where 80 percent of its citizens ride public transit, to evacuate? What [were] they supposed to do? Fly?” New Orleans citizen and evacuee Terrol Williams observed, “I think, unfortunately, a lot of the destruction that we saw, that persons were unable to safely evacuate, was because they were basically poor,” which was echoed by Doreen Keeler: “They suffered through it because they had no way of getting out.”

New Orleans citizen and evacuee Leah Hodges complained that “[t]he stray animals from the animal shelter, most of whom would have been euthanized, were
evacuated 2 days before the storm, and the people were left to die. Buses that could have gotten our people, who otherwise could not get out, were left to flood, and people were left to die.” And Barbara Arnwine, Executive Director for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, testified: “We know that people were not able to evacuate because some people just didn’t own cars.”

In contrast to New Orleans, officials in adjoining Plaquemines Parish cited their early declaration of a mandatory evacuation as the key to achieving a high evacuation rate. Plaquemines Parish President Benny Rousselle (according to Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Jiff Hingle) declared a mandatory evacuation on television at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 27. Sheriff’s deputies started working the intersections to turn off traffic lights and expedite outbound traffic. On Sunday, August 28, Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s deputies went door-to-door to warn people to evacuate and to identify those who needed help doing so. Hingle said these efforts resulted in Plaquemines Parish having an evacuation rate of 97 to 98 percent, which helped account for the small number of fatalities there — only three.

The shelter of last resort for those who could not or would not evacuate was inadequate

A critical part of evacuation planning is accounting for those who cannot evacuate on their own, including those without access to private transportation. State and local emergency operations plans task transportation agencies with primary responsibility to assemble buses and other resources to operate this response function. For example, Alabama’s Mobile County EOP states: “The principle mode of transportation during an emergency situation will be private vehicles. There will be citizens in Mobile County that do not have private vehicles nor are able to obtain transportation. These people will be looking to the City and County government to provide this emergency transportation. The Mobile County Emergency Management Agency has been given the responsibility of managing and coordinating this task.” An annex to the Baldwin and Mobile County plans is more explicit:

Evacuation preparedness plans consider all persons who do not have access to a private vehicle and therefore would have to rely on public transportation for evacuation. Local governments attempt to arrange for adequate resources to meet the demand for public transportation. Planning for adequate special needs emergency transportation for residents in private homes is usually the responsibility of local emergency management officials, while transportation for those in health-related facilities is the responsibility of the individual facilities. Although detailed information concerning residents of private homes may be difficult to obtain, each local government is developing procedures for maintaining an up-to-date roster of persons likely to need special assistance. Non-ambulatory patients will require transportation that can easily accommodate wheelchairs, stretchers, and, possibly, life-sustaining equipment. Lack of resources for these needs could result in critical evacuation delays and increased hazards for the evacuees. The Special Needs population for each county changes from year to year and requires public cooperation and assistance to maintain an up-to-date listing.
Similarly, the New Orleans Plan specifically addresses the issue of those without access to transportation. The plan states that “[s]pecial arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves…. Additional personnel will be recruited to assist in evacuation procedures as needed.” The New Orleans Plan further warns that “i]f an evacuation order is issued without the mechanisms needed to disseminate the information to the affected persons, then we face the possibility of having large numbers of people either stranded and left to the mercy of the storm, or left in areas impacted by toxic materials.”

Specifically, the New Orleans Plan provides that “[t]ransportation will be provided to those persons requiring public transportation from the area,” placing the Regional Transit Authority as the lead agency for transportation, supported by multiple federal, state, and local agencies, including the Orleans Parish School Board, New Orleans Equipment Maintenance Division, Louisiana Department of Transportation, Louisiana National Guard, Port of New Orleans, U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, and Amtrak. The tasks allotted to the RTA include: “place[ing] special vehicles on alert to be utilized if needed[,] [p]osition[ing] supervisors and dispatch[ing] evacuation buses [and i]f warranted by scope of evacuation, implement[ing] additional service.” The New Orleans Plan expressly acknowledges that “[a]pproximately 100,000 Citizens of New Orleans do not have means of personal transportation.” Following the mandatory evacuation order, city officials sent the police and fire department through the city “asking” people to go to checkpoints where buses circulating through the city would pick them up — but only to take them to the Superdome which had been opened as a refuge of last resort that day.

Despite the New Orleans Plan’s acknowledgement that there are people who cannot evacuate by themselves, the city did not make arrangements for their evacuation. Instead, city officials decided to shelter them in New Orleans. As stated previously, emergency planners prefer evacuation to sheltering, because the sheltered population is subject to the most intense dangers of the storm. Evacuation is also favored because it may be slow and difficult to get relief personnel and supplies back into hurricane ravaged areas.

In addition, New Orleans preparations for sheltering these individuals were woefully inadequate. On Sunday morning, New Orleans officials, instead of working to move individuals out of New Orleans and out of harm’s way, were drafting a plan to seize private facilities to create additional “refuges of last resort.” Ultimately, city officials designated only the Superdome as such a refuge.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Superdome proved to be inadequate for the crowds that had to take refuge there. Only at the last minute did the City ask for food and water and medical personnel for the Superdome. As discussed in the MEDICAL CARE chapter, some of the federal medical assistance teams were called in so late they did not make it to the Superdome before landfall. On Sunday morning, the New Orleans Director of Homeland Security, Terry Ebbert, predicted “nightmare” conditions in the Superdome.

Individuals share the blame for incomplete evacuation

The role of the individual was also an important factor in metropolitan New Orleans’ incomplete evacuation. In Louisiana, state and parish officials said that it is generally the individual’s responsibility to evacuate or identify themselves as having special needs if they need help. State and parish officials noted varying degrees of cooperation with evacuations among the individuals in the general
population. They said many residents evacuate early on their own, even before an evacuation is declared. These individuals watch the weather reports when a hurricane is in the Gulf and make their own informed choices.

Officials know from experience, however, that some percentage (from 10-25 percent) will not evacuate. The Governor and other state officials said some residents play “hurricane roulette.” That is, against the advice of the authorities, they stay and take the risk that the hurricane will hit somewhere else or that they will be lucky and relatively unaffected.

Select Committee staff heard similar comments in Mississippi. Testimony from county emergency management officials as well as Mississippi’s governor indicated that “hurricane fatigue” as well as the expense of repeatedly evacuating when storms threaten may have caused some to not heed the mandatory evacuation orders. For example, Barbour testified that various areas in the state had undergone mandatory evacuations for Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and Hurricane Dennis earlier in 2005, but in both instances the storms ultimately made landfall farther east, sparing Mississippi.

Both state and parish officials in Louisiana said the older population, some of whom might be classified as special needs, make up a substantial portion of those playing “hurricane roulette.” They said there are a few reasons for this. First, many of the older residents had experience “sitting out” earlier hurricanes such as Betsy (1965) or Camille (1969) and reasoned they could “sit out” Katrina. Second, some of them were just “set in their ways” and would not listen to others’ advice, even that of their own adult children, to evacuate. In addition, Katrina was originally headed for the Florida Panhandle, and its turn to the west caught many residents by surprise. Finally, it was the end of the month, when people did not have money for gas to evacuate.

Regardless of their reasons for not evacuating, those that had the means to evacuate and did not do so must share some of the blame. Many of these people paid for their poor choices with their lives — as rising floodwaters drown them in their homes. Others who stayed, but could have left, suffered the less severe consequences of walking through floodwaters to crowded shelters or other high ground. These individuals suffered in horrible conditions — some with shelter and food and water and some without any of these — while they awaited evacuation, which they could have done for themselves earlier.

Finding: The incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and horrible conditions for those who remained.

Failure of complete evacuation resulted in hundreds of deaths and severe suffering for thousands

Contrary to Blanco’s claim that “[t]he word ‘mandatory’ doesn’t mean any more than us getting up, saying, get out[,]” the delay in calling a mandatory evacuation and not enforcing or facilitating that evacuation had real consequences for the city and for the protection of...
ordinary people. As noted above, many residents believed that an earlier declaration of a mandatory evacuation would have helped get more people out. The President of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association also told Select Committee staff that at least one nursing home had been unable to evacuate its patients prelandfall because it could not find bus drivers by the time the mandatory evacuation order was issued.84

While these warnings were sufficient to motivate more than a million citizens to evacuate using the state’s revised, well-planned and executed, phased contraflow evacuation plan, more than 70,000 people did not evacuate.85 Those who did not evacuate were exposed first to the dangers of drowning in the flood waters after the breach of the levees and then to deprivation of food, water, and shelter as they awaited rescue from other locations.

The anticipated flooding of New Orleans, unfortunately, occurred in an environment where a population of more than 70,000 had not evacuated, with thousands of these people remaining in their homes. Hundreds of these people died as floodwaters enveloped low lying neighborhoods in waters above the roof lines.86 In tours of the affected areas, Select Committee staff noted the debris lines from the floodwaters were halfway up the roof of many single-story houses in St. Bernard Parish. The parish Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Larry Ingargiola told Select Committee staff that during the storm, he had answered emergency cell phone calls from desperate people trapped in their attics, who had no way to escape the rising floodwaters.87 As stated before, many of these deaths were the result of hurricane roulette — individuals making decisions not to evacuate, or, for the poor population and those who procrastinated, not to seek shelter in the Superdome or other refuges of last resort in other parishes. As discussed in the MEDICAL CARE chapter, there were also many deaths among those in medical and nursing home facilities.

An analysis of these deaths indicates that the flooding had a broad impact across all neighborhoods in New Orleans and the immediate surrounding parishes. The Knight Ridder news organization, using preliminary data from the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, reviewed the location, ethnicity, sex and age of the victims. The results of their analysis were published in the Baton Rouge Advocate newspaper on December 30, 2005.88 According to the analysis, “[t]he bodies of at least 588 people were recovered in neighborhoods that engineers say would have remained largely dry land had the [levees] not given way. . . .”89 However, according to Orleans Parish coroner Dr. Frank Minyard, “[t]he cause of death for many will never be known because their bodies were too badly decomposed by the time they were recovered.”90 Dr. Minyard, however, did estimate that 20 percent of Katrina’s New Orleans victims drowned,91 and scores of others died of other causes awaiting rescue, trapped by floodwaters. Similarly, St. Bernard Parish Coroner, Dr. Bryan Bertucci, is cited as saying that most of the parish’s 123 victims drowned in their homes.92

The analysis found that the victims of Hurricane Katrina were roughly proportionate to the pre-landfall population (based on census data) in terms of ethnicity, sex, and wealth. In terms of ethnicity, the dead in New Orleans were 62 percent black, compared to 66 percent for the total parish population.93 The dead in St. Bernard Parish were 92 percent white, compared to 88 percent of the total parish population.94 The percentage of the dead by sex was approximately the same as the overall population.95 In terms of wealth, the analysis found that the percentage of dead bodies found in poorer New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish neighborhoods—as measured by poverty rates and median household incomes—was roughly equivalent to their percentage in the overall population.96
The finding about wealthier residents comports with statements by Louisiana First Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Gachassin, Jr. who said that many New Orleans area residents with the wealth and the means to evacuate and who decided not to do so paid for that decision with their lives. Gachassin said that there were approximately 250,000 vehicles left in New Orleans, which he said demonstrated that there were many people with the means to leave the city who chose not to do so. Similarly, the Advocate article stated that “at many of the addresses where the dead were found, their cars remained in their driveways, flood-ruined symbols of fatal miscalculation.”

Failure of complete evacuations required heroic search and rescue efforts

The fortunate ones — among those who had stayed in their homes — were those that were able to climb to their roofs or flee into flooded streets. Many of these individuals had to use tools or other objects to chop through their roofs to escape the rising floodwaters. Thousands of these people were saved by a massive and heroic search and rescue effort. The U.S. Coast Guard alone reported that it rescued more than 33,000. The Louisiana National Guard reported initial rescues of more than 25,000. These people were pulled out of the floodwaters into boats or plucked from roofs into helicopters operated by a wide array of government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and citizen volunteers. State rescuers included personnel from the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, local police, and the National Guard. Federal rescue personnel included the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and several law enforcement agencies. All 28 of FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue teams (who come from a variety of states and local governments across the nation) were also involved in the rescues. The chapters on THE MILITARY and LAW ENFORCEMENT have more details on the search and rescue efforts by the military and law enforcement, respectively.
The massive search and rescue effort, while necessary under the circumstances, distracted emergency managers and diverted key assets from other critical missions. According to National Guard officials involved in search and rescue, the entire focus of Monday and Tuesday was on saving lives; that was the Governor’s top priority. While the Select Committee does not question Blanco’s urgency and priority on saving lives after the flooding took place, the same urgency and priority on a more complete evacuation of New Orleans before the flooding would have saved lives. If there had been a more complete evacuation, the number of flood victims requiring search and rescue would have been greatly reduced. This would have allowed federal, state, and local emergency response officials to focus earlier on re-establishing communications and situational awareness, and moving commodities into hard hit parishes beyond New Orleans. Many of the helicopters used for search and rescue could have been utilized for these tasks.

Those in shelters or on high ground suffered through horrible conditions

Those who escaped to shelters or high ground suffered horrible conditions at a number of locations including the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the Cloverleaf, where they arrived through a number of different means. Some had walked or driven before landfall, some had walked after the floodwaters reached their homes, and some had been dropped off by search and rescue boats or helicopters. Each of the locations had their own miserable conditions.

New Orleans opened the Superdome as a “refuge of last resort.” As such, it was set up to allow people to survive a storm passing over; it was not intended to house, feed, and water thousands of people for several days. A cadre of more than 200 New Orleans Police and the Louisiana National Guard searched all people entering the Superdome for weapons and contraband. In addition, FEMA and the National Guard had prepositioned food and water in the Superdome, and some additional food and water was trucked in at the last minute. Some of the people arriving had listened to the Mayor’s suggestion and had brought a three day supply of food and water, sleeping bags, and clothes. Those who came to the Superdome after the flooding brought nothing but the clothes on their backs.

The conditions in the Superdome soon deteriorated. The initial calm situation Sunday night changed early Monday morning when the dome’s roof opened up and the building lost power. While the Superdome was still structurally sound, the hole in the roof scared people; it made noise and water started coming in. The National Guard had to suddenly move thousands of people from the field up into the seating sections. Later, after the flooding, the power went out across the city.

Without power, the only lighting in the Superdome was emergency lighting that ran off the emergency generator. This was not the same as full lighting, and with no power, the air conditioning was also not working. Related to the power outage, the water system went out, causing the toilets to back up, creating an awful stench that grew progressively worse as the days wore on.

Many people could not stand the heat and smell and gathered outside on the surrounding walkway area, which thus became very crowded. Although the situation was bad and deteriorating, there was never a shortage of food and water; they were distributed twice a day at first and continuously later. In general, people were hot, it smelled, and they were anxious to leave. This deteriorating situation led to the increasing urgency among officials and the population to evacuate the Superdome.

Conditions were also unbearable in the Convention Center. The Select Committee was unable to determine exactly when the Convention Center became a shelter and when officials became aware of the deteriorating
People initially went to the Convention Center after the breaches of the levees late Monday night or early Tuesday morning. As the floodwaters rose, people left their homes and headed for higher ground. The Convention Center is near the Mississippi River levee, one of the higher elevations in New Orleans. The National Guard estimated that there were 19,000 people there. Conditions in the Convention Center were notably worse than the Superdome in several ways. Like the Superdome, the Convention Center had no electrical power, no lighting, no air conditioning, and no functioning toilets. But unlike the Superdome, the Convention Center had no authorities or security on hand, no weapon screening, no food and no water.

Other high ground spots became spontaneous gathering points with miserable conditions. Many people went to these locations on their own, because their houses were flooded and they were looking for dry land. In addition, many people were dropped off at these sites by rescuers. Because of initial emphasis on saving lives, people were just dumped off there by helicopters or boats without any initial concerns for providing them with food or water.

Unlike the Superdome or the Convention Center, there was no shelter from the sweltering sun. Specific locations

conditions there. None of the officials who spoke with the Select Committee staff were willing to take responsibility for the operation of the Convention Center as a “shelter,” and none claimed that they knew about the situation until Wednesday morning or afternoon, August 31.

While these officials stated that the Convention Center was never designated as a shelter like the Superdome, Mayor Nagin’s testimony suggested that the city had sanctioned that location. In his prepared statement, the mayor stated that “[t]he swelling crowd at the Superdome and the number of people needing shelter required us to open the Convention Center as another refuge.” Brown was widely criticized for saying on Thursday night that he only found out that afternoon about the people at the Convention Center. Late that same night, however, the city of New Orleans finally requested that the National Guard secure and evacuate the Convention Center in conjunction with the New Orleans Police Department the next day.
where evacuees found themselves included the Cloverleaf (where two highways met), the Industrial Canal levees, the Mississippi River levees, and Broad Street levees. These locations had generally not been manned with security personnel such as police, nor had there been any plans to supply them with food, water, or medical treatment.

The “Cloverleaf” on the interstate was one of the worst locations. The site was being used for medical triage and evacuation, so there was initially some food and water there, at least for the medical patients. However, additional people arrived on their own or by the helicopters or boats that rescued them from the water. The supply of food and water was not sufficient for the crowd, which eventually grew to 6,000-7,000 people.\footnote{116}

Flooding further hampered relief efforts for those not initially evacuating

Efforts to provide relief to those stranded at the Superdome, Convention Center, the Cloverleaf, and other positions of high ground were stymied by the floodwaters. Simple tasks, such as trucking food and water to these locations, were complicated by flooded highways that necessitated the use of high clearance vehicles or long detours. Some of these sites were very difficult to supply or evacuate later because they were “islands” completely surrounded by water. As mentioned in the COMMUNICATIONS and the COMMAND AND CONTROL chapters, the lack of communications, situational awareness, command and control, and effective logistics systems further hampered efforts to identify many of these locations and coordinate relief. The floodwaters also complicated efforts to conduct a post landfall evacuation, as discussed in the next section.

Finding: Federal, state, and local officials’ failure to anticipate the post-landfall conditions delayed post-landfall evacuation and support

Federal, state, and local officials had not prepared for post landfall evacuation despite predictions of extensive flooding

While these victims endured horrendous conditions, hundreds of city buses and school buses that could have been used for evacuation sat useless, flooded or without drivers. Nagin testified that the school buses belong to the New Orleans school district and, to his credit, he is now considering a cooperative agreement with the school district to move the school buses out of the area for the next storm.\footnote{117} Nagin also testified that the RTA buses were “always staged, or have been staged, in an area that has been high and dry throughout every storm that has ever hit the City of New Orleans; and we expected the same for this event. Unfortunately, those buses flooded also because 80 percent of the city went under water.”\footnote{118} He testified that he had had trouble getting drivers even for the 20 buses that had taken residents to the Superdome prelandfall “because most [drivers] had evacuated” and that the National Guard was not available to drive buses.\footnote{119}
By the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall at 6:10 a.m. central time on Monday, August 29, approximately 10-12,000 people were sheltered in the Superdome. The massive flooding led to urgent search and rescue operations throughout the city and in other parishes as well. Those search and rescue operations moved tens of thousands of people off of their roofs and out of the flood waters to shelter or high ground. As the flood waters rose, people also self-evacuated from the city to the Superdome, the Convention Center, and other high ground around the city.

As previously noted, the Governor and the Mayor were well aware of the probability of levee breaches and flooding in New Orleans following a Category 4 or 5 hurricane. Federal officials were also aware of that probability. When Brown was asked by Select Committee Member Congressman Hal Rogers: “Was it known by you and others that the flood wall around New Orleans was only rated to take a category 3 hurricane,” he replied, “Yes. That was a fact that came out in [the Hurricane Pam Exercise] that the levees may or may not hold, that the storm surge may or may not top them, they could top — the storm surge could top the levees without breaking and they could top and also break the levees. So we knew both of those were potential.” As Vice Mayor of Newport News, Virginia, and city planner Charles Allen testified before the Select Committee: “[I]t is clear from information in the news that the U.S. Government, in the form of the U.S. Weather Service [sic], the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Corps of Engineers [sic] understood the magnitude of this storm.”

Planning for the post landfall evacuation had to be done in emergency environment

Despite the advance knowledge of extensive flooding, the first task order for buses by the federal government to evacuate New Orleans post landfall was not issued until 1:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31. Although Blanco claims that Brown told her that he had 500 buses standing by and that she was concerned when those buses did not materialize sooner, the Select Committee found no other evidence that any such buses were, in fact, “standing by” or that Brown had made such a statement to Blanco.

Developing a plan to evacuate the Superdome and other locations after the flooding was a complicated endeavor. That planning included determining the number of buses needed, accessible routes to the Superdome and other locations, security needs, and the ultimate destination of those evacuated. This planning occurred in a highly degraded environment that included limited communications that prevented a full understanding of the scope of the needs and even the visibility of deployed resources. Repeatedly, during the daily video teleconferences, state and federal officials expressed their frustrations with the level of communications.

In assessing the needs for the Superdome alone, Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Spot Report Number 30, prepared at 2:00 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31, (even after the federal task order for buses) reflects that (1) there are 12-15,000 people at the Superdome, (2) the water is not rising as rapidly as previously feared, (3) the loss of electricity does not appear imminent, (3) the intention was to begin evacuations that day and continue them over the next few days, (4) alternate shelters have not been identified, and (5) two days of food and water is on hand. According to that document, neither the means of egress to the buses for the Superdome population nor the alternative location to which they would be evacuated had been determined. Options for egress from the Superdome included walking once the State Police can verify a route, constructing temporary bridging, “construct[ing] a sandbag dyke to allow for walk[ing] out,” “us[ing] DOD landing craft to shuttle . . . to buses,” and using helicopters for short flights to buses. Alternative shelters included “stadiums in the State college system but other options are possible.” As we now know, many of the buses took people to the Astrodome in Houston. But as of Wednesday morning, FEMA officials were still concerned that Blanco had not spoken to Texas Governor Rick Perry to confirm that part of the plan.
The planning process for the post-landfall evacuation did not really begin until Tuesday, August 30. Blanco testified that she did not realize the full consequences of the levee breaches until Tuesday morning, when she was able to travel to New Orleans and see the effects of the flooding for those sheltered in the Superdome. At the noon video teleconference, Smith asks only that you realize what’s going on and the sense of urgency here needs to be ratcheted up. Everybody is being fully cooperative, but in the deployment of some of these Federal assets, especially transportation for the evacuation effort that we’re trying to coordinate, we don’t need anything to slow that down. The push of the resources and so forth to date has not been an issue, but we don’t need to let it become an issues because we’re going to literally have tens of thousands of people that we’ve got to push these supplies too.

Later that day and into the evening, FEMA official Phil Parr and others sheltered in the Superdome, apparently unaware of the evacuation planning at the EOC, began their own planning to evacuate the Superdome as they observed the rising waters around the building and realized that people would not be able to walk out of the dome and return home. According to Parr, the team inside the Superdome devised a plan involving the use of helicopters to airlift people away from the Superdome. They concluded that they needed at least nine helicopters, of which the Louisiana National Guard had three. They communicated this plan to the FEMA Regional Response Center (FEMA RRC) in Denton, Texas and got initial approval for it, with the RRC searching for the assets to implement it. They believed their plan would have been able to move virtually all of the evacuees from the Superdome at that time in about 30 hours. The next day, Parr learned that Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina Lt. General Russel L. Honoré had stopped that plan as he came to Louisiana to lead Joint Task Force Katrina.

At the same time, there remained some doubt about the consequences of the levee breaches. General Don Riley of the Army Corps of Engineers reported at the noon video teleconference on Tuesday, August 30, that "[t]he lake [Pontchartrain] level may recede quickly enough before we can get anything in there [to fill the breach] and then we can turn that pump station on with the city and turn that water around and pump it back into the lake." FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) Bill Lokey discussed at the same video teleconference that they were "developing the distribution plan [for commodities] that we can get them out to the communities as the water does recede in some areas . . . ." The FEMA Acting Director for Response during Hurricane Katrina, Ed Buikema, also said that on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 30 and 31, there was still some hope that the breaches in the levees could be repaired quickly.

By the Wednesday, noon video teleconference, the numbers at the Superdome had swollen to approximately 23,000. Reggie Johnson from the U.S. Department of Transportation reported that there were 455 buses under contract and "it looks like we’ve got about 200 that are currently in place, with the remainder that should be coming in on a staggered basis." The next day, Johnson reported:

120 buses . . . departed for [the] Houston Astrodome last night. And there are 300 buses in the New Orleans area. You may not see those because actually they’re staging at what’s called the Poker Palace Texaco refueling site, and that’s in a place in Louisiana, and I understand that they are drawing down from that site. They’re bringing in about 40 buses at a time. There are 155 buses that were requested, and they are en route and should arrive at the truck stop by midnight tonight. We have not received any other requests . . . .
Blanco also attempted to deploy state resources. She issued an executive order on August 31 to commandeer school buses to assist in the evacuation. While these buses could handle short trips (such as to the airport or other local shelters), they were not appropriate for long trips, such as the trip to Houston.

**Lack of willing drivers and diversions of buses further delayed Superdome evacuation**

But even as the buses were arriving there were further delays. There was evidence that drivers refused to drive into New Orleans because of perceived security problems. Although the state had found 100 school buses, the drivers, according to Smith, “are little old ladies, and I don’t blame them, they don’t want to go and drive in and do evacuations.” He added that 100 military police had just arrived at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station right across from the Superdome and that two Chinooks with National Guard MPs were arriving.

Although the state had found 100 school buses, the drivers, according to Smith, “are little old ladies, and I don’t blame them, they don’t want to go and drive in and do evacuations.”

In addition, there were concerns that drivers had to meet the requirements for limiting hours of service between rests. In that same video teleconference, Smith reported that the Governor would waive the commercial drivers license requirements. DOT’s Johnson advised that he would “coordinate with the bus companies to ensure that we can start doubling up on the drivers.” Smith responded to this report by advising that they were about to run out of buses and that he had just made a new request for 500 buses.

Finally, the buses for the Superdome did not always get to the Superdome. Parr said that the Governor diverted some buses from the Superdome to other locations like the Cloverleaf and other high ground where, unlike the Superdome, there was no food, water, or shelter. Buikema agreed that buses that were intended for the Superdome actually picked people up off the highway and filled up before getting to the Superdome.

Strangely, the video teleconference transcripts never refer to evacuating the Convention Center. At one point, Smith seems to recognize that the evacuation problem is broader than the Superdome, when he says on September 1, “I would ask you to quit referring to evacuation from the Superdome, but maybe an evacuation from the greater New Orleans area from the Superdome.”

**The insatiable demand for more buses was a constant source of frustration**

On September 2, Smith expressed substantial frustration with the number of available buses: “I’ve got 2500 people on Algiers Point right now, which is not right in the downtown area, that we could be sending missions to and getting off. Those people have been on levees for a day and a half. Get us the transportation assets with drivers, and we’ll start making that happen quicker and more effectively, and I told you all that yesterday.” But by September 2, DOT’s Johnson reported that of apparently 1,100 buses in the system, “800 of those buses . . . are actually operating throughout.” Despite having 1,100 buses operating, DOT recognized at that time that it “appears that what we’re going to have to do is increase the amount of buses from the 1,100 to an additional 5-600 buses for their operation.” But DOT had no “visibility of how many buses [were] right now within the state of Louisiana and getting close to staging areas.”

Louisiana National Guard General Graham, who was coordinating the bus evacuation for the state reported that there were 40 commercial buses “on the ground.”

Despite the large number of buses deployed, there were still not enough. Some delays were inherent in the system. DOT’s Johnson related that buses were delayed at “chokepoints” at their destinations where it takes three to four hours to unload at times. And Graham reported that buses would be held up to allow drivers to rest: “Many bus drivers have driven a long way and must rest prior to driving.” These factors alone could not have accounted for the shortage. More likely, the degraded environment prevented Smith and other federal officials from realizing the full scope of the need for evacuation by bus that even 1,100 buses could not satisfy.
Airlift operations supplemented evacuations by the buses

The effort to evacuate New Orleans was greatly facilitated by the establishment of an air evacuation component at the New Orleans International Airport. This activity required significant coordination regarding obtaining aircraft and crews, passenger screening, security (crowd control), air traffic control, passenger boarding, availability of passengers for departure, and itinerary management. According to Air Transport Association (ATA) officials, late Thursday, September 1, Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson called the ATA President Jim May and said they had 25,000 people who needed to be evacuated. \(^{162}\) That night, airplanes from Washington, D.C. were in transit to New Orleans. \(^{163}\) Friday morning, planes started arriving with Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials, flight crews, volunteers, and supplies. Planes were loaded around the clock from that weekend through most of the following week. A total of 13,000 evacuees were moved using 129 airplanes. \(^{164}\)

Despite their overall success, airlift operations needed to feed into an overall management system. There were times when the military and the private carriers were duplicating efforts. Moreover, the coordination of all the parts was complex. For example, there were no pre-existing contracts in place for air support. \(^{165}\) Landstar asked carriers like Delta, JetBlue, Spirit, and approximately a dozen commercial airlines for help. \(^{166}\) These airlines provided planes (“hot spares” or back-up planes) flight crews, and additional staff, asking at most for jet fuel reimbursement. In the future airlines may be interested in entering into a Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program (a contractual program where civil airlines augment military operations during a crisis in exchange for Defense Department business).

### Conclusion

None of this had to happen. The potential effects of a Category 4 or 5 storm were predictable and were in fact predicted. Declarations of mandatory evacuations — declarations that could have resulted in a more complete evacuation — were delayed or not done at all. New Orleans’ decision to shelter instead of evacuate the population, as well as individuals’ reluctance to leave, further resulted in an incomplete evacuation. The thousands of people left in New Orleans suffered death or had to be rescued to await an evacuation that should have already occurred before landfall.

Regarding the post landfall evacuation, neither the New Orleans Plan nor the state’s Emergency Plan expressly provided for the protection of vital transportation assets to evacuate the City after flooding. State and local officials also failed to prepare for such an eventuality, regardless of the plans. Nor did the expert federal agency anticipate the needs of the state and city to bring to bear immediate relief. As DHS Secretary Chertoff observed, planning was not what it should be at DHS. \(^{167}\) Despite years of recognition of the threat that was to materialize in Hurricane Katrina, no one — not the federal government, not the state government, and not the local government — seems to have planned for an evacuation of the city from flooding through breached levees. Having failed to anticipate these needs, poor communications that hampered situational awareness, hours of service limits, security needs, and logistical problems further delayed the deployment of buses to evacuate the city. ■


3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 54.
6 Id. at 48.
7 Id. at 50.


9 Id.
10 Id. at 34 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr., Exec. Dir., MS EMA).

12 Id. at 122-123 (statement of Bruce Baughman, Dir., AEMA).
13 Director's Brief, Director of MS Emergency Management Agency, Brief as of 1900 hours, Aug. 28, 2005 (MEMA 0010688) [Aug. 28, 2005] at 3.
14 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 2 (written statement of Brent Warr); see also id. at 157 (statement of Benjamin J. Spraggins, Dir., Harrison County EMA).

15 Id. at 64, 74 (statement of Haley Barbour).
16 Director's Brief, Director of Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Brief as of 1900 hours, Aug. 28, 2005 (MEMA 0010688) (Aug. 28, 2005) at 3.

17 See generally, Director's Brief, Director of Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Brief of 0430 hours, Aug. 29, 2005 (MEMA 0010696) (Aug. 29, 2005).

18 September 27 hearing at 68-9.
19 Id. at 70.

21 Baldwin County, AL, Hurricane Katrina Time Line of Events (Doc. No. 002553AL). The notation on the Time Line reads "volunteer evacuation" which Select Comm. Staff interpreted as a "voluntary evacuation."


24 Nov. 9, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 28 (statement of Bob Riley).

26 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 67 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco) (Blanco: “I am very happy to talk about our evacuation process, because it is the one thing that we did masterfully.”) [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; id., at 94 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA) (Chairman Davis: “This was the most successful evacuation you ever had, right?” Blanco: “Absolutely without a doubt.”).

27 Id. at 68-69 (statement of Jeff Smith, State Coordinating Officer and Deputy Dir., LA Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness).


31 Id. at 88 (statement of Jeff Smith). However, despite this insistence that forcing people out of their homes prelandfall was not an option, it was apparently still a very live option post landfall and may have been carried out, even if not ordered. See E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 4, 2005) (10:33 a.m.) (“Appears state is reluctant to execute a true mandatory evacuation – i.e., forced if necessary. Therefore, State is pushing for shelters (includes all life support) in [New Orleans] to house citizens that will not leave voluntarily.”); see E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 5, 2005) (9:13 a.m.) (“Governor Blanco has decided not to force any evacuations in New Orleans. Resident are still encouraged to evacuate. Buses were sent through NO on previously in defined evac routes today and no additional residents would board buses for voluntary evacuation. It appears that the evacuation phase of operations is winding down, or may be completed. Since FEMA did not anticipate reversal of decision for mandatory evacuation, crisis-action planning is now underway to provide this support.”); see E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 5, 2005) (10:04 a.m.) (“Evacuations are slowing to a trickle.”); see E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 6, 2005) (11:17 a.m.) (“Decision by Governor Blanco to not force any evacuations in New Orleans remains in place. Mayor of New Orleans is not forcing evacuations in NO and is not prohibiting residents from returning. Residents are still strongly encouraged to evacuate. . . . [S]ince NO is not being fully evacuated, requirements exist to provide all commodities to the remaining population.”). See also Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from inside the Storm Before Select
“I was [in my mother’s home] for about a week until September 8th or so, at which point a rescue crew comprised of State and local police as well as armed military officers forced me to evacuate. They arrived in a truck and two tanks and confiscated my weapons. I didn’t resist them, and the officers weren’t rough with me . . . . The rescue team took me to the Convention Center . . . . and from there I was immediately taken by helicopter to the airport. The next morning I was put on a Delta 757 airplane . . . . Passengers weren’t told where they were going until after the plane had taken off.” [hereinafter Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].

See ALA. CODE §§ 31-9-6 (4); 31-9-8 (4); 31-9-14 and 31-9-15 (2005).

Id. at 22 (statement of Bob Riley).

Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 65 (statement of Hal Rogers) (“Saturday evening at 7:30, Max Mayfield, the head of the National Hurricane Warning Center, personally, for the second time in his 36-year career, personally, called the mayor [of New Orleans] and the [Louisiana] Governor, all the Governors, by phone to reiterate the severity of this upcoming storm. 8 p.m., Mayfield telephones Mayor Nagin.”); see also id. at 72 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco) (“On Saturday morning, indeed, Max Mayfield didn’t call until – in fact he didn’t call until Saturday night.”).

Press Conference by C. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, and Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, MSNBC, et al. Aug. 28, 2005 (Blanco: “Just before we walked into this room, President Bush called . . . and asked me to please ensure that there would be a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.”) [hereinafter Nagin-Blanco Press Conference].


Interview of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, CNN Saturday Night, (Aug. 28, 2005) (8:00 p.m. ET) (Blanco: “We are very concerned about the people in the City of New Orleans and some of the people in the region as well, who have not actually gotten the message. They went to bed last night thinking the hurricane was going to Florida. And some have just gotten busy in their day and not gotten – you know, had any media contact, and don’t even know this is happening. So, we’re hoping that by tonight, that they’re watching you and getting the message that it’s a real threat. It’s very serious. We want them to get out of town.”).


New Orleans Plan at 12.

Id. at 48, 50.

Nagin-Blanco Press Conference (emphasis supplied).

Id. (emphasis supplied).

Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 28, 2005) (12:00 p.m.) (statement of Aaron Broussard).

Nagin-Blanco Press Conference.

Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written statement of Jeff Smith). This figure was arrived at based upon the reported number of individuals evacuated by officials from New Orleans.

Id. at 162 (statement of C. Ray Nagin).

Id.

Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 23 (statement of Doreen Keeler).

Id. 90 (statement of Doreen Keeler).

Id. at 49-50 (statement of Dyan French).

Id. at 61 (statement of Terrol Williams).

Id. (statement of Doreen Keeler).

Id. at 64 (statement of Leah Hodges).

Id. at 137-138 (statement of Barbara Arnwine).


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 45.

Id. at 50, 24.

Id. at 54.

Id. at 55.
Mr. BROWN: Paula, the federal government did not even know about the Convention Center people until today [Thursday, Sept. 2, 2005]. I just heard about that this morning. And so I have directed that we have all available resources to get to that Convention Center to make certain that they have the food and water. And I'll tell you...
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

2005].”); see NBC Today Show (NBC television broadcast Sept. 10, 2005) (New Orleans co-host, Lester Holt: “That’s right Campbell. If you’ll recall, Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, acknowledged it was about 24 hours after those first TV reports of people held up here [the New Orleans Convention Center] without food, in need of water, that he found out about it. That opened him up to a lot of criticism.”); see, Editorial Opinion, Bush: First the Head of FEMA; Would you trust your safety to Michael Brown?, DAILY NEWS (Phila.), Sept. 7, 2005, at 17 (“Here was a clueless bureaucrat [Mr. Brown] who didn’t seem to believe the horror stories coming out of the New Orleans convention center.”); see, Leadership: Some tragedy avoidable, CHARLESTON GAZ. (W. Va.), Sept. 3, 2005, at 4A (“FEMA Director Michael Brown admitted that he did not know until Thursday that thousands of people had been stranded at the New Orleans Convention Center for days without water, as well as in the Superdome. How could he not know? Anyone listening to local radio knew.”).
15 Id. at 11.
152 Interview.
153 Buikema Interview.
154 VTC (Sept. 1, 2005) at 14.
155 See generally. Id. Daily VTC (Sept. 2, 2005).
156 Id. at 4-5.
157 Id. at 5.
158 Id. at 5-6.
159 Id. at 3.
160 Id. at 5.
161 Id. at 3.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
“The one-two combination of a catastrophic hurricane and massive flood overwhelmed the normal disaster relief system. Some things worked well. But there were shortcomings that we must urgently address.

“This tragedy has emphasized how critical it is that we ensure our planning and response capabilities perform with seamless integrity and efficiency in any type of disaster situation – even one of cataclysmic nature.”

Michael Chertoff
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Select Committee Hearing, October 19, 2005
Critical elements of the national response plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all

Summary

Similar to the troubled national responses to Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew in 1989 and 1992 respectively, the federal government failed to recognize the magnitude of the situation presented by Hurricane Katrina prior to landfall, adequately project future needs, fully engage the President, and respond in a proactive and timely manner. While the Federal Emergency Management System had evolved since Andrew to include a developed protocol for responding proactively to catastrophic disasters, important aspects of the National Response Plan were poorly executed, which contributed to the inadequate federal response to Hurricane Katrina.

With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the development of the National Response Plan (NRP), an additional layer of management and response authority was placed between the President and FEMA, and additional response coordinating structures were established. The Secretary of Homeland Security became the President’s principal disaster advisor responsible for enabling the President to effectively utilize his authority under the Stafford Act to direct all federal agencies, particularly the Department of Defense (DOD), to respond in a coordinated and expeditious fashion. As part of these changes, critical response decision points were assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Secretary Chertoff executed these responsibilities late, ineffectively, or not at all. These secretarial authorities include:

- The designation of an incident of national significance (INS);
- The authority to convene the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG);
- The designation of the principal federal official (PFO);
- The invocation of the national response plan’s catastrophic incident annex (NRP-CIA).

There was plenty of advance warning by the National Weather Service, and the consequences of a category 4 hurricane striking New Orleans were well-documented. Fifty-six hours prior to landfall, Hurricane Katrina presented an extremely high probability threat that 75 percent of New Orleans would be flooded, tens of thousands of residents may be killed, hundreds of thousands trapped in flood waters up to 20 feet, hundreds of thousands of homes and other structures destroyed, a million people evacuated from their homes, and the greater New Orleans area would be rendered uninhabitable for several months or years. An August 28 report by the department’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center concluded: “Any storm rated Category 4 or greater . . . will likely lead to severe flooding and/or levee breaching, leaving the New Orleans metro area submerged for weeks or months.”

Under these conditions it seems reasonable to expect the criteria for designating an INS would have been met, the appointment of a PFO would be necessary to coordinate an unprecedented federal response, the IIMG would be convened to provide strategic guidance and recommendations to the Secretary and the President, and the NRP-CIA would be invoked to shift the federal response posture from a reactive to proactive mode in order to save lives and accelerate assistance to overwhelmed state and local systems. According to a recent letter submitted by DHS (see Appendix 7) in response to the preliminary observations of the Comptroller General (see Appendix 6), DHS viewed the NRP-CIA as applicable only to no-notice or short-notice events. And the Select Committee acknowledges that the State of Louisiana expressed its satisfaction with the supplies and that former FEMA Director Michael Brown directed that commodities be “jammed up” the supply chain.

While the NRP-CIA may be particularly applicable to a no-notice event, the Annex itself reflects only that a catastrophic incident may occur with little or no warning.
And the pre-positioning of supplies to the satisfaction of state and local authorities, while an appropriate measure for a disaster without catastrophic consequences, was clearly not sufficient for the catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Katrina.

Instead, absent a catastrophic disaster designation from Chertoff, federal response officials in the field eventually made the difficult decisions to bypass established procedures and provide assistance without waiting for appropriate requests from the states or for clear direction from Washington. These decisions to switch from a “pull” to a “push” system were made individually, over several days, and in an uncoordinated fashion as circumstances required. The federal government stumbled into a proactive response during the first several days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, as opposed to the Secretary making a clear and decisive choice to respond proactively at the beginning of the disaster. The White House Homeland Security Council (HSC), situated at the apex of the policy coordination framework for DHS issues, itself failed to proactively de-conflict varying damage assessments. One example included an eyewitness account of a levee breach supplied by a FEMA official at 7:00 p.m. on August 29. The White House did not consider this assessment confirmed for 11 more hours, when, after 6:00 a.m. the next morning, it received a Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Situation Report confirming the breach.

The catastrophic nature of Katrina confirmed once again that the standard “reactive” nature of federal assistance, while appropriate for most disasters, does not work during disasters of this scale. When local and state governments are functionally overwhelmed or incapacitated, the federal government must be prepared to respond proactively. It will need to anticipate state and local requirements, move commodities and assets into the area on its own initiative, and shore up or even help reconstitute critical state and local emergency management and response structures.

The need for assistance is extreme during the initial period of a catastrophic hurricane, yet the ability of state and local responders to meet that need is limited. That is why it is so important for the federal government, particularly DOD resources, to respond proactively and fill that gap as quickly as possible. Because it takes several days to mobilize federal resources, critical decisions must be made as early as possible so that massive assistance can surge into the area during the first two days, not several days or weeks later. The CIA-NRP was drafted to meet this specific and well known requirement, yet Chertoff never invoked it for Katrina.

In contrast, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), a critical part of the national emergency management framework, successfully provided unprecedented levels of response and recovery personnel and assets to the Gulf coast in record time following Hurricane Katrina. EMAC is designed by statute to be adaptable and scaleable to meet the changing needs of each event. EMAC was widely praised for its quick and effective process for putting vital resources into every aspect of the response.

Finding: It does not appear the president received adequate advice and counsel from a senior disaster professional

Although the Select Committee’s access to White House documents, communications, and staff was not as comprehensive as we had hoped, the information we did receive suggests the President could have received better disaster advice and counsel.

The Stafford Act places the federal government’s disaster response authorities with the President. Similar to military matters, the President is the commander in chief of federal disaster response. Yet, unlike the military, which provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President’s primary professional military advisor, the President does not have regular access to a senior disaster professional to advise him during disasters or on disaster response issues. The President lacks this resource even though catastrophic disasters may strike with little or no warning and require early Presidential involvement to reduce the loss of life, human suffering, and extensive property damage.5

Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security reports to the President and is the department’s top disaster official; yet emergency management is just one of the Secretary’s many responsibilities.6 According to Chertoff’s testimony before the Select Committee, he is not a hurricane expert, nor does he have much experience with disasters.7
However, according to White House and FEMA documents, it appears the White House took several steps to improve the flow of information and strategic advice into the President. For example, HSC staff solicited regular situation reports from almost every federal agency for the White House situation room. The HSC commenced 24-hour operations the morning Katrina hit New Orleans. In addition, White House officials attempted to pressure the HSOC to convene the IIMG on the Saturday before Katrina made landfall.

The IIMG consists of high level officials from all the major federal agencies, and it is intended to assess the magnitude of crisis situations, project future requirements for federal assistance, develop plans for meeting those requirements, recommend to the Secretary and the President appropriate courses of action, and provide strategic advice. The Secretary did not convene the IIMG until three days later, roughly 36 hours after landfall.

Within the emergency management community, there are a handful of potential catastrophes that keep disaster professionals awake at night. Perhaps the most troubling of these has been a category 3 or larger storm striking New Orleans because of its high likelihood of occurrence, the extreme vulnerability of the city to long term flooding, and the difficulty of evacuating a large urban population over limited evacuation routes. As a result, this scenario has been studied, planned, and exercised perhaps more than any other potential catastrophic disaster in the country. A senior disaster professional would be well aware of the consequences of such a storm, recognize the challenges of responding to such a disaster, and appreciate the need for timely and proactive federal assistance.

Comments such as those the President made about not expecting the levees to breach do not appear to be consistent with the advice and counsel one would expect to have been provided by a senior disaster professional. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect delays in recognizing the need for and then requesting DOD mission assignments may have been avoided if the President had been advised of the need for early presidential involvement.

Finding: Given the well-known consequences of a major hurricane hitting New Orleans, the Secretary should have designated an incident of national significance no later than Saturday, two days prior to landfall, when the National Weather Service predicted New Orleans would be struck by a Category 4 or 5 hurricane and President Bush declared a Federal Emergency.

The consequences of a major hurricane, defined as a category 4 or greater storm, striking New Orleans were well-known within Louisiana, the emergency management community, and DHS. FEMA officials selected New Orleans as the first project for its catastrophic disaster preparedness program precisely because of its high probability of occurrence and horrific consequences. The New Orleans levee system was designed to withstand, in
The “single biggest failure” of the federal response was that it failed to recognize the likely consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the flooded city. If it had, then federal assistance would have arrived several days earlier.

The authority to convene the IIMG is the Secretary’s, yet Chertoff did not execute that authority early enough for the IIMG to perform this function during the critical pre-landfall period and initial days of the disaster. According to an e-mail between top FEMA officials on Sunday, the day before landfall, White House officials were pressuring the head of the HSOC, Matthew Broderick, to convene the IIMG. Because the Secretary did not activate the IIMG until roughly 36 hours after landfall, despite the White House pressure, we will never know what the IIMG would have done, given the hurricane forecast and well-known consequences of a category 4 storm, in anticipation that the New Orleans levees would likely breach and force the rescue and evacuation of tens of thousands of victims from the flooded city.

If Chertoff had convened the IIMG, then perhaps on the Saturday or Sunday before landfall, when FEMA officials were deploying emergency response teams and moving tons of commodities into the surrounding region, the IIMG would have begun to accelerate DOD’s involvement, develop plans to evacuate the Superdome, and pre-stage buses and boats outside the region for immediate deployment after the storm passed. Instead, the FEMA operational teams did not begin planning these critical actions until three days later, Tuesday evening, and the buses and boats did not arrive in large quantities until Thursday.

According to Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness...
(LOHSEP), the “single biggest failure” of the federal response was that it failed to recognize the likely consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the flooded city. If it had, then federal assistance would have arrived several days earlier.19

By not convening the IIMG prior to landfall, the Secretary robbed himself and the President of the opportunity to receive professional advice and strategic options for proactively addressing the unfolding catastrophic disaster. The threat stream presented by Katrina was clear days before landfall, the potential consequences were well-known, and important tools for dealing with the situation were available yet not utilized.

Finding: The Secretary should have designated the Principal Federal Official on Saturday, two days prior to landfall, from the roster of PFOs who had successfully completed the required PFO training, unlike FEMA Director Michael Brown. Considerable confusion was caused by the Secretary’s PFO decisions

According to the NRP, “the PFO is personally designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate federal support to the established Incident Command System (ICS) Unified Command structure and to coordinate overall federal incident management.”20 During large multi-state disasters such as Katrina, the PFO’s role becomes particularly important for providing a coordinated federal response, as the FCOs appointed by the President for each state only control operations within their respective states. The Secretary should have begun this coordination earlier and appointed a PFO on Saturday.

The Secretary’s eventual designation of Brown as PFO on Tuesday evening was highly unusual and elicited a concerned and confused reaction from Brown.21 In order to prepare PFO-designates to fulfill the responsibilities and functions of the PFO, the department conducts a formal training program, and maintains a roster of individuals approved and qualified to serve as a PFO. The NRP requires that “[u]nless extenuating circumstances dictate otherwise, all PFO-designates should satisfactorily complete this training program prior to performing PFO-related responsibilities.”22

According to DHS officials, Brown had not taken the required PFO training program and was not on the approved PFO roster.23 Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen had successfully completed the training program, as had all of the other individuals designated by the Secretary to serve as PFO for past INS designations and National Special Security Events.24 It is unclear why Chertoff deviated from the requirements of the NRP and designated an untrained individual to serve as PFO for such a catastrophic disaster.

There was confusion over the role and authority of the PFO

The Secretary was confused about the role and authority of the PFO. According to Chertoff’s testimony, he designated Brown PFO because Brown was his “battlefield commander.”25 Yet, the NRP specifically states, “The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority over the SFLEO [Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer], FCO [Federal Coordinating Officer], or other federal and state officials.”26 Furthermore, the Stafford Act places all emergency response authorities with

Brown had not taken the required PFO training program and was not on the approved PFO roster.
implementing a push system—a proactive federal response—does not require federalization of the disaster or the usurping of state authority. Although a push system is a proactive response by the federal government, it still requires notification and full coordination with the state. The coordination process, however, should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of these critical federal resources.32

A proactive response, or push system, is nothing new. In 1992, the nation’s management of catastrophic disasters was intensely criticized after Hurricane Andrew leveled much of South Florida and Hurricane Iniki destroyed much of the Hawaiian island of Kauai.33 In particular, a 1993 GAO report points to the slow delivery of services vital to disaster victims as a major flaw in the response to Hurricane Andrew in South Florida.34 The report then contrasts this with the more effective response to Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii, where FEMA implemented a push system and sent supplies to the island of Kauai before local officials requested them.35 This occurred despite being implemented in an ad hoc manner—rather than as part of an orderly, planned response to catastrophic disasters.36 Furthermore, the long-standing authority for a proactive federal response resides in the Stafford Act. The current plan for how to utilize that authority is the NRP-CIA.

Finding: A proactive federal response, or push system, is not a new concept, but it is rarely utilized

What is a push system?

In response to most disasters, the federal government provides assistance in response to state requests. This reactive approach is often referred to as a “pull” system in that it relies on states knowing what they need and being able to request it from the federal government.30 States may make these requests either before disasters strike because of the near certainty that federal assistance will be necessary after such an event, e.g., with hurricanes, or afterwards, once they have conducted preliminary damage assessments and determined their response capabilities are overwhelmed.

Unlike the bulk of the disasters requiring FEMA’s response, catastrophic disasters require the federal response to be more proactive. This proactive response is referred to as a “push” system, in which federal assistance is provided and moved into the affected area prior to a disaster or without waiting for specific requests from the state or local governments.31

The pre-positioning of assets and commodities is a distinct action from the push or pull of those assets

The federal government will often pre-position life-saving and life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies prior to landfall of a hurricane as close to a potential disaster site as possible. This pre-positioning of supplies can substantially shorten response time and delivery of initial critical disaster supplies to the field.

Although part of a proactive response, this pre-positioning of disaster supplies and assets is not in and of itself a push of commodities. Once assets are pre-positioned to go into the field, they still need to be mobilized and deployed into the field either proactively by pushing the commodities to the state or reactively by waiting for a request from the state.
Operational procedures for a push are not well exercised, practiced, or utilized

The majority of declared disasters are not catastrophic. Because of this, the pull system is most commonly used during disasters and training exercises and, therefore, is more familiar to disaster response personnel. In fact, the NRP-CIA has never been appropriately exercised. As a result, federal personnel have little experience or comfort with instituting a proactive response.

Additionally, if the Homeland Security Secretary does not invoke the NRP-CIA, federal personnel have no clear instruction to switch from a reactive approach to a proactive approach. Without this clear direction, federal personnel can be uncomfortable pushing resources into the state because of the inherent risks, such as complicating the disaster response by diverting needed resources from other areas or wasting millions of dollars in a duplication of effort.

Finding: The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) to direct the federal response posture to fully switch from a reactive to proactive mode of operations

Perhaps the single most important question the Select Committee has struggled to answer is why the federal response did not adequately anticipate the consequences of Katrina striking New Orleans and, prior to landfall, begin to develop plans and move boats and buses into the area to rescue and evacuate tens of thousand of victims from a flooded city. At least part of the answer lies in the Secretary’s failure to invoke the NRP-CIA, to clearly and forcefully instruct everyone involved with the federal response to be proactive, anticipate future requirements, develop plans to fulfill them, and execute those plans without waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed state and local response officials.

The NRP-CIA was specifically written for a disaster such as Katrina. According to the NRP:

- A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of casualties and displaced persons.
- The incident may cause significant disruption to the area’s critical infrastructure.
- A credible operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours or longer. As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a complete needs assessment.
- Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal NRP protocols.
- Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed may occur.
- Large numbers of people may be left homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing.

It is clear the consequences of Hurricane Katrina exceeded all of these criteria and required a proactive response. According to the NRP, “Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g. involving mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of DHS immediately designates the event an INS and begins, potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, implementation of the NRP-CIA.” On Monday evening, when DHS received reports the levees had breached in multiple locations, it should have been clear to the department the nation’s worst case hurricane scenario had occurred and a proactive federal response was required. Chertoff never invoked the NRP-CIA.

Smith, LOHSEP Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness, believed, “the biggest single failure of the federal response was the Department of Homeland Security’s failure to recognize that Katrina was a catastrophic event and implement the catastrophic incident annex to the National Response Plan…Had DHS recognized Katrina for the event that it was, a truly catastrophic event, had DHS implemented the catastrophic incident annex to the NRP, Louisiana should have had a significant number of federal troops and federal assets, days prior to their actual arrival. . . . Instead federal troops did not arrive in number until Saturday, after the evacuations of the Superdome, Convention Center and cloverleaf were complete.”
Finding: Absent the Secretary’s invocation of the NRP-CIA, the federal response evolved into a push system over several days

Even though Chertoff never invoked the catastrophic annex, federal officials in the field, began, in an ad hoc fashion, to switch from a pull response to a push system because of the operational demands of the situation. The switch was uncoordinated but widespread by the end of the first week. This has occurred in previous disasters. As previously mentioned, the response to Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii implemented an ad hoc push system as FEMA sent supplies to the island of Kauai before local officials requested them. Similarly, the response to Katrina evolved into an ad hoc push system, even though the NRP-CIA was not invoked.

The following Mississippi and Louisiana examples illustrate the switch to a push response and several other important principles of effective emergency management. First, they demonstrate the importance of having qualified and experienced professionals in charge of operations. Second, these officials need to have the authority to commit resources as they see fit without waiting to seek approval from above. And, third, federal officials need to have good working relationships with their state counterparts. In the first example, Carwile had been the FCO in Florida during the 2004 hurricane season and developed a close relationship with the Florida Director of Emergency Management Craig Fugate. It is clear from e-mails and numerous staff interviews that Carwile did not hesitate to authorize and Fugate provided any and all assistance to Mississippi without formal requests from Mississippi authorities.

On August 30, FEMA worked with Florida officials to push response assets into Mississippi. In an e-mail to Brown and Carwile, Fugate informed them Florida was pushing search and rescue teams into Mississippi. He noted the EMAC paperwork was not keeping up with the need, so they were working off of verbal requests. Specifically, he wrote, "To both of you, you need it, you got it from [Florida]. [T]he paper work (sic) can follow.”

On Thursday, September 1, Carwile and Fugate continued to push resources into Mississippi without clear mission requests:

[5:42 a.m. e-mail from Fugate to Carwile]

I’m out of water and ice from my stocks. I’ve directed Mike DeLorenzo [with the Florida Division of Emergency Management] to start purchasing and shipping product into the coastal Mississippi Counties. Not sure I have an EMAC mission, but our folks on the ground have concerns if they run out.
Not sure how much and when, but will try to keep you updated on progress. If this works, will continue until told to stop.

So far we have only been shipping water and ice. No food or baby products.

Craig
__________________________
Craig Fugate, Director
Florida Division of Emergency Management

[10:26 a.m. reply from Carwile to Fugate]

Craig:

You are doing the right thing. Thanks. Know Robert [Robert Latham, Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency] would concur. Will police up paperwork later – you have my guarantee.

Food is also critical. Need MRE [meals ready to eat] and/or heater meals if you have any. Water, ice, food in eastern counties should be your priority. Recommend Allen coordinate with MGEn Cross (TAG, MS) for integration into their distribution system.

Also, know FL is providing law enforcement. Need all you can send. Public safety major concern (looting, etc.). Have used Dixie Co. body bags (250) got more?

Thanks, old friend, Bill
In Louisiana, FEMA response personnel tried on a number of occasions to push commodities and assets into the field. In cases where it was clear there was a need for life-saving and life-sustaining commodities but no clear state distribution system set up, FEMA acted proactively to provide assistance. For example, Louisiana FCO Bill Lokey noted there were situations where stranded individuals were not in immediate danger, but needed food and water. When FEMA gained access to several helicopters, FEMA began ferrying food and water to people stranded on high ground even though there was no formal request by the state to perform this function. In addition, FEMA contracted with over 100 ambulances to transport hospital evacuees. This mission was not requested by the state, but FEMA responded proactively because the situation demanded immediate action.

Although there are numerous examples of a push system being implemented at times, there were also a number of times when state or local officials expressed frustration that requests for assistance were not processed because they did not follow the formal request process. For example, according to Louisiana and FEMA officials, state and local officials verbally requested specific assets or commodities during conference calls that were never fulfilled. In these cases no immediate action was taken because FEMA officials assumed the state would follow up the verbal requests with official written requests. If the catastrophic annex had been invoked, then perhaps FEMA would have expected requests outside the normal process and acted on them.

Finding: The Homeland Security Operations Center failed to provide valuable situational information to the White House and key operational officials during the disaster

During Hurricane Katrina, the roles and responsibilities of the HSOC were unclear. One of the primary roles performed by the HSOC is to maintain an accurate picture of events as an incident unfolds by gathering and integrating information from multiple sources, including the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the Coast Guard, and other DHS elements. Specifically, the NRP has designated the HSOC as the national-level hub for information sharing management during domestic incidents. The HSOC provides primary situational awareness to the Secretary, the IIMG, and the White House.

Perhaps the single most important piece of information during Katrina was confirmation of the levee breaches in New Orleans. Beyond the importance of the information itself, the implications of the information determined whether or not Katrina would be just another bad storm in New Orleans or the nation’s worst-case hurricane disaster. Because DHS failed to anticipate the likely consequences of the storm and procure the buses, boats, and aircraft that were ultimately necessary to evacuate the flooded city prior to Katrina’s landfall, the next critical decision point of the federal response became

On Monday evening the HSOC failed to conclude levees breached in New Orleans despite a FEMA eyewitness report and the presence of numerous Coast Guard air assets over New Orleans, which had the ability to communicate to most anywhere in the country.
confirmation of the levee breaches. If the levees breached and flooded a large portion of the city, then the flooded city would have to be completely evacuated. Any delay in confirming the breaches would result in a delay in the post-landfall evacuation of the city.

On Monday evening the HSOC failed to conclude that levees had breached in New Orleans despite a FEMA eyewitness report and the presence of numerous Coast Guard air assets over New Orleans, which had the ability to communicate to almost anywhere in the country. According to the commander of the Coast Guard’s Air Station New Orleans, Captain Bruce Jones, there were nine Coast Guard helicopters, including the helicopter he piloted, operating over New Orleans by Monday evening, and Rear Admiral Duncan was flown over the city in a Coast Guard Falcon aircraft to assess the situation.

In addition, a Coast Guard C-130 from Clearwater, Florida arrived over the city Monday evening after it heard the radio chatter from the rescue helicopter operations and diverted from its mission to reconnoiter the status of offshore oil rigs. The C-130 was able to communicate with all of the helicopters, and it could patch some communications through to the Coast Guard’s division eight headquarters temporarily established in St. Louis. The division headquarters could then patch those communications through to a landline and reach almost any destination from there. The one important exception was calling into Baton Rouge, which was not possible.

According to Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA External Affairs official, and the Coast Guard, he was flown over New Orleans early Monday evening for the specific purpose of providing situational awareness to Brown and DHS headquarters. Captain Frank M. Paskewich said his unit took Bahamonde up in the helicopter because they were under the impression he had a direct line of communication into the White House. They thought Bahamonde could get the information regarding the status of the levees and flooding in the city to Washington faster than they could through the Coast Guard chain of command. Bahamonde’s observations were received in the HSOC a few hours after his over flight and became a Monday 10:30 p.m. HSOC spot report that was sent to the White House situation room shortly after midnight. This spot report can be found in Appendix 2. However, it is not clear if the other Coast Guard observations, including Duncan’s reconnaissance flight, reached the HSOC on Monday evening or at all.

Because the HSOC failed to confirm the levee breaches on Monday, the first federal decision to procure buses was made by Deputy FCO Phil Parr, who was at the Superdome, on Tuesday when he saw the water reaching the Superdome and realized it would become an island and have to be evacuated. At that point he began to develop an evacuation plan and requested hundreds of buses.

The HSOC’s role is not only to provide situational awareness and policy advice to top officials within DHS, but also to provide situational information and address lower level coordination issues. Yet, interviews suggest that while information was flowing upwards to the HSOC and onto the Secretary, it was less clear what valuable information was flowing down to key officials on the ground during the disaster. Edward Buikema, FEMA’s former Acting Director of Response, and Mike Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, both stated that while situational reports were continually flowing up the ladder from FEMA headquarters to the HSOC, no information was flowing back down from the HSOC to the NRCC.

Finding: The White House failed to de-conflict varying damage assessments and discounted information that ultimately proved accurate

In response to document requests to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and the Office of the Vice President, the Select Committee received and reviewed 22,830 pages of Katrina-related documents. Of this production, 16,482 pages were from staff of
the President’s Homeland Security Council Prevention, Preparedness and Response (PPR) directorate, headed by Kirstjen Nielsen. The remaining 6,348 pages were produced by the Office of the Vice President.

Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff received a continuous paper flow in the hours and days before Katrina made landfall and after. Of the 16,482 pages produced, almost all of the documents are repeated numerous times. The most commonly found documents include:

- HSOC Situation Reports
- HSOC Spot Reports
- Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness Situation Reports
- Mississippi Emergency Management Agency Situation Reports
- Alabama Emergency Management Agency Situation Reports
- E-mails from DHS Watch Officer to White House HSC Staff
- FEMA executive briefing slides
- FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) Advisories
- FEMA National Situation Reports
- FEMA Regional Situation Reports
- DOE Energy Reports from Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
- DOT Situation Reports
- Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Status Reports
- Talking Points from both DHS and the White House National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Reports
- Coast Guard briefing materials
- National Guard briefing materials
- Pipeline Situation Reports
- FAA Emergency Operations Division Reports
- HHS Operations Center Situation Reports
- HUD briefing materials
- White House Press Office materials, and
- Red Cross Disaster Operations Summary Reports

The HSC was situated at the apex of the policy coordination framework for responding to Hurricane Katrina.59 A HSC chart has Chertoff, and the IIMG through the Secretary, seemingly reporting into the HSC. As the coordinator of policy, it would seem to follow that HSC was directly involved in the Katrina response:

Not really, according to Deputy Homeland Security Advisor Ken Rapuano, who twice briefed Select Committee members and staff. “We don’t do operations at the White House,” Rapuano said on January 27. “We’re a transit site for information. DHS is the operating agency for response, and we were working closely with them . . . At the time we believed we were fully supporting the [federal, state, and local response] requirements. Now we know differently.”60

As discussed previously in the Investigation Overview chapter, the Select Committee grew frustrated by the White House’s slow response to requests for information and documents. On the one hand, it is true the Rapuano briefings the Select Committee ultimately received in lieu of more complete document production offered a wide array of acknowledged failures and lessons learned. On the other, the White House’s decision to withhold documents and communications raising concerns about executive privilege, leaves the Select Committee no choice but to find, based on the information we have received, that a failure of initiative plagued the White House as well.

**Failure to resolve conflicts in information and the “fog of war,” not a lack of information, caused confusion**

The White House did not suffer from a lack of information. At 1:47 a.m. on August 29, before Katrina made landfall, DHS forwarded an infrastructure advisory to the White House Situation Room and HSC staff indicating the risks associated with a potential levee
breach.\textsuperscript{61} The report advised a severe storm surge would likely lead to severe flooding, leaving New Orleans under water for weeks or months.\textsuperscript{62} The report further estimated an economic impact of \$7 to \$10 billion.\textsuperscript{63} Detailed diagrams of the New Orleans levee system arrived at the White House at 12:14 p.m. on Sunday, August 28.\textsuperscript{64} After Katrina made landfall and the levees failed, the White House continued to receive a substantial information flow. At 2:20 p.m. on August 29, a HSOC report stated some Louisiana parishes had eight to 10 feet of water and an unspecified number of Louisiana and Mississippi residents were stranded in flooded areas.\textsuperscript{65} In a 6:00 p.m. HSOC report, the White House was advised extensive flooding in New Orleans could take months to reverse through the dewatering process.\textsuperscript{66} At 12:02 a.m. on August 30, the White House received the Bahamonde spot report in which it was reported he observed a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal. Bahamonde also reported free-flowing water emptying into the city, Orleans Parish “under water,” homes completely underwater, hundreds of people on roofs and balconies, and bodies floating in the flood waters.\textsuperscript{67} While Bahamonde’s report was detailed in a 10:30 p.m. HSOC spot report, that report was not e-mailed to or received by the White House Situation Room until shortly after midnight on August 30.\textsuperscript{68} Even then, according to Rapuano, White House officials did not believe they had confirmation of any levee breaches, since an earlier Army Corps of Engineers’ report had not confirmed them and because “this was just Marty’s observation, and it’s difficult to distinguish between a [levee] overtopping and a breach.”\textsuperscript{69} Bahamonde has testified, however, that he was certain the levee was breached.

At approximately 11 a.m. [Monday, August 29], the worst possible news came into the EOC. I stood there and listened to the first report of the levee break at the 17th Street Canal. I do not know who made the report but they were very specific about the location of the break and the size. And then they added it was “very bad.” I continued to provide regular updates to FEMA Headquarters throughout the day as the situation unfolded.

At approximately 5 p.m., I rushed over to the Superdome because I had been notified that a Coast Guard helicopter was able to take me for a short flyover so that I could assess the situation in the city and plan for Under Secretary Brown’s visit the next day. My initial flyover lasted about 10 minutes and even in that short time I was able to see that approximately 80 percent of the city was under water, and I confirmed the 17th Street Canal levee break. I was struck by how accurate the 11 a.m. call was about the levee.\textsuperscript{70} After his helicopter over flight at about 7:00 p.m., Bahamonde said he called Brown and explained what he saw.\textsuperscript{71} “I picked up the phone and I called Under Secretary Brown directly and I began a 10-, 15-minute conversation that explained everything that I have already explained in my statement.”\textsuperscript{72} Brown listened to Bahamonde’s report and did not ask any questions.\textsuperscript{73} “All he said was, ‘Thank you. I am now going to call the White House.’”\textsuperscript{74} White House officials did not consider the breaches confirmed until roughly 6:30 a.m. the next morning, upon receipt of an updated situation report from DHS, Rapuano said.\textsuperscript{75} “Confirmation of a full breach would not have changed anything we would have done,” Rapuano said. “We weren’t going to repair the levees overnight, and search and rescue was already operating in full gear, regardless.”\textsuperscript{76} Determining the status of the levees could have spurred earlier evacuation for that population, which might have been facilitated by White House involvement.

But confirmation of the breach of the levees could have had practical implications for White House involvement in the response. Flooding from breaches and flooding from overtopping have different consequences. Overtopping flooding will stop as the waters recede; flooding through a breach will continue, as it did, through the breach until the water in the city is at the same level as the water in the lake. The latter flooding could drive more of the population that stayed behind from their homes, necessitating greater needs for evacuating that population.
population. When President Bush was concerned that Governor Blanco had not ordered the evacuation of New Orleans, he called her on Sunday morning to urge such an evacuation. Similarly White House involvement could have spurred earlier evacuation post-landfall for those trapped by the floods from the breached levees.

Further, White House officials clearly were able to identify and locate resources for the relief effort when they had sufficient information to know what was needed. Maggie Grant, Special Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs, played a key role in coordinating shelter for 15,000 in Arkansas with Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee and in coordinating shelter for thousands of others in Georgia and Alabama.

Regardless of what the White House did or did not, or could or could not, do with the information at its disposal, it appears clear officials charged with reviewing that information failed to de-conflict it. Among the primary tasks of the HSOC and HSC is to shuttle and synthesize information. Yet both appeared to discount information that ultimately proved accurate, and failed to provide decision-makers, up to and including the President, with timely information.

Brown testified that he spoke with White House officials as many as “thirty times.” He said he had no trouble getting through to senior decision makers: “I had no problem picking up the phone and getting hold of Chertoff or Andy Card or Joe Hagin, or the President; I don’t have those problems.” Brown told The New York Times he advised both Chertoff and a White House official, either Chief of Staff Andrew Card or Card’s deputy, Joe Hagin, on Monday evening, August 29, “I am having a horrible time. I can’t get a unified command established.” On Tuesday, August 30, he said he called to ask the White House to “take over” the Katrina response. In his testimony, Brown said that this was offered to Blanco.

One of the things that I was trying to do was to assist the Governor in any way that I could in the decision-making process, in trying to help her manage what was going on. And one of my suggestions was that, you know, that we could federalize this disaster and take over the National Guard and run the operation through that National Guard. And I do not know whether she considered it or not, but I know that she came back to me and rejected that.

Rapuano acknowledged at both briefings that “the fog of war” affected both the quality and quantity of information that reached the White House. Neither Rapuano nor anyone else at the White House would confirm these accounts. Rapuano would only say he “was not aware that Brown called the White House asking us to take over.”

Rapuano acknowledged at both briefings that “the fog of war” affected both the quality and quantity of information that reached the White House. The Select Committee also believes, in the absence of any information to the contrary from the White House, that the President’s Homeland Security team did not effectively substantiate, analyze, and act on the information at its disposal.

Listed in Appendix 3 are examples of documents that flowed to the White House over the days right before and after Katrina made landfall, August 27 through September 3. The items logged do not reflect the entire information flow to the White House, or all documents provided to the Select Committee. Rather, they are meant to illustrate the type and range of information known to the White House suggesting Katrina and the subsequent flooding was not a standard emergency event. Yet the enormity of Katrina seemed not to have been fully understood by the White House until at least Tuesday, August 30.

Finding: Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS)

It has become clear the response to Katrina was not unified and coordination among local, state, and federal authorities failed in several areas. The NRP and NIMS serve as a pre-established unified command structure for response to such a catastrophic incident. In order to seamlessly execute the NRP, each agency needs to develop effective operating procedures essential to satisfying that agency’s roles and responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS.
Some agencies had well developed standard operating procedures while others had none at all. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Transportation had previously developed significant operating procedures that covered agency responsibilities under the NRP.\textsuperscript{85} Both agencies had used these operating procedures during training exercises to ensure an understanding of operating procedures prior to real time application.\textsuperscript{86} These agencies executed their responsibilities under the NRP fairly well. Other agencies lack sufficient operating procedures for their responsibilities under the NRP. Many, when asked for operating procedures, referred to related sections of the NRP. Since the NRP is not an operational plan, this led to problems with execution of Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibilities.\textsuperscript{87}

While DOD, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Coast Guard performed admirably in many respects, there were problems adequately coordinating their activities with other federal, state, and local agencies through the NRP structure.

For example, DOD by-passed the NRP mandated unified command, taking requests from the states directly, absent the necessary input and coordination by FEMA. This was apparent in the evacuation of the Superdome. Parr completed a plan to evacuate the Superdome Wednesday morning with the support of the Louisiana National Guard. Shortly before implementation of the plan, Parr was informed of the decision by General Honoré of Northern Command to proceed with a different evacuation plan. Unknown to Parr, Blanco had requested DOD’s involvement in the evacuation the day before. The Governor’s request was made outside the unified command and without the knowledge of FEMA officials, resulting in a duplication of efforts and a delay in the evacuation. Additionally, Parr stated that the actual evacuation under Honoré’s plan resulted in an additional 24 hour delay to evacuees.\textsuperscript{88}

In another case, HHS activated the National Disaster Medical System without prior notice or consultation with Alabama, thereby removing 200 beds from the inventory the state believed on hand, and to which state officials were still directing patients. Likewise, Coast Guard search and rescue operations were bringing survivors from Mississippi unannounced to already full hospitals until Alabama sent its own personnel forward to help triage cases and coordinate the direction of Coast Guard flights. This resulted in confusion over available hospital beds for victims through the Gulf coast and delay in the medical response.\textsuperscript{89}

Additional failures to adhere to the NRP were apparent in the lack of communication between the NRCC and the HSOC, which disrupted the overall information flow and situational awareness.

Finding: Once activated, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) enabled an unprecedented level of mutual aid assistance to reach the disaster area in a timely and effective manner

EMAC provided invaluable interstate mutual aid in support of Hurricane Katrina by deploying more than 67,891 personnel (19,481 civilians and 48,477 National Guard) to Louisiana and Mississippi.\textsuperscript{90} EMAC facilitated mutual assistance from 48 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

In support of Hurricane Katrina, more than 2,188 resource requests (missions) were filled.\textsuperscript{91} Record numbers of National Guard troops, local responders, and health/medical personnel were deployed through the compact. EMAC also works in cooperation with the federal government by co-locating personnel, when requested, in the NRCC or Regional Response Coordination Center.
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Not only did senior DHS officials fail to acknowledge the scale of the impending disaster, they were ill prepared due to their lack of experience and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by the NRP.

(RRCC) in order to share information on EMAC activities in the affected states, monitor the availability of needed resources being offered by assisting states, and facilitate overall emergency response and recovery activities.

Through state statute, EMAC addresses the legal issues of liability, workers compensation, reimbursement, and professional licensure—prior to a disaster or emergency when resource needs and timing are critical. State and territory members must pre-designate personnel with the authority to request and commit resources. Standard operating procedures exist for compact members and training and exercise of state personnel is required. While formalized protocols are in place, EMAC is designed to be adaptable and scaleable to meet the changing needs of each event.

Following each large scale activation of the compact, a review and evaluation of the response is conducted and standard operating procedures revised and updated to reflect lessons learned and best practices. For example, lessons learned from the 2004 Florida hurricanes led to an overhaul of some operational procedures related to mobilization and deployment of resources, an enhanced automation system to provide more accurate data and electronic tracking of resources, and a new standardized EMAC training curriculum and updated operations manual. These enhancements were either in progress or completed prior to Hurricane Katrina.

In Mississippi, EMAC assistance was considered a success. The assistance in Mississippi included help from other states’ security agencies (such as their state police) as well as various states’ National Guards (troops and hard assets). (See the MILITARY chapter for more detail.)

Louisiana state officials also viewed EMAC assistance as very successful. One state official said there were almost 900 EMAC agreements for assistance. Although the EMAC response from surrounding states varied, state officials applauded EMAC for successfully getting law enforcement manpower assistance. According to state police officers Ralph Mitchell and Joseph Booth, Arkansas, Tennessee, New Jersey, and California all sent law enforcement officers through EMAC.

FEMA officials also noted the general success of EMAC. Because of the magnitude of the disaster, however, Louisiana was unable to handle all of the EMAC requests, requiring FEMA to become more involved in the process than normal. In particular, FCO Scott Wells noted some state offers of assistance through FEMA were rejected by Louisiana. He said these offers were rejected by SCO Smith because of concerns about the costs to the state.

Finding: Earlier presidential involvement might have resulted in a more effective response

Similar to other large scale disasters, the catastrophic nature of Katrina required early presidential involvement to direct federal agencies in a massive coordinated response. In practice, it takes presidential action to quickly deploy the logistical capability of the military to meet the tremendous food, shelter, and medical needs of large affected populations. According to the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) review of hurricanes Hugo (1989, SC and NC), Andrew (1992, FL and LA), and Iniki (1992, HI):

Often, when a catastrophic disaster leaves a gap between what volunteers can provide and the needs of disaster victims, DOD is the only organization capable of providing, transporting, and distributing sufficient quantities of the items needed to fill that gap. . . . While we clearly see a major role for DOD in providing mass care, we do not advocate turning over the entire disaster response, relief, and recovery operations to the military.
Similar to other large scale disasters, the catastrophic nature of Katrina required early presidential involvement to direct federal agencies in a massive coordinated response.

Instead, the GAO recommended increased presidential involvement in the disaster and an improved process for FEMA to request DOD assistance as the solution for enabling DOD to provide relief during the critical first few days of a catastrophic disaster.98 The Stafford Act authorizes the President, not the director of FEMA or the Homeland Security Secretary, to direct federal agencies to save lives and protect property and support state and local response efforts.99 While the Stafford Act requires the President to delegate the coordination of response efforts to a federal coordinating officer (FCO), the law does not give the FCO command authority over other federal agencies. As a result, the FCO is not in a position to direct the operations of large departments such as DOD. Only the President appears able to promptly engage active duty military forces and achieve a unity of effort among all the federal agencies responding to a catastrophic disaster.

During Hurricane Katrina this problem was apparent in FEMA’s and DHS’ inability to promptly task major mission assignments to DOD. For example, FEMA did not approach DOD about taking over the logistics mission until Thursday, September 1, according to staff interviews with senior FEMA officials.100 In response, Colonel Chavez with the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense Paul McHale instructed FEMA that the request had to go to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.101 Although details and planning still needed to take place, the Secretary of Defense supported approval of the request on Friday, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Verga approved execution orders on Saturday, September 3.102 Out of this request, according to McHale, DOD found additional mission assignments that it could undertake and proposed them to FEMA. Seven other mission assignments were negotiated and approved over the next few days with senior DHS officials, including Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and the Director of Operations Coordination Brigadier General Matthew Broderick (USMC-Ret).103 But by the time all of these missions were assigned, it was one week since Katrina had made landfall.104

Conclusion

Hurricane Katrina exposed numerous deficiencies in the existing national framework for emergency management, including specific mistakes that delayed an appropriate federal response. Confusion accompanied the implementation of the NRP, resulting in key elements of the plan executed late, ineffectively, or not at all. Not only did senior DHS officials fail to acknowledge the scale of the impending disaster, they were ill prepared due to their lack of experience and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by the NRP. The Secretary of DHS failed to declare an INS, convene the IIMG, and properly designate the PFO in a timely manner. The White House failed to de-conflict varying damage assessments and discounted FEMA-supplied eyewitness information that ultimately proved accurate. Furthermore, the government was limited to a reactive response due to failure to activate the NRP-CIA. Despite failures of the system, portions of the national framework were successful, including EMAC, which proved invaluable in providing necessary levels of mutual aid assistance. ■

Although the Select Committee’s access to White House documents, communications, and staff was not as comprehensive as we had hoped, the information we did receive suggests the President could have received better disaster advice and counsel.


3 State of Louisiana, Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Planning Project, (Sept. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Southeast LA Planning Project].


5 1993 GAO Report.

6 Homeland Security Act.


8 See E-mail correspondence from Kirstjen Nielson, White House Homeland Security Council, to Tom Ryder, Department of Energy (Aug. 29, 2005) (10:58 a.m.).

9 E-mail correspondence from Michael Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, FEMA, to Patrick Rhode, FEMA, et al. (Aug. 28, 2005) (7:48 p.m.) [hereinafter Aug. 28, 2005 Lowder E-mail].

10 NRP at 22.


12 Aug. 28, 2005 York E-mail; E-mail correspondence from Andrew Akers, DHS, to Paul Perkins, HSOC, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (1:47 p.m.) [hereinafter Aug. 29, 2005 Akers E-mail].


14 Southeast LA Planning Project.

15 NRP at 22-23.

16 Id. at 22.

17 Aug. 28, 2005 Lowder E-mail.


20 NRP at 33.

21 See E-mail correspondence from Ken Hill, Executive Secretary, DHS to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS, et al., (Aug. 30, 2005) (8:22 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Michael Brown, Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to Sharon Worthy, Special Assistant, DHS (Aug. 30, 2005) (11:00 p.m.).

22 NRP at 34.

23 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview.

24 Id. at 17.


26 NRP at 33.

27 Stafford Act, §§ 5143, 5170(a)-(b), 5192.

28 NRP at 33-34.

29 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview.

30 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with New Orleans officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).

31 Id.

32 NRP at 342.

33 1993 GAO Report at 3.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 7.


38 NRP at Catastrophic Incident Annex.

39 Id. at CAT-4.


43 E-mail correspondence from William Carwile, DHS, to Craig Fugate, Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management (Aug. 30, 2005).

44 Id.

45 Jan. 23, 2006 Lokey Interview.

46 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Louisiana officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).

47 NRP.

48 Southeast LA Planning Project.

49 Briefing for Select Comm. Staff by U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, DC (Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 10, 2006 Coast Guard Briefing].
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50 Id.
52 Jan. 10, 2006 Coast Guard Briefing.
54 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Louisiana officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005); Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 70-73 (testimony of Philip Parr).
55 Jan. 6, 2006 Bukuema Interview.
57 Letters from Select Comm. to I. Lewis Libby, Jr., then Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Oct. 13, 2005, and to David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, Oct. 4 and Dec. 7, 2005.
58 The Executive Office of the President produced 16,482 pages of documents and the Office of the Vice President produced 6,348 pages of documents.
59 Hurricane Katrina – Policy Coordination Framework for Response, Office of the Vice President document supplied to the Select Comm.
61 Aug. 28, 2005 York E-mail.
62 Aug. 29, 2005 Akers E-mail; DHS National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center, Fast Analysis Report (Update to Reflect Category 5 Status) to DHS IP on Hurricane Katrina, Gulf Coast (Aug. 28, 2005).
63 Id. at 1.
65 E-mail correspondence from Insung Lee, HSOC, to Frank DiFalco, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (2:20 PM). HSOC report received at the White House Aug. 29, 2005 at 2:20 PM.
66 E-mail correspondence from Tom Holz, to Bethany Nichols, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005 (6:13 PM); HSOC, Hurricane Katrina SITREP #7. HSOC report received at the White House, Aug. 29, 2005 at 6:13 PM.
67 Aug. 30, 2005 Inzer E-mail; Aug. 29, 2005 HSOC Spot Report.
68 Id.
69 Jan. 27, 2006 White House Briefing.
70 Oct. 20, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing (testimony of Marty Bahamonte, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region One, FEMA).
71 Id. at 27.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 28.
74 Id.
75 Jan. 27, 2006 White House Briefing.
76 Id.
77 Id.
79 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 213 (testimony of Michael Brown, then Director of FEMA) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
81 Id.
82 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 104.
87 NRP at 5.
88 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 70-72 (testimony of Philip Parr).
89 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Alabama Officials in Clanton and Montgomery, AL on October 11-12, 2005.
91 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Louisiana Officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).
92 See Emacweb.org.
93 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Louisiana Officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).
95 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA Officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).
96 Id.
97 Hearing on Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation’s Response Strategy Before the Subcomm. On Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence of the Senate Comm. on Armed Forces, 103rd Cong. (May 25, 1993) at 11-12 (statement of J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller General) [hereinafter May 25, 1993 Senate Armed Forces Comm. Hearing].
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100 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Edward Buikema, former Acting Director of Response, FEMA [hereinafter Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview], in Washington, DC (Jan. 6, 2006).
101 E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, to Thomas Kuster, CIV, OSD-Policy (Sept. 2, 2005) (9:38 AM).
102 DOD and FEMA, MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina, on file with the Select Comm., No. MMTF 00028-05.
103 Correspondence from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, to Chairman Davis (Jan. 25, 2006).
104 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview.
“FEMA pushed forward with everything it had in order to help the states respond after landfall ... Every single team, every single program of FEMA, was pushed to its limit to respond to Hurricane Katrina.”

Michael D. Brown
Former FEMA Director, Select Committee Hearing, September 27, 2005
DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event

Summary

It is clear the federal government in general and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in particular were not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina. There is also evidence, however, that in some respects, FEMA’s response was greater than it has ever been, suggesting the truly catastrophic nature of Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed a federal response capability that under less catastrophic circumstances would have succeeded.

Nevertheless, DHS’ actual and perceived weaknesses in response to Katrina revived discussion of the value of incorporation of FEMA into DHS. Many experts and Members of Congress debated the policy and operational ramifications of bringing FEMA into DHS during consideration of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA).

The HSA transferred FEMA functions, personnel, resources, and authorities to the DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate. The emergency management community has complained since 2003 that FEMA was being systematically dismantled, stripped of authority and resources, and suffering from low morale, in part because of the Department’s focus on terrorism. Others have said that FEMA’s placement in DHS enabled the Secretary of Homeland Security to augment FEMA’s resources with other DHS personnel and assets, all within an integrated command structure.

The cycle of emergency management begins with preparedness and mitigation, flows into response, and ends with recovery. The four cornerstones to comprehensive emergency management — preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation — are interdependent and all vital to successful emergency management.

Preparedness encompasses those pre-disaster activities that develop and maintain an ability to respond rapidly and effectively to emergencies and disasters. All levels of government need to be prepared to respond to disasters. International Association of Emergency Managers President Dewayne West described preparedness as “what emergency managers do every day in order to be able to respond.” Emergency management officials at different levels of the government expressed concerns that distancing preparedness efforts from response, recovery, and mitigation operations could result in an ineffective and uncoordinated response.

Following Hurricane Katrina, emergency management professionals in the Gulf coast region have questioned whether DHS and state preparedness for catastrophic events has declined over the past years due to organizational changes within DHS and a shift in programmatic priorities. In particular, the decline in preparedness has been seen as a result of the separation of the preparedness function from FEMA, the drain of long-term professional staff along with their institutional knowledge and expertise, and the diminished readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams.

In the Gulf coast region, emergency managers expressed the view that FEMA’s disaster response capabilities had declined since its inclusion in DHS, in part due to subsequent organizational changes within DHS and FEMA. The emergency management community has suggested that FEMA’s readiness for a large disaster has declined despite extensive preparedness initiatives within the federal government, pointing to the separation of preparedness functions from response, recovery, and mitigation.
Additionally, the tremendous damage and scale of Hurricane Katrina placed extraordinary demands on the federal response system and exceeded the capabilities and readiness of DHS and FEMA in a number of important areas, particularly in the area of staffing. The response to Hurricane Katrina required large numbers of qualified personnel at a time when FEMA’s professional ranks had declined. FEMA response officials in both Mississippi and Louisiana testified that the department’s inability to field sufficient numbers of qualified personnel had a major impact on federal response operations. In addition, FEMA had lost, since 2002, a number of its top disaster specialists, senior leaders, and experienced personnel, described as “FEMA brain drain.” Many emergency management professionals had predicted this ‘drain’ would have a negative impact on the federal government’s ability to manage disasters of all types.

In addition, emergency management professionals said the degraded readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams reduced the effectiveness of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. The diminished readiness of the national emergency response teams has been attributed to a lack of funding for training exercises and equipment. Emergency management professionals note the need for trained people, who have experience working together with their federal colleagues and state counterparts prior to a disaster, as a part of national emergency response teams. Emergency responders should not meet each other for the first time right before or after a major catastrophe. A decline in the readiness of these teams along with appropriate staffing added to an ineffective response.

**Finding:** While a majority of state and local preparedness grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this does not preclude a dual use application

The “all hazard” versus “just terrorism” debate plays out in the interpretation of permissible uses for homeland security grant funding and efforts to make equipment purchases and exercise scenarios fit terrorism-related criteria while still being of some general use in day-to-day emergency response. For example, funding to exercise response capabilities for WMD-related scenarios might be used to test evacuation planning and other “all hazard” response functions, with the WMD element little more than pretext.

This concern is evident at the local level. Alabama conducts or participates in approximately 50 training exercises each year ranging from “table top,” classroom-like discussions to full scale exercises involving all members of the emergency management community, including federal, state, and local officials. According to Alabama officials, federal DHS funding restrictions dictate that almost all of these exercises involve a terrorism-based threat or scenario, despite the fact that all emergencies largely involve the same set of procedures — evacuations, loss of power, communications difficulties, need for shelter, food, and water, and inter-governmental coordination.

State officials also voiced a concern that in the post-9/11 environment undue emphasis is placed on terrorism-based hazards. Alabama’s hazard risk profile includes terrorism, but state emergency management officials believe natural disasters pose a much more likely, perhaps inevitable, risk. Although lately, hurricanes have hit the state with some regularity, Alabama is susceptible to a wide variety of other natural disasters, including earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and droughts. With nuclear facilities located within the state, Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) officials are also on alert for nuclear-related emergencies. Special plans and precautions have also been funded to prepare for risks posed by an Army chemical weapons storage and incineration facility.

According to Colonel Terry Ebbert, the Director of Homeland Security & Public Safety for the City of New Orleans, DHS’ all hazards focus is unsubstantiated.

[T]he Office of Domestic Preparedness restricted any use of grant funding for preparing, equipping, training, and exercising to enhance the preparedness of first responders operating in
a potential WMD environment. Most allowable expenditures under the UASI program remain closely linked to the WMD threat to the exclusion of many other forms of enhanced readiness.\(^7\)

When Ebbert submitted a request to purchase a number of inexpensive, flat-bottomed, aluminum boats to equip his fire and police departments, with the intent of having them available to rescue people trapped by flooding, the request was denied. Ebbert concluded that the rules on what is permitted and reimbursable are unaltered while the newly stated focus on an “all hazards” approach to preparedness remains “elusive.”\(^8\) Ebbert recommended that “existing limitations imposed on the availability of Federal preparedness funding should be broadened.”\(^9\)

DHS officials are particularly sensitive to the charge that the agency has stopped state and local governments from purchasing equipment not exclusively suited to terrorism preparedness. Former Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Director Suzanne Mencer stressed the dual use capability of many grants: “The grants don’t prohibit a city from buying equipment for use in a natural disaster if it can also be used in a terrorist attack.”\(^10\) Mencer said some locals see the WMD wording and think it prohibits items, such as radios, that could also be used in a natural disaster: “They can still meet their needs in almost all instances if they look at the broader picture and not [just] the wording in the grant.”\(^11\) When asked about state and local complaints in Alabama and elsewhere, former director of ODP’s Preparedness Programs Division, Tim Beres, noted that in fiscal 2004, grants paid for more than $1 billion worth of dual-use equipment, including $925 million for interoperable communications equipment and $140 million in chemical protection suits.\(^12\)

DHS continues to develop and refine its guidelines to states and localities, in accordance with Presidential Directives, which require grants to be used in support of catastrophic events regardless of their cause.\(^13\) Although a July 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found many state preparedness officials and local first responders believed DHS planners focused excessively on anti-terrorism criteria in their grant, training, and exercise programs, the auditors concluded that 30 of the 36 essential capabilities first responders need to fulfill the critical tasks generated by the department’s 15 catastrophic emergency planning scenarios would apply to both terrorist and non-terrorist incidents.\(^14\) The GAO auditors concluded that DHS planning supported an all hazards approach.\(^15\) Indeed, according to GAO auditors, in response to state and local complaints that DHS required too much emphasis on terrorism-related activities, DHS increasingly promoted flexibility to allow greater dual usage within the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005.

DHS’ growing dual use flexibility is reflected in its most recent grant guidelines. Specifically, the FY2006 guidance points out the numerous dual-use target capabilities (identified in the National Preparedness Goal) to be attained through DHS grant funding.\(^16\) The guidance further states:

> [f]unding remains primarily focused on enhancing capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional Explosives], agriculture, and cyber terrorism incidents. However, in light of several major new national planning priorities, which address such issues as pandemic influenza and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the allowable scope of SHSP [State Homeland Security Program] activities include catastrophic events, provided that these activities also build capabilities that relate to terrorism.\(^17\)

**Finding: Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina**

As a result of various changes within DHS and FEMA, the emergency management community suggested FEMA’s preparedness and readiness for a large disaster would decline despite extensive preparedness initiatives within the federal government. For example, during an April 2005 House Subcommittee hearing on DHS preparedness efforts, Dave Liebersbach, then President of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), expressed
his fear that DHS’ de-emphasis of hazards other than terrorism would result in FEMA’s inability to respond to a major disaster.\(^{18}\)

My concern is we are not going to be able to maintain [capabilities]. I honestly believe . . . that if the hurricane scenario of September 2004 that occurred in the Southeastern U.S., [happens] five years from now, we will fail the way we are going, because the success of that response, of that hurricane season, was based on the programs that had come before . . . . As we are moving forward, that legacy is going to drop if we don’t pay attention to dealing with that.\(^{19}\)

Similar issues were raised during the establishment of the department by various first responder professional associations and think tanks, Members of Congress from both political parties, the Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service.\(^{20}\)

One of the primary reasons for creating FEMA in 1979 was to closely link preparedness, response, and mitigation within one organization.\(^{21}\) During consideration of the Homeland Security Act in 2002, the President proposed that all terrorism preparedness functions be consolidated into FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness and be managed within the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (EP&R) of the proposed department.

The intention was to provide a one-stop shop for state and local governments and achieve a unified approach to disaster response. Instead Congress opted to split preparedness functions between the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which was to be transferred to DHS from the Justice Department, and EP&R (or FEMA).\(^{22}\) The goal was to place terrorism preparedness in an organization, ODP, with a strong law enforcement background and relationship with that community.

In late 2003, the debate over the need for a one-stop shop for first responder grants and to unite preparedness with the other functions of comprehensive emergency management continued. When DHS Secretary Tom Ridge proposed to transfer most state and local grant programs to ODP, the emergency management community again cautioned the capabilities of state and local governments and FEMA to respond to all disasters would suffer.\(^{23}\) Ridge and his aides “believed FEMA should be a response and recovery agency, not a preparedness agency. In an age of terrorism, they argued, preparedness needed a law enforcement component, to prevent and protect as well as get ready to respond.”\(^{24}\)

The proposal prompted then FEMA Director Michael Brown to urge Ridge not to further distance preparedness from response as it “can result in an ineffective and uncoordinated response . . . [would] shatter agency morale and would completely disconnect the Department’s response functions from the responders and governments they are supposed to support.”\(^{25}\) Brown was overruled and the programs were transferred to ODP, which was then incorporated into the newly created Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP).

The controversy over how to manage disaster preparedness increased with incoming Secretary Michael Chertoff’s Second Stage Review. Chertoff argued the federal government’s preparedness efforts needed to be enhanced, particularly for catastrophic disasters, and that could be best achieved by consolidating the department’s preparedness functions into a new Preparedness Directorate. In a letter opposing the move, NEMA criticized the department’s “total lack of focus on natural-hazards preparedness” and argued that separating preparedness from response and recovery would break emergency management’s cycle of continuous improvement and result in disjointed and ineffective response operations.\(^{26}\)

While Brown agreed with the need to increase catastrophic planning (FEMA had originally proposed the catastrophic preparedness program that funded the Hurricane Pam process), he strongly disagreed with Chertoff’s recommended solution of removing FEMA’s remaining preparedness functions and transferring them to ODP, which would then be elevated to a Preparedness Directorate. Instead, Brown drafted a 13-page memo to Chertoff urging the consolidation of all preparedness functions into the Emergency Preparedness & Response Directorate, as originally proposed by President Bush, in order to “ensure that capabilities and procedures trained will be identical to the capabilities and procedures
“These recent organizational changes have divided what was intended to be one, all-hazards preparedness mission into two artificially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural disasters.”

actually applied during a real event.” As Brown described it, “These recent organizational changes [the transfer of several FEMA preparedness programs to ODP in Secretary Tom Ridge’s reorganization plan of September 2003] have divided what was intended to be one, all-hazards preparedness mission into two artificially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural disasters.”

Some experts do, however, endorse the consolidation of preparedness efforts. Last December, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage Foundation released a joint study called “DHS 2.0,” in which the authors suggested adding a new undersecretary for preparedness with direct access to the secretary. Such a move, they said, would speed preparedness decisions past layers of bureaucracy. And in a September 1, 2005 Washington Post article, at the height of the Katrina response effort, Paul C. Light, an authority on government operations at New York University, also endorsed Chertoff’s proposed reforms.

In a December 7, 2005 report entitled “The Truth About FEMA: Analysis and Proposals,” Heritage Foundation homeland security expert James Carafano and the Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz argued that Chertoff’s proposed reorganization would address many of the shortfalls created by placing FEMA within DHS. At the same time, they said it would preserve the advantages of having most major federal disaster-related preparedness and response activities, for both man-made and natural disasters, concentrated in one department. The authors pointed out that in the event of large-scale disasters, FEMA could be reinforced by other assets from within DHS.

In testimony before the Select Committee, Chertoff explained his rationale for integrating the Department’s existing preparedness efforts in to a single directorate for Preparedness:

Preparedness is not just about response and recovery — rather, it must draw on the full spectrum — from prevention through protection to response. Our preparedness directorate will rely on the expertise of FEMA, but it will also integrate the experience of the Coast Guard, our Infrastructure Protection division, our intelligence units, and our other operational assets . . . FEMA will become a direct report to the Secretary, allowing it to focus on response and recovery while partnering with the new preparedness directorate to increase our overall capabilities . . . FEMA must also continue to function as an all-hazards agency, leveraging entities within the preparedness directorate, including Infrastructure Protection, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, and State and Local Government Coordination.

Although many in the emergency management community opposed Chertoff’s preparedness consolidation, many first responder groups support it. For example, in a press release issued immediately following the release of Chertoff’s Second Stage Review, the International Association of Fire Chiefs applauded the proposal, particularly the creation of a Preparedness Directorate.

Finding: DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced staff for the Katrina response

Brown’s memorandum also identified budget cuts and organizational changes he believed were harming FEMA’s ability to perform its statutory responsibility of leading the federal government’s response to all disasters, including terrorist attacks. For example, Brown claimed
FEMA’s operational budget baseline (for non-Stafford Act disaster funding) had been permanently reduced by 14.8 percent since joining DHS in 2003. In addition to the permanent baseline reduction, he claimed FEMA lost $80 million and $90 million in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 respectively from its operating budget. Brown argued these budget reductions were preventing FEMA officials from maintaining adequate levels of trained and ready staff.

Brown also said FEMA no longer managed numerous functions that were essential to meeting its statutory responsibilities, and therefore did not have the tools to successfully accomplish its mission. For example, the National Response Plan is a fundamental element of coordinating the federal government’s response to disasters. Given FEMA’s response mission, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 specifically assigned FEMA responsibility for “consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan.” However, instead of assigning this function to the organization responsible for executing the plan during a disaster (i.e. FEMA), the department initially assigned it to the Transportation Security Administration, which then relied on an outside contractor.

When some in the first responder community reacted negatively to the contractor’s draft plan, the department transferred the NRP’s development to another area of the department, the Integration Staff within the Secretary’s office. The resulting plan made a number of departures from the existing Federal Response Plan, including the introduction of the Incident of National Significance (INS), the Principal Federal Official (PFO), the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), and the Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA). The emergency management community expressed concerns about each of these newly created structures, which ultimately proved problematic or experienced difficulties achieving their intended purposes during the response to Hurricane Katrina.

Brown also identified what he believed were the most important goals for achieving FEMA’s mission of leading the federal government’s response to disasters. Several of the issues he identified for improvement proved to be critical problem areas in the Katrina response. The requirements he identified in March 2005 included the following:

1. Improve logistics capability and asset visibility.
2. Implement a comprehensive and integrated multi-year catastrophic planning strategy.
3. Establish a National Incident Management System Integration Center to improve command and control capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels.
4. Recruit, train, credential, deploy and retain a disaster workforce with the appropriate skill mix and management structure to support the operational requirements of all disaster related functions.
5. Ensure appropriate numbers, skills, and grades of employees to support current and long-term mission needs.

Senior DHS and Office of Management and Budget officials vigorously dispute the claim that FEMA’s budget has been cut at all. They argue that any transfers from the FEMA budget reflect the transfer of functions carried out by DHS for FEMA, start up costs of the Department, and the use of unobligated funds. According to Andrew Maner, Chief Financial Officer for DHS, the core of the budget adjustments cannot be classified as permanent reductions to FEMA’s base budget, as Brown claims. For example, Maner said the transfer of $30.6 million was a transfer of unobligated balances from the 2002 Olympic Games to help fund the start-up of the new Department. The transfer of such unobligated balances was authorized by Congress in H.J. Res. 124, which became law on November 23, 2002 (P.L. 107-294), to pay for “the salaries and expenses associated with the initiation of the Department.” Also, Maner noted the $28 million transfer to ODP reflects efforts to complete the transfer of funds accompanying former FEMA functions that have been assumed by other DHS entities.

Regardless of the impact, if any, of these budget adjustments on FEMA capabilities, the tremendous damage and scale of Hurricane Katrina placed extraordinary demands on the federal response system and exceeded the capabilities and readiness of DHS and FEMA in a number of important areas, including staffing. Hurricane Katrina consisted of three separate major disaster declarations, three separate statewide field operations, two directly-affected FEMA regional operations, and the full activation of national level resources such as the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the HSOC, and the IIMG. In addition, most FEMA regional offices were actively supporting...
Katrina operations or assisting their regions receive Gulf Coast evacuees. These operations required large numbers of qualified personnel from what had become a relatively small agency of approximately 2,500 positions.

FEMA response officials in both Mississippi and Louisiana testified that the department’s inability to field sufficient numbers of qualified personnel had a major impact on federal response operations. The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in Mississippi, Bill Carwile, described how managing the personnel shortfall was perhaps his most difficult challenge. While he was able to deploy division supervisors to the coastal counties, he needed similar qualified employees for the devastated cities of Gulfport, Biloxi, and Pascagoula. Ultimately, FEMA officials turned to federal agencies like the U.S. Forest Service and city firefighters from across the country to staff FEMA positions in the state.

Despite those measures, Carwile stated, “We never had sufficient personnel to meet requirements.” According to Scott Wells, Deputy FCO for Louisiana, a 90-person FEMA regional office “is woefully inadequate” to perform its two primary disaster functions, operating a regional response coordination center and deploying people to staff emergency response teams in the field. “You cannot do both. Pick one,” he said. Wells added, “We had enough staff for our advance team to do maybe half of what we needed to do for a day shift....We did not have the people. We did not have the expertise. We did not have the operational training folks that we needed to do our mission.”

In addition to having an inadequate number of qualified personnel, FEMA had lost a number of its top disaster specialists, senior leaders, and most experienced personnel. Both critics and supporters of FEMA’s merger with DHS have acknowledged “FEMA brain drain” in recent years and its negative impact on the federal government’s ability to manage disasters of all types. Since 2003, for example, the three directors of FEMA’s preparedness, response, and recovery divisions had left the agency, and departures and retirements thinned FEMA’s ranks of experienced professionals. At the time Hurricane Katrina struck, FEMA had about 500 vacancies and eight out of its ten regional directors were working in an acting capacity.

At least two factors account for FEMA’s loss of seasoned veterans. First, like other government agencies, many of FEMA’s long-term professionals are reaching retirement age. And second, job satisfaction was second to last in 2005, according to the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit group that promotes careers in federal government. Regardless of the reasons for the exodus, Brown and senior DHS officials were unable to maintain their ranks of disaster professionals, through employee retention, development, or recruitment, and this failure hindered the response to Hurricane Katrina.

The disastrous effect of this manpower shortage was compounded in Hurricane Katrina by the difficulty of getting federal workers where they needed to be because of security concerns. In Louisiana, media reports and rumors of violence and general lawlessness delayed the deployment and placement of federal response workers. The Governor’s Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin said there were approximately 1,000 FEMA employees deployed and on their way to New Orleans Wednesday, August 31, 2005, many of whom turned back due to security concerns.
Finding: The readiness of FEMA’s National Emergency response teams was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response

One of the most critical links in the federal response system is the team of FEMA personnel that deploys to a disaster site to establish a unified command with state officials and directs federal operations. These national emergency response teams are the conduits through which federal disaster assistance is requested by and delivered to a state. They are intended to be on call and deploy at a moment’s notice, since many disasters provide no advance warning. In prior years, according to Carwile, “We were then able to build a team to about 125 individuals, hand picked, from around the country, and we were able to routinely exercise that team because we had the funding in place to do so on the plan, against several scenarios.”

The team had a robust operational plan, was sent to the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and received dedicated satellite communications equipment. It appeared to be a well-equipped, well-trained team at a high state of readiness.

Carwile testified that by 2004, the readiness of FEMA’s emergency response teams had plummeted dramatically. Funding for the teams dried up after 2002. They lost their dedicated communications equipment. Teams were split up into ever smaller units. Team training and exercises ceased.

In a June 30, 2004 memorandum, FEMA’s top disaster response operators, the cadre of Federal Coordinating Officers, warned then FEMA Director Brown that the national emergency response teams were unprepared because no funding was available for training exercises or equipment. In a few short years, FEMA’s emergency response teams had been reduced to names on a roster. It appears no actions were taken to address the problems identified in the memorandum.

Asked whether or not implementing the recommendations would have made a difference in Katrina, Carwile responded, “I felt very fortunate because many of my colleagues with me in Mississippi had been with me on a national team in years past. It was kind of coincidental . . . but I can’t help but believe that trained and ready teams, people who have worked together, would not have made some difference in a positive way.”

Wells described the situation in Louisiana in this way: “We need to really train together as a team. We need to work as a team. What you have with this National Response Plan in the field is we have no unity of command.”

The requirement for trained people, who have experience working together with their federal colleagues and their state counterparts, is a constant theme of federal, state, and local emergency professionals. Numerous officials and operators, from state and FEMA directors to local emergency managers told the same story: if members of the state and federal emergency response teams are meeting one another for the first time at the operations center, then you should not expect a well-coordinated response.

Conclusion

For years emergency management professionals have been warning that FEMA’s preparedness has eroded. Many believe this erosion is a result of the separation of the preparedness function from FEMA, the drain of long-term professional staff along with their institutional knowledge and expertise, and the inadequate readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams. The combination of these staffing, training, and organizational structures made FEMA’s inadequate performance in the face of a disaster the size of Katrina all but inevitable.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

1 International Ass’n of Emergency Managers, Press Release: IAEM Announces Recommendations for Improved Emergency Response, (Oct. 25, 2005) [on file with Select Comm.]).


4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with senior AL emergency management officials, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005).

5 Id.


9 Id. at 174-75 (statement of Terry Ebbert).


11 Id.

12 Id.


15 Id. at 39-41.

16 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit, (Dec. 2005). Those capabilities include planning, community readiness and participation, communications, critical infrastructure protection, on-site incident management, citizen protection: evacuation and in-place protection, emergency operations center management, critical resource logistics and distribution, urban search and rescue, volunteer management, emergency public information and warning, responder safety and health, triage and pre-hospital treatment, public safety and security response, medical surge; medical supplies management and distribution, environmental health, mass prophylaxis, mass care, firefighting operations and support, hazardous material response, structural damage assessment and mitigation, economic and community recovery, restoration of lifelines. Id.

17 Id.


19 Id.


24 Spencer S. Hsu and Julie Tate, Brown’s turf Wars Sapped FEMA’s Strength, WASH. POST., Dec. 22, 2005.

25 Letter from Michael Brown, Dir., FEMA to Tom Ridge, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 15, 2003).


30 Paul C. Light, Katrina’s Lesson in Readiness, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005 at A29.


32 Id.

33 Id.


40 Briefing for Select Comm. Staff with Madhu Beriwal, Pres., Innovative Emergency Mgmt., in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 2006) (discussing how funding for FEMA staff to participate in subsequent Hurricane Pam implementation workshops had been cut).

41 Briefing for Select Comm. Staff with Andrew Maner, Chief Fin. Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Briefing with Andrew Maner].
According to OMB data, a total of 448 employees (full-time equivalents, or FTEs) were transferred from FEMA to various DHS offices in 2003:

- 42 FTEs were transferred from FEMA's salaries and expenses budget account to DHS's Departmental Operations account;
- 206 FTEs were transferred from FEMA's Working Capital Fund to DHS's Working Capital Fund; and
- 200 FTEs were transferred from FEMA's Office of Inspector General to DHS's Office of Inspector General. (GAO, GAO-04-329R, Transfer of Budgetary Resources to the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (DHS), at 22 (Apr. 30, 2004) (on file with Select Comm)).

And since the establishment of the Department, the following programs have been transferred from FEMA to other Departmental entities (OMB, Funding Chart (Oct. 4, 2005) (on file with Select Comm.)):

- Emergency Management Performance Grants
- National Strategic Stockpile
- Citizen Corps
- Other grants for emergency management
- Inspector General
- FIRE Act Grants
- First Responder Grants
- Metropolitan Medical Response System grants

Moreover, according to information provided to the Select Comm. by DHS, the funding transfers that Brown referenced in his testimony Before the Select Comm. break down as follows (Briefing with Andrew Maner; FEMA, Reductions to FEMA Base, FY 2003-2005 (Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with Select Comm.)):

**FY 2003 –**
- Unobligated balances from FY 2002 – $30.6 million (Id.) (DHS start-up costs)
- FY 2003 appropriations – $12 million (DHS start-up costs) (Of the $12 million in FY 2003 appropriations, $10 million had been allocated for Salaries and Expenses for preparedness functions and $2 million had been allocated for the programs of another management account – Emergency Management Planning and Assistance.)
- Transfer of Office for National Preparedness functions to Office of Domestic Preparedness/Bureau of Transportation Security - $10.6 million
- Transfer to the Transportation Security Administration to fund a shortfall from the Liberty Shield Supplemental – $5.5 million
- Transfer to the DHS Office of Inspector General for audits and investigations of the Disaster Relief Fund – $21.4 million

**FY 2004 –**
- FEMA share of DHS e-government initiatives (mostly to maintain DisasterHelp.gov website) – $2.6 million
- FEMA share of other DHS central services – $2.8 million
- Transfer to Inspector General for audits and investigations of the Disaster Relief Fund – $22 million
- National preparedness functions transferred to ODP – $28 million
- General reduction to base funding for Departmental management – $34 million

**FY 2005 –**
- Reduction for management cost savings realized from efficiencies attributable to the creation of DHS – $11.7 million
- $18,501 million for Working Capital Fund


Perspectives of FEMA Hearing at 57 (statement of Scott Wells, Deputy, FEMA Fed. Coordinating Officer, State of LA) [hereinafter statement of Scott Wells].
“The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina disabled many of the communications systems that state and local authorities and first responders rely upon to communicate with each other and with FEMA. This was not an issue of interoperability, but of basic operability, resulting from wind, flooding, loss of power, and other damage to infrastructure.”

Michael Chertoff
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Select Committee Hearing, October 19, 2005
Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness

Summary

Massive inoperability—failed, destroyed, or incompatible communications systems—was the biggest communications problem in the response to Katrina. It was predicted and planned for by some, while others experienced problems with their operations or were caught relatively unprepared. The loss of power and the failure of multiple levels of government to take the initiative to adequately prepare for its effect on communications hindered the response effort by compromising situational awareness and command and control operations, particularly in New Orleans and along the Mississippi Gulf coast. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) could have pre-positioned mobile communications in New Orleans but did not because it believed that it should first be asked to do so by local authorities. In turn, poor situational awareness, and its resulting effect on command and control, contributed to the negative effects of inaccurate or unsubstantiated media reports because public officials lacked the facts to address what the media reported. To deal with the loss of power, some state and local governments had redundant communications and other means to communicate, such as satellite phones, which were invaluable. But they also experienced certain problems due to technical difficulties, high winds, and exceptionally high demand that at times overtaxed their capacity.

Where communications were operable or soon were restored, long debated and unresolved issues with interoperability among federal, state, and local communications systems complicated the efforts of first responders and government officials to work together in managing the response to Katrina. In recent years, local and state governments in each of the affected states have received several million dollars in federal funding to address communication interoperability issues. Despite claims of an “austere fiscal environment,” at each level of government, internal debate, parochial interests, and a general lack of prioritization and coordination between affected jurisdictions regarding the formation and implementation of interoperable communications policies and plans severely hindered the rescue, response, and recovery efforts at all levels of government.

Finding: Massive inoperability had the biggest effect on communications, limiting command and control, situational awareness, and federal, state, and local officials’ ability to address unsubstantiated and inaccurate media reports

Massive inoperability was the biggest communications problem in the response to Katrina. By all accounts, destruction to regional communications companies’ facilities and the power systems on which they depend was extraordinary. For example:

A downed communications tower, Plaquemines Parish, LA.

■ More than three million customer telephone lines were knocked down in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. As of September 28, 2005, over 260,000 customer lines remained out of service, including...
238,000 in Louisiana and 22,000 in Mississippi.

- The entire communications infrastructure on the Mississippi Gulf coast was destroyed.
- Significant damage was inflicted both on the wire line switching centers that route calls and on the lines used to connect buildings and customers to the network.
- Thirty-eight 911 call centers went down. Thirty days after landfall, two call centers in Louisiana remained out of service.
- Two telephone company switches in New Orleans responsible for routing 911 calls for the surrounding parishes were knocked out by flooding, resulting in one of the most significant losses of capacity in and around New Orleans.
- Local wireless networks also sustained considerable damage, with up to 2,000 cell sites out of service.³
  A month after landfall, approximately 820 cell sites remained out of service, the majority within New Orleans and other areas of Louisiana.⁴
- Over 20 million telephone calls did not go through the day after the hurricane.
- 37 of 41 broadcast radio stations in New Orleans and surrounding areas were knocked off the air (2 AM and 2 FM stations continued to broadcast).

After surviving Hurricane Katrina’s initial blow, the radio communications system for the New Orleans police and fire departments dissolved as its radio towers lost their backup power generators in the ensuing flood.⁵

The New Orleans Police Department’s communications system failed and was inoperative for three days following the hurricane. At one point, hundreds of New Orleans first responders were trying to communicate on only two radio channels on a backup system, forcing them to wait for an opening in the communications traffic to transmit or receive critical information. The New Orleans Police Department headquarters, and six of the eight police districts’ buildings were out of commission due to flooding, limiting (or precluding) their ability to establish command and control by performing basic law enforcement functions because their communications were destroyed.

The Louisiana State Police reported the devastation caused by the storm “severely hampered the ability of emergency responders operating on the state system to communicate with other emergency services personnel.” The State Police currently operate a statewide analog wireless communications system originally installed for voice communications and last upgraded in 1996. It is used by about 70 agencies with a total of over 10,000 subscribers. Its infrastructure consists of 46 tower sites and 28 dispatch consoles. In a report issued December 7, 2005, the State Police reported, in addition to the effect it had on the state’s system, storm damage to communications systems the local governments maintained was “severe and debilitating,” further restricting communications between emergency responders. The equipment at its 46 towers depends on electricity and, when that was lost, keeping them running was nearly impossible once it became necessary to refuel the generators operating them because debris and flood waters hampered their refueling efforts.⁶

Mississippi experienced problems similar to the other affected Gulf states. Most of its state and first responder communications capabilities were inoperable during and in the immediate aftermath of the storm, forcing the various responders to rely on satellite phones and radios (which experienced their own problems due to wind damage and interference). According to Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Director Robert Latham, the entire communications infrastructure of the state’s Gulf coast was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, systems elsewhere across the state were inoperable, and those systems that were working were overloaded, resulting in delays processing local governments’ requests for assistance. As a result, often the only communications capability present in Mississippi — for both MEMA as well as the affected counties — was through satellite phones and radios, which operate by connecting to satellites rather than routing calls through land-line or

Six of the eight police districts’ buildings were out of commission due to flooding, limiting (or precluding) their ability to establish command and control by performing basic law enforcement functions because their communications were destroyed.
cellular towers. FEMA, for its part, deployed a Mobile Emergency Response Support detachment (MERS) to the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi, to provide satellite communications systems for its operations in the Gulf coast counties. However, despite the presence of MERS and hand-held satellite phones in all of the affected counties’ EOCs, the Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, Bill Carwile, testified that communications capabilities were far short of what was needed to be effective.

The majority of site problems were due to lack of power. Some sites had T-1 (high speed data) telephone land-line problems, but the design of the system generally allows access to more than one site in the area, so the radio/telephone calls were routed from the secondary tower site. This created some delays in accessing the system, but was not a critical factor. Cellular telephone service was generally available throughout Alabama’s affected areas, but several tower sites were overloaded or not fully operational after Katrina made landfall. This was not a major problem because the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) does not consider cellular telephone service a primary source of communications during emergency response. Instead, AEMA has a cache of pre-programmed Southern LINC radios that are activated during disasters, programmed with specific groups for users (such as Mutual Aid, Logistics, Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), Staging, etc.) and have telephone capability. There were approximately 115 LINC portable units activated and delivered for use in the field for this disaster.

The importance of power, fuel, and communications to disaster response and situational awareness

The near total failure of regional communications degraded situational awareness and exacerbated problems with agency coordination, command and control, logistics, and search and rescue operations. Reliable communications are critical to the preparation for and response to a catastrophic event because of the effect they have on establishing command and control and maintaining situational awareness. Without functioning communications systems, first responders and government officials cannot establish meaningful command and control, nor can they develop the situational awareness necessary to know how and where to direct their response and recovery efforts. Similarly, without the ability to call for help, citizens cannot seek emergency assistance, alert responders or others to their whereabouts and needs, or receive updates or instructions from officials.

Katrina interoperability problems were masked to some degree by the larger and more serious breakdown of operability resulting from the destruction of facilities or power outages. Restoring phone service requires more than waiting for the flood waters to recede and restoring power. While many cables may be salvageable, the electronics that pass the signals across those lines will need to be replaced. As noted by Jim Gerace of Verizon Wireless: “It’s essentially analogous to putting a PC in your bathtub. It’s not going to work once it dries.”

In Louisiana, the winds and flooding degraded the quality of available communications, reducing most communications to the limited number of available satellite phones. Additionally, the communications infrastructure that remained intact was soon overwhelmed by the heavy communications traffic during the response. FEMA officials reported “there were no status reports coming into the EOC Monday.” Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer Scott Wells stated that if the Coast Guard was doing flyovers of New Orleans, those reports did not get to the EOC on Monday. Additionally, failed communications affected responders’ ability to share information up and down the chain of command. According to Louisiana officials, “Two or three days after the storm, state police were running into division commanders in the New Orleans Police Department who reported that they had not talked to anyone above their rank since the storm.”

The Alabama communications infrastructure fared better than in Mississippi and Louisiana. The AEMA has various communications capabilities, with redundant backups, to ensure it maintains a high level of connectivity throughout the state. The EOC had equipment and trained personnel to communicate over all types of communications networks, including satellite, 800 MHz digital phone service, amateur radio, and others. AEMA staff viewed communications systems and capabilities during Katrina as strengths, although the goal of true interoperability within and among county emergency response and law enforcement agencies remains elusive to this day. The state has little ability to
mandate what types of communications technology each county procures. AEMA makes recommendations, but with so many different counties all with communications equipment in various stages of their life cycle, the EOC must be able to process all types of communications. The AEMA integrates these systems with various bridging technologies. Several attempts have been made in the past to build a state-wide/state-owned system, but lack of funding has prevented construction of this system. Nevertheless, state and county emergency management officials concluded their communications capacity functioned reasonably well during their response to Hurricane Katrina.\footnote{17}

Power is the most dominant factor for any telecommunications system\footnote{18} and hurricanes virtually always knock out the power, even if only for a short period of time. Very often these power outages can last for several days or more following powerful storms. For Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was aware the power outages caused by the storm could go on for weeks after the storm, possibly longer. On August 28, the DHS National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center issued and provided to the White House (among others) a "Fast Analysis Report" predicting the storm’s likely impact on the Gulf coast area based on conditions as of August 27 when Katrina was still a Category 5 storm. In the report, DHS made a number of predictions about the storm’s impact on power supplies, including:

- Electric power loss is likely to affect over 2.6 million customers;
- Restoring power could take more than 2 weeks for most of the affected areas excluding New Orleans and the coastal areas and may be hampered by flooding or other obstacles;
- The New Orleans region could have power outages lasting 16 weeks if excessive flooding occurs, disabling existing pumping stations up to 10 weeks and entailing power repairs that may take up to 6 weeks to complete.\footnote{19}

As predicted, the affected states all suffered severe damage to their power and communications infrastructures. During Hurricane Katrina, the City of New Orleans lost two primary tower sites and had to evacuate the police and fire communications centers because of flooding. Associated with the loss of the communications centers was the loss of all 911 capabilities and the federally funded New Orleans Maritime Interoperable Committee’s (NOMIC) interoperable bridging capability. Colonel Terry Ebbert, the Homeland Security Director for New Orleans, testified "Over 2,000 police, fire, and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel were forced to communicate in a single channel mode, between radios, utilizing only three mutual aid frequencies."\footnote{20}

The government’s ability to communicate depends upon the viability of the commercial network’s infrastructure. Ninety percent of communications assets are privately owned and operated.\footnote{21} Verizon Wireless serves the Gulf coast with two major switching stations in Baton Rouge and Covington, Louisiana. These serve as the links between cell phone antennae scattered throughout the region and the rest of the global network. While the stations themselves remained operational during and after landfall, the Covington facility lost connectivity with the cell towers due to two breaks in the connecting fiber-optic ring run by BellSouth.\footnote{22} Normally, a fiber-optic link provides redundancy: if one link is cut, information can still travel along the other route. Katrina, however, knocked out both sources because of physical damage to the fiber-optic cable. In one case, the fiber-optic cable that transported calls and internet traffic to and from New Orleans and ran along the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway was severed. Additionally, at least 20 cell towers went down due to either power loss or flooding. Verizon Wireless installed backup generators at many of the towers, but not at all, reportedly, due to local zoning restrictions.\footnote{23} Refueling remote generators also proved
difficult if not impossible. Verizon Wireless reported a number of its generators were stolen, one of Nextel’s fuel trucks was stopped at gunpoint and its fuel taken for other purposes while en route to refuel cell tower generators, and the Mississippi State Police redirected a fuel truck carrying fuel designated for a cell tower generator to fuel generators at Gulfport Memorial Hospital.24

Other power and telecommunications companies reported similar problems due to exhausted fuel supplies, disruption of natural gas supply lines, or refueling difficulties due to flooding or security concerns. BellSouth reported that on September 1, 112 of its central offices were running on emergency generators, an additional 17 were completely down, and an additional 32 had no connectivity to the backbone network.25 These central offices served as 911 tandems, and when they went down, they created outages of 911 service in as many as 13 Louisiana parishes.26 In Gulfport, Mississippi, company officers at Alabama Power and Southern Nuclear’s Watson Electric Generating Plant watched as a 30-foot storm surge rose 20 feet within the plant and flooded the 50-kilowatt backup generator that normally would have started when the power failed. The nerve center for the region’s power company had no backup power to supply to the community.27

The loss of power — a common and altogether expected result of a hurricane — need not mean an affected area has no communications capability until the utility companies are able to restore normal electricity service. A well-planned and robust emergency communications system should be sustainable at reasonable levels of operation even after electrical power is lost.28 Resources to sustain operations include backup generators and fuel, redundant systems, self-healing networks, access to multiple technologies, common radio frequencies for wireless communications, sufficient spectrum bandwidth to support communications needs, and the proper equipment and infrastructure to make it all work.29 Regular land-line telephone connections can function after local power is lost if central switches maintain power and lines are not damaged; telephone switches can usually operate until their backup generators run out of fuel or are knocked out by flooding. Similarly, cell towers carrying commercial phone service and public safety radio communications can continue to function with back-up power, usually batteries.

Destruction to communications capability hindered command and control and severely limited situational awareness

“It sounds like it can happen again. How many local governments have a communications plan when everything fails?”

REPRESENTATIVE TAMMY BALDWIN (D-WI),
query during hearing, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2005

In myriad ways, the vast destruction to the communications infrastructures, particularly those in Mississippi and Louisiana, negatively affected first responders and local and state governments’ attempts to establish command and control. It also limited — and sometimes precluded — them from achieving and maintaining situational awareness. In New Orleans and along the Gulf coast, the National Guard and first responders were forced to rely on paper relays or face-to-face communications to convey critical information between emergency operation centers and the field.30 This drastically slowed the pace at which...
those in the EOCs became aware of situations throughout their respective areas of responsibility. It delayed the delivery of direct assistance where it was most needed, and it hindered the ability to forward requests to state or federal agencies that might have been able to help. In the Louisiana state EOC, the communications problems were so severe that state officers could not reliably communicate with local officials, others in the state government, or federal officials, exacerbating the already severe problems with situational awareness.

On Tuesday, August 30, FEMA Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer Phillip E. Parr traveled by helicopter to the New Orleans Superdome. His mission there was threefold: (1) form a unified command with the state as represented by the Louisiana National Guard, and the City of New Orleans; (2) maintain visibility of commodities ordered; and (3) build out a base from which FEMA teams could be formed to locate and assist in the hardest hit parishes. But according to Parr his ability to accomplish those goals were hindered by the lack of appropriate communications as mentioned in his statement: "To accomplish these goals we were to meet a Mobile Emergency Operations and Communications Vehicle and use that as a base of operations and communication. Due to extensive flooding in the city our communications vehicle was unable to enter the Dome and this severely hampered our operations."³²

First responders' ability throughout the Gulf coast to communicate across a broad range (or distance) and gain control of an incident was compromised when power was lost and many had only their mobile (cellular) phones available. Because these phones run on batteries, they lose power the longer first responders have to use them in lieu of other means and, as a result, have shorter and shorter ranges over which they can operate as their batteries run down.

In Mississippi, Major General Harold A. Cross, the state's Adjutant General, told Select Committee staff the National Guard forward operating units on the coast were unable to establish and maintain meaningful communications with MEMA or Governor Barbour for the first 48 hours following landfall.³³ As a result, their initial activities were based on executing pre-landfall assignments and reacting to events on the ground as they found them. They acted with initiative. Exacerbating the situation, and unknown to Cross, the company providing the satellite service to his phones (Mobile Venture Satellites) had not informed the Guard it had changed the contact numbers on two of the Guard's satellite phones. As a result, no one attempting to reach these phones — one with the Guard's Director of Military Assistance, Lieutenant Colonel Lee Smithson (the officer responsible for coordination of the Guard's materials and assets during the response and recovery effort), and another at the Stennis Space Center commodities distribution center — could get through. The Guard did not learn of the change until two days into the response when the state National Guard's Assistant Adjutant General, Gen. Playnt, finally spoke with Smithson to ask why he was not answering his satellite phone. Smithson contacted the satellite phone company, and was only then informed of the number change.³⁴ Because of this failure to notify the Guard of two number changes, those who needed to reach two of the most important people or places involved in the response did not have the correct numbers to do so. This contributed to the problems and delays experienced during commodity coordination and distribution efforts experienced in Mississippi.³⁵ These types of problems are further discussed in the COMMAND AND CONTROL chapter.

**FEMA pre-positioned communications assets, but not in New Orleans, where the need became exceptionally critical**

FEMA partially anticipated the communications infrastructure, particularly the parts dependent on electric power, would be needed in the Gulf coast and pre-positioned with each of the three states' EOCs a MERS detachment.³⁶ MERS detachments are designed to
provide rapid multi-media communications, information processing, logistics, and operational support to federal, state, and local agencies during catastrophic emergencies and disasters. They do so, in part, by providing mobile telecommunications, operational support, life support, and power generation for on-site disaster management; this includes satellite, telephone, and video hook-ups.\textsuperscript{37}

Former FEMA Director Michael Brown testified, in hindsight, FEMA should have pre-positioned a MERS detachment in New Orleans. Brown stated:

In terms of communications, one of the things that I didn’t mention in the litany of things that we prepositioned is something called our MERS unit, our Mobile Emergency Response System [sic]. Those are vehicles that are command and control units that have satellite hook-ups, telephone hook-ups, video hook-ups; enable us to do communications. I prepositioned those in all three states so that we would have communications wherever we needed it. I eventually sent one of those command units — in fact, it’s one of the largest ones we have, called Red October — I eventually sent one of those into New Orleans for Mayor Nagin to use.

In retrospect, I wish I’d done that four days earlier. Had I done it four days earlier, though, guess what? It probably wouldn’t have gotten there. So I’m now second-guessing myself, and perhaps I should have prepositioned it there before Katrina made landfall. But again, that’s not the role of the federal government; that’s Mike Brown Monday morning quarterbacking, having seen everything that took place and trying to figure out, okay, now seeing everything that did not work in Louisiana, if I had known that beforehand, what could I have done?\textsuperscript{38}

As a result, one of the federal assets that might have allowed FEMA and the local and state governments to work around the damage to the communications systems and sooner gain situational awareness about conditions in New Orleans was not present. Arguably, this instance of a failure of initiative — leaving a MERS detachment outside of the city — exacerbated the degree to which the massive damage to the local communications infrastructure delayed the ability of FEMA to learn of or confirm events on the ground in New Orleans and act accordingly.

“Communications and coordination was lacking, preplanning was lacking. We were not prepared for this.”

WILLIAM M. LOKEY, FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer in Louisiana, testimony before U.S. Senate, Jan. 30, 2006

Poor situational awareness and its resulting effect on command and control contributed to the negative effects of inaccurate media reports because public officials lacked access to the facts to address media reports. Throughout the early days of the response, media reports from New Orleans featured rampant looting, gunfire, crime, and lawlessness, including murders and alleged sexual assaults at the Superdome and Convention Center. Few of these reports were substantiated, and those that were—such as the gunfire—were later understood to be actually coming from individuals trapped and trying to attract the attention of rescuers in helicopters.

Officials on the ground in New Orleans interviewed by Select Committee staff stated the media greatly exaggerated reports of crime and lawlessness and that the reports from the Convention Center and Superdome were generally unsubstantiated. Of the six deaths in the Superdome, none were crime-related (five were due to medical reasons and one was a suicide).\textsuperscript{39} In some cases, the media’s coverage of its own performance - well after the fact - showed many of these reports from the early days after Katrina were false. In December, \textit{ReasonOnline} reported that:

On September 1, 72 hours after Hurricane Katrina ripped through New Orleans, the Associated Press news wire flashed a nightmare of a story: “Katrina Evacuation Halted Amid Gunfire…Shots Are Fired at Military Helicopter.”

The article flew across the globe via at least 150 news outlets, from India to Turkey to Spain. Within 24 hours commentators on every major American television news network had helped turn the helicopter sniper image into the disaster’s enduring symbol of dysfunctional urbanites too depraved to be saved.

Like many early horror stories about ultra-violent New Orleans natives, whether in their home city or in far-flung temporary shelters, the A.P. article turned out to be false. Evacuation
from the city of New Orleans was never “halted,” according to officials from the Coast Guard, FEMA, and the Louisiana National Guard. The only helicopter airlifts stopped were those by a single private company, Acadian Ambulance, from a single location: the Superdome. And Acadian officials, who had one of the only functional communications systems in all of New Orleans during those first days, were taking every opportunity to lobby for a massive military response.

More important, there has been no official confirmation that a single military helicopter over New Orleans—let alone a National Guard Chinook in the pre-dawn hours of September 1—was fired upon.

The Air Force, to which the Air National Guard reports, also has no record of helicopter sniping. “We investigated one incident and it turned out to have been shooting on the ground, not at the helicopter,” Air Force Maj. Mike Young told The New York Times on September 29.

Aside from the local National Guard, the other government agency with scores of helicopters over New Orleans was the U.S. Coast Guard, which rescued more than 33,000 people. “Coast Guard helicopters,” says spokeswoman Jolie Shifflet, “were not fired on during Hurricane Katrina rescue operations.”

[But] the basic premise of the article that introduced the New Orleans helicopter sniper to a global audience was dead wrong, just like so many other widely disseminated Katrina nightmares. No 7-year-old rape victim with a slit throat was ever found, even though the atrocity was reported in scores of newspapers. The Convention Center freezer was not stacked with 30 or 40 dead bodies, nor was the Superdome a live-in morgue.

“[The] National Guard have landed in the city of New Orleans. These troops are fresh back from Iraq, well trained, experienced, battle-tested and under my orders to restore order in the streets. They have M-16s and they are locked and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and they are more than willing to do so if necessary and I expect they will.”

GOVERNOR KATHLEEN B. BLANCO

According to officials on the ground in New Orleans interviewed by Select Committee staff, and subsequent media reports, erroneous or exaggerated reporting of conditions in New Orleans created anxiety and fear among those sheltering at the Superdome and Convention Center, delayed some critical elements of the response effort, and discouraged some residents in dry neighborhoods from evacuating the city. Media reports described how BellSouth evacuated its personnel from their Emergency Operations Center near the Superdome under armed escort due to security concerns. Reportedly, company officials worried about the center being targeted by unruly individuals.

Gary Ludgood, vice president for integrated network planning and implementation for BellSouth, stated, “[W]e chose to evacuate our employees before anything happened.”

Officials interviewed by Select Committee staff said some of the media reporting made the crowds in the Superdome anxious and scared away truck drivers carrying critical commodities; these same officials indicated some residents of the city in areas not flooded were reluctant to evacuate because of these reports, choosing instead to stay behind to protect their belongings. ReasonOnline reported on the effect of radio broadcasts containing erroneous reports.

The information vacuum in the Superdome was especially dangerous. Cell phones didn’t work, the arena’s public address system wouldn’t run on generator power, and the law enforcement on hand was reduced to talking to the 20,000 evacuees.
“A Failure of Initiative”

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“A lot of them had AM radios, and they would listen to news reports that talked about the dead bodies at the Superdome, and the murders in the bathrooms of the Superdome, and the babies being raped at the Superdome,” Bush [Maj. Ed Bush, public affairs officer for the Louisiana Air National Guard] says, “and it would create terrible panic. I would have to try and convince them that no, it wasn’t happening.”

The reports of rampant lawlessness, especially the persistent urban legend of shooting at helicopters, definitely delayed some emergency and law enforcement responses. Reports abounded, from places like Andover, Massachusetts, of localities refusing to send their firefighters because of “people shooting at helicopters.” The National Guard refused to approach the Convention Center until September 2, 100 hours after the hurricane, because “we waited until we had enough force in place to do an overwhelming force,” Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, told reporters on September 3.

“One of my good friends, Col. Jacques Thibodeaux, led that security effort,” [Maj.] Bush says. “They said, ‘Jacques, you gotta get down here and sweep this thing.’ He said he was braced for anything. And he encountered nothing—other than a whole lot of people clapping and cheering and so glad that they were here.”

““We were going to protect the lives of our residents. It’s impossible to know what happened unless you were here. At the time, you don’t know what to believe, but you don’t want to be in a place to find out if what you heard is true.”

RONNIE HARRIS, Mayor, Gretna, LA

Without sufficient working communications capability to get better situational awareness, the local, state, and federal officials directing the response in New Orleans had too little factual information to address — and, if need be, rebut — what the media were reporting. This allowed terrible situations — the evacuees’ fear and anxiety in the Superdome and Convention Center — to continue longer than they should have and, as noted, delayed response efforts by, for example, causing the National Guard to wait to assemble enough force to deal with security problems at the Convention Center that turned out to be overstated. For further discussions of exaggerated media reports, see the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter.

““I certainly saw fights, but I saw worse fights at a Cubs game. The people never turned into these animals. They are been cheated out of being thought of as these tough people who looked out for each other. We had more babies born [in the Superdome] than we had deaths.”

MAJOR ED BUSH, LA National Guard

Mississippi government officials echoed these concerns: “Even drivers coming in to Mississippi were dissuaded by the media reports in New Orleans. A lot of them ended up demanding military escorts. They’d call and say ‘we’ve been hijacked or we ran out of gas on Highway 49 or 59. When help arrived they’d admit that wasn’t the case, that they just wanted an escort. Obviously this situation impeded ‘just in time’ logistics,” Ebbert said.

“I certainly saw fights, but I saw worse fights at a Cubs game. The people never turned into these animals. They are been cheated out of being thought of as these tough people who looked out for each other. We had more babies born [in the Superdome] than we had deaths.”

Finding: Some local and state responders prepared for communications losses but still experienced problems, while others were caught unprepared

Though the loss of power and damages to the Gulf coast area’s communications infrastructure were massive, some of the local and state responders had taken the steps necessary to ensure that they had some communications capability in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The AEMA had various communications capabilities, all with redundant backups, to ensure that
it maintained a high level of connectivity throughout the state. AEMA officials considered their communications redundancy to be one area that worked well in their response to Katrina. Southern LINC, the company whose network Alabama uses as its primary radio system, had a representative on site at the state EOC during this period that provided outage updates (as noted earlier, the AEMA has a cache of pre-programmed LINC radios that it activates during disasters and which also provide telephone capability).

In Mississippi, Gulf coast county governments had taken steps (including using DHS preparedness grant funds) to ensure some communications capability would likely survive a disaster. For example, despite the catastrophic damage suffered by the Gulf coast, Harrison County’s Enhanced Digital Access Communication Systems (EDACS) remained operational at nearly 100 percent capacity during and after Katrina’s landfall. One interoperability success story from Mississippi was that although the Harrison County EDACS was not capable of linking to FEMA or to the MEMA EOC in Jackson, Mississippi, it was capable of linking with similar systems utilized by the Florida State Police and the Florida Fish & Wildlife Agency who arrived in Mississippi shortly after Katrina’s landfall. These Florida state agencies were able to quickly reprogram their EDACS radios to communicate over the county’s network. Within two weeks of landfall, the Harrison County EDACS system was able to expand to allow first responder communications within the adjoining Jackson and Hancock counties.

MEMA Director Latham testified that Mississippi had satellite radios permanently mounted in the three coastal counties (Harrison, Hancock, and Jackson) and that 30 other counties also had these radios. All MEMA personnel had access to a mobile satellite radio for communications throughout the state. This proved fortunate because often the only communications capability in Mississippi after the storm—for both MEMA and the affected counties—was through satellite phones and radios, which operate by connecting to satellites rather than routing calls through land-based lines or cellular towers. The Harrison County EOC was only able to use its cellular communications system for approximately 12 hours until the battery on the cell tower died. They were unable to use the satellite system at the Harrison County EOC because it was damaged during the storm. Additionally, and currently, MEMA has a mobile operations unit, which it can deploy to disaster areas and allows communication across all bands. Despite problems the satellite systems experienced (discussed below), Latham noted they did allow the state to learn vital information it needed about conditions in the counties and their assistance needs.

Unlike the three coastal counties, Pearl River County fared better at maintaining communications capability during and after the storm. Pearl River County had two satellite phones in its emergency operations center. According to its Emergency Management Director, Bobby Strahan, these worked throughout the response but did prove problematic early on because it took a long time for any calls to go through. In addition, Strahan reported the county has four high band repeater systems strategically placed throughout the county which allow all of its first responders (including police, fire, and EMS) as well as its schools to communicate. All of these systems’ locations had generator backup systems which functioned properly during Katrina. In addition, Pearl River County was able to sustain communications within the county and, to a limited extent, with portions of adjacent Hancock County because it had used DHS grant funds to buy a mobile communications center (trailer) that allowed it to communicate with agencies throughout the county as well as with MEMA’s mobile operations unit.

In Louisiana, most of the parishes did not have satellite phones because they chose to discontinue the service after the state stopped paying the monthly fees for the phones.

Others were caught relatively unprepared to deal with the communications problems that resulted from the hurricane’s damage or found their existing capabilities were insufficient. In Louisiana, most of the parishes did not have satellite phones (as their counterparts in Mississippi did) because they chose to discontinue the service after the state stopped paying the monthly fees for the phones. In 1999, the state began using federal funding to provide each parish emergency management office with
a satellite telephone and paid the $65.00 monthly fee, but it discontinued doing so for the parishes in August 2004. As a result, all but three parishes—Orleans, Plaquemines, and Jefferson—discontinued their satellite phone service. Larry Ingargiola, Director, Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, St. Bernard Parish, told Select Committee staff the parish returned the satellite phones when the state stopped paying the monthly service fee. After Katrina hit, the state sent the phones back to St. Bernard because there was no other means of communication available to the parish.

The failure of 911 call centers in New Orleans also illustrates how others were unprepared to deal with communications problems. Identifying where calls to a 911 call center will be routed if it is rendered inoperable is a basic preparation for Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) such as 911 call centers. Although the technology to switch calls to 911 to an alternative location exists, many 911 call centers in Louisiana did not have protocols in place to identify where their calls should go and had not arranged for any rerouting. As a result, numerous calls to 911 in the immediate aftermath—especially as the floodwaters in New Orleans were rising—simply dropped.

In Mississippi, MEMA Director Latham testified the state found it did not have enough satellite radios when only its satellite systems were operable. As a result, during its response to Katrina, MEMA purchased additional portable satellite phones for its State Emergency Response Team (in the future, Mississippi indicated these additional phones can be issued to local authorities as a redundant system in disasters). Some Mississippi responders also found their satellite communications capabilities were not sufficiently capable of withstanding high winds. Specifically, though they generally remained operable and the state relied on them during its response to Katrina, Mississippi’s satellite communications capabilities suffered because the hurricane force winds—at times sustained over 130 miles per hour—shifted the antennas in each of the coastal counties, causing satellite communications there to fail because the antennas were no longer properly targeted. As a result, for several days, these counties lost their ability to communicate with the state EOC in Jackson or FEMA about their needs for assistance or the status of any commodities requests they had made before the storm. Because of the lessons it learned from the damage to its satellite systems in Katrina, Mississippi is investigating for future use in its counties’ EOCs the omni-directional antennas it has in place on all of its state EMA and Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks vehicles. According to Latham, these antennas would not be affected by strong winds and would allow constant communications.

Responders in Louisiana similarly experienced certain problems that can plague satellite-based communications. Specifically, satellite phones are technically capable of transmitting calls virtually anywhere on earth, but they may have trouble doing so when the user is inside a building or when the weather is cloudy. According to the Louisiana State Police report, “heavy cloud coverage and system inundation” limited the effectiveness of the portable satellite phones delivered to several troop headquarters in the affected areas. Even when weather conditions permit smooth transmissions of signals for satellite communications, this is meaningless if the caller does not know how to use the satellite phone, or the phone does not work at all. As Mayor Nagin noted during Congressional testimony, “I have a huge box of satellite phones that did not work.”

For the systems that were functioning after the storm as well as those that were eventually restored, problems with interoperability further exacerbated rescue efforts. As Colonel Ebbert testified, “[T]here was no voice radio contact with surrounding parishes or state and federal agencies. Lives were put at risk and it created a direct operational impact on their ability to maintain control of the rapidly deteriorating situation within the city, carry out rescue efforts and control the evacuation of those people who had failed to heed the call for evacuation.”

Despite hundreds of millions in federal funding for technology and communications, the absence of true communication interoperability within and between affected jurisdictions severely hindered rescue and response efforts at all levels of government.
to crews patrolling in boats, and National Guard Commanders in Louisiana and Mississippi had to use runners to relay orders.

“We’ve got runners running from commander to commander. In other words, we’re going to the sound of gunfire, as we used to say in the Revolutionary War.”

MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD A. CROSS, Adjutant General, Mississippi National Guard

Interoperability for public safety communication is defined as the ability to share information via voice, data, on-demand, in real-time, when needed and as authorized. The public safety community expects this level of interoperability will be available using equipment from multiple manufacturers, be transparent to the user, require little or no special knowledge of the system, and not be dependent on common frequency assignments. A Conference of Mayors 2004 survey of 192 cities showed 44 percent reported an accident within the preceding year in which the lack of interoperable communications made response difficult; 49 percent of cities are not interoperable with state police; 60 percent are not interoperable with their state emergency operation centers; and 83 percent are not interoperable with the federal law enforcement agencies.

Communications — particularly wireless communications — enable all other functions in any disaster relief operation along with the sensors to inform officials and first responders what is happening and share the information and the ability to command and control those functions and information. These are all mission-critical functions. Hurricane Katrina was no exception. Without effective communications, every operation will suffer debilitating inefficiencies, some leading to ineffectiveness. Too many public safety personnel cannot communicate by radio because their equipment is still incompatible or the frequencies they’re assigned are different. They operate on 10 different frequency bands and run communication systems that are often proprietary and too often 30 or more years old. Over 90 percent of the nation’s public safety wireless infrastructure is financed, owned, operated, and maintained by the more than 60,000 individual local jurisdictions, police, fire and emergency medical services that serve the public.

Louisiana government officials have long been cognizant of the interoperability problem among the state and parish first responders. Despite longstanding and sizable federal interoperability grants to multiple Louisiana jurisdictions, coordinated planning had barely progressed when Katrina hit. Although some New Orleans and Louisiana state officials attribute the lack of true interoperability for first responders in the region to financial limitations, this explanation flies in the face of the massive amounts of federal grants to Louisiana. State and local governments were responsible for designing and coordinating their efforts, and they failed to make meaningful progress despite knowledge of the problem for years and the expenditure of millions in federal funds.

Since 2001, the federal government has given $8.6 billion to states for equipment, first responder training, and disaster exercises. In 2005, DHS gave the states $2.1 billion, of which $925 million was allocated for communications upgrades. In Louisiana alone, since fiscal year 1999, the federal government allocated over $135 million for preparedness, of which more than $108 million was awarded to local governments, and nearly $27 million to the state. Of these funds, nearly $107 million was dedicated to equipment purchases and the remaining $28 million was allocated for planning, training, exercises and administrative costs. Since 1999, approximately $16 million has been spent on interoperability. In addition to these funds, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are also the recipients of federal grants for law enforcement agencies via the Justice Department’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office.

Alabama received $24,770,274 from FY2003 to FY2005 under the COPS Interoperability Communications, Law Enforcement Technology, Universal Hiring Program (UHP), COPS in Schools (CIS), and Homeland Security Overtime (HSOP) grant programs;
Louisiana received $23,495,114 from FY2003 to FY2005 under the COPS Interoperability Communications, Law Enforcement Technology, UHP, CIS, Regional Community Policing Institute (RCPI) and Homeland Security Overtime (HSOP) grant programs; and,

Mississippi received $7,003,688 from FY2003 to FY2005 under the COPS Law Enforcement Technology, UHP, CIS, and HSOP grant programs.\(^{76}\)

More specifically, the COPS Interoperable Communications Grant Program provides funding to local communities to help them develop effective interoperable communications systems for public safety and emergency service providers. The grant program funds projects that explore the use of equipment and technology to increase interoperability and data sharing amongst law enforcement, fire departments, and emergency medical services. From 2003-2005, the COPS program awarded over $242 million to 63 agencies across the nation to address the need to ensure interoperable communications. In 2003, for example, the City of New Orleans received a COPS grant for interoperable communications technology in the amount of $5,510,412; in 2004, the City of Shreveport and the Birmingham, Alabama Police Department received COPS grants for interoperable communications technology in the amount of $5,510,412; in 2005, the City of Baton Rouge Police Department and the Police Department in Mobile, Alabama received COPS grants for interoperable communications technology in the amounts of $5,999,184, and $3,000,000, respectively.\(^{77}\)

The $5,510,412 COPS interoperability grant awarded to the City of New Orleans in September 2003 initially was approved for one project. A year and a half later, however, the city requested approval to modify its original plan, and in May 2005, the COPS program office approved a new plan to build upon the Jefferson Parish 800 MHz radio system, and link four parishes (Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard and Plaquemines) together. As of September 2005, the City had spent only $275,428 of the $5,510,412 originally awarded in 2003.\(^{78}\)

“Technology is at the center of this, but most of the components required to achieve interoperability in the near-term already exist. However, it requires agreements, planning, and governance arrangements across jurisdictions.”

DAVID BOYD, Deputy Director, Office Systems Engineering & Development, DHS Testimony before U.S. Senate Sept. 29, 2005

Despite these awards (and other federal grants described in detail in Appendix 4 of this report), officials in Louisiana claim “austere financial circumstances” prevented the completion of the interoperability modifications of its communications system. New Orleans designed and purchased its M/A-Com 800 MHz radio communications system in 1992. The Louisiana State Police updated a different Motorola 800 MHz radio communications system in 1996, and while the two systems are capable of communicating, this requires special integration modifications to each system, and only is attempted, typically, for large events such as the 2002 Super Bowl held in New Orleans.\(^{79}\) Under normal circumstances, the City’s system is linked to the state’s system via a traditional T1 landline. As Greg Meffert, the New Orleans Chief Information Officer told Select Committee staff, the two systems’ interoperable capabilities are based on faulty assumptions. If the T1 lines are damaged, this destroys the connection between the systems.\(^{80}\) This is exactly what happened during Katrina. The city’s system went down after the system’s generators were flooded or damaged by flying debris. As noted by Ebbert in his testimony before the Select Committee, “there was no voice radio contact with surrounding parishes or state and federal agencies. Lives were put at risk and it created a direct operational impact on their ability to maintain control of the rapidly deteriorating situation within the city, carry out rescue efforts and control the evacuation of those people who had failed to heed the call for evacuation.”\(^{81}\)
Finding: The National Communications System met many of the challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina, enabling critical communication during the response, but gaps in the system did result in delayed response and inadequate delivery of relief supplies.

The federal government’s use of the National Communications System (NCS) prior to, during, and after Katrina’s landfall to coordinate assets and personnel proved effective, but like the efforts of the Gulf states, it too was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the damage left in Katrina’s wake.

Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy established the National Communications System by a Presidential Memorandum on August 21, 1963. On April 3, 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12472, which broadened the NCS’ national security and emergency preparedness capabilities and superseded President Kennedy’s original 1963 memorandum. The NCS expanded from its original six members to an interagency group of 23 federal departments and agencies, and began coordinating and planning NS/EP telecommunications for the federal government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstruction. As mandated by the Executive Order, the NCS also includes an industry component called the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), a joint industry-government body within the NCS. The operational mission of the NCC is coordination of restoring and reinstituting national security and emergency preparedness communications in an emergency situation. During Hurricane Katrina, the NCC operated a 24-hour watch center and conducted daily analysis and situational monitoring of ongoing events, and coordination of government and industry response capabilities.

In addition to the Executive Order, the NCS has a specific communications role in the National Response Plan (NRP). Specifically, the NCS is the lead agency responsible for the communications component of Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF 2), which “ensures the provision of Federal communications to Federal, State, local, tribal and private-sector response efforts during an Incident of National Significance.” In support of ESF 2, the NCC is tasked to function as a central point of coordination and information sharing among communications infrastructure operators.

To facilitate coordination of industry and government operations during an emergency, the NCS maintains and operates several priority service programs, which help ensure critical calls are completed in the event of congestion damage to the national commercial communications infrastructure. They include the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), which provides authorized users a higher rate of call completion during periods of outages or congestion resulting from disasters. During and after Hurricane Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000 new GETS access code numbers to first responders and emergency recovery officials in the affected states. Between August 28 and September 9, the GETS system was utilized to make over 35,000 calls. The NCS also operates a wireless counterpart to GETS, the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program. It provides priority treatment for calls made during periods of wireless network congestion by emergency response personnel with national security and emergency preparedness responsibilities. During Katrina, the NCS enabled and distributed over 4,000 WPS cellular phones.

In Gulfport, MS., video conferencing was used to coordinate disaster aid.
The NCS operates the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program, which establishes a regulatory, administrative and operational framework for restoring and provisioning priority communications services. Through this program, service vendors are authorized to give priority to restoration and provision of service to those with TSP assignments. Following Hurricane Katrina, the NCS completed more than 1,500 TSP assignments helping to restore emergency response capabilities in the Gulf states.

The NCS also maintains the Shared Resources High Frequency Radio Program (SHARES), which provides a single, interagency, voluntary message handling system using over 250 High Frequency (HF) radio frequencies when other communications are unavailable. A network of government, military, and Military Affiliate Radio Service (MARS) radio stations (an organized network of Amateur Radio stations affiliated with the different branches of the armed services to provide volunteer communications), and more than 90 federal, state, and private industry organizations participate in the SHARES program. Within days following Katrina’s landfall, the NCS coordinated participation by 431 SHARES stations across the nation and assisted first responders conducting search and rescue missions by relaying information to appropriate government agencies; relayed logistical and operational information between FEMA’s EOCs in Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana; relayed health and welfare messages between volunteer agencies in Georgia and the national headquarters of the American Red Cross in Washington, DC; established radio contact with deployed U.S. Navy ships detailed to New Orleans; and provided frequency coordination between federal agencies, Louisiana and Mississippi’s EOCs, and the Civil Air Patrol.

Additionally, the NCS coordinated the frequencies used by the nearly 1,000 Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) volunteers across the nation who served in the Katrina stricken area providing communications for government agencies, the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. Emergency communications were conducted not only by voice, but also by high-speed data transmissions using state-of-the art digital communications software known as WinLink. In Mississippi, FEMA dispatched Amateur Radio operators to hospitals, evacuation centers, and county EOCs to send emergency messaging 24 hours per day. According to Bay St. Louis Mayor Edward A. “Eddie” Favre, amateur radio operators were especially helpful in maintaining situational awareness and relaying Red Cross messages to and from the Hancock County EOC. At airports in Texas and Louisiana, radio amateurs tracked evacuees and notified families of their whereabouts. The Red Cross deployed amateur radio volunteers at its 250 shelter and feeding stations, principally in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. The Salvation Army operates its own Amateur Radio communications system using Amateur radio volunteers, known as SATERN. During the Hurricane Katrina response and recovery effort, SATERN joined forces with the SHARES program and received over 48,000 requests for emergency communications assistance utilizing federal frequencies made available via the SHARES program.

Following landfall, the NCS activated the SHARES network on August 29, and worked with The U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to identify and deploy communications assets, and by September 2, all NCS ESF 2 systems were in place to receive communications requests from the affected region. The NCS dispatched satellite communications vans to various locations, including New Orleans City Hall, the Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge, the New Orleans Airport, and the Louisiana National Guard in Jefferson Parish; dispatched AT&T and MCI cellular communication vans to the state EOCs in Mississippi and Louisiana; and identified and delivered satellite handsets to first responders in all three affected states. Additionally, the NCS designed and installed a new E-911 system in Plaquemines Parish, and provided an interim digital Land Mobile Radio system to the eight parishes surrounding New Orleans.

Like all levels of government, the NCS was not able to address all aspects of the damage to the communications networks.
infrastructure of the Gulf states. Although the NCS performed several important functions prior to and during the response efforts, the “historical magnitude of Hurricane Katrina stressed the processes and procedures of the NCS and required ESF 2 to perform functions . . . which it [had] never done before.”

Conclusion

The extent of destruction and damage to the communications infrastructure and services caused by Katrina exceeded that of any other natural disaster experienced by the Gulf coast states. Simply put, Katrina’s devastation overwhelmed government resources at all levels. The loss of power and the failure of various levels of government to adequately prepare for the ensuing and inevitable loss of communications hindered the response effort by compromising situational awareness and command and control operations.

Despite the devastation left by Katrina, this needn’t have been the case. Catastrophic disasters may have some unpredictable consequences, but losing power and the dependent communications systems after a hurricane should not be one of them. The parish officials in Louisiana who declined to spend $65 per month for satellite phones showed a failure of initiative when they gave up those assets. Why such a “penny wise-pound foolish” decision was allowed to stand defies explanation. The same satellite phones that were given up by some of the parishes eventually were returned to them after Katrina’s landfall because they had no other means of communicating with those bringing help to people in need. Similarly, those in the 911 call centers who could not reroute calls for help showed a failure of initiative by not taking the steps necessary to ensure calls to them were not in vain, simply because predictable things — power losses and flooding — happened after a hurricane.

Issues with interoperability have existed for years. Government officials and emergency service agencies are well aware of the need to establish and maintain robust emergency communications systems. Modern day National Guard units should not have to rely upon runners to relay messages. Governors should be able to communicate with their generals. Police commanders should be able to communicate with their officers in the street. Despite knowledge of interoperability problems and the seriousness of the consequences of failure to address them, and because of often parochial desires for duplicative, expensive, and diverse stand alone communications systems, officials responsible for providing for public safety spent millions on other priorities.

Disasters start and end at the local level. If first responders want interoperability with their counterparts in the future, their leaders need to communicate. Federal authorities need to establish standards. State and local officials need to take the initiative to make responsible use of federal, state and local funding to develop communications systems that can grow with their communities. These officials need to fulfill the public trust given to them. They need to lead.

COPS Office is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The COPS Office awards grants to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States so they can hire and train law enforcement officers to participate in community policing, purchase and deploy new crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test new and innovative policing strategies.

Id. at 1 (written statement of Benjamin J. Spraggins; Id. at 4 (written statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.).


Communication correspondence from Colonel Henry L. Whitehorn, Superintendent, LA State Police, to Select Comm. (Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Col. Whitehorn correspondence].


Col Whitehorn correspondence.

The COPS Office was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The mission of the COPS Office is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The COPS Office awards grants to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States so they can hire and train law enforcement officers to participate in community policing, purchase and deploy new crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test new and innovative policing strategies.


Id.

Interview (telephone) by Select Comm. Staff with Gilbert Moore, COPS Program External Affairs Office (Sept. 27, 2005).

Radio System Article.

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gregg Meffert, Chief Information Officer, City of New Orleans, in Wash., DC (Oct. 18, 2005).
The NCS began in 1962 after the Cuban missile crisis when communications problems among the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and foreign heads of state threatened to complicate the crisis further. After the crisis, President John F. Kennedy ordered an investigation of national security communications, and the National Security Council (NSC) formed an interdepartmental committee to examine the communications networks and institute changes. This interdepartmental committee recommended the formation of a single unified communications system to serve the President, Department of Defense, diplomatic and intelligence activities, and civilian leaders in order to provide better communications support to critical government functions during emergencies. The NCS mandate included linking, improving, and extending the communications facilities and components of various federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity and survivability. See NCS website: http://www.ncs.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
“Natural disasters will always be chaotic situations. But with proper planning and preparation, it is possible to respond quickly to restore order and begin recovery efforts.”

Bob Riley
Governor, State of Alabama
Select Committee hearing, November 9, 2005
Command and Control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief

Summary

Command and control are key aspects of emergency management, and the federal government has taken several steps, most notably developing an Incident Command System (ICS), to promote unity of command among local, state, and federal authorities. However, during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, there were lapses in command and control within each level of government, and between the three levels of government.

One of the factors that impaired command and control was the lack of communications and situational awareness. While the reasons for these deficiencies were detailed previously (see the COMMUNICATIONS chapter), their impact was to paralyze normal command and control mechanisms. Local governments in many locations in Louisiana and Mississippi lost all communications capabilities for some period. This prevented them from communicating their situation and needs to the state level.

The state EOC in Louisiana experienced its own communications problems. State officials in the EOC could not reliably communicate with local officials, other state officials, or federal officials. Similarly, the federal government lost some communications, and initial efforts to bring in supplemental capabilities to improve command and control were unsuccessful. Other key factors that impaired command and control can be traced to a lack of sufficient qualified personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding.

The lack of effective command and control, and its impact on unity of command, degraded the relief efforts. Delays and otherwise poor assistance efforts caused by a lack of command and control are documented in this and other chapters. They include:

- delayed and duplicative efforts to plan for and carry out post landfall evacuations at the Superdome;
- uncoordinated search and rescue efforts that resulted in residents being left for days without food and water;
- separate military commands for the National Guard and Department of Defense (DOD) active duty troops;
- confusion over deliveries of commodities because some officials diverted trucks and supplies without coordination with others;
lack of clarity as to who was assisting hospitals to evacuate; and
■ the collapse of the New Orleans Police Department and its ability to maintain law and order.

Finding: Command and Control was impaired at all levels of government

Command and control are key aspects of emergency management

Command and control are key aspects of emergency management, and the federal government has taken several steps to promote unity of command among local, state, and federal authorities. For example, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was developed in 2004 to enable all responders, regardless of jurisdictions or discipline, to effectively and efficiently work together. The NIMS “provides a nationwide template enabling federal, state, local, and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”

In addition, NIMS incorporated the ICS, which has been in existence since the early 1970s. ICS is the standardizing scalable concept designed to provide for an integrated and organized structure while eliminating jurisdictional boundaries. The National Response Plan (NRP) calls for the implementation of NIMS and the ICS upon activation of the NRP to ensure maximum flexibility of operation during the situation at hand.

Optimal levels of coordination occur when there is unity of command, unity of effort, and an accepted chain of command. Unity of effort encompasses the concept that all parties to a mission should be focused upon the same agreed-to objectives and should work together to achieve them. Unity of command is the concept that an individual has only one superior to whom he or she is directly responsible, creating a clear line of supervision and control.

Chain of command furthers the concept of unity of command, creating a line of authority from the lowest ranking individual to those in command, establishing a highly effective and efficient system. It requires that orders are given only to those directly below an individual in the chain of command and orders are received from only those directly superior in the chain of command. Those at the appropriate level in the chain of command can then, as authorized, coordinate their activities with peers in their partner organizations.

Many local governments lost command centers or otherwise could not establish unity of command

Achieving unity of command — with local, state, and federal authorities all acting together seamlessly to plan and conduct emergency operations — is often a challenge during a major disaster. It was particularly so when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Local governments’ command and control was often paralyzed by the complete destruction of their entire emergency management infrastructure.

In Alabama, local counties had the least problems with command and control. Because Katrina turned to the west and hit Mississippi and Louisiana the hardest, Alabama counties were able to maintain their emergency management infrastructure. Both Baldwin and Mobile counties still had operating EOCs and generally were able to stay in contact with the state EOC.
In Mississippi, there was a massive storm surge that destroyed government facilities, making it very difficult for the local communities to establish command and control. According to FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for Mississippi, Bill Carwile, much of the emergency management and public safety infrastructure was destroyed in the coastal counties. Mayor of Waveland Tommy Longo said the city staged at various points around the city some of the resources it expected to need to respond to the storm’s damage, and it also staged some of these resources about 10 miles north of the city as a backup in the event of a catastrophic event. Despite the city’s preparations, the hurricane destroyed these resources. The storm decimated all of Waveland’s public buildings, severely limiting its ability to provide command and control and to mount a response to the storm.

Similarly, Hancock County lost its EOC—the location from which it expected to provide command and control for the county’s response to the storm—because of severe flooding early on in the hurricane. Pearl River County also lost its EOC in the early hours of the storm due to wind and water damage that knocked out its emergency backup generator and caused other damage, making the center inoperable.

In Louisiana, there was a similar level of destruction to the basic emergency management infrastructure at the parish level. Many of the parish EOCs and public safety facilities were wiped out or flooded. While Jefferson Parish was hard hit, it was in better shape to respond because it had protected its EOC. Jefferson Parish Emergency Manager Dr. Walter Maestri explained the EOC was in a hardened facility — an old incinerator with cement walls — with the command center, living quarters, and emergency generator all on upper floors. While the EOC suffered immediate problems with communications being down, and it eventually had a shortage of fuel for its generator, it was able to keep operating at some level.

Lack of command and control was particularly a problem in New Orleans. The authorities in the city lost their command and control facilities after the levee breaches and subsequent flooding. The city abandoned its EOC when City Hall was flooded and the emergency generator was flooded, cutting out power. As discussed in more detail in the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter, the New Orleans Police Department headquarters and district stations were flooded, crippling command and control for that department. Similarly, the Louisiana National Guard, with headquarters at Jackson Barracks in New Orleans, lost its command and control due to flooding and had to abandon its operations center and re-establish it in an elevated parking structure at the Superdome. According to Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, “Jackson Barracks flooded at the most inopportune time, and he [Major General Landreneau—the Louisiana Adjutant General] had to relocate in the middle of trying to gain situational awareness and coordinate the response.” Thus, in New Orleans, for at least some period of time, emergency managers, the police, and the military lost command and control over their own personnel and lost unity of command with the other local, state, and federal agencies that needed to be involved in the relief efforts.

Even where there was still some infrastructure in place and communications were less of a problem, local command and control suffered from lack of clarity. The most notable example of this was at the Superdome in New Orleans. Although there were both National Guard and New Orleans Police Department officials on site to physically establish a unified command and personally talk to each other face to face, there was no consensus on who was in charge. Louisiana National Guard officers who ran security operations at the Superdome, Colonel Mark Mouton and LtC. Jacques Thibodeaux said the New Orleans Police Department had the lead for command and control. They stated that the National Guard was in support of the police. These statements directly conflict with New Orleans Police Department comments that the National Guard had the lead for command and control at the Superdome. Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain, the senior New Orleans Police Department officer at the Superdome, said the National Guard always had the lead for command and control at the Superdome and the police were there in support of the military. In support of this position, New Orleans officials said the Superdome was a state facility, so a state agency (the National Guard) would naturally be in charge.

One FEMA official, Deputy FCO Scott Wells, also said there was no clear unity of command at the Superdome.
He said he arrived there on Wednesday, August 31, and when he tried to contact the leadership at the location to coordinate FEMA activities, he found “nobody in charge, and no unified command.” For example, he said there was no organization or structure to collect requests, prioritize them, and pass them on to the next appropriate echelon. He described the conditions as “chaotic” and said there appeared to be no one planning the next steps.

The Cloverleaf was another location in New Orleans where the command and control structure was unclear. Louisiana State Police officials Ralph Mitchell and Joseph Booth stated that one government agency (they did not know which one) set up a medical triage and treatment center at the Cloverleaf on Wednesday, August 31.

Crowds grew there as people came to the dry land on their own accord or were dropped off by the helicopters or boats that rescued them from the water.

On Thursday, September 1, medical patients were evacuated, but the rest of the crowd grew to about 6,000-7,000 people. By Thursday afternoon and evening, the crowd started getting restless. At one time, there were 60 state police officers there, in addition to National Guard troops. The two officials — who had been on site — said they did not know who was in charge of command and control or which agency had set up the medical triage center there in the first place. Later on Thursday night and Friday morning, some relief came from FEMA and the National Guard, and the Cloverleaf was completely cleared by Saturday, September 3.

The Convention Center, discussed in more detail in the EVACUATION chapter, suffered from no official presence at all. There was not even an attempt to establish command and control there until the rescue mission arrived on Friday, September 2 (four days after landfall).

While there may have been some type of command structures set up at both the Superdome and the Cloverleaf, they do not appear to have been effective. The fact that the senior officials who were stationed at or visiting these locations disagreed on who was in charge, could not find out who was in charge, or did not know who was in charge, shows there was a significant lapse in command and control and demonstrates there was little unity of command at these locations in New Orleans.

State government unity of command was impaired by the magnitude of Katrina and other operational factors

While state command and control facilities (such as their EOCs) were generally intact after landfall, the magnitude of the storm and a variety of operational factors impaired their unity of command.

Again, Alabama encountered the fewest command and control problems because it was least affected by Katrina. According to Alabama Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Director Bruce Baughman, the state EOC was up and running, with effective command and control throughout the hurricane and its aftermath. Unlike Louisiana (discussed below) where the parishes and EOC lost use of their emergency management software, Alabama used its software effectively. The software, known as “EM 2000,” was used by county EOCs to send requests for assistance and by the state EOC to task appropriate state or federal agencies and to track the status. Select Committee staff were able to review the EM 2000 database and confirm the system was effectively used to track and close out many of the local requests.

Many examples demonstrate the effectiveness of Alabama’s EOC and the EM 2000 system. On August 29 at 9:30 p.m. the Mobile Police Department requested vehicles for search and rescue operations. This task was marked complete in the EM 2000 database in a little over one hour at 10:41 p.m. Earlier on August 29, Baughman ordered 40 truck loads of ice and 40 truck loads of water from Lipsey Water. This task was marked complete by 2:00 p.m. the next day. At 6:41 p.m. on August 29, Baldwin County EMA requested, through EM 2000, five generators for use at water wells. This task was marked complete at 9:16 a.m. the next morning.

When some FEMA requests were made, however, they were not immediately addressed. On August 29, Mobile
County EMA Director Walter Dickerson requested two FEMA operations personnel and two FEMA logistics personnel to augment his staff. This need was not addressed until September 21. Similarly, on August 30, when Monroe County requested shelter supplies from FEMA, it had to wait for six days for the task to be closed. 150 cots were needed in addition to a self-contained shower and bath trailer.

The Select Committee encountered severe disagreements about whether the State of Louisiana maintained effective unity of command. Some FEMA officials were very critical of Louisiana’s command and control. Michael Brown, Director of FEMA during Katrina, called the state of Louisiana “dysfunctional” and said it did not have unity of command. Brown cited this as one of the main reasons for delays in relief efforts in Louisiana and New Orleans.

In addition, Wells said there was no unity of command in the EOC. Wells was particularly critical of the state for not practicing unity of command with the federal government’s planning and coordination efforts. Wells said state officials were “preoccupied with the evacuation” and would not participate in critical pre-landfall “hasty” planning in other areas such as (1) search and rescue, (2) rapid assessment teams, (3) medical evacuation, (4) sheltering and temporary housing, (5) commodity distribution, and (6) debris removal.

According to Wells, these “hasty plans” would have helped guide the course of activities for the first couple of days after landfall, when situational awareness was weak and before more deliberate planning could take place. FEMA went ahead and developed the hasty plans, but without the benefit of state EOC personnel participating. He said such state personnel should have participated because they had expertise in state and local conditions and capabilities.

The only exception to this was the commodity distribution hasty plan. Wells said that was the only plan the state worked with FEMA to develop before landfall. As another example, Wells cited the incident where the Louisiana Adjutant General requested DOD active duty forces directly without going through or even notifying FEMA. Instead of practicing unity of command, Wells said the state bypassed FEMA for federal assistance, then later complained FEMA did not know what was going on, and that FEMA could not coordinate the federal effort.

Other FEMA officials were not as harsh in their criticisms of Louisiana. Bill Lokey, the FEMA FCO in the state EOC, said there was at least a minimum level of command and control and unity of command, to the extent the various parties were working together to set common priorities for common objectives. Lokey attributed any lack of unity of command and control to a variety of operational factors (detailed below) and the catastrophic nature of the event.

Similarly, another FEMA official who was in the EOC and in New Orleans, Deputy FCO Phil Parr, said some level of chaos occurs in any disaster, so it was not particularly unusual that the EOC seemed chaotic under the circumstances. As discussed in the next section, Lokey and Parr both stated that not only was the state government overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, but the federal government was overwhelmed as well.

Louisiana state officials, including State Coordinating Officer (SCO) Jeff Smith, countered FEMA criticisms by saying the EOC was fully functional. Smith said it was always clear who was in charge at the EOC: the SCO.

Michael Brown, Director of FEMA during Katrina, called the state of Louisiana “dysfunctional” and said it did not have unity of command.
He also maintained the EOC and the state did maintain unity of command. In response to then-FEMA Director Brown’s comment that he arrived at the EOC and could not figure out who was in charge, Smith said that such comments were "just plain bull." Smith stated — and Lokey concurred — that the SCO and FCO worked closely together throughout the crisis. Smith also provided the Select Committee with a photo taken during the crisis of Lokey and Smith together in the EOC. According to Smith, “if FEMA Director Michael Brown had wanted to find out who was in charge of the EOC, all he had to do was find his FEMA FCO, because I was standing right next to him.”

The Select Committee attempted to make an independent determination of the effectiveness of command and control in the EOC by listening to conference calls between the EOC and parishes. Based on a review of pre-landfall conference calls, the EOC appeared to be organized and unified to the limited extent this could be determined through these calls. For example, the SCO was clearly in charge of coordinating state and parish activities and managing all discussions and decisions in an orderly and logical fashion. Participation in the calls was very broad, to include multiple state agencies, more than a dozen key parishes, federal agencies, other states, and the American Red Cross. In addition, every organization got its opportunity to talk, and there was time for each organization to ask questions. It appeared pre-landfall decisions and issues were fully vetted among the participants. However, these conference calls do not cover the period just after landfall — the most critical and challenging time for establishing and maintaining command and control.

Despite the disagreements over the degree of effective command and control in the state EOC, federal and state officials both cited several operational factors that made unity of command difficult to maintain. Among the most significant factors were a lack of communications and situational awareness and a lack of sufficient qualified personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding. These are described later in this chapter as separate findings. The other operational factors impairing command and control in the state EOC, described by a number of federal and state officials, included the following:

- **Katrina’s late turn toward Louisiana**: State officials indicated that Katrina had taken a “dramatic shift” toward Louisiana on Friday (August 26). They said they were not fully aware of the situation until Saturday and were therefore not as prepared as they otherwise would have been.
- **Overwhelming number of requests**: The size of Katrina and the destruction she wrought was immense, including the flooding of New Orleans and subsequent problems with security and the post-landfall evacuation. All of these circumstances led to an overwhelming number of requests for assistance.
- **Overcrowding in the EOC**: The EOC building and main room were very crowded by the large contingent of state and federal officials. The EOC main room has a capacity of about 50 people, but there were about 200 people. The EOC building as a whole was also overcrowded with about 750-1,000 people in it. There were only 12 Emergency Support Function (ESF) rooms for 15 ESFs. State officials cited the size of the current Joint Field Office (JFO) (in an old department store with thousands of staff) as an indication of the amount of physical space and number of people needed to run an operation the size of Katrina.
- **EOC Information Technology was overloaded**: The Information Technology system was overloaded by the number of additional computers logged in and the volume of information processed. This was slowing down and destabilizing the system, and officials had to add two servers in the middle of the response.
- **Deviation from normal procedures**: Due to the overwhelming number of requests and degraded

![Image of people in the EOC](image-url)
communications, officials had to deviate from normal procedures for requesting assistance. The federal government contributed to this problem by also deviating from normal procedures. Specifically, other federal agencies tasked FEMA directly rather than putting requests to the parishes in the first place so they could go through the normal process (e.g., from the parish to the state and then to FEMA to be mission-assigned to other federal agencies.)

**Freelancing by other federal, state, and local agencies:** State officials said, and a FEMA official confirmed, that federal agencies were “freelancing,” or just showing up without coordinating with the appropriate authorities at FEMA or the state. They would bypass the command structure and just appear in the EOC. In addition, several freelancers showed up from other state and local agencies, again, without coordinating with the appropriate authorities. They too would just appear in the EOC not knowing what to do.

**Visits by politicians and celebrities:** Several elected officials from the state and national levels showed up in the EOC. While they just wanted to see what was going on and were trying to help, their presence distracted the EOC personnel. There were similar visits by celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey and Sean Penn. Most visits by elected officials and celebrities had large media crews covering them, further distracting the EOC personnel from their more urgent tasks.

State officials who directed operations in the EOC — Col. William Doran and Mr. Jim Ballou — noted that with all of these operational factors, it would be easy for an outsider to conclude the EOC was a chaotic place. In response to criticism from FEMA’s Michael Brown, these two state officials (as well as the SCO Smith) said some level of confusion was to be expected in the EOC under the circumstances. They said FEMA should have been more sympathetic and provided more assistance when it was clear Louisiana was overwhelmed by the size of Katrina’s devastation.

**Federal government also lacked unity of command across and within agencies**

Like the states, the federal government also struggled to maintain unity of command across and within agencies. According to Louisiana SCO Smith, the federal government did not follow its own plan, the NRP, which calls for a unified command. In his prepared statement before the Select Committee, Smith stated “[a]nyone who was there, anyone who chose to look, would realize that there were literally three separate Federal commands.” Smith’s statement goes on to describe these three separate command structures:

- **FCO and Joint Field Office (JFO):** This was the unified joint command with the FCO (Lokey) and SCO (Smith) located initially at the state EOC, then moved to the Joint Field Office (in the old department store) once that was established. The FCO, by doctrine, is the individual that is supposed to be in charge of all federal response operations, and only the FCO has the authority to obligate federal funds.

- **Principal Federal Official (PFO):** Smith said that “[t]he Primary [sic] Federal Officer (PFO) by doctrine is not supposed to be an operational person directly involved in response activities . . . . The PFO in Katrina went operational and began directing and guiding response operations and to a large degree left out the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).” This was inconsistent with the NRP: “The PFO cell was operating on its own, communicating directly with the Governor, communicating directly with the Mayor of New Orleans and a myriad of other local elected officials,” Smith said.

- **Joint Task Force Katrina:** This command was intended to serve DOD active duty forces. According to Smith, “[w]henever the task force commander of Hurricane Katrina, General Honoré, came onto the scene, he was also operating independently with little regard whatsoever for the Joint Field Office, which should have been the only unified command.”

The Select Committee found ample evidence supporting the view that the federal government did not have a unified command. For example, FEMA officials Lokey and Wells supported Smith’s position, saying the PFO was not supposed to have an operational role and
was not supposed to bypass the FCO. They stated the initial PFO, Michael Brown, followed protocol. However, the second PFO, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, immediately began directing operations and established a separate command in New Orleans, set apart from the SCO and FCO in the Joint Field Office. Both FEMA officials said Allen’s direction of operations as a PFO exceeded his authorities as enumerated in the Stafford Act.

Eventually Allen was appointed FCO in addition to PFO. As Smith noted, “DHS in essence acknowledges that there was a problem … when DHS appointed the PFO as the FCO as well. DHS discovered the PFO did not have the authority to obligate money. Only the FCO has authority to obligate money.” This issue also arose in an April 2005 national level exercise sponsored by DHS called TOPOFF 3, where there was confusion over the different roles and responsibilities performed by the PFO and FCO. The PFO issue is also discussed in detail in the NATIONAL FRAMEWORK chapter.

FEMA officials also acknowledged that DOD frequently acted on its own, outside the established unified command. Lokey said Honoré was directing activities from his JTF Katrina command ship (the USS Iwo Jima, docked pier-side in Orleans) without coordinating with the FCO at the state EOC and later the Joint Field Office. He said Honoré, like the PFO was coordinating directly with local parishes and was accepting taskings from them, which violated established federal protocols. Requests for assistance are supposed to go from the local level, to the state SCO, then to the FEMA FCO, and if appropriate, then to the Defense Coordinating Officer for DOD support. Some may forgive Honoré for bypassing this process because it was broken and therefore unworkable after Katrina (as we discuss in the NATIONAL FRAMEWORK chapter). In fact, Lokey praised Honoré for “doing what had to be done to get things moving.” However, one of the results of Honoré’s modus operandi of acting independently was further impairing FEMA’s ability to maintain unity of command across the federal government. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale testified that “[m]ilitary command and control was workable, but not unified.” Additional difficulties between FEMA and DOD are discussed in the MILITARY chapter.

In addition to the problems with establishing and maintaining a unified command with DOD, FEMA struggled to establish a unified command with other organizations within DHS. According to Wells, the Coast Guard did not fuse their command in the search and rescue operation with the state and FEMA. Wells stated that for “the U.S. Coast Guard, who had junior officer representation but no authority to direct search and rescue air operations, all operations were directed by senior Coast Guard officers from another location. These officers refused to meet and conduct joint search and rescue operations with FEMA and state agencies.” Captain Bruce Jones, the Coast Guard officer in charge of air operations, commented that airborne search and rescue was sufficiently coordinated between the Louisiana National Guard’s Task Force Eagle at the Superdome and the Coast Guard’s air operations center at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station and that having two incident commands was an effective way to divide the work load. Regardless of the positive outcome of saving lives, there was not unity of command across the function of search and rescue.

In addition to its problems coordinating with other federal agencies, FEMA had problems coordinating its own activities. Because most communications systems were impaired, Lokey could not talk directly with his advance team leader in New Orleans, Parr. Thus, they were unable to coordinate their activities. As another example, Lokey and his staff in the EOC did not know another FEMA official, Marty Bahamonde, was in New Orleans during and immediately after landfall until they were informed by FEMA headquarters on late Monday, August 29. Before that time, they did not even know Bahamonde was there or what his function was. More generally, Lokey said the federal government and particularly FEMA, were overwhelmed. Overwhelmed organizations cannot achieve unity of command.

Louisiana EOC conference calls provide additional evidence there was a lack of coordination within FEMA. Once emergency communications were restored and the Louisiana EOC restarted its conference calls with the
parishes on September 9, it was clear FEMA activities were not well-coordinated. The September 9 call recorded a discussion in which Smith stated FEMA’s “right hand is not always knowing what the left hand is doing.”92

Parish officials agreed with this assessment and provided several examples. They noted the local FEMA representatives (situated in the parish EOCs) were working hard to resolve their problems, but that “other FEMA people just keep showing up.”93 The call indicates some FEMA officials were making commitments to various local elected officials, without coordinating with the FEMA FCO, the state EOC, or the parish EOC. One parish official said this situation was “creating downright chaos.”94

Temporary housing was cited as a particular area where FEMA coordination was unacceptable to the state and parishes. According to Smith, a FEMA regional housing team was not coordinating with the JFO. Smith said he “blew his top” that morning because these FEMA regional officials were bypassing the state and parish EOC process in planning for temporary housing. FEMA needs to have appropriate state and parish representatives involved in any FEMA discussions of temporary housing, he said. Smith told the parishes the FEMA FCO needs to “ride herd” on the FEMA regional housing group so they follow established procedures.95

Finding: Lack of communications and situational awareness paralyzed command and control

Localities, without communications, could not participate in unified command

One of the key factors that impaired command and control was the lack of communications and situational awareness. While the reasons for these deficiencies were detailed previously (see the COMMUNICATIONS chapter), their impact was to paralyze normal command and control mechanisms. Many local governments in Mississippi and Louisiana lost all communications capabilities for some period. This prevented them from communicating their situation to the state level.

Alabama, as noted before in this chapter and the COMMUNICATIONS CHAPTER, experienced relatively few communications problems. Federal and state officials alike concluded their communications capacity functioned well during their response to Katrina.96 The Alabama EMA has various communications redundancy programs to ensure that it maintains a high level of connectedness throughout the state. The EOC has equipment and trained personnel to communicate over all types of communications networks, including satellite, 800 MHz digital phone service, amateur radio, and others. Communications systems and capabilities are viewed by AEMA staff as a strength, and during Katrina, this redundancy proved effective. That said, the goal of true interoperability within and among county emergency response and law enforcement agencies remains elusive since each county has its own authority and timetable to procure communications technology.97

In Mississippi, most land-based communications systems, including cellular phones, were inoperable. According to Mississippi’s EMA Director, Robert Latham, voice and data systems statewide were also inoperable.98 As a result, often the only communications capability present in Mississippi — for both the state EMA as well as the affected counties — was through satellite phones and

FEMA STAFF PHOTO

FEMA STAFF PHOTO
radios, which operate by connecting to satellites rather than routing calls through land-based lines or cellular towers. Despite FEMA efforts to bring in additional communications capabilities to the affected counties’ EOCs, Carwile reported that communications capabilities were far short of what was needed to be effective.99

To illustrate the problem in Louisiana, the EOC uses conference calls as a way to provide command and control and ensure unity of effort among the state and effected parishes. However, after the conference call during landfall on Monday morning, August 29, the parishes lost their communications capabilities and were unable to convene another conference call until 11 days later, on Friday, September 9.100 Even then, the participants in the conference call noted that it was still hard to make regular phone calls.101

State of Louisiana officials lost local input to unified command, and were unreachable for coordinating activities

The state EOC in Louisiana experienced its own communications problems, with officials in the EOC unable to communicate reliably with local officials, other state officials, or federal officials.102 In one conference call, Smith noted that part of the problem was the state EOC had not been wired for the volume of communications required for a major catastrophe.103 Many e-mails noted the difficulty of communicating with the state EOC. As one example, a U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) e-mail that laid out the procedures for requesting DOD assistance through the Defense Coordinating Officer in the EOC also emphasized the EOC telephone appeared to be continuously busy.104

Federal government also lost communications and failed in initial efforts to improve command and control

Similarly, the federal government lost some communications, and initial efforts to bring in supplemental capabilities to improve command and control were unsuccessful. For example, FEMA has a mobile command and control suite, named Red October, which is housed in an oversized tractor trailer.105 Lokey and his staff said during Hurricane Katrina, Red October was pre-deployed to Shreveport, in northern Louisiana, to keep it out of harm’s way but also to allow rapid movement into Baton Rouge or New Orleans after the hurricane passed.106 Red October, once deployed and opened up, had a command and control suite with about 30 work stations and robust communications.

As the situation unfolded in New Orleans, and the flooding destroyed much of the command and control capability of the city, FEMA officials decided to move Red October to New Orleans to provide on-site command and control to its advance team and to help connect with New Orleans and National Guard authorities at the Superdome.107 However, while some tractor trailers were able to get into the flooded city, Red October was unable to do so because of its oversized dimensions. Other FEMA communications vehicles, such as the Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments, noted in the COMMUNICATIONS chapter, were not capable of driving through the floodwaters without damaging their sensitive electronic equipment. Therefore, FEMA was unable to use these to restore command and control with its forward team in New Orleans, led by Parr.108

Finding: A lack of personnel, training, and funding also weakened command and control

A lack of sufficient personnel hindered command and control

The lack of trained, professional personnel at both the state and federal level greatly hindered the response. According to FEMA, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) had an inadequate staff, both in numbers and training. “There were too few professional staff” provided by the state, according to Wells.109 The FCO Operations Chief, Tony Robinson, agreed, saying the EOC had only 40 full-time trained staff, leaving only 20 staff to operate in 12 hour shifts.110 Twenty people were far too few to run the EOC during a large disaster and the state should have developed a surge capacity, Robinson said.111

Wells said LOHSEP’s supplemental staff were inadequately trained, and LOHSEP relied too heavily on the Louisiana National Guard troops to work the EOC.112
He characterized the guardsmen as well meaning but not trained to be professional emergency managers. Wells cited this as one of reasons the state EOC personnel did not understand the unified command under the ICS. Robinson also said the ability to effectively operate decreased as the state’s cadre of professional emergency managers was augmented by these inexperienced guardsmen. FEMA was also significantly short on available trained staff to send into the field. Finally, Wells stated that “[w]e did not have the people. We did not have the expertise. We did not have the operational training folks that we needed to do our mission.”

A lack of training also hindered command and control

In Louisiana the lack of adequately trained personnel was also a major impediment to utilizing ICS and achieving effective command and control over state and federal resources. Wells said the state personnel lacked overall discipline, lacked clear control lines of authority, lacked a clearly understood command structure, and lacked consistency in operational procedures. “If people don’t understand ICS, we can’t do ICS. And if we can’t do ICS, we cannot manage disasters,” he stated in testimony before the Senate.

Valuable time and resources were expended to provide on-the-job training in ICS to state personnel assigned to the emergency operations center in Baton Rouge. Wells noted that state officials hired a consultant to teach their EOC staff about ICS after landfall. Specifically, the state hired former FEMA Director James Lee Witt as a consultant, and one of Witt’s staff (a former FCO) was training the state staff in the EOC on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 30 and 31. Wells said it was ridiculous to try to teach unified command after the hurricane had hit when everyone in the EOC should have already known it by then; at that point, it was too late, and the training created additional confusion in the EOC, Wells said.

In Mississippi, ICS issues were less of a problem. According to Carwile, “[t]here had been training previous to Hurricane Katrina by the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency on down to the county emergency managers. So, it worked well.”

Inadequate funding cited as reason for inadequate personnel and training

As addressed more fully in the FEMA PREPAREDNESS chapter, the lack of adequate staff and insufficient training are directly attributable to limited funding for FEMA operations. For example, the funding for training exercises is, and has been deficient. This is evident in the lack of coordination of FEMA staff. According to Carwile, training funding for national emergency response teams dried up in 2003. Teams sent to the Gulf coast never had an opportunity to train together beforehand. Prior to activation, the teams were nothing more than names on rosters. This contributed greatly to the inefficient and timely delays in the initial federal response. Senator Joe Lieberman described the training and funding issues as “a FEMA disaster waiting to happen because we weren’t giving [FEMA] the resources to get ready for this.”

Senator Joe Lieberman described the training and funding issues as “a FEMA disaster waiting to happen because we weren’t giving [FEMA] the resources to get ready for this.”

Finding: Ineffective command and control delayed many relief efforts

The lack of effective command and control, and its impact on unity of command, degraded the relief efforts. Moreover, the problems experienced individually by the local, state, and federal governments exacerbated the challenges of coordinating across all levels of government and prevented overall unity of command.

The evacuation of the Superdome provided one of the clearest examples of how ineffective command and control and the lack of unity of command hindered urgently needed relief. It was planned multiple times by different parties. On the day after Katrina’s landfall, Parr worked with the Louisiana National Guard to devise a
plan for evacuating the Superdome through the use of Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters.\textsuperscript{127} After working through most the night, the plan was ready for execution Wednesday morning. Parr and the Louisiana National Guard officer working with him estimated it would take 30 hours to completely evacuate the Superdome. However, earlier that day Blanco had instructed Landreneau of the Guard to contact Honoré of Northern Command to arrange for active duty military support of response operations in Louisiana.\textsuperscript{128}

This request was made outside the unified command and without the knowledge of FEMA and Parr. During the early morning hours of Wednesday, Landreneau instructed Louisiana National Guard officials at the Superdome to cease planning for the evacuation as Honoré would be “taking charge” of the evacuation project, thus bypassing the unified command and requirements that state requests to federal agencies go through FEMA to further coordinate and limit duplication.\textsuperscript{129} Parr said this resulted in the evacuation of the Superdome population 24 hours later than would have occurred under the joint National Guard / FEMA plan put together at the Superdome.\textsuperscript{130}

Other delays and poor assistance efforts caused by a lack of command and control, mainly in Louisiana, include:

- Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue efforts were uncoordinated. During the critical first days after Katrina and the flooding, there was no unity of command between the various local, state, and federal agencies participating in search and rescue efforts. While heroic efforts by these agencies immediately saved lives, there was little coordination of where the victims should be or actually were taken. This resulted in victims being left in shelters or out in the open on high ground for days without food and water. For more details, see the EVACUATION chapter.
Military Support. Much of the military support was also uncoordinated. The Louisiana National Guard and DOD active duty forces, under Joint Task Force Katrina, were under separate commands. Federal attempts to bring them under the same command were rejected by the Governor. This resulted in delays in the arrival of DOD active duty troops—troops that provided a robust reservoir of manpower and a wide array of capabilities. For more details, see the MILITARY chapter.

Medical Evacuations. There was confusion over which agencies or personnel were supposed to assist with hospital evacuations. Hospitals reported that Army and FEMA officials came and surveyed the situation and never returned despite saying that they would. This resulted in delays in evacuating patients, with sometimes fatal consequences. For more details, see the MEDICAL CARE chapter.

Lawlessness in New Orleans. The New Orleans Police Department, in addition to losing hundreds of its personnel who did not report to duty, lost command and control over those that still reported to work. This resulted in delays in determining where problems were, dispatching officers to those locations, and otherwise planning and prioritizing operations to restore law and order. For more details, see the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter.

Conclusion

In responding to Hurricane Katrina, elements of federal, state, and local governments lacked command, lacked control, and certainly lacked unity. Some of the reasons for this can be traced back to the magnitude of the storm, which destroyed the communications systems that are so vital to effective command and control. In addition, the magnitude of the storm created so much damage across such a wide area that it overwhelmed agencies and individuals who were struggling to mount an organized response.

But some of the lapses in command and control can be traced back to agencies and individuals demonstrating a failure of initiative to better protect their command and control facilities, better clarify command and control relationships on location, and better follow established protocols for ensuring unity of command. This problem of not following protocols is summed up well in a recent DHS-IG report on an exercise involving federal, state, and local governments: all levels of government have “a fundamental lack of understanding for the principals and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”

Finally, to some degree, lapses in command and control can be traced to a lack of sufficient qualified personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding. In total, these factors paralyzed command and control, leading to an agonizingly disjointed and slow response to the disaster.
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2 Id. at 66.

3 Id. at 1.

4 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Leigh Anne Ryals, Emergency Manager, Baldwin County [hereinafter Ryals Interview], in Washington, DC, via telephone from AL (Oct. 25, 2005); see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Walter Dickerson, Emergency Manager, Mobile County [hereinafter Dickerson Interview], in Washington, D.C., via telephone from AL (Oct. 25, 2005).


6 Id. at 125-127 (statement of Steve Longo).

7 Id.

8 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Hootie Adams, Director, Emergency Management for Hancock County, MS, in Hancock County, MS (Oct. 14, 2005).

9 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Director, Pearl River County Emergency Management Agency, in Washington, D.C., via telephone from MS (Nov. 29, 2005).


11 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005).

12 Id.

13 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Rex Macdonald, Information and Technology and Communications Director, Department of Public Safety and Corrections [hereinafter Macdonald Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans [hereinafter Ebbert Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).

14 Macdonald Interview; see also Ebbert Interview.


16 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) at 194 (statement of H. Steven Blum) [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].

17 See Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview.

18 Id.

19 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lonnie Swain, Deputy Chief New Orleans Police Department [hereinafter Swain Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).

20 Ebbert Interview.

21 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy Fed. Coordinating Officer, FEMA [hereinafter Wells Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).

22 Id.

23 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Ralph Mitchell, LA State Police [hereinafter Nov. 4, 2005 Mitchell Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Joseph Booth, LA State Police [hereinafter Booth Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005).

24 Mitchell Interview; see also Booth Interview.

25 Id.

26 See Thibodeaux Interview; Swain Interview.

27 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, AL Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter Baughman Interview], in Clancy, AL (Oct. 11, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Tranter, General Counsel for AL Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter Tranter Interview], Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005).


34 Id.

35 Wells Interview.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id.

41 Id.

Lokey Interview; see also Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 229-230 (statement of Bill Lokey).

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Phil Parr, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Officer, FEMA [hereinafter Parr Interview], in Washington, DC (Dec. 6, 2005).

Lokey Interview; see also Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 196 (statement of Phil Parr).

See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LTC William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LA Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness [LOHSEP] [hereinafter Doran Interview]; see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jim Ballou, Operations Division, LA Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness [LOHSEP] [hereinafter Ballou Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005); see also Smith Interview.

Smith Interview.

Id.

Smith Interview; see also Lokey Interview.


Smith Interview.


Id.

Id.

Id.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview.

Id. see also Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview.

Id.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Parr Interview.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

Nicole Bode, Sean Penn Gets into Rescue Act, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.) (Sept. 8, 2005) at 6; Ryan Parry, 150 Hurricane Brits Missing, MIRROR (London) (Sept. 5, 2005) at 1, 4 (“Last night [Sept. 04] TV’s Oprah Winfrey arrived in New Orleans with 33 supply trucks.”).

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Parr Interview.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview; Smith Interview.

See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Smith Interview.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Lokey Interview; see also Wells Interview.

Id.

Smith Interview.


Lokey Interview; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense: Legislative Affairs, DOD Support for Hurricane Katrina Relief: Executive Summary Mon., Sept. 12, 2005 as of 0700 (Sept. 12, 2005).

Lokey Interview.

Id.

Id.


Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operational Professionals Before Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 45 (statement of Scott Wells) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing].

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Jones, Captain, Coast Guard, in Washington, D.C. via telephone from New Orleans, LA (Jan. 10, 2006).

Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview.

Id.

Lokey Interview.


Id.

Id.

Id. It was not possible to determine exactly which parish official made this statement.

See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005).

See generally Ryals Interview; see also Dickerson Interview; Baughman Interview; Tranter Interview.

Baughman Interview; see also Tranter Interview.

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Id. at 7 (written statement of William L. Carwile).


See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005).

Macdonald Interview.

See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005).

E-mail correspondence from Clair Blong (DHS/FEMA NORAD USNORTHCOM IC) to FEMA-NRCC and FEMA-HSOC Staff (Sept. 01, 2005 7:51 p.m.), citing e-mail correspondence from Nanette Nadeau (DAF NORAD USNORTHCOM), to Clair Blong, Sept. 01, 2005 (Doc No. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000685).

Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview.

Id. It is not clear which FEMA official ultimately approved this decision.

Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview.


Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tony Robinson, FEMA JFO Operation [hereinafter Robinson Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10, 2005).

Robinson Interview.

Wells Interview.

Id.

Id.

Robinson Interview.

Wells Interview.

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 58 (statement of Scott Wells).

Wells Interview.

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 46 (statement of Scott Wells).

Wells Interview.

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 46 (statement of Scott Wells).

Wells Interview.

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 48 (statement of William L. Carwile).

Id.

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 61 (statement of Senator Joseph Lieberman).

Parr Interview.

Id.

Id.

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 70-72 (statement of Phil Parr).

DHS IG Report at 1, 12.
“In the early hours of Hurricane Katrina, and without regard to their own safety, and in many cases, knowing their own homes were probably destroyed, these great citizens of Louisiana began to go out, by helicopter and boat, to begin the massive search and rescue operations.

“Pulling residents from rooftops, out of attics, and directly from the water, the men and women of the Louisiana National Guard were there, saving thousands of lives …”

Major General Bennett C. Landreneau  
The Adjutant General, State of Louisiana  
Select Committee hearing, October 27, 2005
The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking

Summary

The active and reserve components of the United States armed forces have a long and proud history of providing essential aid to the civilian populace of this country in the aftermath of natural disasters. There are several reasons the nation continues to rely on the military to perform this role. One is that the military is able to provide essential, life-saving services more quickly and more comprehensively than any other entity when local and state response capabilities are overwhelmed, including the ability to provide helicopter and boat rescue, shelter, food, water, and medical support. Importantly, much of this capability is vested with the National Guard, and is thus an asset under the control of the governor of each respective state or territory and the District of Columbia.

As robust as the military capability is, there are limitations, many of which are highlighted in the specific findings below. The most important limit to the military’s ability to manage domestic disaster response is the nation’s traditional reliance on local control to handle incident response. The federal government, with the Department of Defense (DOD) serving as part of the federal response team, takes its directions from state and local leaders. Since that is our nation’s tradition, DOD does not plan to be the lead agency in any disaster situation and expects to assist as local authorities request and direct. Furthermore, DOD lacks the detailed knowledge of local conditions essential to effective relief operations.

Even so, the element of the U.S. military with the longest tradition of service — the militia, now called the National Guard — is a particularly valuable asset to each state, territory, and the District of Columbia. Units can be called to active duty by the order of the governor and serve as the state’s chief executive directs. Thus, the National Guard is responsive and will possess knowledge of local conditions. In contrast, the processes by which active military forces are brought to a region are lengthy and burdensome. When they arrive, these forces will not have detailed local knowledge and will be prohibited by law from performing law enforcement functions.

In addition, there will be two distinct military chains of command — one for federal troops and one for National Guard troops under state command.

This dual chain of command structure, lengthy federal troop activation system, and, in the case of Katrina, devastated local authorities, contributed to a poorly coordinated federal response to Katrina. It would not be possible to anticipate all problems and prevent all the difficulties that ensued from a storm of this magnitude, but better planning, more robust exercises, and better engagement between active forces and the National Guard both before and during disaster response would have helped prevent human suffering.

Two new organizations created after September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD’s Northern Command, are integral parts of this process, and the growing pains were evident to the Select Committee. Northern Command is charged with managing the federal military response to disasters and DHS is in charge of the overall federal effort. Northern Command has taken strides, but needs better integration with FEMA and with the National Guard effort at disasters and emergencies. Clearly, more needs to be done.

Even though there were problems, the military played an invaluable role in helping the citizens of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi respond to the devastation of Katrina and saved countless lives. Indeed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale testified:

“The Department of Defense’s response to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United States since the Civil War.”

from performing law enforcement functions. In addition, there will be two distinct military chains of command — one for federal troops and one for National Guard troops under state command.
There is no doubt DOD resources improved the national response to Katrina. Although trained and equipped for war fighting, there is enough commonality of expertise and equipment that made for a significant military contribution to the majority of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of the National Response Plan. DOD is the only federal department with supporting responsibilities in each of the fifteen ESFs.\(^2\)

The Hurricane Katrina response also reinforced the National Response Plan's designation of the National Guard as the military's first responders to a domestic crisis.

“In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992) in which National Guard forces constituted 24% of the military response, National Guard forces represented more than 70% of the military force for Hurricane Katrina.”\(^3\)

Number of National Guard and active Duty Personnel in Joint Operational Area of Hurricane Katrina

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<td>September 13</td>
<td>45,791</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 14</td>
<td>45,063</td>
<td>18,690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: NORTHERN COMMAND TIMELINE

Despite the immediacy of required action, confusion created by multi-intergovernmental agency activities and dual military responses, the men and women of the armed services came when they were called. And whether on the ground, in the air, or on the water, they worked extremely hard to save and offer aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

There are a number of specific areas where better coordination mechanisms could have greatly improved the execution of military support during Hurricane Katrina. The protocols associated with sharing essential information, the coordinated movement of personnel and equipment, and prior joint planning and training are vital to an effective and comprehensive response.

Finding: The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex as written would have delayed the active duty military response, even if it had been implemented

The National Response Plan (NRP) creates confusion about federal active duty military involvement due to unresolved tension between the possible need for active duty military assistance when state and local officials are overwhelmed, and the presumption that a governor will use his or her understanding of the situation on the ground to decide whether and when to ask for active duty military support.

A foundational assumption of the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) is that local and surrounding jurisdictions’ response capabilities may be insufficient as they could be quickly overwhelmed by an event. Despite this guiding assumption, NRP-CIA policy assumes that state/local incident command authorities will be able to integrate federal resources into the response effort. The NRP-CIA fails to reflect whether in a catastrophic incident, DHS should rely upon the same principle — the presence of local and state first responders for the first 48-72 hours of an emergency — as the non-catastrophic incident portion of the NRP. This failure would have delayed the federal military response and prevented full integration of the National Guard and active duty missions, even if the NRC - CIA had been involved.
Whether there exists an effective local and state response for the first 48-72 hours of a disaster is a critical element in determining the need for and extent of military involvement. Some point out that in cases of a major catastrophe, the President through the Stafford Act can designate and deploy federal resources without following NRP procedures. This view does not address if the NRP procedures in place in the event of a major catastrophe — whether or not the President chooses to federalize the response — are sound.

Recognizing that federal resources might be required to augment overwhelmed state and local response efforts, the NRP-CIA establishes protocols to pre-identify and rapidly deploy essential resources that are urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents. Under the NRP-CIA, normal procedures for a number of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) may be expedited or streamlined to address urgent requirements. These include: medical teams, urban search and rescue teams, transportable shelter, medical and equipment caches, and communications gear. Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended.

One of the planning assumptions of the NRP-CIA is that a detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours after the incident. As a result, the NRP-CIA calls for response activities to begin without the benefit of a complete situation and critical needs assessment. Moreover, under this Annex, notification and full coordination with states should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical federal resources.

Finding: DOD/DHS coordination was not effective during Hurricane Katrina

The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense share responsibility for ensuring the security and safety of America. Since the establishment of DHS after 9/11, both departments have sought to define their roles and responsibilities.

McHale testified at a recent congressional hearing that he was the Defense Department’s principal liaison with DHS. A memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOD assigns 64 DOD personnel to DHS to fill critical specialties, principally in the areas of communications and intelligence. There is also a Homeland Defense Coordination Office at DHS headquarters, as well as around-the-clock DOD presence in the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center.

Despite these efforts to integrate operations, gaps remained in DOD/DHS coordination. During a BRAC Commission hearing conducted August 11, 2005, a commissioner asked Peter F. Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), of the existence of any document issued by DHS that would help DOD determine the requirements for military assistance to civilian authorities. Verga replied: “To my knowledge, no such document exists.”

On August 30, an e-mail generated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicated concern about the flow of information between DOD and FEMA and a lack of understanding of what was an official request for assistance and what was not. Another e-mail from DHS to DOD on this day indicated Secretary Chertoff was requesting updated information on the levees in New Orleans, shelter information, and search

Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process.
and rescue missions DOD was performing. The OSD response expressed wonder at why DHS was asking for this information, as FEMA had not yet even generated requests for these missions for DOD.7 Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process.8 As time went on, and FEMA and DOD worked out Requests for Assistance (RFAs), and communications and information sharing did improve.9

These problems are indicative of a dispute between DOD and DHS that still lingers. DOD maintains it honored all FEMA requests for assistance in the relief effort, refusing no missions.10 FEMA officials insist that notwithstanding the official paper trail, DOD effectively refused some missions in the informal coordination process that preceded an official FEMA request.11 Therefore, when DOD thought a mission was inappropriate, FEMA simply did not request the assistance from DOD.

The reliance of FEMA on DOD during the Hurricane Katrina response, although not anticipated in scope, became at its most basic, a takeover of FEMA's responsibilities as the logistics manager for the federal response. According to Secretary McHale:

During Katrina, the federal military remained under FEMA's control. It meant that the Defense Department, which had the resources to appraise the situation and prioritize its missions more quickly than could FEMA, actually drafted its own requests for assistance and sent them to FEMA, which copied them and sent them back to the Department of Defense for action.12

Finding: DOD, FEMA and the State of Louisiana had difficulty coordinating with each other, which slowed the response

The process for requesting DOD active duty forces has several layers of review and is understandably not well understood or familiar to state officials who rarely would need to request DOD support. Even though state officials do not routinely work with DOD, requests for DOD assistance are generated at the state level. These go from the state to FEMA's Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who in turn requests assistance from the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The DCO passes these requests on to the joint task force, which routes them through Northern Command to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretariat, to the Joint Directorate of Military Support on the Joint Staff. At each stage, the request is validated to ensure it can be met and that it is legal to provide the assistance. Once vetted, the request is tasked to the services and coordinated with Joint Forces Command, and forces or resources are then allocated to the joint task force, which in turn gets the support down to the user level by way of the DCO. This process is in place not only to satisfy DOD internal requirements, but to ensure maximum coordination with both FEMA and the state.

DOD's process for receiving, approving, and executing missions was called bureaucratic by Louisiana officials.13 Despite the multiple layers of paperwork requirements described above, the Select Committee could not definitively determine the origin of the request for DOD to provide active duty forces. Louisiana officials said their Adjutant General made the request directly of General Russel L. Honoré — without coordinating the request through FEMA — the established process to request all federal assistance.14 This request outside of normal channels may reflect frustration with the bureaucratic process.

Current FEMA FCO Scott Wells told Select Committee staff this direct state request to DOD was indicative of Louisiana not having a unified command during Katrina and created coordination problems during the response and recovery efforts.15 Without a unified command, the system for requests for assistance was difficult. This difficulty was compounded by the scarcity of telephone
communication capability remaining in Louisiana, resulting in a communications chokepoint at the EOC in Baton Rouge where the telephone was continuously busy.

Prior to the arrival of Honoré, senior FEMA officials were unable to get visibility on their requests. For example, former Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and FEMA Director, Michael Brown, testified that he did not know what happened to some of his requests for assistance.\(^\text{16}\)

While DOD officials testified in October that DOD was “leaning forward” and taking quick action prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA officials said the DOD process appeared cumbersome.\(^\text{17}\) Louisiana Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin said DOD was, in his opinion, slow and overly bureaucratic.\(^\text{18}\) It appears that although DOD may have been doing the best it could with the system it had, Hurricane Katrina was of such magnitude that more rapid response was necessary. Although acknowledging that General Honoré operated outside normal FEMA-led channels, FEMA FCO William Lokey praised him for getting things done that Louisiana and FEMA could not.\(^\text{19}\)

**Finding:** National Guard and DOD response operations were comprehensive, but perceived as slow

**National Guard response**

“I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the National Guard’s efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people within four hours of Katrina’s passing. More than 9,700 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen were in New Orleans by the thirtieth of August. The National Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the passing of the storm.”\(^\text{20}\)  

*Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau*

When reports on the catastrophic damage in Louisiana and Mississippi began to flow in, the National Guard Bureau did not hesitate to act. The NGB took responsibility for coordinating the flow of Guard resources and personnel from all 50 states to speed up the process and increase efficient use of resources as requirements from coastal states grew beyond their ability to coordinate individual state-to-state compacts.\(^\text{21}\) The NGB Joint Operations Center (NGBJOC) worked closely with the Army National Guard Crisis Response Cell and the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team to source and move these forces into the Gulf Coast.

Initially, this operated via a “push” methodology with supporting states pushing available forces based on requirements identified by the Adjutants General in the supported states.\(^\text{22}\) As situational awareness improved, this gradually transitioned to a “pull” process whereby supported states submitted requests for forces through the NGBJOC to be sourced by the supporting states.

NGB operated its Joint Operations Center around the clock to coordinate all National Guard actions associated with information sharing between Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army and the Air Force, Northern Command, state emergency operations centers, and other DOD liaison officers. This coordination supported National Guard response activities in the affected states.\(^\text{23}\) One of the challenges of Katrina for the Department of Defense was the lack of protocols set by Northern Command for information flow between the separate DOD entities.\(^\text{24}\)

On Tuesday, August 30, state Adjutants General reported the following troop deployments to the NGB: 5,149 to Louisiana, 2,826 to Mississippi, 1,066 to Alabama, and 753 to Florida for a total of 9,794.\(^\text{25}\) At this time, Louisiana and Mississippi were supplemented...
by Guardsmen from nine other states. In position and responding were 64 Army National Guard aircraft, that reported 186 search and rescue missions performed, 1,017 patients moved, 1,910 evacuees, 91 cargo movements, and 29 food and water movements.

On August 31, at 7:21 a.m., Lieutenant General Blum and Army National Guard Director Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn placed a phone call to Louisiana State Adjutant General Landreneau.26 The following is a record of their conversation:

General Blum: Benny, how are things going?
General Landreneau: Sir, we’ve had a difficult night.
General Blum: What do you need?
General Landreneau: We need 5K soldiers to help out. The armory is flooded. My command and control is at the Superdome. We have a lot of undesirables here trying to cause trouble.
General Vaughn: Hey Benny, can we drive to the Superdome?
General Landreneau: No sir, we are cut off by the rising water, along with the armory.
General Vaughn: Where do you want us to send the incoming soldiers?
General Landreneau: Sir, send them to the intersection of Interstate 310 and State 10.
General Blum: Benny, when’s the last time you got any sleep?
General Landreneau: Well sir, I think two days ago.
General Blum: Listen, you need to get some rest, you sound exhausted.
General Landreneau: I’ll try Sir, but every time I lay down someone gets me up for a little emergency.
General Blum: Try and get some rest, this is an ongoing effort and we need your energy.
General Vaughn: Benny, we’re going to push help so be ready.27

On Wednesday, August 31, Blum set up a teleconference with all state Adjutants General at noon to coordinate “full capabilities of National Guard to be deployed as rapidly as possible to save life and limb.”28 Every state Adjutant General reported their Guard forces deploying or available for deployment.29

On Thursday, September 1 at 11:30 a.m., Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Blum met with President Bush to discuss the National Guard response.30 At this briefing, the President agreed with Rumsfeld that the National Guard was responding effectively to the disaster and chose not to federalize Guard troops.31 At 1:15 p.m., Blum was asked to be part of a DHS press conference with Chertoff and McHale, to discuss federal assistance to the Gulf. At 5:30 p.m., after coordinating with McHale and Rumsfeld, Blum departed for Belle Chasse, Louisiana, and immediately met with Louisiana State Adjutant General Landreneau at the Superdome. Later that evening, Blum met with Governor Kathleen Blanco to discuss troop and resource requirements in Louisiana.32

Also during this time, federal officials considered ways to structure a unified command. According to Deputy Homeland Security Advisor Ken Rapuano, federal officials discussed with Blanco federalizing the National Guard.33 President Bush ultimately offered Blanco a “Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization, Consent and Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF Katrina,” making Honoré, as commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, a member of the Louisiana National Guard.34 An excerpt from a DOD letter drafted for Governor Blanco to President Bush explained how the command would have been structured under the proposal:

In order to enhance Federal and State efforts, and if you grant permission, I would like to appoint the Regular Army officer commanding the Federal Joint Task Force Katrina to be an officer in the Louisiana National Guard. I would assign him to command the National Guard forces under my command.35

Thus, President Bush’s proposal would not have put National Guard troops under federal control. Rather, the proposal would have put Honoré under Blanco’s command in the chain-of-command over National Guard troops in Louisiana. In this proposal, Honoré would
have served in two capacities — first, as the commander of federal troops ultimately answering to the President, and second, as the commander of the Louisiana National Guard, answering to Blanco. This proposal was intended to establish a single command for all military operations in Louisiana.

Blanco wrote to President Bush on September 3, declining this proposal. The Governor only agreed to the importance of creating a single military commander for federal forces that “could enhance the contribution of over 25 National Guard states currently being commanded by the Louisiana State Adjutant General.” As a result, federal troops remained under one command — Honoré and Northern Command, while the National Guard remained under the separate command of Landreneau and the Governor.

Administrative matters proved to be a challenge as well for National Guard troops deploying under Emergency Management Assistant Compacts (EMAC) with various states. Since these forces were activated in state-to-state agreements they were on state active duty and subject to the rules and entitlements authorized by their respective home states. This plethora of statuses made administration problematic for the National Guard, and led to a request that these forces be activated under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. This federal status permits uniform administration while allowing continued command and control by the Governor. Numerous state Adjutants General suggested the National Guard Bureau request that guard troops be activated under Title 32. In response, the National Guard Bureau strongly advocated for the use of Title 32:

not only because it allowed Governors to retain control, but because it was the right thing to do for the soldiers and airmen. Each state has a different way of handling pay and benefits under State Active Duty. We had soldiers and airmen operating under 54 different payroll systems and receiving different benefits such as medical care and disability coverage. Our forces needed the protection provided by DOD entitlements.

Between September 2 and September 5, the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana sent letters to the Secretary of Defense asking for all National Guard assets to be put under Title 32. Blum then discussed putting the Guard on Title 32 status with McHale and together, they submitted a formal Title 32 request to Rumsfeld. On September 7, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England approved Title 32 status retroactive to August 29.

On September 8, the NGB noted 50 States, two territories, and the District of Columbia had contributed forces in support of operations in Louisiana and Mississippi. National Guard forces reached peak deployment numbers for Katrina relief with over 50,000 personnel mobilized on this day.

**Army National Guard**

“Four hours after landfall, Army National Guard helicopters are performing rescue missions, with 65 helicopters positioned in Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama.” *Northcom Timeline: Hurricane Katrina 1/3/06*

The Army National Guard contributed heavily to the Katrina response, including the primary priority of search and rescue, evacuation, and commodity distribution. Distribution of water, ice, and food from military stockpiles in the days immediately following landfall was done at both designated and undesignated distribution sites. The Army Guard also provided much needed military transportation, helped clear debris from roads and residences, and provided assistance to law enforcement. Unlike their active duty counterparts, the National Guard is not restricted from performing law enforcement duties under federal law, and thus rendered considerable assistance to civilian law enforcement efforts. According to the daily log of Mississippi National Guard activities prepared for the Select Committee, the majority of the mission requests were for security, a mission that would only increase in the weeks following landfall.

The following chart contains the number of Army National Guard present in the Gulf States.
Air National Guard

August 30: “The Air National Guard launches its first Air National Guard JTF-Katrina mission. A C-17 crew assigned to the 172nd Fighter Wing, Mississippi ANG flew its first sortie in support of Hurricane recovery. The mission lasted for 3 days. They airlifted 85 civilians from Gulfport.”

Northcom Katrina Timeline 12/22/05

The Director of the Air National Guard Lieutenant General Daniel James III, told the Select Committee the efforts of the Air National Guard during Hurricane Katrina represented “the largest military airlift operation supporting disaster relief in the United States.”

But the Air National Guard brought more than evacuation, rescue, and airlift capabilities to the response. The Air National Guard also has an emergency medical capability. ANG medics treated over 13,000 patients by September 19. Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) units provided medical personnel and equipment to support up to 10 major trauma surgeries without re-supply. The Air National Guard also has a large civil engineering capability in its Rapid Engineer Deployable Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) Squadrons.

Date | Number of Army Guard Personnel In Katrina Joint Operational Area
--- | ---
August 26 | 922
August 27 | 1,701
August 28 | 4,444
August 29 | 6,908
August 30 | 9,668
August 31 | 10,428
September 1 | 14,284
September 2 | 18,678
September 3 | 24,548
September 4 | 29,588
September 5 | 33,608
September 6 | 38,093
September 7 | 39,736
September 8 | 40,667
September 9 | 42,164
September 10 | 42,257
September 11 | 42,264
September 12 | 41,530
September 13 | 40,928
September 14 | 41,119
September 15 | 38,831

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS TIMELINE, 12/21/05

Date | Number of Air Guard Personnel In Katrina Joint Operational Area (includes Air Guard in transit from outside wings transporting personnel, supplies and equipment)
--- | ---
August 26 | 8
August 27 | 932
August 28 | 932
August 29 | 933
August 30 | 956
August 31 | 960
September 1 | 972
September 2 | 2,464
September 3 | 3,998
September 4 | 4,596
September 5 | 6,613
September 6 | 5,770
September 7 | 5,952
September 8 | 5,735
September 9 | 4,347
September 10 | 4,581
September 11 | 4,125
September 12 | 4,109
September 13 | 4,112
September 14 | 3,477
September 15 | 3,512

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS TIMELINE, 12/21/05

Some of the highlights of ANG activity in the first few days following landfall include:

August 29 Aero-medical Evacuation Squadron positioned to respond in Mississippi 50 ANG medical personnel at Naval Air Station New Orleans

August 30 The ANG launches its first Air National Guard JTF Katrina mission. A C-17 crew assigned to the 172nd FW, Mississippi ANG flew its first sortie in support of Hurricane recovery. The mission lasted for three days.
They airlifted 85 civilians from Gulfport. All ANG Airlift and Tanker units put on alert and places all air crew on Title 32 status.

Texas ANG starts reconnaissance, activates search and rescue personnel and security forces to Louisiana.

ANG establishes Tanker Airlift Control Center.

August 31

ANG sources a NORTHCOM request for ANG Combat Weather Team to New Orleans.

ANG reports 700 ANG Civil Engineer and 350 Red Horse personnel available.

Tennessee and Oklahoma ANG help evacuate 143 patients from the New Orleans Veterans Hospital.

The 259th ATCS Louisiana Air National Guard deploys their MSN-7 Mobile Control Tower to the Superdome.51

September 1

First Air Force, composed of ANG wings across the country, is tasked to lead for planning, orchestrating and overseeing all Air Force support to Joint Task Force Katrina.52 Gulfport, Mississippi is designated the main operating base for sustained ANG Hurricane relief efforts, including evacuation.

ANG Expedionary Medical Support (EMEDS) units, civil engineering units arrive in Mississippi and New Orleans.

On this day ANG Para-rescuemen are credited with 48 air saves and 250 boat saves in New Orleans.

ANG Combat Controllers provide air movement for 750 helicopter sorties where 3,000 people are evacuated. From September 1 through 9, ANG from Alaska and Oregon pushed through 3,169 military and civilian helicopter sorties at multiple landing zones in New Orleans. ANG aircraft and crew would fly 2,542 sorties, airlifting 21,874 people and 11,110 pounds of cargo in support of hurricane relief.53

September 2

149th Air National Guard Surgical Team established field hospital in parking lot adjacent to New Orleans Convention Center.54

The National Guards of other states also played key roles in the Hurricane Katrina response. Through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC), Louisiana and Mississippi were able to request and receive assistance from scores of states from across the country. While the EMAC process is a direct state-to-state relationship, both FEMA and the National Guard Bureau participated in negotiations to facilitate the identification and procurement of specific types of assistance from other states. There was a consensus among federal, state, and local officials that EMAC worked well. These troops served in Title 32 status, and were therefore commanded by the respective Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and paid with federal funds.

Louisiana

The Louisiana National Guard conducted roving patrols, manned checkpoints, and supported the New Orleans Police Department in the parishes. The Army National Guard also secured key infrastructure sites, including levees,55 and provided support for general purpose shelters and special needs shelters with medical personnel. One of the Guard’s largest missions was to provide security and other support at the Superdome. Approximately 250 Guardsmen were at the Superdome, searching entrants for weapons, providing them with food, water, and medical attention, and attempting to maintain law and order.

After Katrina hit, the National Guard was deeply involved in search and rescue operations to save people after the levees breached and many areas flooded.56 Their role included both helicopter and boat sorties to rescue people from roofs and floodwaters and take them to
high ground. They were also part of the more deliberate post-flood activities to go house to house and search for survivors and victims.

The National Guard also had a law enforcement mission beyond the shelters (e.g., the Superdome) to help restore law and order through street patrols and other activities in support of the overtaxed New Orleans Police Department.57 One of the National Guard’s law enforcement missions was to secure the Convention Center and generally maintain order there as occupants were evacuated. They provided food, water, and medical treatment, and searched evacuees as they boarded buses. Because the National Guard was never federalized, they could fully participate in all law enforcement missions.

Finally, the National Guard played a key role in logistics and transportation, using their high-clearance vehicles and helicopters to ferry personnel and supplies into and out of flooded areas.58 For example, they transported and distributed food into the Superdome and supported the evacuation of its occupants.

The Louisiana National Guard received much assistance from many states across the country through EMAC.59 Examples of the specific deployments included 2,426 infantry from Pennsylvania, 1,016 military police from Puerto Rico, 580 security troops from Michigan, 500 support troops from Arkansas, 535 security troops from Massachusetts, 350 security forces from Tennessee, 315 transportation and logistics troops from Alabama, 310 maintenance troops from Illinois, 250 air traffic controllers from Texas, and 221 truckers from South Carolina. In total, Louisiana made 451 EMAC requests, and 29,502 National Guard troops responded from other states to undertake these missions.

Alabama

The Alabama National Guard headquarters began monitoring Hurricane Katrina on August 23 and actively engaged in discussions with the National Guard Bureau on August 25. When Katrina became a Category 3 hurricane on August 27, the Alabama Guard increased staff at the state emergency operations center. EOCs along the Alabama Coast for the 20th Special Forces Group, 711th Signal Battalion, and 16th Theater Support Command were opened and manned. When FEMA designated Maxwell Air Force Base as a federal staging area for supplies, the Alabama National Guard sent troops there to help prepare for distribution.60 Governor Riley declared a state of emergency on August 28, which formally activated the state National Guard.61

On August 29, the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) received requests for commodities from Mobile, Baldwin, Butler, and Washington counties, and the Alabama Guard took control of all recovery and relief operations in coastal Alabama to include county distribution points. When AEMA requested special boat teams for search and rescue, and security, the Alabama National Guard responded. The Guard also performed damage assessment tasks. The Alabama National Guard had developed mission specific force packages for emergencies like hurricanes, snow and ice storms, and chemical and biological attacks. These force packages include security forces, engineers, medical, communications and logistical equipment, and trained personnel.62

The Alabama National Guard deployed approximately 750 soldiers and airmen within Alabama, but also provided 2,000 soldiers to locations in Mississippi and Louisiana in response to immediate EMAC requests for support on August 29 and 30.63

Mississippi

On August 29, in the rear area operations center in Jackson, it was recorded that the Mississippi National Guard had activated 2,736 Army National Guard soldiers, and 1,003 Air National Guard members to provide security, search and rescue, and debris removal operations.64

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Mississippi Adjutant General, Harold A. Cross, made the following observations:

During and immediately after landfall, National Guard search and rescue operations began on the Gulf Coast. My personnel night
ground reconnaissance on the 29th and aerial reconnaissance early the next morning clearly revealed a disaster of unprecedented proportion along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi and significant damage as far as one hundred and fifty miles inland. After reporting this initial surveillance to Governor Barbour, I immediately directed my rear operations center to activate all remaining available Mississippi National Guardsmen and to execute the movement of pre-planned assistance from other states. In addition, I requested assistance through the National Guard Bureau from other states, up to division sized strength. Accordingly, the 4,533 Mississippi National Guard soldiers and airmen were ultimately augmented by 11,839 National Guard personnel from 36 states under EMAC agreements.

The Mississippi National Guard personnel on standby at Camp Shelby moved forward after the storm had passed to a scene of unbelievable destruction. Hurricane Katrina was by all accounts the worst storm in nearly a century, but Cross was prepared. As soon as the storm abated somewhat, Mississippi National Guard personnel deployed from Camp Shelby into the devastated Mississippi coast to provide security, search and rescue and debris removal operations. Even so, Cross recognized his own resources would be insufficient to assist along the whole coast of the state and he needed help from the National Guard of other states. In that regard, General Cross said:
The initial requests for assistance from Cross were through personal relationships with other State Adjutant Generals. General Blum, held a video teleconference on August 31 to solicit assistance from each of the 54 states and territories for both Louisiana and Mississippi. States responded rapidly to the urgent need and decided to worry about the authorizing paperwork later. In most cases, EMAC documentation followed after individual states provided the assets requested by Louisiana or Mississippi. As noted earlier, all National Guard troops were retroactively placed in Title 32 status on September 7 by Deputy Secretary of Defense England.

Out of state National Guard support in Mississippi through EMAC process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>National Guard Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1,500 Security Forces, 7 Tactical planners and engineers, 2- CH47s with crew for S and R, 2-UH60s with crew for S and R, 500 Sleeping Bags and 80 cots, Engineering Brigade, MP Battalion, 1,450 personnel for TF, 37 personnel from Air Refueling Wing, CBCS Communications support, Ministry Team, Ground Safety Manager, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Family Assistance Personnel, Medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>100 soldiers, MP Company, 25 Heavy Trucks with 75 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Fire Team, Aircraft Maintenance personnel, medical support personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>MP Company, 50 Signal company personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>MP Security Company, 100 personnel to assist command and control, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>4-UH60s, rescue teams, infantry battalion, 50 ambulances with crew, 15 cooks, OH-58 with crew, logistics aides, safety personnel, aircraft maintainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2- UH1s, 2 CH47s with crew, 1,500 Task Force personnel, Fire Vehicle, Cable/Copper Repair personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Refuelers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Security Forces, EMEDS personnel, public health personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>2,300 soldiers, 40 tankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Medical Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Air Refueling personnel, Emergency Medical teams, Guard Fire Fighters, Ministry Team, Internist, 25 EMEDs personnel and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>50 Heavy trucks with 150 soldiers, 24 person refueling team, food service personnel, Medical Preventative Medicine personnel, communications and LNO personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Water Purification Equipment with Operators, Ministry Team, medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Preventative Medicine Team, Cable repair personnel, Security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>MP Security Company, 104 Personnel for S and R and ice and water distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Medical Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>MP Security Company, construction engineers, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Ministry Teams, Mental Stress Team, medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2-C130 Aircraft with Crew, medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Public Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Security Forces, Priest, Ground Safety Manager, ARW personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>EMEDS personnel, bioenvironmental personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Medical Support Personnel, bioenvironmental personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8 UH6s, 2 CH7, 6 UH1 and 130 personnel, Rabbi, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>Water Purification Equipment with Operators, 72 personnel from fighter wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>119 soldiers for debris removal, etc., 1,300 Task Force soldiers, aviation assets, generators, 3 OH-58 with crew, aircraft maintenance personnel, food service personnel, EIS Management Team, tactical support personnel, EMEDS personnel, Air wing personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>25 personnel/Air Mobility, Fire Vehicle, Medical Support personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Chief of Safety, Medics, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>SatCom with personnel, AVC ATS Company, Food Services, Medical Support Personnel, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Air wing personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Units to load and unload aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Bioenvironmental Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>ATS Co. with Tower, TTCS, 3 MP Security Companies, fixed wing support teams, engineering battalion, logistics control cell, Mobile Emergency Operations Center, EIS Teams, 26 personnel from air refueling wing, aviation assets, Forklift Loader, Fire Vehicle, EIS Management Team, EIS Repair Team, 26 Security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Ministry Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Bioenvironmental personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>447 Light Infantry for security and recovery, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Airlift Wing support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wisconsin EMEDs personnel
Wyoming Medical Support, Bioenvironmental Engineer

MISSISSIPPI EMAC COST TRACKER DATED OCTOBER 10, 2006

Cross also coordinated closely with all other state entities involved, including the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, in order to maintain a coordinated law enforcement effort. Cross noted that coordination between Guard engineering companies with various utility companies to clear roads and restore electricity and phone services was instrumental in getting power restored to the majority of coastal counties well in advance of projections.72

The National Guard provided immediate and continued support to the people of Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina.73 National Guard accomplishments included: 3,900 miles of roads cleared of fallen trees and debris; 1.2 million meals ready to eat (MRE) and 1 million gallons of water delivered via air (over 2,000 missions); 39 million pounds of ice, 56.4 million gallons of water, and 2.7 million MREs distributed to central distribution points in 37 counties; 200 presence patrols and more than 600 search and rescue missions conducted; law enforcement assistance provided, resulting in 72 arrests; aircraft logged over 1,995 hours and delivered 2.57 million pounds of cargo. Emergency medical assistance from the Air National Guard assisted hundreds of Mississippi citizens.

Department of Defense response

The day after Katrina made landfall, England led an early roundtable session to get damage assessments for DOD facilities and review resources that may be required of DOD to support hurricane relief.74 The Secretary of Defense was briefed on DOD’s response and Northern Command issued several more alerts in anticipation of requests for assistance.

While Honoré arrived on Wednesday, August 31, as the commander of the newly established Joint Task Force Katrina to supervise federal military operations, the first active duty Navy and Air Force personnel arrived in Louisiana late Thursday, September 1, and active duty Army personnel started to arrive early Friday, September 2.75 These active duty personnel helped the Louisiana National Guard and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) control the crowds during the evacuation of the Superdome, maintain law and order in the streets, and eventually conduct secondary searches, going door to door looking for survivors or bodies and assisting those who had not yet escaped.

The support provided by DOD was invaluable, according to a wide variety of officials.76 DOD active duty forces were involved in search and rescue, but generally after the initial rescues from roofs by helicopters and boats. They were involved in the more deliberate search activities where mixed teams, to include National Guard, law enforcement, Coast Guard, and DOD worked together going house to house and searching for hold-outs and dead bodies.77

DOD also took over FEMA’s logistics distribution functions. According to FEMA Acting Director for Response during Hurricane Katrina, Edward G. Buikema, FEMA initially approached DOD about this mission on Thursday, September 1.78 On that date, Colonel Richard Chavez informed FEMA Acting Director of Operations Ken Burris the request “would require a Secretary DHS [sic] to Secretary DoD call to initiate and significant General Counsel input.”79 The formal Mission Assignment was prepared the next day at 6:15 p.m.80 and by 7:41 p.m., McHale informed DHS Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson that “SecDef agreed to support your RFA for broad logistics support” and that DOD was “working on the specific language — and a planning staff to implement it.”81 Execution of the mission apparently began the next day, September 3, according to written orders signed by Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Pete Verga.82
In the same e-mail to Jackson, McHale also said, “We may actually be able to do more than you have requested.” This apparently led to further meetings and, according to McHale, an additional seven approved mission assignments on Monday, September 5.

Although Buikema and his FEMA colleague Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder expressed their view that DOD acted slowly on the logistics request, the record reflects a prompt decision, followed by final resolution of details involving a billion dollar mission assignment. FEMA officials’ perception of a slow response from DOD reflected that they were (1) unaware of the planning already under way (as reflected in McHale’s e-mail) before final details were resolved and (2) possibly an unrealistic expectation that acceptance of such a massive mission would result in immediate action. This was not, however, just a single airlift of needed supplies — it was “planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel and medical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.”

This is not to say that all went smoothly with DOD support. For example, DOD apparently refused to allow the shipment of MREs on FEMA-provided transportation. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) apparently claimed DLA could only ship MREs on “DOD approved carriers” and DLA “would arrange transportation within the next 24-48 hours.” The September 4 e-mail lamenting this problem ended: “SEND MRE’S NOW.”

Finding: The Coast Guard’s response saved many lives, but coordination with other responders could improve

On August 29, the day Katrina made landfall, the U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans Incident Management Team was stood up in Alexandria, Louisiana. Outside of the forecasted area of impact, Coast Guard Disaster Assistance Teams from Ohio, Kentucky, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Miami were pre-positioned to the region to respond as soon as conditions permitted.

During normal conditions, there are 15 helicopters assigned within the Eighth Coast Guard District, along with four fixed-wing aircraft and 16 cutters. Within hours of Hurricane Katrina’s passing, the Coast Guard surged 31 cutters, 76 aircraft, 131 small boats, and over 4,000 personnel into the affected areas.

The first Coast Guard rescue occurred within a few hours after the storm made landfall. An HH-65 helicopter working out of the Coast Guard’s Air Station New Orleans located at Naval Air Station Bell Chasse rescued two adults and one infant, operating in 60-knot winds.

On August 30, all pre-positioned Coast Guard aircraft began conducting search and rescue missions, damage over-flight assessments, and logistical support, and the medium endurance cutter DECISIVE arrived offshore to conduct damage assessment of oil platforms.

To maximize the number of missions that could be flown, all of the helicopters refueled at Air Station New Orleans, which was also in charge of Coast Guard air asset coordination. When crew changes were to occur, the Mobile-based aircraft would return to Mobile. Tasking orders, such as directing a helicopter to pick up a particular group of people, were provided when the aircraft was located at a base, as well as any time communications were possible. Nevertheless, specific tasking orders were not necessary in the initial days after the storm because of the large volume of survivors throughout the region. Helicopters were able to rescue people without needing instructions.

Search and Rescue Communications

Communications were limited in many respects. Vital communications infrastructure was destroyed by the storm, and it was not possible for the Aviation Training
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

Center or Air Station
New Orleans to
communicate directly
with the operations
centers in the rescue
area, nor could the
Emergency Operation
Center (EOC) in
Baton Rouge be
contacted.\(^93\) When
aircraft left their
base in Mobile,
communication
was limited to
aircraft-to-aircraft
transmissions; pilots were unable to speak with the
Aviation Training Center.\(^94\) When aircraft flew over
New Orleans, communication was possible with Task
Force Eagle (the National Guard command center for
air operations at the Superdome) and occasionally with
Air Station New Orleans.\(^95\) Air Station New Orleans lost
all power and telephone lines were inoperable.\(^96\) When
power was restored, however, it was intermittent at times
and continued to limit communications.\(^97\) By 5:00 p.m.
on the first day of rescue operations, communication
became more difficult because of the large volume of
radio traffic in the area.\(^98\) Boats were able to communicate
via limited range low-level radios, but these did not afford
continuous coverage for airborne assets.\(^99\) On Monday
August 29, a Coast Guard C-130 arrived to provide
communications assistance; it could occasionally patch air
communication to land lines (if operational) in St. Louis,
Missouri and Alexandria, Louisiana (where Sector New
Orleans had set up operations).\(^100\)

For the first three days, no air traffic control was
available, and pilots relied solely on internal pilot-
to-pilot communications and standardization of
training to maintain order in the airspace.\(^101\) The Coast
Guard practice of standardization allowed for easy
communication between pilots who had never flown
together before, and this proved to be critical to the
success of search and rescue missions in the first days
without air traffic control. A U.S. Customs and Border
Protection P-3 aircraft arrived four days after landfall
to provide air traffic control and ground communication.

On the day of the storm, helicopter crews monitored
weather reports to determine locations in the region
where the weather would permit them to begin rescue
flight operations.\(^102\) Subsequently, crews proceeded to
areas located at the edge of the storm.\(^103\) The first rescue
occurred in 60-knot winds in Port Sulphur, Louisiana
at approximately 3:00 p.m.\(^104\) One helicopter flew to
Air Station New Orleans to drop off three personnel
to clear the field of debris, activate the generators, and
permit operations to resume at that location, while
others conducted rescues in Grand Isle, Louisiana and
St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana.\(^105\) At approximately 5:00
p.m., Coast Guard helicopters from Mobile and Houston
began rescuing people in New Orleans.\(^106\) At that time,
the Coast Guard only rescued people from immediate
danger and brought them to higher ground because of the
tens of thousands of people in immediate danger and the
limited fuel capacity of each helicopter.\(^107\) In the case of
people with medical conditions which required treatment,
helicopters transported them to the Louis Armstrong New
Orleans International Airport (New Orleans Airport).\(^108\)
Central drop-off locations were not set up until the
next day, when large areas that were dry and close to
operations were able to be identified.\(^109\)

Conduct of Coast Guard search
and rescue operations

Upon the completion of each mission and arrival on the
ground at either the Mobile or New Orleans Air Stations,
pilots briefed the Operations Commander on their missions,
including the number of people rescued.\(^110\) Given the time
constraints of performing rescues, the Coast Guard did not
record the names of those rescued, nor the locations where
they were deposited.\(^111\) While the immediate life saving
measures taken by the Coast Guard crews were laudable,
the failure to systemically communicate the location of the
rescued citizens to local authorities resulted in some rescued
persons being effectively stranded, lacking food, water, and
shelter for extended periods. There was no way to confirm
whether survivors would remain in these locations, and
specific information concerning a number of those rescued
was communicated to other entities (EOCs and other Coast
Guard stations) whenever communications were possible.\(^112\)

Within 24 hours of the storm, surface operations
(boats) were conducted out of Zephyr Field (a local
professional baseball stadium). According to the Coast
Guard, a unified command for surface operations was
established at Zephyr Field with the Coast Guard, FEMA,
and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.113 A Coast Guard officer dispatched vessels. Crews returned to the site for food and rest.

On the second day of operations, August 30, drop off locations were chosen by helicopter pilots and established at the Superdome, Lakefront Airport, the “Cloverleaf” (an area along I-10), the University of New Orleans, Zephyr Field, and New Orleans Airport.114 This information was communicated to the FEMA representative at Zephyr Field, who coordinated resources to assist survivors at each location. Notwithstanding this effort to coordinate, the hand-off was not effective, leaving many “rescued” persons without sustenance or shelter for extended periods. In addition, as larger numbers of survivors were placed at each location, requests were made for larger Department of Defense and National Guard helicopters, including MH-53s (from the USS Bataan) and CH-47s to shuttle them from dry land islands to locations accessible by bus for further evacuation; the helicopters began arriving on the same date.

On August 31, a Coast Guard liaison officer arrived at Task Force Eagle (the National Guard command center for air operations) at the Superdome.115 The National Guard also received rescue requests at this site, and tasking orders would be passed to Coast Guard helicopters that arrived at that location.

On the afternoon of September 1, additional communications were re-established when Coast Guard Cutter SPENCER arrived on-scene in New Orleans.116 SPENCER took tactical control of Coast Guard surface forces in New Orleans and, on September 2 established a Vessel Traffic System (VTS) to control marine vessel traffic in the area. The SPENCER’s communications capabilities include satellite, medium frequency, high frequency, and very high frequency voice and data communications (surface – to - surface communications, and surface - to - air voice and data links).

On September 2 and 3, Joint Field Operations (JFOs) were established.117 In Louisiana, however, there were Coast Guard and urban search and rescue personnel at

While the immediate life saving measures taken by the Coast Guard crews were laudable, the failure to systemically communicate the location of the rescued citizens to local authorities resulted in some rescued persons being effectively stranded, lacking food, water, and shelter for extended periods.

The first heavy lift aircraft to arrive at the New Orleans Airport was a Coast Guard C-130.118 It brought water and food to the area on approximately August 31, which was subsequently forwarded to Zephyr Field, the Superdome, and Air Station New Orleans to be distributed by helicopters on their return flights to flooded areas. The Coast Guard initiated this effort because it recognized that victims placed on higher ground “islands” had not yet been completely evacuated and required water and food, as temperatures during the day were nearing one hundred degrees. Once again, the effort was laudable but fell short of the need, as some evacuees remained in distress.
the state EOC in Baton Rouge before the formalized JFO was established. A cadre of Coast Guard personnel from Port Arthur, and others, who had been evacuated from New Orleans, was already in the EOC handling search and rescue coordination.

By September 20, the Coast Guard had organized and coordinated the rescue or evacuation of 33,544 people.119 At the height of Katrina operations, over 33 percent of Coast Guard aircraft were deployed to the affected region.120 Despite coordination difficulties, the Coast Guard’s efforts were heroic and saved countless lives.

Finding: The Army Corps of Engineers provided critical resources to Katrina victims, but pre-landfall contracts were not adequate

The Army Corps of Engineers ("USACE" or "Corps"), another active duty military unit, provided critical resources to respond to Hurricane Katrina. The Corps provided relief and response support to FEMA in accordance with the National Response Plan as the lead federal agency for public works and engineering (Emergency Support Function #3). Some of the Corps’ specific missions related to Hurricane Katrina included providing water and ice to regional warehouses, providing emergency power, providing emergency roof repair, and removing debris.

During Katrina and the aftermath, USACE provided 112 million liters of water, 232 million pounds of ice, installation of about 900 large generators, repairs to 170,000 roofs, and removal of a million cubic yards of debris.121 USACE had pre-awarded competitively bid contracts for all of these functions to allow quick deployment of resources prior to and immediately after an event.122 These pre-awarded contracts are part of USACE’s Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI) which has been in place for six years.

Due to the magnitude of the destruction, USACE pre-awarded contracts for roofing repair and debris removal were not adequate, and additional contracts were advertised and awarded using shortened but competitive procedures.123 In addition, FEMA tasked USACE to provide structural safety evaluations of low-rise and non-public buildings in New Orleans and other locations. To date, USACE has completed assessments of 47,800 of an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 units.124 Given the large number of uninhabitable or unusable buildings, FEMA has recently tasked USACE with demolition of buildings.125 To date, USACE is still developing estimates and conducting planning for the demolition mission.

Finding: The Department of Defense has not yet incorporated or implemented lessons learned from joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed for a more effective response to Katrina

The Department of Defense participates in several command and control exercises involving responses to domestic emergencies, ranging from the combatant command level to the national level.126 In the past these have included Northern Command exercises UNIFIED DEFENSE (2003,2004), ARDENT SENTRY (2005), DETERMINED PROMISE (2003, 2004), VIGILANT SHIELD (2005), DILIGENT ENDEAVOR (2003), DILIGENT WARRIOR (2004), NORTHERN EDGE (2003), SCARLET SHIELD (2004), DARK PORTAL (2004) and TOPOFF (2003, 2005). Many of these exercise scenarios were designed to overwhelm local and state assets to evoke a response under the National Response Plan, including the employment of DOD assets.

Hurricane Katrina was a test of the recently established (post - 9/11) United States Northern Command, and its ability to oversee and coordinate the largest use of active duty and Guard military in a domestic action in recent
history. Although Northern Command has conducted numerous exercises with the National Guard in state and local exercises, the lessons learned during these events were not consistently applied to the military response to Katrina.

NORAD/NORTHCOM ARDENT SENTRY 05 was a combined exercise with TOPOFF 3, conducted April 4-9, 2005.127 The overall goal of this exercise was to conduct a joint service and interagency exercise that would provide realistic training opportunities for all agencies in incident management. Canadian forces also participated as part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Another objective was to plan, deploy, and employ DOD forces in support of civilian authorities’ operations in accordance with the National Response Plan and DOD policy. The lessons learned during this exercise offered a preview of problems that would surface again during the Katrina response. Some of Northern Command’s recommendations for improvement were as follows:

- Conduct strategic effects-based planning between DOD and DHS for each Incident Annex in the National Response Plan.
- Investigate requirement for integrated “National Strategic Communications Plan” in coordination with interagency partners.
- Develop national capability to electronically produce, staff, validate, approve and track mission accomplishment of mission assignments.
- Determine requirements for a “National Common Operating Picture” in coordination with DHS, Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies.128

TOPOFF 2 also contained findings that, if corrected, would have enhanced the federal response to Katrina.129 From uncertainty between federal and state roles to the lack of robust and efficient local emergency communications and the need to improve data collection from military agencies, TOPOFF 2 findings were telling predictors of some of the challenges the military faced. Northern Command predicted in its ARDENT SENTRY/TOPOFF 3 Master Executive Summary, that “this exercise success is due in part to scenario constraints that could provide a false sense of security and lack of incentive to initiate or aggressively participate in the integrated regionally-based planning that is so essential.”130 Just over four months later, Katrina struck.

After Katrina, DOD officials reflected on the value of prior exercises. McHale commented that government training exercises “have not been sufficiently challenging.”131 Other Pentagon officials noted that in many cases, top officials, from Cabinet-level secretaries and generals to governors and mayors, do not participate and these simulations do not last long enough.132 The Government Accountability Office, in a November 29 briefing also noted key players are not always involved in drills, the lessons from previous training and exercises are not retained, and the training and exercises are more targeted at terrorist events than natural disasters.133

The lack of implementation of lessons learned and the training necessary to learn them resulted in less than optimal response by all military components. Oxford Analytica took the following view:

After Katrina made landfall, the NORTHCOM-led military support mission suffered many of the same planning failures, unclear lines of authority, communication breakdowns, and shortages of critical resources that were experienced by the civilian agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security.134

**Finding:** The lack of integration of National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response

*“Title 10 versus 32 versus 14…again.”*135

*Coast Guard Vice Admiral Jim Hull, NORTHCOM*

*“Advance planning between active-duty personnel and the Guard is vital – in contrast to the cooperation that . . . unfolded during Katrina ‘on the fly’ – albeit by ‘superb leaders.’”*136 *Washington Post, October 13, 2005, quoting Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale*

In a speech on October 21, McHale indicated planning by the National Guard was not well integrated with the
overall military, and the Joint Staff did not have a grasp of the National Guard’s plans.\textsuperscript{137} Interestingly, a September 14 e-mail originating in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) offices commended the Bureau’s efforts to provide operational information to JCS.\textsuperscript{138} McHale stated that National Guard plans were not well integrated with overall DOD plans. The Joint Staff acknowledged that the NGB was providing timely and accurate reports, but Northern Command was apparently more focused on active operations and therefore did not have a well informed view of the significant National Guard effort in the region. The Joint Staff e-mail went on to say that Northern Command’s briefings are too active duty focused and lack unity of effort.\textsuperscript{139} In the same speech, McHale said DOD did not understand how to integrate with the plans of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{140} The reverse was also true, despite past lessons learned.

In the TOPOFF 3 exercise in April 2005, it was clear the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau would be part of a large scale emergency response. The New Jersey National Guard noted that “although TOPOFF 3 began as an exercise with minimal National Guard involvement, it quickly evolved into one that heavily relied upon Guard participation, and identified a need early on for assistance from the National Guard Bureau.”\textsuperscript{141}

At the time of Katrina landfall, however, the National Guard did not have adequate knowledge of DOD planning guidance developed at Northern Command, including concept of operations plans and functional plans for military support to civilian authorities.\textsuperscript{142} The National Guard After Action Report on TOPOFF 3 found that numerous members of the Guard operational leadership did not have adequate knowledge of these plans.\textsuperscript{143}

At an after action meeting of state Adjutants General, the Adjutants General agreed coordination between active duty and National Guard in the response operation needed to be improved. According to the meeting report, “There was a lack of coordination of Joint Task Force Katrina operation with the National Guard Headquarters in the supported states.”\textsuperscript{144}

The National Guard Bureau also reported lines of command, control, and communications lacked clear definition and coordination between federal military forces and National Guard forces operating under state control, resulting in duplicate efforts. For example, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division moved into a sector already being patrolled by the National Guard.\textsuperscript{145} The meeting report also stated:

Federal troops often arrived prior to being requested and without good prior coordination. This resulted in confusion and often placed a strain on an already overburdened disaster response system. A specific case in point was the Marine Corps amphibious units which landed in Mississippi without transportation, requiring National Guard transportation assets to move them to New Orleans increasing the burden on an already stretched support system.\textsuperscript{146}

The National Guard 38th Infantry Division, composed of smaller Guard units from many states, reported they never formally coordinated with Northern Command.\textsuperscript{147} Members of the 82nd Airborne Division, the first active duty personnel to arrival in New Orleans on September 3, had a similar experience. In a September 9 e-mail, a soldier in the 82nd indicated coordination of evacuation efforts in New Orleans was very poor.\textsuperscript{148}

We’re conducting boat patrols using Coast Guard boats but coordination is very difficult . . . . National Guard seems to move in and out of sectors doing what they want then just leaving without telling anyone . . . . And this is in 4 days of operations.\textsuperscript{149}

Despite the lack of integration in Washington, D.C. and in Louisiana, active and reserve forces worked well together in Mississippi. Notably, the Governor of Mississippi did not request active duty military assistance, relying instead on Mississippi and other National Guard personnel provided through EMAC.
However, in the DOD effort to lean forward, Honoré contacted Cross immediately to offer any help needed, and remained in contact with him daily in person or on the phone. On September 3, Northern Command and JTF Katrina received confirmation from the Secretary of Defense that JTF Katrina was to assume responsibility for logistical operations in Mississippi and Louisiana in response to FEMA’s request. All DOD operations in the state of Mississippi were conducted with Cross’ consent.

One of the most important roles played by DOD in Mississippi was the delivery of military stocks of food and water that started to arrive in Gulfport on September 1. In his testimony before the Committee, Cross noted:

By the end of the second day after landfall, my intelligence reports indicated that the previously assumed flow of food and water was severely restricted. Many pre-planned distribution points were inaccessible and many hundreds of people were stranded by flood waters, blocked roadways or lack of fuel for transportation. These desperate civilians were primarily observed by aerial reconnaissance in Hancock County. Upon realization that food and water was not going to arrive by normal means in time, I offered an immediate airlift of food and water utilizing our helicopters and our rations and immediately requested through US NORTHCOM an emergency airlift of military stocks of MRE’s. Within a day, massive amounts of MRE’s began arriving at Gulfport just in time to be disseminated to prevent starvation. Almost 1.7 million MRE’s were flown in to my position thanks to the quick reaction of Lieutenant General Joe Inge of Northern Command.

Air Force personnel and aircraft from the 920th Rescue Wing and 347th Rescue Wing, as well as Special Operations Command aircraft arrived at the Jackson Air National Guard Base the day after landfall, and along with National Guard, performed search and rescue mission in the first days.

The USS Bataan, the USS Truman, the USS Whidbey Island, and other vessels supported Navy and Marine Corps operations in Mississippi, delivering personnel, equipment, and commodities. The USS Bataan had six helicopters, one land craft, extensive logistics supplies, and trauma medical capabilities that were used for search and rescue in both Mississippi and Louisiana. According to a September 1 e-mail from Colonel Damon Penn, Mississippi’s Defense Coordinator, a total of 19 active duty and National Guard teams were conducting search and rescue missions on the Mississippi coast.

The Naval Construction Battalion Center at Gulfport was severely damaged during Katrina, and although most of the 800 “Seabees” were evacuated before the hurricane struck, remaining personnel and other Seabees deployed by the Navy helped with Hurricane Katrina recovery operations. Gulfport-based Seabees, who linked up with the National Guard at their Joint Operations Center in Gulfport, coordinated with the National Guard to clear roads and assisted in removing debris. The Seabees also set up logistics centers to distribute food and water and provide emergency medical services. Two active-duty Seabee battalions from Port Hueneme, California, their subordinate detachments from both coasts, and Reserve Seabee volunteers joined those already in Gulfport, Mississippi, forming a total Seabee force of about 3,000 sailors by September 9. The Seabees were also joined by 100 Mexican Marines and 215 Canadian Navy personnel who helped them work on FEMA temporary housing sites, nursing home repair, and repairs to public buildings, schools and construction sites.

On September 5, 1,000 Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Camp Pendleton, California, arrived at Biloxi, and 1,000 Marines from the II MEF Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, arrived at Stennis Space Center. These Marine units, commanded by Marine Corps Reserve Major General Douglas V. Odell, Jr., assisted in the transportation of large amounts of commodities, as well as providing personnel and
equipment to assist in recovery operations in Hancock County as directed by Cross. Odell accepted the mission and executed all requirements, until directed by his higher headquarters to move to New Orleans,” Cross said.

On September 8, the USNS Comfort arrived in Pascagoula to offer medical assistance and facilities.

Four days later, the Northern Command suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Comfort be withdrawn because there was “very limited usage;” estimated at “fewer than a dozen patients.”

According to Cross’ response to questions by the Select Committee, the Mississippi National Guard maintained a very good relationship with DOD forces. “Active duty units that responded always took a subordinate, support role and these units coordinated directly with the Mississippi National Guard Forward Operations Center.”

In Louisiana, airborne search and rescue was another area where National Guard and DOD integration was lacking. As noted in the National Guard Bureau’s After Action Report, National Guard and DOD active duty (as well as other) helicopters were conducting rescue missions over New Orleans with no preplanning for command and control. The different helicopters had different radios and used different frequencies, creating a dangerous situation for mid-air collisions in an area with little or no air traffic control. Beyond the safety issue, National Guard and DOD active duty assets operated under their own tasking orders, which sometimes led to duplication. Search and rescue coordination problems are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Another Louisiana example illustrating integration problems is the area of communication. The 35th Infantry Division, a National Guard unit, arrived at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station on September 6, and the 82nd Airborne Division, a DOD active duty unit, was to provide them with some communications support. Specifically, the 35th Infantry Division had forwarded its frequency and network requirements and the 82nd Airborne Division was to provide frequency management support – providing specific frequencies to use. However, after the arrival of the 35th, there was still confusion over what frequencies to use because many systems were already using the assigned frequency. The 35th Infantry Division did not have the proper equipment to de-conflict the frequency use, and could not obtain it until September 12, almost a week later. For more information on communication difficulties during Hurricane Katrina, see chapter on COMMUNICATIONS.

Finding: Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response

“There must be a strong agreement between state and federal leadership as to the operational objectives. State concerns about maintaining sovereignty must be respected.”

General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau

“Admiral Keating, who heads US NORTHCOM, a newly created military body overseeing homeland defense, has told lawmakers that active-duty forces should be given complete authority for responding to catastrophic disasters . . . . The head of the Washington State National Guard, General Timothy Lowenberg, suggested in emails to colleagues that Admiral Keating’s suggestion amounted to a “policy of domestic regime change.”

Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2005

On Friday, September 1, the President offered to place Honoré under the joint command of Northern Command and Governor Blanco. Under this proposal, Honoré would have commanded both active duty U.S. military forces and the Louisiana National Guard, subject to the command of the Governor with respect to the Guard and Northern Command with respect to the federal active duty troops. Governor Blanco declined this offer, leaving Honoré and Northern Command in charge of the federal active troops and Landrenau and Blanco in charge of the Louisiana National Guard.

The Governors of the Gulf states chose not to relinquish command of the National Guard units in their respective states. While better coordination of the military
effort may have resulted if one commander were in charge of all aspects of military support, the Governor had confidence in Landreneau and saw no need for an added layer of command.

The Department of Defense was eager to assist the Gulf states. The establishment of JTF Katrina to coordinate the military response and the command’s desire to help made state sovereignty an issue during the Katrina response. Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi declined active duty military assistance, but active duty units pre-positioning at active duty bases in Mississippi operated smoothly with the Mississippi National Guard. Therefore, the issue of federalism played out in Louisiana. Resolving this issue may have slowed the active duty military response and contributed to tension in the state-federal relationship. In the end, there was a dual military response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. Honoré commanded the active duty military response, and Landreneau commanded the Louisiana National Guard response.

The failure of DOD, governors, and other state officials to actively participate in joint planning for emergencies, both natural and man-made, that occurred within Northern Command’s area of responsibility contributed to the tension. There were too few “civilian authorities” in DOD’s military assistance to civilian authority planning. As Northern Command lamented it did not have adequate insight into the states, the Gulf governors also lacked insight into the operations of Northern Command.

In Northern Command’s Master Exercise Summary Report on ARDENT SENTRY/TOPOFF 3, concern was expressed that Northern Command “does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities (responders, medical systems, National Guard, etc.) and other federal capabilities (contracts, FEMA, DHHS, etc.) . . . This lack of understanding could contribute to off-target planning for potential active duty DoD roles and missions.”

DOD understands the different capabilities of Transportation Command, Forces Command, 1st Army, 5th Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Navy and role and capabilities of Joint Forces Command, Northern Command and Joint Task Force Katrina, but the Governor of Louisiana did not. In a September 19 interview with Gannett News Service, Blanco commented on the difficulties of communicating her request for troops. She said others asked, “Did you ask for this; did you ask for that[?]” It got to be a very difficult little game,” she said.

DOD and DHS have not adequately defined what is required for military assistance to civilian authorities during large disasters.

One cause of this misunderstanding is that DOD and DHS have not adequately defined what is required for military assistance to civilian authorities during large disasters. According to McHale, “It has never been the plan, nor has the Department of Defense been trained, resourced and equipped to provide a first responder capability.”

According to a September 2003 report to Congress on DOD’s role in supporting homeland security missions:

[The] Chairman [of the] Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintains visibility of National Guard assets performing homeland security missions. . . . Moreover, NORTHCOM and PACOM must have insight into state-controlled National Guard operations to facilitate coordination between Title 10 and Title 32 or State Active Duty military operations, which might be occurring in the same area, at the same time, towards a common goal. [emphasis added]

Honoré was not familiar with emergency operational procedures and personnel within the Katrina states. According to Blum, granting him a state commission without the knowledge and understanding of the state’s operational environment would not necessarily have added anything to the response. The Gulf coast governors, with their close relationships to state Adjutants General and common experiences with past emergencies, shared that view.

Admiral Keating, the Commander of Northern Command has acknowledged that there are advantages to having a National Guard officer in command of homeland response:

The advantages of using a National Guard officer during a disaster are: (1) the overwhelming majority of forces that respond to disasters are/will
be National Guard who will usually be on the scene in a state active duty status before DOD is requested to respond; (2) the NG is familiar with the local area and the local culture; (3) the NG usually has close ties with first responders such as local and state law enforcement, fire departments, etc.; and (4) the local community knows and relies upon the NG because they are part of the community. . . . NG personnel are more likely to have more experience working with local responders than the active component. A disadvantage of using a NG officer is: NG commanders might not be familiar with federal capabilities brought to the table, especially those from Navy and Marines.18

Some of the Adjutants General from the Gulf states and around the country believe the much needed integration, trust, and increased understanding by state officials of what constitutes joint military assistance would improve if Northern Command were a National Guard Command, led by an experienced National Guard officer.182

Northern Command’s mission is to “deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States.” It also has a mission to “provide defense support of civil authorities.” During a national emergency within the United States, NORTHCOM requires policies and procedures for interaction with state officials. The absence of these policies hampered the Katrina response.

The Select Committee does not believe there is a simple answer to improving state and federal integration. Local control and state sovereignty are important principles rooted in the nation’s birth that cannot be discarded merely to achieve more efficient joint military operations on American soil.

Finding: Even DOD lacked situational awareness of post-landfall conditions, which contributed to a slower response

The Department of Defense has significant assets for the collection of intelligence, as well as communications and satellite equipment needed in all military operations. These assets are at the very heart of conducting comprehensive and directed military operations around the world, and were not optimally used during the Katrina response. For example, the Select Committee found little evidence that DOD satellite imagery was used to great advantage to target relief to the hardest hit areas, nor was information resulting from DOD aerial damage assessment flights properly disseminated. Lack of a unified data collection system among DOD military and civilian personnel also forced the Department to rely on other sources.

Department of Defense documents indicated an unusual reliance on news reports to obtain information on what was happening on the ground in the days immediately following landfall. It appeared the Department also relied on the press for initial damage assessment in New Orleans. Reliance on often unsubstantiated press stories appeared to make DOD reactive instead of a leading participant in the response.

DOD e-mail and JTF Katrina Commander’s Assessments cited press as the source of the information on looting, the situation at the Superdome, other shelters, and the New Orleans Hyatt.185 E-mail from private sources to Honoré and McHale about people needing to be rescued at Xavier University and the Salvation Army Building in New Orleans were acted on. In the Xavier case, Honoré dispatched a reconnaissance team based on this
An e-mail dated August 30 from a colonel from the National Guard Bureau noted that Northern Command, First Army, and Fifth Army commanders could not make contact with the Louisiana State Adjutant General.\textsuperscript{187}

Keating stated that the biggest challenge for Northern Command was “gaining and maintaining situational awareness as to the catastrophic disaster.”\textsuperscript{188} This also came as no surprise to McHale, who commented that “early situational awareness was poor, a problem that should have been corrected following identical damage assessment challenges during Hurricane Andrew.”\textsuperscript{189}

**Finding: DOD lacked an information sharing protocol that would have enhanced joint situational awareness and communications between all military components**

According to a National Guard assessment, JTF Katrina “had limited visibility on in-transit forces” being deployed. There was no system in place to track all active duty or Guard “forces and material from ports of embarkation” through distribution.\textsuperscript{190} For example, an August 29 e-mail generated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated concern over a Navy ship that announced its deployment without legal authority or Secretary of Defense approval.\textsuperscript{191}

Information flowing up from the National Guard state headquarters or the National Guard Bureau also did not always make its way to the JTF Katrina commander. An August 31 e-mail confirmed that 1st Army and 5th Army headquarters could not communicate directly with the Louisiana Defense Coordinating Officer, which prevented the JTF Katrina commander from knowing what Guard assets were streaming into New Orleans at the time. On September 1, a general officer at NORTHCOM complained he had not been getting e-mail from the DCOs for two days.\textsuperscript{192}

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense also had problems keeping track of what DOD capabilities were being utilized and what tasks had been performed for the Homeland Defense Secretary. In a September 4 e-mail, some questions posed were:

- How many MREs have been made available by DoD? . . .
- What is the # of hospital beds on USN ships? . . .
- What is the status of aerial surveillance capability? . . .
- What is [the] status of the New Orleans Police Department?
- How linked up is the Guard with NOPD?\textsuperscript{193}

There was also a request: “Need a daily DoD roll-up matrix: What we’re doing, Who’s doing it, [and w]hat’s the progress?\textsuperscript{194}

During the TOPOFF 3 and ARDENT SENTRY 05 exercises, NORTHCOM learned that . . .

. . . . the ground rules for the channel of communications between USNORTHCOM, NGB [Joint] O[perations] C[enter] and State National Guard JOCs is largely undefined. There is not an agreement that delineates reporting responsibilities for force readiness and disaster response planning. Needed is a framework and an agreed on channel of communications to ensure the flow of information between USNORTHCOM, NGB and State National Guard JOCs is timely and complete.\textsuperscript{195}

Yet, during Katrina, the National Guard Bureau learned NORTHCOM did not standardize reporting guidelines.\textsuperscript{196} E-mails, logs, and daily briefings indicated a great flow of information between DOD component headquarters and the National Guard Bureau. There also appeared to be numerous mechanisms to assist in integrating federal and state operations. These included the establishment of a National Guard desk at the National Military Command Center, Guard representation in the Northern Command Joint Operations Center, web portals, daily conference calls, and e-mail situation updates to key leaders.\textsuperscript{197} However the Select Committee could find no
reporting requirements for sharing important information between DOD entities. Blum, however, noted that “these efforts, while effective, cannot be expected to overcome the inability of forces on the ground to effectively share information.”

Finding: Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked joint training, which contributed to the lack of coordination between active duty components

Hurricane Katrina required the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to work together in an emergency mission in the continental United States. Although skilled and trained in war-fighting missions abroad, conducting joint missions in this country, quickly, and under tremendous public pressure, posed integration challenges. One of the findings in an after action report from the Department of the Navy stated: “Service cultural issues seemed to dominate in a negative fashion.”

The core element of the JTF is formed by the 1st Army Staff. There is a perception that JTF is in essence, an Army T[ask] F[orce], with joint augmentation and that this disposition colors their decision making processes and view of the conduct of operations. . . . In a crisis, organizations play to their strengths and [tend] to disregard unfamiliar capabilities or concepts.

Retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral Jim Hull was asked by Northern Command to assess the command’s Katrina response. Hull’s observations were critical of JTF Katrina, noting that the capabilities of 1st Army headquarters, which formed the nucleus of JTF Katrina, “was not organized or resourced to operate as a Joint Task Force.” Specific challenges ranged from inexperienced personnel to lack of communications and equipment. “The JTF is an ad-hoc organization doing the best it can without the resources necessary to make it an optimal enabler,” he said. Hull noted that as Honoré made command decisions away from his headquarters, his staff was not always informed. “We track General Honoré’s location by watching CNN,” JTF Katrina staff said.

Joint Doctrine was largely ignored. In the melee of the first few days where lives literally hung in the balance, perhaps this was a necessary course of action. However, as the Active Duty Force began to develop, the JTF Katrina headquarters never transitioned from the very tactical mindset of life saving to the operational mindset of sustaining and enabling a Joint Force. Since the Forward Command Element (General Honoré) was unable to communicate, they became embroiled and distracted with the tactical and were unable to focus on even the most basic of operational issues. . . . Other units who were responding from outside the area to integrate with what was called a “Joint” task force expected certain doctrinal norms which materialized very slowly or not at all.

The report also remarked that since the JTF did not establish a commander for all land components, 1st Army, 5th Army, and the Marine Corps were unclear on JTF Katrina expectations, causing confusion and lack of coordination between land forces in New Orleans. The effects of the difficulties with creating and sustaining a truly joint effort were visible on the ground in Louisiana, especially during later evacuation efforts, and the patrolling of New Orleans parishes.
Finding: Joint task force Katrina, the National Guard, Louisiana, and Mississippi lacked needed communications equipment and the interoperability required for seamless on the ground coordination

Reliable communications were the exception in the aftermath of Katrina. Even Honoré experienced communications problems. Honoré moved into Camp Shelby before he had the communications equipment necessary to support JTF Katrina. Honoré’s staff was frustrated at the lack of communications equipment. According to a Navy after action report, “At this stage it is believed that when the commander leaves Camp Shelby in the morning and returns in the evening, the staff’s only access to communicate with him is through a borrowed Nextel cell phone and his Blackberry.” The Navy reported the USS IWO JIMA did have task force-capable communications equipment during the first ten days of the storm that would have been of great help to General Honoré.

Blum also noted that “one critical area where we lack integration is in interoperable communications. National Guard units do not have the equipment necessary to effectively share information with Title 10 forces. This caused significant challenges on the ground that then bubbled up the chains.”

At the time of Katrina, Northern Command had yet to establish standardized communications architecture or to identify the system and information requirements to be used during homeland response operations. Oxford Analytica reported:

Since September 11, emergency response planners have recognized that during a major disaster, local communications systems would be disrupted or disabled, and communication between federal, state, and local officials is a particularly weak link in coordinating emergency response. Katrina showed that little has been accomplished to fix this disconnect. Within the military, the National Guard was hindered by a shortage of communications equipment. These shortcomings suggest that the Pentagon does not assign homeland defense a sufficiently high priority.

The loss of communications infrastructure in Mississippi and Louisiana due to hurricane forces caused a great deal of confusion for days following landfall. Communication outages that occurred in state emergency offices also caused problems in situational awareness. The state Adjutant General of Mississippi on the Gulf coast could not reach the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency in Jackson until two days after landfall. When cell phones and towers were destroyed or lost power, states were not equipped with backup communications capabilities even with Guard forces. According to Cross:

One of the biggest lessons learned was the need to adequate, redundant communications systems with an emphasis on satellite backhaul capability in the event of cellular and landline failure. Obviously, this type of equipment requires resourcing. The Mississippi National Guard received $29,100 for fiscal year 2005 for Military Support to Civil Authorities. $8,000 of this amount was applied to pay the satellite phone service bill for the seven satellite phones currently on hand. In order for the Mississippi National Guard to be prepared to respond to catastrophic events, it must be funded accordingly.

The Louisiana National Guard also experienced problems with lost or weak communications infrastructure. Immediately after Hurricane Katrina passed, the Industrial Canal levee broke, flooding the National Guard headquarters at Jackson Barracks. The Guard had to abandon its headquarters operations center and establish a new one, including new communications connections, at the Superdome. Re-establishing these communications was greatly facilitated by the arrival of the state’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) and its emergency communications suite.

However, the National Guard in Louisiana was also plagued by problems with the state’s 800 MegaHertz public safety radio system, which it shares with the state’s law enforcement and other public safety agencies. State officials said this system was about 11 years old and
limited to 48 channels. They said it was not designed to handle thousands of calls, so the volume of calls after Hurricane Katrina overloaded the system. In addition, one of the state’s three 800 MegaHertz relay towers, the Buras tower in Plaquemines Parish, was toppled by the hurricane, which further degraded the capacity of the system. Louisiana National Guard officials cited the weaknesses in this system as one of the reasons they had problems communicating with the state’s Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge.

The National Guard Bureau confirmed that its liaison teams should also be deployed with significant mobile communications. The Louisiana NGB Liaison Officer was equipped with a satellite phone, which was critical during the first days of response.

Finding: EMAC processing, pre-arranged state compacts, and Guard equipment packages need improvement

Although there was a consensus among federal, state, and local officials that Emergency Mutual Assistant Compacts worked very well, the current EMAC approval process is cumbersome, and therefore not fast or suited to a large scale emergency. While initial Adjutant General to Adjutant General coordination allowed for rapid deployment of National Guard forces during Katrina, the sheer size of the emergency pointed out weaknesses in the current system.

As key communications infrastructure was taken out, the ability to negotiate state-to-state compacts became difficult, if not impossible. In the hours immediately following landfall, when it was needed most, offers of assistance from states all over the country were delayed in the EMAC process, as other states’ invaluable assets were not immediately visible to the states affected.

The National Guard Bureau stepped in to help the Gulf state Adjutants General prior to landfall, and increased its management of requests for National Guard forces throughout the response, but some states still used the standard EMAC process through the National Coordinating Committee (NCC). As both the National

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Guard Bureau and the NCC tried to anticipate requests, this dual track approach for requesting troops caused confusion and duplicated efforts. Better coordination between the NGB and the NCC was needed.

In addition, not all National Guard personnel are trained in the EMAC process. Louisiana National Guard officers seemed to lack the knowledge and experience necessary to manage the tremendous surge of requests for assistance, as well as field offers from other states under EMAC. This inexperience was one of the reasons the National Guard Bureau played an unusually large role in the EMAC process.

More familiarity with the EMAC procedures and assets by Northern Command and other federal forces would also have enhanced joint response efforts and given them a better appreciation of National Guard capabilities.

Finding: Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected the National Guard response

Needed equipment and manpower

The Army National Guard relied heavily on its aviation units and found that helicopter hoist-equipped aircraft resulted in immediate and successful search and rescue operations. Current Army doctrine, however, does not provide sufficient numbers of hoist-equipped aircraft to its Guard counterpart, nor stage them regionally to support responses to events of significant size. For example, the Mississippi National Guard needed more airlift and helicopters immediately. Cross suggested pre-arranged state compacts for hurricane assets, especially search and rescue aviation assets, would make these assets more readily available and not run the risk they could not be obtained through EMAC requests.
The Air National Guard also relied heavily on its airlift capabilities during Hurricane Katrina. The Air National Guard flew 351 missions with C-130s between August 30 and September 6. Air National Guard personnel reported that:

The C-130 is the ANG work horse, moving equipment for the National Guard such as CST’s, EMEDS, and civil engineering equipment into areas with moderate to heavy infrastructure damage…the Guard can’t have enough of them for responding to major homeland emergencies…they are essential.

New aircraft like the C-17 are better suited to carry over-size equipment such as the Rapid Engineer Deployable Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) Squadrons, but the limited number of C-17s in inventory require its use to take care of war fighting requirements overseas. This 404-person mobile construction squadron does it all: rapid damage assessment, repair, contingency heavy construction operations such as roads and ramps. Red Horse Squadrons were invaluable during Katrina.

At the time of Katrina’s landfall, Northern Command had not yet articulated specific requirements or capabilities that National Guard forces need during major homeland disasters. Without established formal requirements, the equipment deemed necessary for the National Guard to assist civilian authorities in Katrina had not been purchased by the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force. The military departments only establish units and procure equipment for which formal mission requirements have been validated, like Title 10 warfighting missions abroad. Northern Command has yet to determine — with or without input from DHS — which specific military assets should be dedicated to provide military assistance to civilian authorities, in part because DHS has not articulated the requirement to DOD in any formal manner. Therefore, at the present time, DOD does not require the purchase of equipment specifically for homeland defense or military assistance to civilian authorities for the National Guard.

Attempts to rent needed equipment were complicated by the great demand for heavy machinery created by the storm. Cross noted that contractors responding to other federal, state, and local requests for assistance leased the same type of equipment sought by the National Guard, leaving little available for National Guard use.

In a National Guard After Action Review dated September 2005, it was strongly recommended that the Department of Defense “identify the Continental United States mission as a valid requirement and equip it as a valid tasking.”

“I was there. I saw what needed to be done. They were the fastest, best capable, most appropriate force to get there in the time allowed. And that’s what it’s all about.” General Blum

Hurricane Katrina required significant National Guard manpower, and quickly. With the current level of 457,000 personnel in the National Guard, the Katrina response demonstrated the Guard response was not hindered by the deployment of Guard troops to support the War on Terrorism. According to Blum, although National Guard from the affected states were deployed overseas, Guardsmen from surrounding, and then other states quickly supplemented the effort. At landfall, over 40 percent of the Mississippi Guard, some 4,200 troops, were deployed overseas. Fortunately, critical engineering units and military police units were home. In Louisiana, Blanco asked for the immediate return of Louisiana National Guard troops from Iraq, but the National Guard Bureau was satisfied it could provide sufficient troops from other states to meet the needs of Louisiana more quickly than trying to extract Louisiana troops from combat operations in Iraq. The Joint Staff and Center for Army Lessons Learned were very impressed at the ability of the Guard to mobilize and move a Corps worth of personnel and equipment in four days.

Nonetheless, organizational challenges surfaced in this rapid deployment. The National Guard forces flowing
into the staging areas at Alexandria, Louisiana, and to the Naval Air Station New Orleans at Belle Chasse arrived so quickly that the number of Guardsmen assigned to process and task these units was too small. The capabilities of each unit were not readily known by the logistics personnel tasking officers, causing further delays.

A lack of well defined personnel and equipment packages by the Department of Defense to support civilian authorities in large disasters degraded instant tasking of units deployed to Louisiana. General DOD development of regional strike forces composed of various National Guard units would have done a great deal to mitigate the effects of a large natural disaster or other catastrophic event: “Hurricane equipment packages for the Guard should be developed by the Department of Defense to help them provide more adequate assistance to civilian authorities in the future, Cross said.”

Current law hindered some congressionally mandated National Guard Civil Support Teams’ response

Congress established WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs) to deploy rapidly to assist local incident commanders in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. The first 10 teams were funded as part of the National Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1999. Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who are federally resourced, trained, and exercised in chemical, biological, and nuclear specialties, and skilled in reconnaissance, medical support, logistics, administration, communications, air liaison, and security.

In these capacities, especially the use of their communications vehicles, the National Guard CSTs proved invaluable to the Katrina response. On September 2, a JTF Katrina official relayed a report from the National Guard Bureau that CSTs from Connecticut, North Carolina, Nebraska, Utah, Arkansas, West Virginia, Indiana, Kansas, Alabama, and the District of Columbia were on route to the Gulf Coast.

During Katrina, there was confusion regarding the legal aspects of CST deployment, as some states interpreted the law to mean they were only authorized to be used for WMD incidents, and only in their states. This interpretation delayed deployment of these vehicles to Mississippi. Lieutenant Colonel Smithson of the Mississippi National Guard said, “CSTs saved the day, I just wish they were here sooner.” Clarifying that they are available for use beyond WMD events would have greatly enhanced states abilities to react quickly to the Katrina disaster.

Guard personnel categories caused confusion

Multiple types of duty status of National Guard personnel presented some legal challenges in the proper employment of forces. State military lawyers interpreted laws, regulations, and policies pertaining to the various statuses and units of assignment very differently, which caused unnecessary delays. Delays in the Title 32 approval process, previously identified, added to the difficulty. The National Guard Bureau May 23, 2005 after action report on TOPOFF 3 found:

As highlighted in Operation Winter Freeze, [the Democratic National Convention, the Republican National Convention] and [the] G-8 summit, and further during Ardent Sentry 05 events, the Title 10/Title 32 approval process must be standardized. Current process is lengthy, largely undefined, and requires excessive time periods for approval.

E-mails from various state Adjutants General began to arrive at the National Guard Bureau immediately after landfall inquiring about changing all Guard response to Title 32. The National Guard Bureau agreed with these suggestions and began to actively discuss this status change with the Department of Defense. On September 2, 4 and 5 respectively, Governor Riley of Alabama, Governor Barbour of Mississippi, and Governor Blanco of Louisiana wrote to the Secretary of Defense to formally ask that all National Guard personnel responding in their states be put on Title 32, Chapter 9, a new operational section of Title 32 that allows for the National Guard to perform homeland missions under governor control.

The Select Committee believes the Guard response in Katrina would have been more effective had the decision to place National Guard troops in Title 32 status been made earlier by the governors, the National Guard Bureau, and the Secretary of Defense.
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Lack of unified DOD support for enhanced Guard resources under Title 32

A September 10 NGB e-mail to Blum indicated frustration at the lack of understanding by the Army and Air Force and some DOD offices of Title 32 and the resources that were to flow to the National Guard of states participating in the Katrina response. Currently, there are no clear directives for the use of Title 32 National Guard homeland missions, so the confusion was not unexpected. The e-mail indicates, however, that some officials in DOD did not totally embrace the use of Title 32 during the Katrina response. The e-mail stated specifically that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Craig Duehring, expressed that Title 32 would only apply to the three affected states; that Service Secretaries must get approval from the Deputy Secretary of Personnel and Readiness before issuing any orders; and that the Office of Reserve Affairs will “run this” and have a matrix of needed information that will be required before any consideration is given to funding of Guard activities. Even though the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved use of Title 32 on September 7, uncertainty within the Pentagon on Title 32 parameters, required the National Guard Bureau to ensure Title 32 status for those states who had rushed in to help.

Finding: Search and rescue operations were a tremendous success, but coordination and integration between the military services, the National Guard, the Coast Guard, and other local, state, and federal rescue organizations was lacking

“During the first four days, no single organization or agency was in charge of providing a coordinated effort for rescue operations.”

Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, NORTHERN COMMAND

Lack of training for Military Assistance to Law Enforcement (MSCLEA)

Before the storm, the Louisiana National Guard opened the Superdome for evacuees with a minimal number of staff, many of whom were not military police or formally trained for crowd control operations. On Monday night, August 29, when an increased number of Louisiana National Guard arrived at the Superdome, they found many Guard personnel working at checkpoints alone, with no hand held radios, and unarmed. Though the crowd was generally peaceful, even when the plumbing failed, these soldiers were in a volatile situation they were not trained to handle. An Army National Guard after action report dated December 21 found these Guard personnel were not properly trained to respond to areas where there are a large number of civilians, resulting in risk to their safety and the safety of others. McHale indicated the Pentagon is interested in enhanced training for National Guard in this homeland role. “I think we will be looking at formalizing the training, equipment and deployment capability associated with National Guard military police units,” McHale said.

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Urban search and rescue operations are multi-agency in nature and no standardized federal system currently exists to effectively integrate operations. The lack of a coordination mechanism and standardized processes led to duplication of effort in some locations.
and a lack of response in others. Each military entity relied on its own airspace coordinators during the first critical days, which also contributed to a lack of awareness of who was doing what.

In New Orleans, the Louisiana National Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard maintained separate tactical operations centers for airborne search and rescue missions. The National Guard had its tactical operations center with Task Force Eagle at the Superdome, and the Coast Guard had its tactical operations center at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station. The two entities divided up areas and ran separate operations.

Because of the urgent emphasis on getting victims to high ground, the drop-off points were not well coordinated. While some were dropped off at the Superdome (which provided shelter, food, and water), others were dropped off at the Convention Center (which provided only shelter), and others were dropped off on freeway overpasses or levees (with nothing at all). The philosophy at that point was to save first, then worry later about providing other relief.²⁵⁶ This situation resulted in people being saved from the floodwaters, but then suffering — some for days — in sweltering conditions with or without food and water. ■
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30 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 17.

31 See Blum, James, Vaughn Interview; National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005; Nicole Gauotte, et al., Government’s Response Plan Proves to be a Disaster, STAMFORD ADVOCATE, Sept. 15, 2005 at A1.

32 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 17.


34 E-mail correspondence from Jon Sims, DOD Office of General Counsel to Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary for Defense for Homeland Defense (attached Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization, Consent, and Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF Katrina) (Sept. 2, 2005) (11:45 p.m.).


41 Dec. 19, 2005 Blum, James, Vaughn Interview; National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 24.

42 Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Francis Harvey, Secretary of the Army, and Acting Secretary of the Air Force (Sept. 7, 2005).

43 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 29.

44 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing [written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-NORTHCOM].

45 See NGB, Chief’s Battle Update Brief Covers 04 1400 September 2005, (Sept. 4, 2005); NGB, Chiefs Battle Update Brief Covers 01 September 2005, (Sept. 1, 2005).


47 See Mississippi National Guard, Hurricane Katrina August 2005-November 2005 [hereinafter “Mississippi National Guard Daily Logs”].

48 Blum, James, and Vaughn Interview.


51 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 14-15.

52 E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Scott Mayes, 1st Air Force, Command and Control, to Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-NORTHCOM, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (2:40 p.m.).


54 E-mail correspondence from Fletcher Thornton, Joint Operations Center, HQ, First U.S. Army (Sept. 2, 2005).

55 See NGB, Chief’s Battle Update Brief, Covers 04 1400 September 2005; Louisiana National Guard, Overview, Hurricane Recovery, Focus of Effort.


57 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lt. Col. Jacques Thibodeaux, LA National Guard [hereinafter Thibodeaux Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005); Dabadie Interview.

58 Id.

59 Email correspondence from Angela Copple, EMAC Coordinator, National Emergency Management Association regarding numbers of personnel assisting by State (Nov. 3, 2005) (2:49 p.m.).

60 Alabama National Guard, Hurricane Katrina Binder, at Tab 1, p. 3-4, and Tab 4.


62 Alabama National Guard, Hurricane Katrina Binder, at Tab 1 at p. 6, and Tab 4.

63 Id. at Tab 4.


See Id.


Dec. 19, 2005 Army National Guard Binder.


Operation Secure Magnolia Presentation.


Dabadie Interview; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Sheriff, Plaquemines Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005); Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Homeland Security Director of New Orleans, in New Orleans, LA [hereinafter Ebbert Interview] (Nov. 9, 2005); Lokey Interview.

Thibodeaux Interview; Ebbert Interview.


E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, USAF, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, to Thomas Kuster, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy, et al. (Sept. 2, 2005) (9:38 a.m.).


E-mail correspondence from Paul McNalle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS (Sept. 2, 2005) (7:41 p.m.).

DOD, MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina, signed by Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (Sept. 3, 2005).

E-mail correspondence from Paul McNalle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS (Sept. 2, 2005) (7:41 p.m.).


Buikema Interview; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Michael Lowder, Director of Response Division, FEMA, in Washington, DC (Jan. 5, 2006).

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“The members of the public safety community aggressively moved into areas immediately after the storm passed and saved many lives and brought order. This was a very difficult mission as much of the public safety infrastructure, police and sheriff’s stations, patrol cars, and communications had been destroyed in the coastal communities.”

WILLIAM L. CARWILE, III
Hurricane Katrina Federal Coordination Officer for Mississippi
Select Committee hearing, December 7, 2005
The collapse of law enforcement and the lack of effective public communications led to civil unrest and further delayed relief.

Summary

A wide variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence in areas hit by Hurricane Katrina. Lack of food, water, and electricity. Uncertainty about evacuations. Even the loss of hope. Looting occurred in several locations. In some cases, people looted stores for their survival and to diminish suffering, taking items such as food, water, clothing, flashlights, batteries, and camping supplies. At least some police departments were involved in breaking into stores and commandeering supplies needed for their departments, as well as those needed for feeding people in shelters before state or federal assistance arrived. One New Orleans physician said police helped him break into a pharmacy to get needed medications and supplies. In other cases, people looted for purely criminal purposes, apparently taking items for personal use or resale that would not be needed or were useless without electricity (e.g., televisions).

General unrest and lawlessness arose in crowded areas where people were uncertain about their survival, or rescue, or prospects for evacuation. In some areas, the collapse or absence of law enforcement exacerbated the level of lawlessness and violence. Several police departments lost dispatch and communication capabilities, police vehicles, administrative functions such as booking, and jails to confine arrested suspects. Tremendous additional burdens were imposed on the police, like search and rescue operations, that took priority over normal police functions. The extent of crime and lawlessness is difficult to determine, partly because of the loss of police record keeping during the disaster and partly because of unsubstantiated reporting by the media.

The breakdown of law enforcement was particularly notable in New Orleans. Despite the well-known threat from flooding, the New Orleans Police Department had not taken basic steps to protect its resources and ensure continuity of operations. For example, communications nodes, evidence rooms, and even emergency generators were housed in lower floors susceptible to flooding. When the levees broke and the floodwaters overtook police headquarters and district offices, the department lost its command and control and communications functions. Police vehicles believed to be moved out of harm’s way were lost to the floodwaters. Hundreds of New Orleans Police Department officers went missing — some for legitimate reasons and some not — at a time they were needed most. This left the city unable to provide enough manpower and other resources to maintain law and order at shelters and on the streets.

Looting broke out in the downtown section of the city, particularly along Canal Street. There were also reports, currently under investigation by the Louisiana Attorney General, that New Orleans police officers were involved in stealing vehicles from a car dealership. Even when police were present to restore law and order, they did not have the resources to arrest, book, and detain suspects. Other parts of the city, according to witnesses, were relatively calm despite the lack of law enforcement personnel.

Public communications is a key aspect of emergency management, and this function has its own emergency support function in the NRP. In Louisiana, and particularly
New Orleans, the federal, state, and local governments did not appear to have a public communications strategy to utilize the media. This problem was particularly severe in the area of law enforcement and crime. While the media played a positive role in many aspects — such as providing situational awareness to government authorities — it also played a negative role in the often unsubstantiated reporting of crime and lawlessness, undermining the accuracy and value of that awareness.

Media reports of violence often gave credence to rumors that were either false or highly exaggerated. Public officials did not have a strategy to get ahead of the “information curve” to use the media to the public’s advantage and help quell rumors. In fact, Mayor Ray Nagin and the Chief of Police repeated rumors of rampant criminality to the national media, contributing to the exaggerated image of utter lawlessness. Many of these reports, particularly of unchecked violence in the Superdome, appear to have been unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, the hyped media coverage of violence and lawlessness, legitimized by New Orleans authorities, served to delay relief efforts by scaring away truck and bus drivers, increasing the anxiety of those in shelters, and generally increasing the resources that needed to be dedicated to security.

Law and order were eventually restored as local law enforcement officers were removed from search and rescue, reassigned to law enforcement missions, and supplemented first by state National Guard troops, then by other state and local police through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process. The National Guard played a substantial role in providing security and restoring law and order. The Louisiana National Guard was deployed before landfall, and provided security at the Superdome that helped maintain order there. Once looting broke out in New Orleans, guardsmen also patrolled the streets to restore law and order.

The Alabama National Guard was also deployed before landfall, providing a security task force for Mobile and Baldwin counties. National Guards from other states sent units through the EMAC process to perform security or law enforcement duties. For example, Arkansas provided 310 guardsmen from a military police company to provide security in Mississippi.

While not immediately deployed, Department of Defense (DOD) active duty forces also played a role in restoring and maintaining law and order. For example, the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne arrived in New Orleans on September 3 (five days after landfall) and, according to the city’s Director of Homeland Security, had a “calming effect” on the populace by their mere presence on the street. Precautions were taken to prevent DOD active duty forces from direct law enforcement missions, thereby avoiding Posse Comitatus issues.

Civilian law enforcement agencies from other states and localities also provided personnel through the EMAC process to supplement beleaguered state and local police. For example, South Carolina provided 118 law enforcement personnel with equipment to Mississippi.

Federal law enforcement agencies also played a major role in restoring law and order after Hurricane Katrina. Specific agencies included the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the U.S. Marshal Service (USMS), the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). The first priority for most of these agencies was implementing continuity of operations plans — locating their people, securing their workplaces and sensitive information, getting supplemental manpower from other field offices, and otherwise fully restoring their mission capabilities. These federal agencies then turned to assisting state and local law enforcement agencies.

These agencies brought a wide array of capabilities and tactical teams to help restore and maintain law and order. Most of the federal personnel were deputized as state law enforcement officials, so they could fully partner with local police by participating in patrols, investigating crimes, and arresting suspects. The FBI deployed its Critical Incident Response Group and ATF deployed one of its Special Response Teams. ATF located and inspected federal firearms and explosives licensees to determine if their facilities were secure. USMS assisted with evacuating prisoners from flooded jails into federal facilities. FAMS provided security at the New Orleans Airport.
Federal agencies also helped establish interagency and intergovernmental mechanisms — such as common credentialing and a Law Enforcement Coordination Center — to coordinate the activities of the multitude of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Finally, these federal agencies provided equipment, supplies, and other resources to local law enforcement agencies to help them start rebuilding their capabilities.

Finding: A variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence in hurricane stricken areas

Several conditions led to lawlessness and looting

A wide variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence in areas hit by Hurricane Katrina. Bobby Strahan, Pearl River County Emergency Management Agency Director, said the lack of critical commodities for those residents who did not evacuate (or returned quickly) and crowds seeking shelter at a limited number of facilities with generators may have been behind some of the post-landfall requests for security and law enforcement assistance. According to Strahan, Pearl River experienced some looting and other crimes in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Once the county was able to secure and distribute limited amounts of food, ice, and water (what it could gather on its own plus assistance from the state of Florida), these security problems largely dissipated.

Similarly, those who did not evacuate (or returned quickly) may have contributed to significant security challenges at some of Mississippi’s healthcare facilities in the affected areas. According Dr. Brian Amy, the State Health Officer of Mississippi, most of those facilities had generators and a limited power supply. This caused them to quickly attract the attention of displaced residents, who were drawn to the lights and the possibility they might seek shelter there, and created what Amy termed an “overflow” situation resulting in security issues at the facilities. In Louisiana, officials cited the lack of food, water, electricity, and uncertainty about evacuations as reasons for lawlessness and looting. Even Governor Kathleen Blanco said she sympathized with people who looted stores to survive.

Looting occurred in several locations. Mississippi experienced some looting, armed robbery, and crowd control problems immediately after the storm. Security-related requests the state received from local officials included: (1) nighttime military police (MP) security at pharmacy and drug dispensing operations in several coastal cities; (2) help with security issues at an understaffed shelter that was about to receive evacuees from New Orleans; (3) law enforcement personnel to deal with reported theft and carjacking threats at a medical center in Biloxi; and (4) additional National Guard protection to deal with looters at the South Mississippi Regional Center in Long Beach.

In Louisiana, state police officials said looting was most concentrated in the New Orleans area. However, major looting was generally limited to the Canal Street area and ended by Tuesday, August 30. According to these officials, in some cases people looted stores for their survival, taking items such as food, water, clothing, flashlights, batteries, and camping supplies. In other cases, people looted for criminal purposes, apparently taking items for their personal use or resale that would not be needed or were useless without electricity (e.g., televisions). Once most perpetrators realized they had no way to transport their loot and no place to store it, they often abandoned it. State police officials said several blocks away from the looting area, many large electronic items and appliances were found abandoned in their original boxes.

At least some police departments were involved in breaking into stores and taking supplies. Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Jiff Hingle said his officers broke into stores and commandeered food, water, and medicine. Some of these items were needed to sustain the sheriff’s office and other emergency personnel. Most of the items taken,
However, were food and medical items for the growing population at the parish’s designated shelter of last resort. The shelter had been originally set up to house the police, other emergency workers, and those with special needs. However, after landfall, the shelter became crowded with additional evacuees or people rescued by boat. Eventually the numbers increased to about 400, and since state and federal relief was slow in arriving, the sheriff’s officers commandeered needed items. The sheriff said he later contacted the stores and asked for forgiveness, which was granted under the circumstances.

In Alabama, there were almost no reports of lawlessness, looting, or other crimes. Officials said this was because Hurricane Katrina did not hit Alabama as hard as it hit the other states. In addition, Alabama’s law enforcement infrastructure was not as severely damaged and remained functional in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane.

General unrest and violence occurred in crowded areas

General unrest and lawlessness arose primarily in crowded areas where people were uncertain about their survival, or rescue, or prospects for evacuation. For example, local officials in Mississippi asked the state to send National Guard soldiers to provide security and crowd control at a Red Cross shelter because of “chaotic conditions” and the shelter director’s belief that help was needed to prevent “potential behavioral problems.” Some of the most notorious locations for unrest were in New Orleans, at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the Cloverleaf, as discussed in the EVACUATION chapter. The conditions at the Superdome, as described in a National Guard report, illustrate the desperation felt by the crowd inside:

The water pressure declined steadily over the first several days and failed to provide toilet function on or about Wednesday the 31st of August. Unfortunately, many of the toilets had overflowed by then and foot traffic distributed fecal material and urine throughout the facility…The warm temperature, combined with the floodwaters on the lower level, rotting food and other refuse, human and animal (pets) waste material, and the aroma of unwashed humans, produced an increasingly noxious smell in the place.

Louisiana National Guard personnel said a lack of hope was also a factor in the Superdome with the crowd becoming restless and, in isolated incidents, violent. These people had lost their homes and belongings, had to suffer unbearable conditions, and were uncertain about their future. Exacerbating the problem were continuing delays in getting buses to evacuate the Superdome, as discussed in the EVACUATION chapter. After people had been told for several days they would be evacuated the next day, the buses did not arrive in large numbers, and people did not see any progress.

The collapse or absence of law enforcement exacerbated lawlessness

In some areas, the collapse or absence of law enforcement exacerbated the level of lawlessness and violence. For example, several police departments lost their dispatch and communication functions, police vehicles, administrative functions such as booking, and jails to confine arrested suspects. Tremendous additional burdens were imposed on the police — such as search and rescue — that took priority over normal police missions.
In Mississippi, massive damage to police and sheriff cars and stations, emergency response vehicles, and emergency operations centers made it very difficult to maintain law and order. According to William Carwile, the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, much of this public safety infrastructure was destroyed in the coastal counties. Mayor Thomas Longo of Waveland said the city staged at various points around the area some of the resources it expected to need to respond to the storm’s damage, including dump trucks and front-end loaders. Waveland also staged some of these resources about 10 miles north of the city as a backup in the event of a catastrophe. Nonetheless, despite those preparations, the hurricane destroyed the resources Waveland had staged north of the city as well as much of what remained in the city itself. Waveland lost all of its police cars (in addition to other emergency vehicles), and the storm destroyed all of Waveland’s public buildings, severely limiting its ability to mount a response to the storm.

Also in Mississippi, Hancock County lost its emergency operations center — the location from which it expected to manage the county’s response to the storm — to severe flooding soon after the hurricane hit. Pearl River County lost its emergency operations center in the early hours of the storm due to wind and water damage that knocked out its emergency backup generator and caused other damage, making the center inoperable. These losses degraded the ability to maintain law and order.

In Louisiana, there were similar losses of law enforcement infrastructure, in both rural and urban areas, that weakened the law enforcement community’s ability to function. The lack of preparation and almost total loss of police capabilities in New Orleans are addressed in the next finding.

Plaquemines Parish, in contrast to New Orleans, appeared to take many precautions before Katrina made landfall. According to Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Jiff Hingle, all police vehicles were moved and parked on high ground. Only one or two vehicles were slightly damaged when flying debris cracked their windows. Before landfall, the sheriff’s office gathered all administrative records, loaded them into U-Haul trailers, and moved them to safe locations in the north. In addition, Plaquemines Parish evacuated all its prisoners in advance to upstate facilities.

After landfall, the Plaquemines Parish sheriff’s office was immediately able to conduct search and rescue missions, along with some embedded Louisiana National Guard and Coast Guard personnel who had radios. The sheriff reported no major law enforcement issues, in part because his office could function immediately after the storm.

The full extent of crime and lawlessness is difficult to determine, partly because of the loss of police record-keeping during the disaster, and partly because of unsubstantiated reporting by the media (discussed below).

Finding: The New Orleans Police Department was ill prepared for continuity of operations and lost almost all effectiveness

New Orleans Police Department had not prepared for flooding

The collapse of law enforcement was particularly notable in New Orleans. Despite the well-known threat from flooding, the New Orleans Police Department had not taken some basic steps to protect its resources and ensure continuity of operations. For example, communications nodes, evidence rooms, and even emergency generators were housed in lower floors that were susceptible to flooding.

In 2004, the police department reportedly produced an “elaborate hurricane plan” which was issued to all commanders. But, according to a reporter who was present during Katrina and reviewed police operations, it “stayed on their bookshelves,” and the department never ran “exercises to familiarize officers with the plan.” Few officers the reporter spoke with even knew the plan existed.
When the levees broke, the floodwaters overtook police headquarters and district offices. As a result, the department lost its command and control and communications functions. The dispatch and 911 call center ceased to function. Most police vehicles had not been moved out of harm’s way and were lost to the floodwaters. The flooding created impassable roads which prevented the New Orleans Police Department from using their few remaining vehicles in most parts of the city. This left officers to patrol without any communications or transportation. With no command and control or guidance, there was no unified command or clear priorities within the department. One reporter who was on the scene wrote that "As an institution... the New Orleans Police Department disintegrated with the first drop of floodwater."\(^{24}\)

**Missing police officers led to a law enforcement manpower shortage**

Further, hundreds of New Orleans Police Department officers went missing — some for understandable reasons and some not — at a time they were needed the most. This left the city unable to provide enough manpower and other resources to maintain law and order at shelters and on the streets.

All New Orleans Police Department officers are required to reside within the city limits, so a majority of the city’s officers were personally affected by Katrina.\(^ {25}\) Whether it was damage to their homes or the health and safety of family members, many New Orleans Police Department officers, like members of the general public, were trapped in their homes and needed to be rescued during the critical days and hours after the levees failed and the flood waters rose.

Dereliction of duty by New Orleans Police Officers factored significantly into the department’s inability to marshal an effective response. Original reports indicated that up to 320 officers (of its 1,750-officer force) resigned, were terminated, or are under investigation for abandoning their duties.\(^{26}\) However, on December 14, Mayor Nagin testified that as of that date, 133 officers had been terminated or resigned after Hurricane Katrina, and said many of the original reports did not account for nearly 100 officers who were trapped or stranded on rooftops and unable to report to duty for that reason.\(^ {27}\) Regardless, the New Orleans Police force was severely depleted.

As a result, many residents were unable to obtain police assistance. Calls for help to the city's 911 system went unanswered.\(^ {28}\)

Some of the officers were also apparently involved in criminal activities. Officials from the Louisiana Attorney General’s office said they are investigating thefts of luxury vehicles from a car dealership allegedly perpetrated by New Orleans Police Department officers.\(^ {29}\) The dealership, Sewell Cadillac Chevrolet, reported that several police officers had absconded with several brand new Cadillac Escalades.\(^ {30}\)

The Louisiana State Police provided relatively quick assistance. Although the New Orleans Police Department had lost its command and control capabilities, the Louisiana State Police operated under its own broad law enforcement statutory mandate. Thus, state police were able to move into the affected area quickly. As the significance of Katrina became evident, state police ceased other law enforcement activities to focus on New Orleans’ needs.
Police had limited resources to stop looting in downtown New Orleans

Given the situation, police had limited resources with which to stop the looting. And even when police were present to restore law and order, they did not have the resources to arrest, book, and detain suspects. One major problem was the loss of the booking and jail systems. Booking and jailing are done not by the New Orleans Police Department, but by the parish criminal sheriff. Sheriffs in each parish are constitutional positions independent from the parish president or mayor or police. The sheriff’s booking offices and jails were flooded and therefore useless. While criminals, such as looters, could be apprehended by law enforcement officers, there was nowhere to book them or jail them. Many people originally apprehended for looting were just let go.

Finding: Lack of a government public communications strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated public concerns and further delayed relief

Governments appeared to lack any public communications strategy and media and public officials fed rumors

Public communications is a key aspect of emergency management, and this function has its own emergency support function in the NRP. In Louisiana, and particularly New Orleans, the federal, state, and local governments did not appear to have a public communications strategy to deal with the media. This problem was particularly severe in the area of law enforcement and crime.

The media played a positive role in Hurricane Katrina in many aspects — such as providing situational awareness to government authorities and the public. And many media reports of violence were substantiated and responsibly reported. For example, MSNBC provided live coverage of looters, including police officers, ransacking a local Wal-Mart in New Orleans.

However, other media reports were based on rumors that were either false or highly exaggerated, undermining the value of the situational awareness being provided. CNN reported repeatedly on September 1, for example, that evacuations at the Superdome were suspended because “someone fired a shot at a helicopter.” State and local officials later said much of the “rampant shooting” reported was actually from trapped individuals who were firing weapons into the air to attract rescuers.

According to state officials, rumors and reports of people shooting at helicopters were difficult to substantiate at the time. But in the end, there were no bullet holes found in any helicopters. Again, people firing into the air may have been the origin of this rumor. Other reports of people shooting at helicopters taking patients to hospitals were never verified, nor were stories of two babies found with their throats slit in Convention Center bathrooms or of the man who heard a rape victim scream, ran outside for help, and was shot and killed by troops.

State law enforcement officials expressed frustration over media reports of crime. Many of these officials
said the media greatly exaggerated reports of crime and lawlessness. They said any reports from the Superdome and Convention Center were generally difficult to substantiate. Few crime victims ever came forward to the police. Without an official complaint, victim, or eye witness, it was nearly impossible for the police to assess the credibility of rumors or conduct an investigation. On September 1, during a FEMA videoconference call, FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer, William Lokey, stated that “media reports and what we are getting from on-scene were contradictory and we [did not] have a clear picture of what exactly went on.”

Managing the spread of false or highly exaggerated rumors proved difficult – and consequential — for officials on the ground. On September 1, Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, told public officials that “the rumor control on this thing is going to be key… some of the things you hear, some of it has probably partial basis in fact, but there’s a lot of exaggeration going on there.” False media reports impeded the relief effort and affected decisions on where to direct resources. When asked whether exaggerated media reports impeded rescue efforts, Colonel Terry J. Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security, City of New Orleans, responded “absolutely.” Mayor Nagin testified that “dealing with the realities of all the multiplicity of challenges that we had, managing rumors, was the thing that we spent way too much time doing.”

At the strategic level, public officials did not have a strategy to get ahead of the “information curve” to use the media to the public’s advantage and quell rumors. On the contrary, Mayor Nagin and the New Orleans Chief of Police repeated unsubstantiated rumors before the national media, creating an exaggerated image of utter lawlessness.

New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin told Oprah Winfrey that “hundreds of armed gang members” were raping women and committing murder in the Superdome. The occupants, he said, were “in an almost animalistic state… in that frickin’ Superdome for five days watching dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people, raping people.” Many news outlets also covered Nagin’s claim that the city’s death toll would top 10,000.

Police Superintendent Eddie Compass went further, and told Oprah, “We had little babies in there getting raped.” Compass was also reported as saying officers were shot at inside the convention center but couldn’t return fire “because of the families.” He said officers caught 30 suspects by rushing at muzzle flashes.

Many of these media reports, particularly of rampant violence in the Superdome, appear to be completely unsubstantiated. National Guard officials who were on the scene believe these reports were highly exaggerated. Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, stated “the media is not supposed to be inciting an insurrection. It is not supposed to be advertising and hyping lawlessness.” National Guard officials said there were numerous reports and rumors of rape or assault, but guardsmen and police could not find any witness, victim, or anyone willing to report the crime firsthand. Only two arrests were made by the police. Of the six deaths in the Superdome, none were crime-related. Guard officials said there were only 50 weapons found among the 25,000 to 30,000 people searched as they entered the Superdome. According to the Guard and police, the people in the Superdome were very unhappy and anxious, but they were never out of control. The exaggerated media reports of violence (which some of the evacuees had picked up on their transistor radios) served to further evacuees’ anxiety, pushing some close to the boiling point.

Like the Superdome, there were media reports of violence and lawlessness in the Convention Center. For example, the Times-Picayune reported that Guard troops found 30 to 40 decomposing bodies piled in a freezer at the Convention Center. But again, these reports were generally uncorroborated. There were only four dead bodies recovered from the Convention Center. The National Guard officials that secured the site said they encountered no lawlessness or any resistance when
they moved in to clear out the Convention Center. As an indication of the generally peaceful intentions of the crowd, they reported there were only 13 weapons found among the 19,000 people searched before they boarded the buses.

NOPD Captain Jeff Winn said, however, he made several approaches to the Convention Center during those first few days and saw muzzle flashes. He also suggested crime went unreported because of the continuing danger in the Convention Center, the lack of law enforcement resources to investigate and detain suspects, and the dispersal of witnesses when the evacuation of the facility was complete. He also reported he saw a body with puncture wounds.

Exaggerated media reports of crime further delayed relief efforts

The hyped media coverage of violence and lawlessness, legitimized by New Orleans authorities, served to delay relief efforts by scaring away truck and bus drivers, increasing the anxiety of those in shelters, and generally increasing the resources needed for security. With regard to the impact of the media reports on the hurricane recovery, Lieutenant General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, testified:

They [the media reports] also prevented truck drivers coming in with the most needed supplies, water, food, ice, shelter, medicine. They were afraid to come in. They had to be escorted in by National Guard convoys, which took other manpower away from the relief efforts to go help get the commercial truckers that the civilian organizations had contracted to come in and help the people. They delayed the exact commodities from getting to the people that they were complaining weren't getting the commodities.

State officials reported the hysterical and uncontrolled media images led to much confusion. As the broadcast media reports became widely seen and heard, the Superdome population became increasingly agitated. Reports of truck drivers and FEMA employees turning around due to security concerns did not help the situation. First Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Gachassin said those in lesser affected neighborhoods were afraid to evacuate as looting fears prompted them to stay at their residences. Similarly, the Governor's Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin reported that 1,000 FEMA employees set to arrive in New Orleans on Wednesday, August 31, turned back due to security concerns. In repeating unsubstantiated rumors of mayhem, news reporters unwittingly helped slow an already slow response and further wound an already wounded population.

Finding: EMAC and military assistance were critical for restoring law and order

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the state to state assistance compact, facilitated the deployment of resources to the hardest hit regions

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a mutual aid agreement and partnership between states to provide resources to one another during times of emergency. EMAC offers state to state assistance during governor-declared states of emergency. Ratified by Congress in 1996, 49 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation to become members of EMAC. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). NEMA provides the day to day managerial support and technical infrastructure for EMAC operations and training programs. EMAC works as follows:

1. Governor declares a state of emergency.
2. A representative from the state emergency management agency notifies the EMAC National Coordinating Group.
3. Affected state requests an EMAC team to be
deployed to its emergency operations center. This EMAC team is called an “A-Team.”

4. A-Team arrives at state emergency operations center and begins coordinating state-wide EMAC resource requests. These resource requests are broadcast to all members of the compact soliciting assistance.

5. States willing to assist respond to the broadcast and coordinate with the A-Team the specifics of the transaction, including costs. The A-Team helps the affected state choose from available resources.

6. Formal requisitions are finalized specifying, as precisely as possible, the resources that will be made available and their costs.

7. Resources are sent to the affected states.

8. Responding state submits reimbursement request.


EMAC is executed by eight components:

1. Requesting state – EMAC state, operating under a governor declared emergency, requests assistance.

2. Assisting state – EMAC state, responds to a request for assistance.

3. Authorized representative – state official empowered to request assistance or commit state resources in response to a request.

4. Designated Contact – EMAC subject matter expert within each member state.

5. National Coordination Group (NCG) – national EMAC group during non-emergencies. The NCG stands ready to activate EMAC as emergencies develop.

6. National Coordinating Team (NCT) – when the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA activate their National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) to coordinate the federal response and recovery operations during emergencies, EMAC deploys a NCT to serve at the NRCC in Washington, D.C. From the NRCC, the NCT coordinates EMAC’s national response.

7. Regional Coordinating Team (RCT) – If FEMA activates a Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) a parallel EMAC RCT is deployed. From the RRCC, the RCT coordinates deployed EMAC components responding throughout the affected region.

8. Other member states – during times of emergencies EMAC members are charged with monitoring the situation and to stand ready to assist as appropriate.

In supporting the response to Hurricane Katrina, a two-person EMAC A-Team was deployed to Baton Rouge, Louisiana on Sunday, August 28. Jeff Smith was identified as the Louisiana state EMAC coordinator. In Mississippi, Bill Brown, Operations Branch Chief, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, coordinated EMAC. On August 29, the A-Team was increased to four people, and shortly thereafter the team increased to eight members in Louisiana and nine members in Mississippi. Through EMAC, a sizable contingent was deployed to assist Louisiana and Mississippi in the aftermath of Katrina.

In Louisiana, 27,727 personnel were deployed through EMAC by September 13, and during the same time frame, in Mississippi, 18,247 people deployed. There were 680 requests for assistance in Louisiana and 723 in Mississippi. The total estimated cost for Louisiana is $201.8 million and for Mississippi, $314.1 million. EMAC’s total Katrina response involved processing 1,403 requests for assistance and 46,288 personnel deployments for a total estimated cost of $515.9 million. The most commonly requested resources included: firefighters, search and rescue personnel, HAZMAT personnel, emergency medical technicians, state police, sheriffs, fish and wildlife personnel, corrections personnel, livestock inspectors, bridge inspectors, airport maintenance personnel, ambulances, medical doctors, registered nurses, and National Guard troops.

EMAC officials have acknowledged a significant population of “self-deployed” personnel, a large majority of which were local and state police officers who deployed to the scene, in what is believed to be a spontaneous response to media reports of lawlessness in southeastern Louisiana. Due to the ad hoc nature of these “self-deployed” officers, specific figures are not known. As the ranks of EMAC deployed law enforcement officials and officially deployed federal law enforcement officials continued to grow in the region, the number of “self-deployed” personnel is believed to have declined rapidly.
Without an official deployment, the "self-deployed" personnel were acting without proper authority, without liability protection, and without eligibility for expense reimbursement.

National Guard played a key role in restoring and maintaining law and order

Law and order were eventually restored as local law enforcement officers were supplemented, first by state military troops. The National Guard played a substantial role in providing security and restoring law and order. The Louisiana National Guard was deployed before landfall, and provided security at the Superdome that helped maintain order there. Once looting broke out in New Orleans, they also patrolled the streets. The Mississippi National Guard was vital to restoring order and providing security in the aftermath of the storm. According to Carwile, for example, a "massive National Guard presence" helped quell problems with isolated looting in the western affected counties (Pearl River and Hancock) within 2 days after the storm. The Alabama National Guard was also deployed before landfall, providing a security task force for Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

National Guards from other states also sent units through the EMAC process to perform security or law enforcement duties. In Mississippi, nearly 11,000 troops from 19 other states' National Guards joined more than 4,500 Mississippi National Guard troops in missions related to law enforcement (as well as other missions) by September 10, 12 days after landfall. For example, Arkansas provided 310 guardsmen from a military police company to provide security in Mississippi. Similarly, the Louisiana National Guard's security forces were supplemented by thousands of guardsmen from other states. Through EMAC, Louisiana was able to request and receive assistance from scores of states from across the country. Examples of the larger deployments included 2,426 infantry from Pennsylvania, 1,016 military police from Puerto Rico, 580 security troops from Michigan, 500 support troops from Arkansas, 535 security troops from Massachusetts, and 350 security troops from Tennessee.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale, in his testimony before the Select Committee, provided details on the extent of assistance provided by the National Guard. He stated that "when violence erupted in New Orleans, the National Guard Bureau coordinated the deployment of 4,200 National Guard MPs, 1,400 each day every day for 3 days in a row, a law enforcement presence nearly three times of the size of the New Orleans Police Department." There was a general consensus among federal, state, and local officials that EMAC worked very well for National Guard troops. Regarding military alone, by November 3, for Louisiana, there were a total of 451 EMAC requests and 29,502 Guardsmen who came from other states. Many of these out-of-state Guardsmen performed security and law enforcement functions and, like the Louisiana National Guard, operated under the Louisiana governor’s Title 32 authority.

DOD active duty forces played an important, but less active, role in maintaining law and order

While they were not immediately deployed, DOD active duty forces also played a role in restoring and maintaining law and order. For example, the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne arrived in New Orleans on September 3 (five days after landfall) and, according to the city’s Director of Homeland Security, had a “calming effect” by their mere presence on the street. Precautions were taken to prevent DOD active duty forces from direct law enforcement missions, thereby avoiding Posse Comitatus issues. For more details on the use of the military, see the MILITARY chapter.
Law enforcement personnel from other states also played a key role in restoring and maintaining law and order.

Civilian law enforcement agencies from other states and localities also provided personnel through the EMAC process to supplement beleaguered state and local police. In Mississippi, local, state, and FEMA officials noted that assistance from Florida’s law enforcement and emergency management agencies (as well as law enforcement from other states), plus the delivery of commodities Florida pre-positioned in the panhandle, were key to providing security and restoring order in southern Mississippi after landfall.77

Florida, in particular, was instrumental in the early days and received high praise from Mississippi officials for the manner in which its teams provided security, established an incident command structure in the coastal counties, and conducted some of the first search and rescue missions the night after the storm.78 As noted earlier, Florida helped alleviate some of Mississippi’s security problems by sending into the state some of the commodities it had pre-positioned in the panhandle region in anticipation of the hurricane striking farther east than it eventually did. Florida’s supplies of food, water, and ice helped relieve the situation in Mississippi.79

While Florida and Alabama were among the first states to provide Mississippi with law enforcement assistance, they were not alone. Mississippi received assistance from Arkansas, South Carolina, and Georgia’s state police or other state law enforcement agencies.80 For example, South Carolina provided 118 law enforcement personnel with equipment to Mississippi.81

Louisiana also benefited from a very large influx of law enforcement personnel from other states. Like their counterparts in Mississippi, local, state, and federal officials involved in Louisiana’s response to Katrina said EMAC was critical to restoring law and order.

The EMAC process was not always smooth. For example, a sheriff from Michigan and a sheriff from Alabama were at the Louisiana border but could not assist because no EMAC request had been made.82 The Jefferson Parish Sheriff had apparently not made a request through the state EOC for the assistance — a requirement for providing law enforcement assistance through EMAC.83

Also, as late as September 2, EMAC requests simply had not been made. According to Josh Filler, the Director of DHS’ Office of State and Local Government Coordination, on the September 2 video teleconference:

My office has received numerous phone calls from law enforcement organizations across the country — major city police chiefs, national sheriffs — who want to help, but we have encouraged them not to self-deploy to New Orleans or to Louisiana, but to work through the system, but they are saying that their States are not receiving requests for assistance.84

**Finding: Federal law enforcement agencies were also critical to restoring law and order and coordinating activities**

The first priority for federal law enforcement agencies was to implement their continuity of operations plans and locate their affected personnel

Prior to August 30, federal law enforcement worked to prepare their coastal offices for Katrina’s landfall. Immediately after the hurricane, these law enforcement agencies implemented their continuity of operations plans and began the process of locating personnel living in the affected areas.

On August 26, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Jackson Field Office notified its Resident Agencies in Hattiesburg, Pascagoula, and Gulfport to implement their hurricane plans.85 Hurricane shutters were installed, vehicles were secured, computers were bagged, and safes were locked. The traditional FBI operations of the Jackson Field Office were moved to its Oxford Resident Agency, in northern Mississippi.86 FBI air assets and personnel who remained on the coast were utilized to determine the damage and security of the Mississippi offices.87

Within 12 hours after the hurricane subsided, the Jackson Field Office was in contact with all of its personnel.88 The Jackson Field Office established a Command Post at Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi. On August 29, the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of New
Orleans surveyed the damage to the New Orleans Field Office. Sixty percent of the top floor was uncovered. Due to the sensitivity of documents housed in the Field Office, the SAC and the four agents remained at the building. The SAC ordered the move of the New Orleans Division to the Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge. All FBI personnel living in Louisiana were accounted for by September 4.

On August 23, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) began Hurricane Katrina preparations. ATF headquarters coordinated with Field Divisions in Houston, New Orleans (which includes the state of Mississippi), Nashville (which includes the state of Alabama), Tampa, and Miami. Headquarters ordered the evacuation of ATF personnel in New Orleans and Mississippi prior to the hurricane, and a list was comprised of personnel who chose to stay on the coast. All ATF personnel leaving the affected area were instructed to contact their supervisors after the storm. Due to the damage to the ATF facilities, a continuity of operations site was activated on August 30 in Mandeville, Louisiana.

On the same day, ATF began contacting all ATF personnel living in the affected area. The New Orleans Division Office was relocated to Shreveport, where it resumed responsibility over Louisiana and Mississippi. The Biloxi Field Office was relocated to a public safety compound behind the Harrison County Sheriff's Department. The Mobile Field Office was moved to Brookley Air Force Base, an inactive base in the Mobile area. ATF established a Critical Incident Management Response Team in Baton Rouge to coordinate ATF operations.

On August 26, in anticipation of Katrina's landfall, the New Orleans Field Division Special Agent-in-Charge ordered the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Field Division closed and all DEA personnel were asked to evacuate the area. The New Orleans Field Division and the Gulfport Resident Office were severely damaged by the hurricane. DEA established teams responsible for locating all Field Division personnel following the storm. On August 31, command centers were established at the Baton Rouge District Office and in Mobile. DEA headquarters chose the Office of Aviation in Addison, Texas to serve as a logistical command center for the field divisions throughout the country. On September 1, the New Orleans Field Division established an operations center at a high school in Mandeville, Louisiana, to house firearms and sensitive items from the New Orleans Field Office.

On August 29, the United States Marshals Service (USMS) activated an Emergency Operations Center in Washington, D.C. in preparation for Hurricane Katrina. USMS also placed four Operational Management Teams (OMT) on standby. Following Katrina, the OMTs began accounting for all USMS personnel in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Operational Medical Personnel were also deployed to the coast to assist USMS personnel. OMT created a command post in Pineville, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi. On August 30, USMS deployed personnel and surveillance planes to survey the hurricane damage to USMS facilities.

Prior to landfall, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pre-deployed Federal Protective Service (FPS) personnel located in Texas. FPS was able to move into the affected area the day after the hurricane to assist FEMA. ICE's Gulfport office sustained no major damage and due to backup generators, was utilized as a staging site and provided assistance to ICE employees affected by the hurricane, as well as other state and local law enforcement. From landfall until September 2, ICE's New Orleans field office worked to account for ICE personnel assigned to the New Orleans, Lake Charles, Lafayette, Baton Rouge, and Gulfport offices and obtain needed supplies.

On August 26 and 27, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) ordered the ports of Mobile and New Orleans, and the Hammond Louisiana Air and Marine Branch to activate their hurricane preparedness plans. CBP moved its air assets to Shreveport and Dallas. CBP's Mission Critical Team relocated from New Orleans to Shreveport and on August 29 began to locate CBP personnel living in the affected area. CBP created a Forward Deployed Operations Command Center at the air hanger in Hammond to coordinate all CBP missions. By September 4, all CBP employees were located.

While the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) did not need to implement a continuity of operations plan for a specific office, they are responsible for meeting their nationwide primary mission, while coordinating in preparation for severe weather and flight disruptions. In anticipation of these disruptions due to Katrina, FAMS began monitoring the hurricane's track the week of August 21.
From August 26 to August 29, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) personnel from the Office of Emergency Preparedness, in Washington, D.C. and BOP’s South Central Regional Office in Dallas monitored Hurricane Katrina’s path. The Office of Emergency Preparedness is responsible for coordinating the evacuation and for supporting corrections institutions in the areas affected by the hurricane. On August 30, BOP opened a command center to help the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections with transporting inmates out of the New Orleans area.

While working to reconstitute themselves, federal law enforcement agencies supplemented state and local law enforcement with forces and supplies. On September 1, the Critical Incident Response Group deployed agents from the Dallas, Atlanta, Baltimore, and Houston SWAT teams and Hostage Rescue Teams (HRT) to continue to help NOPD control its affected area. The Violent Gang Task Force from the New Orleans Division worked out of the Gretna Police Department. Over 30 more agents coordinated with NOPD to back up NOPD SWAT, FBI SWAT, and HRT Special Agents.

The FBI Command Post at Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mississippi communicated with the Mississippi Bureau of Criminal Investigations, the Mississippi Highway Patrol, the Homeland Security Director for the State of Mississippi, and local police and sheriffs to respond to requests for assistance. The FBI was able to create a Virtual Command Center for the Law Enforcement On-Line Internet site. All law enforcement nationwide were able to log onto the website and receive daily situation reports regarding FBI relief efforts.

The first group of ATF personnel detailed to the affected area arrived on September 2. Thirty-four members of Special Response Teams (SRT), tactical teams specifically trained to handle high risk law enforcement and civil unrest, from the Dallas and Detroit Field Offices and seven SRT support staff were deployed to Algiers, Louisiana. The SRT members were sent to New Orleans to assist the NOPD, whose SWAT teams were down to 25 percent capacity. On September 6 and 7, 10 ATF agents were deployed to Biloxi, and 30 ATF agents were deployed to Gulfport. These agents performed investigative roles, as well as assisting local police with firearms-related calls.
From August 30 to September 12, 251 DEA Temporary Duty agents reported from Miami, Atlanta, St. Louis, Houston and Dallas to provide law enforcement and search and rescue support in New Orleans. On September 4, DEA deployed personnel from the Atlanta Field Division, as well as the Houston Mobile Enforcement Team (MET), self-contained, specially trained teams of eight to twelve agents that specialize in law enforcement missions involving violence. These agents were then joined by the Charlotte MET on September 5, and the Miami MET on September 7. The METs helped state and local departments in conducting routine law enforcement tasks, including patrols as well as search and rescue missions.

On September 1, five USMS Marshals from the Training Academy in Glynco, Georgia were deployed to provide security at the Biloxi Airport. USMS deployed an additional four Marshals to the airport on September 3. USMS supported NOPD by working with the 1st and 5th districts in New Orleans and responded to backlogged 911 calls. In addition, USMS redirected NOPD National Crime Information Center traffic to the USMS Communications Center. USMS deployed more personnel to Mississippi on September 5 to help local police and sheriff departments. They provided security for 11 search and rescue teams, operated a missing persons task force and a task force to locate sex offenders, and protected the Mississippi gulf coast’s fuel depot in Collins.

On September 2, ICE began its support of local law enforcement in New Orleans’ 4th District. The 4th District was still populated at that time, as it had not taken on water. The New Orleans Special Response Team (SRT), ICE’s tactical team, was in the city on September 1. SRT teams from Chicago and San Antonio, consisting of 12 to 18 members, arrived the afternoon and evening of September 2. By midnight of September 2, there were over 100 ICE agents in New Orleans preparing to assist in the response to the hurricane.

Throughout the week, ICE agents were tasked with patrols and shifts with local law enforcement, worked to curtail looting, assisted with evacuations, and followed up on the approximately 6,000 911 calls made during and after the hurricane. ICE’s Tampa Field Office provided three inflatable Zodiac boats that helped ICE personnel assist with transportation for fire departments and medical personnel and respond to rescue calls. ICE agents and logistical teams assisted the Mississippi Highway Patrol, county sheriffs, and city police forces in Mississippi with patrols, rescues, and searches.
helping evacuees onto buses and helicopters. CBP had 100 agents, along with CBP vehicles, emergency equipment, and lifesaving supplies in Louisiana by September 1. On September 2, Border Patrol agents were sent to provide security at the Louisiana State University Hospital, which served as the regional triage center. Border Patrol agents were also deployed to the New Orleans Airport to assist with crowd control and security.

A day after Katrina made landfall, FAMS responded to reports of deteriorating conditions at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport. The airport was starting to receive evacuees and was therefore becoming a shelter. As a response, FAMS sent personnel – drawing from its Houston Field Office – to the airport to assist as necessary. Conditions at the airport continued to deteriorate as thousands of displaced persons sought refuge there. There was no food, water, restroom facilities, or security. Consequently, when FAMS personnel began to arrive, they needed to help restore order. On September 1, FAMS began initial deployment, including 54 from the Houston Field Office, arriving in-person by car. Also by late evening, evacuation flights out of the airport were fully operational. By September 2, FAMS personnel at the airport expanded their mission to include interim law enforcement activities as well as all necessary activities to operate the airport.

On September 3, the Secret Service was asked by NOPD and the Louisiana State Police to take control of the credentialing process for state and local law enforcement in the New Orleans area. The need for secure credentials for NOPD was a primary concern, as many police officers had lost their official identification badges during the hurricane.

On September 5, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections requested that BOP provide 1,000 beds and transportation for Louisiana state inmates. BOP, along with USMS transferred 964 inmates to the United States Penitentiary Coleman-II, Florida. From August 30 to September 7, BOP transported approximately 2,500 inmates or detainees in Louisiana to facilities outside of New Orleans. In addition, BOP provided clothing, food, and water from Texas correctional institutions to the Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge.

Obtaining peace officer status presented problems for some federal law enforcement entities responding to the hurricane

The process for federal law enforcement being deputized or sworn in as a peace officer under state law in Louisiana and Mississippi proved cumbersome for some entities. The general concern was that in the process of assisting state or local law enforcement, or victims of the hurricane, federal law enforcement officers might find it necessary to make arrests outside of their federal jurisdiction. Due to the lack of an across-the-board policy on how to deal with federal law enforcement during a state of emergency, some federal law enforcement entities were required to seek advice from their individual Office of the General Counsel on how to proceed. The process was more difficult in Louisiana, where it became necessary to fly in representatives from the Louisiana Office of the Attorney General to the affected area to swear in the law enforcement officers or agents in person. Still other federal law enforcement agents were deputized by the Louisiana State Police.

Under Louisiana law, FBI agents have qualified immunity that protects them when responding to felonies committed in their presence or when assisting state officers. However, FBI agents did not specifically have peace officer status when responding to Hurricane Katrina.
Emergency Support Function #13 (ESF-13) of the National Response Plan

DOJ, along with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for the Emergency Support Function #13 (ESF-13) of the National Response Plan. ESF-13 covers Public Safety and Security and tasks DOJ and DHS with integrating federal non-investigative/non-criminal law enforcement public safety and security capabilities and resources to “support the full range of incident management activities with potential or actual Incidents of National Significance.” The Office of the Deputy Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel assist in coordinating DOJ’s ESF-13 responsibilities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is responsible for DOJ’s day-to-day actions with respect to ESF-13.

After the hurricane, ESF-13 requests were processed through the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) in Baton Rouge, because the LECC had working knowledge of the available regional resources. The LECC determined whether the request could be met under ESF-13. The LECC (1) confirmed the requestor could not perform the mission, (2) determined whether the request was valid for ESF-13, (3) determined whether there were available federal law enforcement resources; and (4) approved or declined the request. The LECC then forwarded the approved request to Washington, D.C. Each requested agency coordinated with FEMA to establish funding.


The Attorney General of the United States may “appoint officials . . . to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.” The Attorney General may also approve the request of a state governor for federal law enforcement assistance if the Attorney General concludes that such “assistance is necessary to provide an adequate response to a law enforcement emergency.”

DOJ also has the authority under the Stafford Act to provide for non-operational assistance. In the case of a major disaster or an emergency, the President may direct the Department to “utilize its authorities and resources granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment,
supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical and advisory services) in support of State and local efforts."167

On Friday, September 2, Gonzales sent a memorandum to the heads of DOJ’s law enforcement agencies, asking each agency to continue coordinating with state and local law enforcement.168 The Attorney General specifically requested that: (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation continue to deploy agents and tactical assets, (2) the Drug Enforcement Administration prepare to deploy its Mobile Enforcement Teams, (3) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives establish a Violent Crime Impact Team in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and (4) the United States Marshals Service conduct prisoner transport operations and provide court security.

On September 3, Gonzales received a letter from Mississippi Governor Barbour requesting the “deployment of Deputy U.S. Marshals to the State of Mississippi in support of law enforcement requirements created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina.”169 The same day, Gonzales responded in writing to Barbour that his request was approved, and an order authorizing the Director of the U.S. Marshals Service to “take all necessary and appropriate steps within available resources to provide the assistance so requested by [Governor Barbour]” was issued.170

The same day, Gonzales received a letter from Blanco requesting the deployment of the USMS and/or other Department of Justice personnel to the area affected by Hurricane Katrina.171 On September 4, Gonzales responded in writing to Blanco that her request was approved, and an order authorizing the Deputy Attorney General to “take all necessary and appropriate steps within available resources to provide the assistance so requested by [Governor Blanco]” was issued.172

On September 6, Gonzales and DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff received a letter from Blanco requesting “the deployment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers, Customs and Border Protection personnel and/or other Department of Homeland Security personnel ... in support of the law enforcement challenges created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina.”173 Gonzales responded in writing to Governor Blanco on September 7, saying that after consulting with DHS, he approved Blanco’s request and deployed the appropriate law enforcement personnel.174 Chertoff also responded to Blanco on September 7, stating that DHS law enforcement would “continue to provide assistance” with state and local authorities in Louisiana.175

During the first week following the hurricane, local, state, and federal law enforcement working in New Orleans began daily 9:00 a.m. meetings at the Harrah’s Casino in downtown New Orleans.176 These meetings enabled the law enforcement entities to meet face to face and coordinate critical missions. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) District Captain for each city district attended the meetings, along with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

Michael J. Vanacore, Director of International Affairs ICE, and Michael Wolf, Special Agent-In-Charge for the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group, were detailed by their respective agencies to Baton Rouge to coordinate the federal law enforcement response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana.177 The two men were designated as Co-Senior
Federal Law Enforcement Officers (SFLEO) and stood up the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) at LSP headquarters in Baton Rouge.  

Vanacore arrived at the Louisiana State Police (LSP) headquarters in Baton Rouge on Sunday, September 4. At the time, Vanacore understood his role was to work with the ICE New Orleans Agent-in-Charge, Michael Holt, and report to ICE headquarters in Washington, D.C. on ICE’s mission in the area affected by the hurricane. Late that evening, Vanacore was informed of the decision to designate him SFLEO. He was instructed he would share SFLEO responsibilities with Wolf. Wolf arrived in Baton Rouge on Monday, September 5. The same day, Vanacore reviewed an unsigned letter designating him and Wolf as SFLEO.  

Vanacore and Wolf had their first meeting late on September 5. On September 6, it was clear to Vanacore and Wolf they needed an operations center to coordinate federal law enforcement efforts in New Orleans. The center was then designated the LECC. The LECC did not have command and control over the federal law enforcement missions. Rather it served as the point of contact for all federal law enforcement in the greater New Orleans area. The missions of the LECC were to coordinate efforts to reestablish the NOPD and efforts of all law enforcement agencies’ deployed resources to the New Orleans area. According to Vanacore, the main mission of the LECC was to ensure officer safety.  

On September 6, officials from the LECC, including Vanacore, met with the Mayor of New Orleans, the City of New Orleans Homeland Security Director and counsel for the Mayor. Officials also met with the NOPD precinct captains. Vanacore reported the Mayor’s office and NOPD were “very helpful” and worked well with the LECC. The LECC had little communication with the Louisiana Governor’s Office, but Vanacore and Wolf both said interaction with the Governor’s office was not necessary to achieve LECC’s goals.  

Wolf brought additional FBI agents with him to Baton Rouge, as well as a Blue Whale Command, the FBI’s mobile command station, specially equipped with office and communication equipment. Vanacore stated the mobile command center was invaluable to standing up the LECC. By September 7, the LECC was gathering and centralizing information, to ensure there were not duplicate law enforcement missions. The LECC divided the federal law enforcement entities by New Orleans police districts. Each federal law enforcement agency was responsible for coordinating with the precinct captain of the district.  

The LECC also began daily 8:00 a.m. meetings with representatives from state and federal law enforcement. ICE, FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the Border Patrol, the National Guard, the U.S. Attorney’s Office from New Orleans and Baton Rouge, the Office of the Louisiana Attorney General, LSP, NOPD, and the New Orleans Fire Department were all represented at the meetings. The City of New Orleans Homeland Security Director also attended the daily meetings. In addition, the U.S. Secret Service, the Sheriff’s Association, and the Federal Air Marshals participated on a limited basis. CBP and FBI provided helicopters to transport attendees to and from New Orleans and the LECC for the meetings.  

The daily meetings commenced with Wolf reporting the number of arrests and incidents from the prior day. There was then a roll call of all attendees to report their force numbers. Vanacore summarized the daily events on his blackberry and communicated to Jon Clark at ICE headquarters in Washington, D.C. Wolf communicated with FBI Headquarters.  

As the LECC worked from Baton Rouge, it became apparent to Vanacore and Wolf that in order to achieve its goals, the LECC needed to be located in New Orleans. On September 9, the LECC and NOPD moved into the Royal Sonesta Hotel on Bourbon Street. The LECC and NOPD each had a conference room and an additional room was used to receive incoming 911 telephone calls.  

The LECC worked with NOPD to assist in “standing up” the police department. There were eight NOPD district offices in New Orleans. Four were rendered useless due to insufficient power, and four were flooded. LECC acquired air conditioning compressors and generators for the district offices that needed power. Temporary office spaces were procured to replace the flooded offices. The evidence and property rooms for the NOPD were under water and contained mold. The LECC assisted NOPD with procuring contractors to recover and process the evidence and property, and clean NOPD headquarters.  

As a result of stolen uniforms, destroyed homes, and displaced New Orleans police officers, NOPD was patrolling the city without proper uniforms. The LECC was able to procure temporary battle dress uniforms off
the Federal Supply Schedule maintained by the General Services Administrations (GSA) for acquisitions by federal agencies. By using GSA for the uniforms, the NOPD did not have to utilize its local procurement process, which would have required three separate bids before purchasing new uniforms.

In addition, the LECC located photographers to create credentials for LECC and NOPD guards and officials at the Royal Sonesta.\(^{201}\) LECC provided lights and generators to assist 15 police checks points. Supplies were provided for crime scene processing, including gloves and masks to protect police from mold.

Both Vanacore and Wolf reported the LECC had a positive working relationship with NOPD and that the department was receptive to LECC’s assistance.\(^{202}\)

**Conclusion**

First the levees were breached—and then law and order. As Katrina left people scrambling for food, for water, for supplies – for survival — lawlessness and violence, both real and imagined, spread, creating yet another problem for authorities who were burdened enough already.

How did this happen? For starters, the lack of basic necessities for residents who did not evacuate, or went back to their homes too quickly, contributed. As we saw in Pearl River County, once there were sufficient amounts of food, ice, and water, order was restored. Another problem was the uncertainty about evacuations. Confusion reigned, especially in places like the Superdome and the Convention Center, where conditions were terrible, nerves frayed, people desperate.

Compounding these difficulties was the collapse or absence of law enforcement. The police, in some cases, were unable to function or were diverting their attention to search and rescue operations. The New Orleans Police Department had known of the threat that could arise from flooding, yet failed to properly protect its resources or come close to continuity of operations. There was also a dereliction of duty by some New Orleans officers when, of course, their presence was needed most.

The federal, state, and local governments also lost another battle, this one with the media. Rumors spread, as fast as the fear. Some turned out to be true, but many did not, resulting in exaggerated reports that scared away truck and bus drivers who could have furnished people with much-needed supplies. Authorities needed to be on top of this situation, not a victim of it.

Fortunately, the National Guard in all three affected states were able to help out overburdened local authorities. About 20 other states added support, an effort that prevented a dire situation from being much worse. DOD active duty forces also came through, their mere presence serving to reduce tensions. Federal law enforcement agencies played an important role, as well, with additional forces and supplies.

For an exhaustive account of all federal law enforcement actions in response to Hurricane Katrina from August 23 to September 12, 2005, please see Appendix 5.
1 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Dir. Pearl River County Emergency Mgmt. Agency, State of Miss., in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Bobby Strahan].


5 EM2000 Messages, Nos. MEMA-0011924, MEMA-0012244, MEMA-001228, MEMA-0012312, MEMA-0013022 (on file with Select Comm.).

6 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Sheriff, Plaquemines Parish, LA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Jiff Hingle].


8 Tiger Team Katrina Report, LA Nat'l Guard at 27 (Nov. 2, 2005) (on file with Select Comm.).

9 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lonnie Swain, Deputy Chief, New Orleans Police Dep't, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Lonnie Swain].

10 Interview with Mitchell and Booth.

11 Deluged Article at 54.


13 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton; Interview with Terry Ebbert; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Nicholas Gachassin, First Assistant Attorney Gen., LA Dep't of Justice, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Nicholas Gachassin].

14 Daily Video Teleconferences among officials dated Aug. 25 – Sep. 4, 2005 at 15 [hereinafter Daily VTC]. State and local officials from each of the impacted areas met daily with officials from, among other agencies, FEMA, and Nat'l Hurricane Center.

15 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton.

16 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) at 196 (statement of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief of the Nat'l Guard Bureau) [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].

17 Pandemonium Article.

18 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton.

Id.

Id.


Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton; Interview with Nicholas Gachassin; Interview with Terry Ebbert.

Interview with Nicholas Gachassin.

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff, Office of the Governor of LA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 6, 2005).


EMAC Ops Manual.


Id.

Telephonic Interview with EMAC.

Id.

Id.

Id.

E-mail correspondence from EMAC personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 19, 2005) (5:25 p.m.).

Presentation Materials prepared by EMAC personnel, EMAC Responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Oct. 4, 2005).

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Master Log of EMAC Requisitions (unaudited draft).

Telephone Interview with EMAC.


Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 133 (statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Homeland Def.).


Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Col. Marvin E. Curtis, Jr., Assistant Comm’r, Dep’t of Public Safety, State of Miss., in Jackson, Miss. (Oct. 2005).

Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 111 (statement of William L. Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Officer) (“[I]n addition to the relief we got from the things that Mississippi brought to bear, the state of Florida which prepositioned things up at the Panhandle, they bought us time too, because it would have been much worse had it not been for the things we got from Florida.”). 

Hurricane Situation Reports, Miss. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (Sept. 2, 2005 at 1200 hours; Sept. 6, 2005 at 0200 hours); Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 2 (Statement of Governor Haley Barbour, State of Miss.).


E-mail correspondence from Patrick Rhode to Casey Long and Brooks Altshuler (Sept. 2, 2005) (6:46 p.m.).

Id.

Daily VTC, at 9 (Sept. 2, 2005).

Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereinafter FBI] personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI]. The Jackson Field Div. covers the entire state of Miss. and has 10 Resident Agencies located in: Southaven, Oxford, Tupelo, Columbus, Greenville, Meridian, Hattiesburg, McComb, Gulfport, and Pascagoula (E-mail correspondence from FBI personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 5, 2005) (6:10 p.m.)).

Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI.

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 28 Interview with FBI]; Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI.

Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI.

Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI.

Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI.

Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel (Jan. 27, 2006).

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives [hereinafter ATF] Summary of Significant Activity (Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter ATF Summary of Significant Activity].

ATF Summary of Significant Activity; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with ATF].

Interview with ATF.

ATF Summary of Significant Activity.

Id.

Interview with ATF; E-mail correspondence from ATF personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 7, 2005) (11:47 a.m.) [hereinafter E-mail from ATF]. The office in Shreveport oversaw the administrative functions of the Shreveport, Little Rock, Jackson, and Oxford, Miss. Field Offices.
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98 Interview with ATF.
99 E-mail from ATF.

100 Interview with ATF; Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 1, 2005).

101 Response from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Nov. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response].


103 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response.

104 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with DEA, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 28, 2005).

105 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response.

106 Response from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response]; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with U.S. Marshal Service [hereinafter USMS] personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with USMS]. An Operational Mgmt. Team (OMT) oversees USMS’ national response. There are OMTs located throughout the United States. A Chief Deputy, the highest ranking career Marshal in the district is in charge of the OMT. Each OMT has a core group of eight personnel. (Interview with USMS).

107 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response.

108 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [hereinafter ICE] in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 16 Interview with ICE].

109 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ICE personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 2 Interview with ICE].


112 E-mail correspondence to Select Comm. Staff from CBP personnel (Jan. 26, 2006) (1:35 p.m.).


114 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FAMS personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with FAMS].


117 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response.

118 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI.

119 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response.

120 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 27 Telephone Interview with FBI]; Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response.

121 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. There are four Rapid Deployment teams located in: New York City, Wash., D.C., Los Angeles, and Miami. The teams are comprised of 160 people with different specialties. They are equipped to respond and be self sufficient for seven days on their own. (Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 5 Telephone Interview with FBI]).

122 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response.

123 Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI.

124 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. The Law Enforcement On-Line Internet site is not available to the general public. Law enforcement entities from around the country must have a password to access the FBI’s information. (Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI).

125 Dec. 5 Telephone Interview with FBI.

126 ATF Summary of Significant Activity.

127 ATF Summary of Significant Activity; Interview with ATF.

128 Interview with ATF.

129 ATF Summary of Significant Activity; Interview with ATF.

130 Response from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Dec. 21, 2005). The day by day breakdown is as follows: Aug. 30 (24), Aug. 31 (17), Sept. 1 (32), Sept. 2 (16), Sept. 3 (33), Sept. 4 (38), Sept. 5 (11), Sept. 6 (13), Sept. 7 (39), Sept. 8 (10), Sept. 9 (6), Sept. 10 (5), Sept. 11 (4), Sept. 12 (4). (Id.).

132 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response.

133 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response.

134 Id. Police Dep’ts included: Pass Christian Police Dep’t, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Biloxi Police Dep’t, Long Beach Police Dep’t, and Harrison County Sheriff’s Dep’t.

135 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE.

136 Id.

137 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; E-mail correspondence from Ronald R. Grimes, DHS to Gerald Garren, et al, (Sept. 6, 2005) (3:27 p.m.). Miss. entities assisted by ICE: Miss. Highway Patrol, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Harrison County Sheriff’s Office, Waveland Police Dep’t, Bay St. Louis Police Dep’t, Long Beach Police Dep’t, Pass Christian Police Dep’t, Hancock County Sheriffs Office, and Jackson County Sheriffs Office. (Id.; Dec. 2 Interview with ICE).


139 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13.

140 Interview with FAMS.

141 FAMS Timeline.
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Nov. 28 Interview with FBI; Dec. 2 Interview with ICE.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.

Id.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. The assignments were as follows: District 1: ATF/DEA, District 2: FBI/Border Patrol’s Tactical Units (BORTAC), District 3: Federal Protective Service, District 4: ICE, District 5: USMS/DEA/BORTAC, District 6: FBI/ATF, District 7: FBI/DEA/BORTAC, and District 8: ATF. (Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI).

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE.

Id.

Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI.

Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.
“It’s like being in a Third World country.
We’re trying to work without power.
Everyone knows we’re all in this together.
We’re just trying to stay alive.”

Mitch Handrich
Registered Nurse Manager at Charity Hospital
Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and difficulties coordinating efforts

Summary

Public health preparedness and medical assistance are critical components to any disaster response plan

Hurricane Katrina tested the nation’s planning and preparedness for a major public health threat and highlighted the importance of strong cooperation and partnerships among health agencies at all levels of government. The threat of any type of disaster emphasizes the need for planning and practice. Public health preparedness and medical assistance are critical components to any disaster response plan — the faster the health community responds, the more quickly control strategies can be developed and appropriate treatments can be identified. And the faster human suffering is diminished.

The annual hurricane season is a continuous challenge to public health infrastructures and a strain on resources. As seen in the preparation for and response to Katrina, medical personnel, supplies, and equipment were in constant need in the Gulf coast region. Despite deficiencies in coordination, communication, and capacity, public health and medical support services effectively treated a massive and overwhelming evacuee population. Federalized teams of medical first responders were deployed to the affected region to provide assistance. Millions of dollars worth of medical supplies and assets were consumed. Some Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) assets, like the Federal Medical Shelters, had never been used or tested prior to Katrina but were deployed and were, for the most part, considered effective.

Despite difficulties, the medical assistance and response to Hurricane Katrina was a success. Thousands of lives were saved because of the hard work and enduring efforts of public health officials and medical volunteers. Poor planning and preparedness, however, were also too big a part of the story, resulting in delays and shortages of resources, and loss of life in the region.

This chapter outlines what medical personnel and supplies were pre-positioned, and deployed post-landfall, to the affected area and how those assets were utilized. It explains the plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina for health care facilities and shelters. The findings in this chapter conclude several deficiencies in public health and medical response plans exist at all levels of government and within medical care facilities. Ultimately, better planning and initiative would have resulted in a more proactive, coordinated, efficient, and effective response.

Personnel

HHS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have the capabilities to mobilize and deploy teams of medical personnel to disaster areas. HHS controls the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, the Medical Reserves Corps, and personnel from its agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institutes of Health, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration. DHS, specifically FEMA, has direct control over the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which supplies and organizes teams of medical personnel in each state who stand ready to deploy at any moment. Unfortunately, limited numbers of personnel were pre-positioned prior to landfall, and most deployments were delayed until after the storm hit and the magnitude of devastation was realized.
Supplies

In addition to medical personnel, HHS, FEMA, and the Department of Defense (DOD) have medical supplies at their disposal to respond to a public health emergency. HHS has control over the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), a national repository of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. NDMS personnel teams are always accompanied by large caches of supplies and drugs. DOD has a mobile medical unit capability as well. Limited amounts of supplies, however, were staged in the region prior to landfall. Several officials argued the magnitude of the storm’s devastation could not have been predicted, and the amount of supplies needed was unknown until the fog cleared. Despite that argument, more supplies and personnel could have been pre-positioned prior to landfall.

Evacuation plans, communication, and coordination must be executed well for effective response

During the days following Hurricane Katrina, around the clock media coverage of patients and staff trapped in New Orleans hospitals inundated television screens across the country. The nation watched in horror. How long would it take for evacuations to begin? And why had these hospitals not evacuated before the storm?

The Select Committee focused part of its medical investigation on these questions, as well as the overarching issues of impaired communications and lack of coordination. The Select Committee acknowledges this chapter does not tell the story of every hospital devastated by Hurricane Katrina. Nor does it include every detail of the communications and coordination difficulties which impeded the medical response.

Rather, this chapter provides findings based on an in-depth examination of specific plans in place before the storm, and a timeline of events that actually took place after the storm. Similarly, the Select Committee recognizes this section of the report focuses on the evacuations of New Orleans medical facilities in particular. Because New Orleans hospitals and facilities experienced the most complete failure of equipment and communications, and because the need to evacuate New Orleans hospital patients was so extreme, the Select Committee chose these institutions as its focal point.

Evacuations

As it stands, Louisiana hospitals and nursing homes are responsible for having and implementing their own emergency evacuation plans. The Louisiana Hospital Association (LHA) does not provide specific emergency response or evacuation guidance and said, with respect to protecting patients and staff, the primary priority for all hospitals is to “shelter in place” versus evacuate. Hospitals are, however, expected to comply with requirements set forth by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.²

The majority of hospital CEOs, as well as state and local medical personnel with whom the Select Committee met, cited time and money as two key factors influencing their decision about whether to evacuate patients from a shelter or medical facility prior to a hurricane. Time is critical given that the majority of hospital and Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) plans call for evacuation decisions to be made anywhere from 36 to 72 hours in advance of a hurricane’s projected landfall — hospitalized patients require a significant amount of time and staff to be moved safely. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the then Methodist Hospital CEO, Larry Graham, said when he realized Hurricane Katrina was going to hit New Orleans, there simply was not enough time to evacuate patients.

The second much-discussed factor, cost, is perhaps even more critical to the decision. Expenses for evacuating a hospital are astronomical, and in the case of for-profit hospitals, these costs are not reimbursable by FEMA. In
most cases hospitals say that given their cost/risk analyses, it makes the most economic sense to ride out a storm and protect patients within the hospital rather than evacuate them. For example, going to Code Grey alone (without factoring in evacuation expenses) costs Louisiana State University’s hospitals $600,000 per day.\(^3\) Many members of the New Orleans medical community likewise made the point, had Hurricane Katrina not resulted in such catastrophic flooding, their facilities would have been prepared, and their decision not to evacuate patients would have been the most prudent course of action. With the factors of time and money in mind, this chapter seeks to understand evacuation plans in place prior to Katrina, and preparedness levels of hospitals and the government to fully evacuate New Orleans medical facilities.

Communication and Coordination

Medical responders and coordinating officers from the government, hospitals, and private entities, cited non-existent or limited communication capabilities as a primary obstacle to their response. Emergency plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina did not prevent oversights and confusion in procedures for ensuring functional and sufficient communications equipment in the event of a disaster. A comparison of the VAMC plans for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, for example, demonstrates they are not standardized — some pieces of VAMCs’ communications plans do clearly outline the who, what, where, and when of keeping communication systems operating, while other VAMC plans leave many questions unanswered. Most VAMC and hospital emergency plans, reviewed by Select Committee staff do not have one separate section devoted to communications preparation.

The LHA and its hospitals rely on multiple phone service providers, and all LHA hospitals rely on an emergency two-way radio such as Hospital Emergency Area Radio (HEAR) or 800 MHz radio.\(^4\) This chapter describes how VAMC and hospital emergency plans address emergency communications and equipment, as well as exactly how such plans and equipment failed medical responders when they most needed it.

One of the most common and pervasive themes in the response to Hurricane Katrina has been a systematic failure of communications at the local, state, and federal levels — a failure that hindered initiative. The accounts of New Orleans medical facilities and special needs shelters are no exception, underscoring how failed communications with the outside threatened the safety of medical staff and the lives of their patients. It was difficult to ascertain a clear timeline of communication capabilities and failures for medical first responders and personnel. Institutions did not have time to collect information for hourly or even daily reports of how communication equipment and systems were working or not. Medical responders and personnel simply did not have adequate communications capabilities immediately following the hurricane. The majority of cell phones were rendered inoperable because they could not be recharged. Satellite communications were unreliable, and the distribution of satellite phones appeared insufficient.

Government agencies also encountered problems with coordination due to red tape and general confusion over mission assignments, deployments, and command structure. On a large scale, command structure presented problems when HHS, the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8), and NDMS, the system that houses most of the resources needed for a medical response, did not share an understanding of who controlled NDMS during the emergency. Confusion resulted when these two entities were operating separately, albeit with efforts to coordinate with each other. On a smaller scale, e-mails from first responders and medical personnel immediately following the storm reflect coordination problems. Misunderstandings about deployment orders and mission assignments resulted in streams of e-mails expressing uncertainties and frustrations.

ESF-8 Background

HHS is the "principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help
themselves. As such, HHS plays a role in the emergency management process. Under the National Response Plan (NRP), ESF-8 provides for the federal government to augment state and local resources and assist in response. Upon activation, ESF-8 “provides the mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or animal health issues when appropriate) for potential or actual Incidents of National Significance and/or during a developing potential health and medical situation.”

The Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness serves on behalf of the Secretary to coordinate the HHS preparation for, response to, and efforts to prevent public health and medical emergencies or disasters. ESF-8 is tasked with the assessment of public health and medical needs, including behavioral health, conducting public health surveillance, and the provision and deployment of medical care personnel and medical equipment and supplies.

As the designated primary agency for ESF-8, HHS is responsible for:

- Orchestrating federal support within their functional area for an affected state;
- Providing staff for the operations functions at fixed and field facilities;
- Notifying and requesting assistance from support agencies;
- Managing mission assignments and coordinating with support agencies, as well as appropriate state agencies;
- Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of all available resources;
- Supporting and keeping other ESFs and organizational elements informed of ESF operational priorities and activities;
- Executing contracts and procuring goods and services as needed;
- Ensuring financial and property accountability for ESF activities;
- Planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations; and
- Maintaining trained personnel to support interagency emergency response and support teams.

While HHS has a number of internal assets to supplement state, local, and tribal government entities, the NRP lists a number of additional external assets for HHS to use in coordinating the federal response. Support agencies under ESF-8 include DHS (FEMA and NDMS), DOD, VA, and the Department of Transportation (DOT).

Finding: Deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not proactive

Federalized teams were deployed and provided assistance in several locations after landfall

Thousands of people in the Gulf region were treated and hundreds of lives were saved due to the services provided by medical personnel in response to Hurricane Katrina. However, with few medical personnel teams pre-positioned prior to landfall, public health officials scrambled to mobilize and deploy personnel teams after the storm hit the Gulf coast. As a result, medical assistance in some areas was unnecessarily delayed by hours, even days. Personnel and supplies are readily available to decision-makers. With a few exceptions, the deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not proactive as most assets were not utilized until after the need was apparent. Ultimately, public health and medical support services were effectively but inefficiently delivered. Below is a comprehensive assessment of when and where medical personnel were deployed in the Gulf coast region to provide medical treatment and care.
NDMS

FEMA is home to the NDMS. The mission of NDMS is to maintain a national capability to deliver quality medical care to the victims and responders of a domestic disaster. NDMS has medical, mortuary, and veterinarian assistance teams located around the country. These specialized teams include:

- 45 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), groups of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel capable of providing medical care following disasters;
- 11 Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs), which consist of private citizens with specialized training and experience to help in the recovery, identification and processing of deceased victims;
- Four National Medical Response Teams, to deal with the medical consequences of incidents potentially involving chemical, biological or nuclear materials;
- National Pharmacy Response Teams and National Nurse Response Teams, which include pharmacists and nurses to assist in mass-dispensing of medications during disasters along with mass vaccination campaigns.
- Five Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, clinical veterinarians, pathologists, animal health technicians, microbiologists and others who assist animal disaster victims and provide care to search dogs; and
- Three International Medical Surgical Response Teams, highly specialized teams, trained and equipped to establish free standing field surgical facilities anywhere in the world.

Fully operational DMATs have the ability to triage and treat up to 250 patients per day for up to three days without resupply. Within four hours of alert status, DMATs should be able to field a full 35-person roster. Within six hours after activation, DMATs should be deployment ready.

Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, NDMS only staged nine of its 45 DMATs in the Gulf coast region. Three DMATs and a Management Support Team were pre-positioned in each of the following locations: Anniston, Alabama, Memphis, Tennessee, and Houston, Texas. According to FEMA officials, the Superdome in New Orleans was the first NDMS assignment because it was a designated special needs shelter. DMAT Oklahoma 1 (OK-1 DMAT) was pre-staged in Houston, Texas on August 27 in anticipation of the storm. OK-1 DMAT efforts will be discussed more thoroughly in a later section of this chapter. In addition to OK-1 DMAT, other teams at the Superdome included NM-1, CA-6, and RI-1.

WA-1 DMAT from Washington was one of the few teams activated and deployed prior to landfall. It was staged in Houston and was poised to move to its mission assignment post-landfall, which ended up being Louis Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans (New Orleans Airport).

FEMA activated OR-2 DMAT from Oregon on August 30 and immediately began treating patients when the team arrived at the New Orleans Airport on the afternoon of September 1. As previously mentioned, every DMAT includes a large cache of medical supplies and equipment. It is much easier to move personnel than supplies. Although the OR-2 DMAT’s cache left Portland on August 31, it took almost five days for the three trucks of supplies to reach the airport.

By August 31, three DMATs, WA-1, CA-4, and TX-4, had arrived at the New Orleans Airport, where evacuated patients were being received. Eventually, eight DMATs would be stationed there to help provide medical care during the patient movement operations in New Orleans. The medical treatment provided and specific actions taken by the DMATs operating at the airport will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.
With Mississippi’s hospital infrastructure decimated after Hurricane Katrina, nine DMATs and seven DMAT Strike Teams were sent to the state to provide medical care and augment the remaining functioning hospitals.\textsuperscript{19} Mississippi’s State Health Officer, Dr. Brian W. Amy, testified that, “through coordination with the National Disaster Medical System, we positioned DMAT teams at every affected hospital and Strike teams at overflow hospitals in the affected areas. Of the 17,649 reported injuries, DMAT teams treated 15,500 patients in the initial days after landfall.”\textsuperscript{20}

In general, at most locations DMATs were deployed, the teams were met with overwhelming demand for patient assessment and treatment. Many of the teams operated under extreme fatigue with limited medical supplies, inadequate amounts of food and water, intermittent electricity, and no air-conditioning.

DMORTs, teams of private citizens with specialized training and experience to help in the recovery, identification and processing of deceased victims, were sent to the Gulf coast to assist in the recovery process of dead bodies. A standard DMORT team is comprised of 31 medical and forensic volunteer personnel with specific training in victim identification, mortuary services, and forensic pathology and anthropology methods. DMORTs include a combination of medical examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical records, fingerprint technicians, forensic odontologists, dental assistants, radiologists, funeral directors, mental health professionals, and support personnel.\textsuperscript{21} Fully operational DMORTs should be able to deploy within 24 hours of notification.

With only two Portable Morgue Units (PMU) in NDMS, one was sent to Louisiana and the other to Mississippi. PMUs are equipped to support DMORT services when no local morgue facilities are available. Each is manned by four DMORTs. FEMA did not have enough DMORTs and was forced to contract for additional personnel. HHS worked closely with DMORTs and FEMA by embedding Public Health Service (PHS) personnel in each team. A PHS senior officer and mental health officer were assigned to assist each DMORT.\textsuperscript{22}

On Thursday, September 1, 27 Region II DMORTs prepared to leave for Anniston, Alabama, a site designated as the eastern staging point for the DMORT response.\textsuperscript{23} On Monday, September 5, one week after landfall, HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness Stewart Simonson requested “ample mobile mortuary services throughout the affected region.”\textsuperscript{24} An order for 200 mobile mortuary trucks was issued, with 130 designated to Louisiana and 70 to be delivered to Mississippi.\textsuperscript{25} By the next day, mortuary services were being established in St. Gabriel, Louisiana with 96 personnel.\textsuperscript{26} FEMA and Louisiana collaborated on drafting a body recovery plan which required the approval of then FEMA Director Michael Brown and Louisiana’s newly appointed state medical examiner.\textsuperscript{27} In Mississippi, mortuary services were established at the Naval Air Station in Gulfport. By September 6, one DMORT had set up facilities there.

U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps

The U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, one of the seven uniformed services of the United States, is comprised of highly-trained and mobile health professionals who carry out programs to promote good health, understand and prevent disease and injury, assure safe and effective drugs and medical devices, deliver health services to federal beneficiaries, and supply health expertise in time of war or other national or international emergencies.
All Corps officers on deployment rosters were notified by the U.S. Surgeon General's office via e-mail on Saturday, August 27 that Hurricane Katrina could be a catastrophic event creating the need for medical assistance in the Gulf coast after landfall. At the time of the e-mail, there was "no assessment of what will be needed at this point, but they will potentially ask the feds for medical, mental health, and pharmaceutical support, as well as EHOs, environmental and civil engineers to support the obvious needs for water, waste water and sewer, as well as infrastructure problems." Commissioned Corps officers were asked to stand by and prepare for deployment as public health needs became apparent.

According to a briefing with U.S. Surgeon General, Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, PHS had pre-positioned 38 officers on Sunday, August 28 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Biloxi, Mississippi. It was originally planned for the PHS officers to be stationed in New Orleans, but they were unable to get there before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. PHS officers were on the ground in New Orleans by late Monday, August 29.

Carmona suggested coordination with PHS, FEMA, and NDMS was difficult. HHS had trouble with tracking DMAT mission assignments and with staffing and communication. Despite the assignment of a Commissioned Corps officer liaison to FEMA to coordinate medical activities, coordination between the two agencies was lacking.

PHS helped reestablish a public health infrastructure for some communities in the Gulf coast region. For example, when New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin laid-off a majority of the city’s public health employees, PHS helped to fill the gaps. "Public health services were never federalized—PHS just provided a federal presence. But the federal presence was absolutely stabilizing," Carmona said.

By September 9, more than 1,000 PHS Commissioned Corps officers had been deployed to the region in support of the Hurricane Katrina medical response, making it the largest response in Corps history. Shelters at several locations in the Gulf coast; assisted with CDC activities; accompanied SNS assets; and helped provide mental health services to the affected region. In general, PHS is a valuable operational asset to HHS and was a critical component to the medical response to Hurricane Katrina. However, despite having the capability to mobilize Commissioned Corps officers at anytime, PHS failed to deploy a significant number of officers to the region prior to landfall.

### Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

The CDC is a component of HHS that assists in carrying out its responsibilities for protecting the health and safety of all Americans and for providing essential human services, especially for those people who are least able to help themselves. CDC controls the SNS, large quantities of medicine and medical supplies to protect the American public if there is a health emergency severe enough to cause local supplies to run out.

Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, CDC activated the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on August 25. CDC personnel were on the ground in Louisiana with a Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU) which accompanies SNS supplies. In anticipation of the need to provide emergency medical services, 27 pallets of medical supplies were pre-positioned on the ground prior to landfall. On Sunday, August 28, these items were pulled from SNS with the mission assignment for some supplies to be delivered to the Superdome in New Orleans. CDC also staffed and readied 12 teams of 20 people each to be deployed once the request from states for help was received.

CDC was responsible for deploying personnel and SNS assets, assisting state and local public health authorities with communicating food and water safety information, conducting disease surveillance, providing immunizations to displaced residents, and helping reestablish public health services in affected areas. Immediately following the hurricane, CDC’s biggest concern was the risk of food-borne and water-borne illnesses. CDC worked with the Louisiana Office of Public Health to assess reports on an outbreak of cholera and partnered with
the Environmental Protection Agency and local health departments to assess environmental risks of toxins and chemicals in the water and air. CDC also worked with DOD to provide mosquito-control resources in most of the affected areas. Teams were deployed to both Louisiana and Mississippi on a mosquito spray mission.

CDC provided access to Influenza, Tetanus-Diptheria, Hepatitis A, and Hepatitis B vaccines to areas that were lacking them by coordinating the delivery, distribution, and administration of over three million doses of vaccine, with one million of the doses obtained from SNS. When New Orleans lost its public health department due to layoffs, CDC sent over 100 medical personnel to help reestablish services, conduct surveillance, and improve communication.

HHS Credentialed Volunteer Health Professionals

HHS designed a system that assists state and locals in verifying the credentials of volunteer healthcare workers. While stimulating the creation of over 900 medical teams, it also created confusion at the state level. Overall though, HHS was successful in mobilizing and credentialing medical professionals who volunteered in the Gulf coast following Hurricane Katrina. PHS set up a Katrina database to credential and verify medical professionals. With the help of private companies, such as Kaiser Permanente, over 3,400 volunteers were processed and over 1,000 volunteers were deployed. The database was linked to state databases and a national databank, allowing PHS to use existing information to help verify credentials. HHS also established a website (https://volunteer.hhs.gov) and toll-free number (1-866-KATMEDI) to help identify health care professionals and relief personnel to assist in Katrina relief efforts.

The Medical Reserve Corps has a medical volunteer database where medical volunteers are pre-credentialed and can be activated within 24 hours. Carmona oversees this database as well as the response of the volunteers HHS calls upon. HHS was able to link its database to state databases in order to confirm volunteer credentials. Both HHS and Carmona stressed the importance of volunteers linking up with pre-existing rescue teams rather than acting independently. The Surgeon General’s office likewise had generated a separate database for people who wanted to volunteer supplies or equipment.

Setting up a mechanism to allow individual medical personnel to volunteer was a useful tool initiated by HHS. The database was such a success that by September 3, an internal e-mail from HHS indicated “VOLUNTEERS SHOULD NO LONGER BE REFERRED TO KATRINARECOVERY@HHS.GOV, they should be directed to the https://volunteer.ccrf.hhs.gov/ and instructed to complete a volunteer application.” These credentialed volunteers heavily supplemented medical services in the Gulf coast region and were an important part of the medical response.

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

As part of the public health and medical response, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) mobilized personnel to support state mental health program directors in their efforts to conduct needs assessments, provide services, support ongoing administrative operations, access financial assistance and prepare for long-term assistance. SAMHSA deployed Disaster Technical Assistance Center teams to provide information and supplement state and local disaster response planning, review disaster plans, conduct literature reviews, and offer mental health support services. On Wednesday, September 7, SAMHSA created a “Crisis Hotline” to provide victims with 24 hour access to counseling and mental health resources. Additionally, on Tuesday, September 13, HHS Secretary Micheal O. Leavitt announced $600,000 in emergency grants to Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi to ensure mental health assessment and crisis counseling are available in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. The states have used the money to support clinical assessments and provide psychiatric and nursing services, medications, brief interventions, crisis case management, and short-term residential support.
Finding: Poor planning and pre-positioning of medical supplies and equipment led to delays and shortages

Equipment and supplies were in heavy demand immediately following the hurricane and could not be quickly replenished by state, local, and federal resources. As detailed in other sections of this report, most shelters, hospitals, and flooded areas were without electricity and adequate supplies of potable water and food for days after Katrina made landfall. With only nominal amounts of medical supplies pre-positioned by FEMA and HHS, a great deal of medical provisions had to be supplied after Katrina made landfall. In areas like New Orleans, it took days to respond to the catastrophe and deliver medical supplies to the Superdome and Convention Center.

The delays were a result of poor planning. Obviously, supplies should be protected during the storm and staged in safe and secure locations for easy access post-landfall. Despite being unable to predict the magnitude of devastation from the storm, more supplies and equipment should have been pre-positioned and accessible to state and local officials immediately following landfall. Below is a detailed assessment of the different medical supplies and equipment that were provided to the Gulf coast in response to Hurricane Katrina.

States were heavily dependent on CDC/SNS for medical supplies

SNS 12-Hour Push Packages

As previously stated, the SNS is a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV administration, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items.\(\text{50}\) The SNS has 12-hour Push Packages (Push Packs), caches of pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies designed to provide response to a public health emergency within 12 hours. CDC estimates that each Push Pack costs $6 million, weighs almost 50 tons, and includes over 100 different kinds of supplies.\(\text{51}\) Push Packs are configured to be immediately loaded onto either trucks or commercial aircraft for the most rapid transportation. A Boeing 747 aircraft or seven tractor trailers are needed to move a single Push Pack. A TARU accompanies the Push Pack to coordinate with state and local officials and ensure SNS assets are efficiently received and distributed upon arrival at the site.\(\text{52}\) TARU is simply a team of technical advisors to supervise the transfer of Push Pack contents to the receiving state.

Push Packs can be deployed at the request of a governor and independently of the NRP. Mississippi was the only state to request a Push Pack from CDC. The Push Pack arrived in Mississippi on Friday, September 2, four days after Katrina passed through the state.\(\text{53}\) As Amy testified, “within 12 hours of a call and my official request, eight tractor-trailers rolled into Mississippi loaded with medical supplies for affected Mississippi hospitals.”\(\text{54}\) Push Packs were originally designed to respond to a bioterrorist attack, so they included items that were not relevant to treating the medical needs of Katrina evacuees. As a result, some of the Push Pack materials went unused. For this reason, CDC informed state and local officials they could request supplies and materials from SNS without requesting a full Push Pack.\(\text{55}\) Although Mississippi was the only state to request a Push Pack, other states still tapped resources and supplies from SNS. CDC figured out a way early on to prevent the waste of resources and ensure the most appropriate medical supplies were being allocated and delivered.

Also, CDC began to move towards more focused deliveries from existing inventories outside of SNS and acquired materials from private partners, as thousands of critical supplies were needed.\(\text{56}\) The Director for the Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response at CDC, Dr. Richard Besser, suggested creating Push Packs for major public health disruptions other than bioterrorism. This could ensure the
most appropriate medical supplies and equipment arrive to the affected area first and would also prevent the waste of supplies that are not relevant to certain public health emergencies.57

**Temporary medical operations staging areas were assembled and utilized**

**Federal Medical Shelters**

Federal Medical Shelters (FMS) were a new component to the HHS hurricane response introduced following Katrina’s landfall. These are rapidly deployed, minimal care medical kits capable of housing, triaging, and holding displaced patients. Each FMS is a 250-bed emergency shelter with a pharmaceutical suite, designed to provide care to patients for three days before the need to re-supply and re-stock materials.58 An FMS is usually set up in a large space like an airport hanger or gymnasium with some provisions supplied by the SNS. FMS facilities are not designed for comprehensive community care needs; they are designed to offer last-resort care and support during situations in which normal, day-to-day operations are disrupted. FMS were developed to both augment hospitals and serve as quarantine stations.

Under the orders of Simonson, FMS began readying supplies and personnel on August 27, and one FMS was sent to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana on August 28.59 From there, the FMS continued on to Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton Rouge, and on the evening of Tuesday, August 30, the FMS at LSU began operations staffed by PHS commissioned Corps officers. FMS were also staged at Fort Polk Army Base in central Louisiana, Eglin Air Force Base near Pensacola, Florida, the Naval Air Station in Meridian, Mississippi, and the Mississippi Air National Guard Station in Jackson, Mississippi.60 Additionally, the New Orleans Airport was the site of an FMS and helped provide acute medical care to evacuated patients from surrounding hospitals and the Superdome. The National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland set up a critical care facility for the sickest patients evacuated from the Gulf coast region.61

Essentially, these shelters were used to augment hospitals in the Gulf coast and help with the surge capacity of Katrina evacuees. Although Simonson thought the shelters were under-utilized in response to Katrina, he believed the exercise proved FMS are a valuable asset to be used in future public health emergencies. Despite this, only one was pre-positioned while most were readied and deployed in the days following landfall. Precious time was wasted because public health officials lacked initiative.

Prior to Katrina, FMS was only an idea on paper and had never been put into practice. The temporary medical shelters had never been tested in simulated drills or exercises, so it was initially unclear how FMS would perform and if their use would be effective.62 Simonson said he believed HHS held two exercises to test FMS last year. He did not believe them to have been extensive or to have simulated disaster-like conditions.63 The tests were held simply to time setup of facilities and processes. Despite the opportunity to truly test FMS at two federally mandated exercises, one in April 2005 and the other held in 2003, HHS did not seize the opportunity to assess and evaluate them.64

**Expeditionary Medical Support Systems**

The Air National Guard also supplied medical personnel and equipment to the Gulf coast region in response to Hurricane Katrina. Similar to FMS, Expeditionary Medical Support System’s (EMEDS) mission is to provide front line, field hospital care in the event of a catastrophe or terrorist attack where local facilities are too overwhelmed to adequately treat patients.65 EMEDS operate and function like brick and mortar hospitals and have operating rooms, dental, pharmacy and lab services, intensive care units, and other facilities and equipment. These mobile hospitals have a 25-bed capacity and can be set up and ready to receive patients within 24 hours.66 Traditionally, EMEDS are primarily for military personnel but, in response to Katrina, EMEDS were utilized to provide medical treatment to thousands of civilian victims.

On Thursday, September 1, the Air Force deployed an EMEDS to provide medical assistance at the New Orleans Airport. Upon arrival, the EMEDS team set up and began
assisting the DMATs who had already established a make-shift facility. At the New Orleans Airport EMEDS teams helped other government agencies and civilian medical teams provide treatment and health care to those individuals transported to the airport. EMEDS teams also assisted with aeromedical evacuations. According to Colonel Richard Bachman, who directed the Air Force’s medical assistance in the Gulf region, “the EMEDS is to set up rapidly, treat, stabilize, and then air evacuate people out. It’s a 25-bed hospital, but we took care of 2,500 people in two days, so the number of beds is essentially irrelevant, because we weren’t holding them and providing long-term treatment. We never practiced hospital care in an airport terminal without tents or having equipment being overwhelmed by thousands of patients in the dark without air conditioning.” Despite the unfavorable conditions, EMEDS and other medical personnel stationed at the airport completed an enormous patient movement operation in a very brief window of time.

The Air Guard set up an additional mobile military hospital at the Convention Center to take the place of Charity Hospital and provide medical services to military personnel while other facilities are out of commission. The Mississippi Air National Guard established an EMEDS to augment services of the badly damaged Hancock County Medical Center. The EMEDS was set up in the parking lot of that medical center and treated 47 patients before it was demobilized in late September.

State Mobile Hospital Units

As one of the few self-contained mobile hospitals in the U.S., the Carolina MED-1 mobile hospital was federalized and deployed to Waveland, Mississippi. Carolina MED-1 has complete emergency room and operating room capabilities with 100 hospital beds and functions exactly like a brick and mortar hospital. It was staffed by a team of volunteers from the Carolina Medical Center, PHS officers, and other medical volunteers. Waveland was completely decimated by Katrina and was in desperate need of medical facilities and personnel to treat residents. In total, Carolina MED-1 treated almost 5,000 patients and is considered one of the success stories of the medical response to Hurricane Katrina. Amy described Carolina MED-1 as an “invaluable asset to Mississippi’s most hard hit area in Hancock County.”

On Friday, September 2, Simonson wrote an e-mail asking the state of Nevada to transport its mobile medical facility (NV-1) to the New Orleans Airport. He intended NV-1 to serve as a federalized hospital facility to provide medical care. Upon arrival at the airport, though, NV-1 was told its assets were no longer needed and was eventually directed to Gulfport, Mississippi where it was set up with support staff from the Nevada Hospital Association, PHS officers, and volunteer health professionals. When asked why he waited until September 2 to order NV-1 to New Orleans, Simonson recalled there was some confusion as to whether Mississippi had already requested use of NV-1. Simonson said ultimately NV-1 was used in Mississippi and that it was difficult to initially assess where assets were needed most. In total, NV-1 saw almost 500 patients by the end of September. Both of these mobile hospitals were considered extremely valuable assets to the public health response after Hurricane Katrina.

Finding: New Orleans was unprepared to provide evacuations and medical care for its special needs population and dialysis patients and Louisiana officials lacked a common definition of “special needs”

Defining “Special Needs”

New Orleans has the largest special needs population in Louisiana. But the Louisiana Medical Director and State Health Officer, Dr. Jimmy Guidry, and the Director of the New Orleans Health Department, Dr. Kevin Stephens, never offered a clear or consistent definition of “special needs.” According to Guidry, special needs people are
defined as not requiring hospital care, but not appropriate for a general population shelter either. Stephens, on the other hand, indicated the state has a list outlining what criteria constitute a special needs patient. Among the most important, Stephens said, a patient with special needs is someone who requires intermittent electricity to sustain life.

In fact, the list to which Stephens referred says the state of Louisiana has one set of criteria for classifying special needs persons, while Jefferson Parish has another. The state defines Category I special needs persons as “patients who are acutely ill and need to be admitted to a hospital as a patient during an emergency evacuation of the area.” Jefferson Parish classifies Category I special needs people as “patients who do not yet need to be admitted, but whose condition will probably deteriorate during an evacuation.” These patients are to be taken to a trauma hospital. Aside from Jefferson Parish having a definition of Category I special needs that differs from the state’s definition, confusion also arises in determining whether Jefferson Parish’s criteria for Category II special needs people also applies to Louisiana. Category II is for “patients with limited needs and assistance who require special needs sheltering during an emergency evacuation of the area. These will be sent to non-trauma hospitals.” Again, it is unclear whether this category is specific to Jefferson Parish or if it applies to the entire state.

Additionally, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) Director for Plaquemines Parish, Jesse St. Amant, was adamant that nursing home patients are considered “special needs patients.” Neither Guidry nor Stephens concurred, and nursing home patients are not listed within Louisiana or Jefferson Parish’s special needs categories.

Stephens stated New Orleans does not keep a list to identify special needs persons in advance of an emergency. St. Amant, however, keeps a database of Plaquemines Parish’s special needs patient population and interviews each patient about specific requirements for transportation, medications, and other special needs. He has pre-arranged contracts to address these needs and operates on an annual budget of approximately $300,000. Stephens said New Orleans uses statistics from the health care community (such as the number of patients on dialysis) to reach its estimate that New Orleans has 1,000 special needs persons. Interestingly, a September 6 EOC Report indicated the state estimated dialysis patients alone were greater than this figure, saying the “State projects approximately 1,200 dialysis patients.” Additionally, the emergency coordinator in Jefferson Parish, which is an adjacent suburb of equivalent population to New Orleans, said they have a potential of 45,000 special needs patients—41,000 more patients than the estimate given by Stephens.
Guidry says the state bused 200 special needs people from the Superdome to LSU hospitals in Baton Rouge on Sunday before landfall. According to state officials, the New Orleans plan never called for the use of school buses for evacuation, so in their opinion, criticisms about school buses lined up underwater and unused are unfair. Additionally, state officials say New Orleans never requested state assistance or buses to help with this effort (even though Guidry indicated the state did, in fact, assist in this manner).

At the federal level, FEMA Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer Scott Wells said he interpreted special needs to be anyone needing assistance, whether they were impoverished or medically disabled. To his knowledge, the state and the parishes made no significant attempts to evacuate special needs persons, although he indicated there may have been efforts to shelter them. The need to shelter special needs people in the Superdome showed the state and city had not taken steps (to which they had agreed during the Hurricane Pam exercise) to coordinate the movement and sheltering of these people farther north, away from the Gulf, Wells said. The requirement for medical evacuations after the storm was an indication the pre-landfall evacuation was not successful.

Parish officials outside New Orleans also described their efforts to identify and evacuate special needs patients. According to the Plaquemines Parish sheriff, before the start of hurricane season, the parish solicits people to register if they have special needs for evacuation. For Katrina, school buses were used to pick up and move these special needs registrants to a shelter in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. According to the Jefferson Parish emergency management director, their emergency operations plan also includes provisions for special needs people. The parish conducts a triage by telephone to determine which people with special needs require shelter within a parish hospital. Those who qualify are given a password for admittance. For Hurricane Katrina, there were 12,000 such people identified and sheltered.

**Dialysis Patients**

Although dialysis patients were part of his definition of special needs persons, Stephens initially acknowledged the Superdome did not have the personnel, facilities, or supplies to provide dialysis. Nor did it have food appropriate for diabetics. He said although dialysis patients were discouraged from going to the Superdome for this reason, several went anyway. Stephens further stated dialysis patients were among the first patients evacuated by helicopter.

In a subsequent meeting, however, Stephens gave completely different information. He said New Orleans has an evacuation plan specifically designed for dialysis patients so they know the medical facility to which they are assigned during an emergency. He contradicted his early statement (dialysis patients were present in the Superdome) when he told the Select Committee the city’s evacuation planning worked virtually perfectly, and no dialysis patients went to the Superdome. To his knowledge, Stephens said all dialysis patients were evacuated to their pre-assigned medical facilities. Of interest, the definition of Category II special needs persons, mentioned above for Jefferson Parish and possibly the entire state, includes “kidney dialysis” patients.

**The Superdome**

Although Louisiana owns the Superdome, New Orleans runs it with assistance provided by the state, the Department of Health and Hospitals, and the Department of Social Services when needed. The city is also responsible for drafting and implementing a plan for its use during an emergency.

Since 1998, New Orleans has used the Superdome to shelter citizens with special needs during hurricanes. For Hurricane Isadore in 2002, supplies were pre-staged, and the facility was staffed for 400 patients. Despite these preparations, though, only 27 special needs patients were identified and treated. During Hurricane Ivan, in September 2004, the Superdome was again opened as a special needs shelter and received just 32 patients. The small number of special needs patients at the Superdome during these two hurricanes gave New Orleans officials a false indication of how many patients to expect for Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the city was ill-prepared.
The city’s plans call for the Superdome to house only special needs patients — not the general public. For Hurricane Katrina, the special needs area was established in the southeast and southwest quadrant ballrooms, where some supplies were pre-positioned. According to Superdome and Sports Arena General Manager Glen Menard, the Superdome’s only “pre-positioned” supplies were goods leftover from a July event which the city requested remain in place. Menard also said he placed two refrigerators and power generators in the southeast and southwest quadrants of the Superdome, which were designated as the medical care areas.

By the Sunday before landfall, over 400 special needs patients were evacuated to Baton Rouge using 10 para-transport vans and three city buses. For the 8,000-10,000 people who remained in the Superdome, there were federal, state civilian, National Guard, and city medical personnel to provide care. But this contingent proved too small to provide care for the multitude of people who eventually sought refuge there. After the flooding, but before evacuation of the Superdome, it is estimated 23,000 people were sheltered there.

As the crowd grew, it became increasingly difficult for the facility to care for special needs patients — the Superdome only contained enough personnel and supplies to care for approximately 1,000 people. With severe overcrowding of evacuees and flooding from roof leaks, the rest of the crowd was moved to elevated bleachers. Menard said eventually the special needs patients were further evacuated from the Superdome to the Sports Arena.

DMAT OK-1 departed from LSU to the Superdome on the evening of August 29. Upon arrival, the National Guard told DMAT OK-1 it wasn’t needed inside, redirecting the team to the Sports Arena, which is attached to the Superdome by two open-air walkways. DMAT OK-1 finally set up operations at the Sports Arena late that night and began receiving patients the morning of August 30. The establishment of this DMAT came 36 hours after FEMA reported serious medical problems in the Superdome, including 400 people with special needs, 45 to 50 patients in need of hospitalization, and the rapid depletion of supplies.

Evacuations finally began on August 31, and medical workers prepared records for their patients. In the end, though, those records were lost in the confusion. Evacuation of the Superdome concluded on September 3. Six people died in the Superdome — five for medical reasons and one from suicide.

**Convention Center**

Similar to the Superdome, the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center (Convention Center) is the property of the state of Louisiana. However, the Convention Center was never intended to serve as a shelter of any kind — special needs or otherwise — so there were no medical capabilities in place prior to the storm. When asked by the media about conditions at the Convention Center, Brown said, “(W)e learned about that (Thursday), so I have directed that we have all available resources to get that convention center to make sure that they have food and water and medical care that they need.”

The Convention Center General Manager Warren Reuther, however, does not recall the provision of any medical assistance for the evacuees at his facility.

Reuther is an appointee of Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco and says his responsibilities are to oversee the Convention Center and protect its assets. Despite the fact the Convention Center was not intended as a shelter, evacuees seeking dry land arrived there, and upon finding the glass entry doors locked, broke in. Reuther estimates between 18,000 and 25,000, perhaps even 30,000 people, eventually gathered at the center.
During the storm, Reuther and approximately half a dozen of his public safety staff remained in place, attempting in vain to maintain order as evacuees filled almost every area of the building. The Convention Center was quickly overwhelmed, running on reduced emergency power until all power was lost when fuel ran out on the night of August 30. Public bathrooms became overloaded, and problems were compounded by loss of water pressure. Hallways became the de-facto toilets. Walk-in refrigerators were emptied on the floor, and many evacuees began bringing their own food and alcohol into the building. Almost 32,000 chairs were broken or lost, 90,000 square yards of carpeting were destroyed, and the facility’s infrastructure was damaged. Gunshots were reportedly heard, and Reuther and his staff were forced to hide from the crowds.

Evacuations at the Convention Center began Friday, September 2 and continued until Sunday, September 4. Despite Reuther’s assertion medical assistance never arrived, a DOD e-mail indicated medical teams were established and operating at the Convention Center on Saturday, September 3. Medical needs were unclear because of poor communication and situational awareness. The number of evacuees continued to increase at the Convention Center as evacuations at the Superdome concluded. People left at the Superdome were directed to the Convention Center, where they would later be evacuated. Throughout the ordeal, Reuther saw no deliveries of food, water, or other supplies. At one point, he called Blanco but received no answer. He also never saw Nagin throughout the ordeal.

Henderson happened to be attending a physician leader retreat for Ochsner staff on Friday, August 26 and Saturday, August 27, at the Ritz-Carlton hotel on Canal Street when the meeting was cut short because of the impending landfall of Hurricane Katrina. He evacuated his family to Jackson, Mississippi and chose to stay at the hotel so he could remain close to their home.

By the morning of Tuesday, August 30, the Ritz-Carlton was surrounded by three to five feet of water and Canal Street was flooding. There was a hotel announcement that anyone who needed medical care should report to the hotel’s French Quarter Bar. Fortunately there was another medical conference involving medical specialists (seven physicians, a physician’s assistant, and pharmacists) taking place at the hotel. The impromptu medical team had already started to organize a list of medicines and supplies they might need. Looking outside and talking to the police, he realized looting was occurring outside the hotel, and it appeared the looters were armed. Henderson, along with a family practice physician, pharmacist, and two officers from the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), waded across Canal Street through waist-high water to the Walgreens pharmacy across the street. They were able to break into the pharmacy and began stuffing insulin, drugs, and medical supplies into plastic garbage bags. There was a confrontation with the looters, who were held back at gunpoint by the officers. Henderson was able to carry three bags of supplies back to the hotel.

He set up a make-shift clinic at the hotel for the next 24 hours. The majority of the patients were seeking prescription refills, a lot of which he did not have. He subsequently opened another “clinic” when NOPD moved their operational headquarters and command and control center from the Ritz-Carlton to the Sheraton hotel across the street.

He was told by NOPD that Tulane, University, and Charity Hospitals were taking on water and basically inoperable and was asked by an NOPD captain if he could stay and take care of several hundred police officers who had set up camp at the Sheraton. Henderson was dispatched with a team of armed officers and took additional supplies, including insulin, from a second Walgreens pharmacy. Many patients Henderson treated had “generalized anxiety disorders, not unexpected as most of the police had lost homes and some had lost family members and yet still were on the job.”

**A Doctor’s First-hand Account**

Dr. Gregory Henderson is a Tulane University and Vanderbilt University School of Medicine graduate. He lives in New Orleans and is the Associate Chairman of the Ochsner Clinic Foundation Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine. He was set to begin his new job at Ochsner on September 1.
were also many cases of hypertension and diabetes. “I remember thinking it seems like the majority of the NOPD were hypertensive and type II diabetic. I took a lot of blood pressures, listened to a lot of hearts, and refilled a lot of beta-blocker, calcium channel blocker, and diuretic prescriptions. I cleaned and dressed a lot of superficial wounds. I gave a lot of insulin shots,” he said.

Henderson had forgotten to take rubbing alcohol and used Wild Turkey bourbon to sterilize the injection sites. He also distributed the antibiotic, Cipro, and treated several skin rashes which were so severe some police officers had to walk around in underwear. He believed the severe contact dermatitis may have resulted from exposure to toxins in the water. Katrina Rash, they began calling it.

In the meantime, police officers told him stories of rapes and murders at the Convention Center, but because of the lack of communications, they were essentially unable to do anything about it or even confirm the rumors. On September 1, under NOPD escort, Henderson went to his new office at the Ochsner Clinic to collect additional medical supplies.

On the way back to the Sheraton, he asked an NOPD captain to drive by the Convention Center. There, he saw “thousands upon thousands of people collected on the boulevard in front of the convention center. There were the infants to the elderly in wheelchairs. There were many elderly lying on sheets and blankets on the median. There were screaming men, women, and children and dazed quiet and confused men, women, and children. Most were African-American, but many were white.” The NOPD captain was minimally armed and refused to let Henderson get out of the car, but promised to bring him back with armed escort.

Henderson, accompanied by Officer Mark Mornay, returned to the Convention Center where he treated dehydrated infants, mothers, and “hundreds” of elderly confined to wheelchairs. One woman in a wheelchair had deep epidermal ulcerations and two gangrenous toes, and there was nothing he could do for her. He saw three children have seizures because they ran out of medication. He saw and treated a severe asthma attack by only coaching the child’s breathing. He saw diabetics who had been without insulin, oral hypo-glycemics, and dialysis for days. Mornay told Henderson he could not be responsible for his safety after dark, so they returned to the Sheraton.

Finding: Most hospital and VAMC Emergency Plans did not offer concrete guidance about if or when evacuations should take place

The South Central VA Health Care Network (VISN 16) outlines preparedness and response procedures in the event of a hurricane in its Emergency Management Program Standard Operating Procedure NO. 10N16-1. This section provides the Network Director’s Office, as well as the Emergency Operating Centers, with much leeway regarding the assignment of specific responsibility to personnel. Facilities threatened by a hurricane are instructed to “contact their home healthcare patients, especially those that are oxygen or ventilator dependent, and PBHC to determine if they intend to evacuate of (sic) come to the facility.” Additionally, “Threaten (sic) HCSs/VAMCs will be required to evaluate all patients and determine patients that can be moved to other facilities along with special needs (oxygen/suction/ventilator/IV/ etc.) requirements by either ground or air transportation.”

A VAMC is instructed to have made final evacuation decisions within 36 to 48 hours prior to landfall. The number of patients evacuated should depend on how much threat the hurricane poses to the facility. If the VAMC does decide to evacuate patients, the evacuations should be completed 24-hours prior to a hurricane’s landfall.

The VAMC Biloxi, Mississippi Emergency Plan addresses hurricane evacuation protocol more methodically but still gives confusing directions regarding if or when the facility should be evacuated in anticipation
of a hurricane’s landfall. Also absent is specific information about evacuation transportation.

The plan begins by stating, “The basic planning tenet for hurricanes includes a total evacuation of the Gulfport Division.” The VA health care system is instructed to work in “close cooperation” with “Alabama and Mississippi to provide evacuation vehicles and facilities for use prior to storm strike.”

When a hurricane enters the Gulf of Mexico and/or is 96 hours or less away from landfall, “the Gulfport Division will be evacuated entirely.” When a hurricane is within 72 hours of making landfall, the facility is instructed to prepare for evacuations on short notice. When a “storm/hurricane enters the Gulfport (sic) of Mexico and is 48 hours or less away from landfall at Biloxi/Gulfport,” the plan indicates the VAMC Director and the VISN 16 Director are to determine when evacuations will begin. The plan notes, however, “Evacuation may not be required and is not automatic.” If the directors do choose to evacuate, all patients must be moved when the storm is “24 hours or less away from landfall at Biloxi/Gulfport.”

Chapter I of the VAMC New Orleans Emergency Management Plan outlines procedures for total evacuation of patients and staff. The plan indicates the evacuation procedures in this section “will be used for any situation requiring internal transfer of patients or total evacuation of patients from the Medical Center,” so while not clearly stated, it appears this plan should be used in the event of a hurricane.

VAMC patients and staff are directed to evacuate to the ground level. While this plan is more detailed than the VAMC Biloxi plan, it does not account for potential flooding whereby the street exit and the ground floor of the parking garage would be inaccessible. In terms of exactly how to evacuate, the plan states, “Exact evacuation procedures to be followed will be dictated by the nature of the disaster and the extent of damage to the Medical Center buildings.”

If a full-scale evacuation is necessary, the plan says patients “may be transferred to the VA Medical Center, Alexandria, LA.” Transportation of patients to outside facilities will be accomplished by means of commercially owned buses, ambulance services, government lease vehicles or any other means available from outside sources (i.e., National Guard, City of New Orleans).” The plan does not include more detailed information on which services to call upon first or what, if any, transportation agreements have already been made. Likewise, there is no indication of which hospitals should be used in such an emergency if the hospitals in the immediate surrounding area are not operational.

Chapter III states when a Hurricane Watch is established, the VAMC Chief of Staff should coordinate the “relocation of specialty care patients to other facilities if necessary.” Beyond this call for initial coordination with “other facilities,” there is no outline for when or specifically how to evacuate patients. Additionally, the plan calls for the evacuation plan from Chapter I be used in the event of flooding. Again, the five previously-described pages outlining evacuation procedures in Chapter I do not provide guidance on steps to take in the event of flooding.

The Emergency Management Manual for the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) covers both University and Charity Hospitals. The manual says the Emergency Management Program Coordinator is responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring all aspects of the emergency program. The manual provides summary information about evacuation procedures during an emergency, but like the VAMC plans, does not provide concrete information on whether facilities should evacuate in anticipation of a hurricane.

The MCLNO plan states if the CEO (or the designee) so decides, “patients shall be evacuated to an area of safety by whatever means are available. Formal agreements will be in place with ambulance services and neighboring facilities to transfer patients as necessary. All personnel will be trained in evacuation procedures.” The reader is then directed to reference the Emergency Management Evacuation Policy, Reference #1026, for LSU’s ambulance contract, transfer, and vendor agreements. (The Select Committee was not provided with a copy of the Emergency Management Evacuation Policy.)

The plan devotes an entire section to evacuation procedures and provides step-by-step instructions to specific personnel. For a total facility evacuation, it says, “Formal agreements will be made for the following…” and goes on to list ambulance contract agreements, transfer agreements, and vendor agreements for special needs. Decisions regarding the transfer of patients to other facilities may be made as early as 96 hours in advance of a potential hurricane. By 72 hours prior to potential landfall, the plan calls for decisions to be made regarding transfers.
Methodist Hospital uses the Hurricane Preparedness Plan established by the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness. This plan suggests hospitals may begin evacuation preparations when there is a slow-moving Category 3, a Category 4, or a Category 5 hurricane within 72 hours of landfall (and is predicted to make landfall within 100 miles of New Orleans). The CEO or his designee has the authority to call for evacuation. Actual evacuations may begin up to 60 hours in advance. At 60 hours, the plan says, “Make arrangements for at least two flat-bottom type boats in the event of severe flooding conditions” and to fuel vehicles to capacity. The announcement of total or partial evacuation is called, if applicable, no later than 24 hours in advance. The Director of Facility Services, 12 hours prior to landfall, is to “ensure emergency vehicles and boats are in position and ready for immediate use.”

There is also a section of the overall Hurricane Preparedness Plan devoted entirely to evacuations (The Hurricane Evacuation Plan) which states, “...evacuation from the Hospital will be a 'last resort' measure and will be carried out only when a mandatory evacuation is directed by the appropriate authority, or when a situation arises which places patients and staff unquestionably in harm's way. The threat of a direct strike by a major hurricane certainly creates such a situation, and evacuation may be necessary to protect the safety of patients and attending staff.”

If evacuation takes place prior to a hurricane, Methodist has written transfer agreements with two hospitals outside the major hurricane danger zone. This section provides the contact information for Lifeguard Transportation Service, Inc. and Acadian Ambulance and Air Med Services — the two companies with whom the hospital has written transportation agreements. If these services are overwhelmed, the plan instructs the hospital to call the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness.

As illustrated by these plans, hospitals and VAMCs lacked sufficient guidance for if and when they should evacuate their patients in anticipation of a hurricane. They also did not follow the limited guidance they did have.

Finding: New Orleans hospitals, VAMC, and medical first responders were not adequately prepared for a full evacuation of medical facilities

After New Orleans flooded, city medical centers needed to be evacuated. On September 2, Good Morning America showed the desperation of people trapped inside hospitals, reporting on a banner hanging from Charity Hospital that read, “Stop the lying and get us the hell out of here.” Flood waters prevented hospitals from receiving supplies or personnel, and some private hospitals, such as Methodist, say medical supplies and fuel tanks being airlifted to them by their corporate headquarters were being intercepted by FEMA. Many hospital emergency power generators were located at ground level or lower (often below sea level) and were subject to flooding. To make matters worse, fuel pumps were often placed at ground level, and fuel storage tanks (with limited fuel capacity) were frequently below ground level. Three acute care hospitals in the New Orleans area remained operational, four maintained some limited function, and 21 were not operational, closed, or evacuated. In hospitals that lost power like Methodist, pulmonary ventilator systems and other medical equipment requiring electricity became inoperable. Patients requiring ventilators were sustained by hand pumps. State and FEMA urban search and rescue teams were sent to help the hospitals evacuate, but they were intercepted by people trapped in the floodwaters and on rooftops. While Guidry said hospital evacuations were a huge logistical success
— they evacuated 12,000 patients by Saturday, September 3 — they did not seem like a huge success to the many patients awaiting rescue.

**Hospital and VAMC Evacuation: Their Stories and Timelines of Events**

Evacuations from VAMCs for Hurricane Katrina have received mostly favorable attention, particularly in comparison to the evacuation difficulties encountered by other New Orleans hospitals and shelters. “We had people on ventilators, we had liver patients, ambulatory patients, and every patient that we evacuated from every one of our facilities made it through this evacuation,” VA Secretary R. James Nicholson said.\(^\text{144}\)

On Monday, August 29, the VAMC Biloxi domiciliary patients and nine members of the medical staff were evacuated to VAMC Tuscaloosa, leaving 904 patients, staff, and family members sheltered in VAMC Biloxi.\(^\text{145}\) VAMC Gulfport patients were transferred to other facilities before the storm made landfall. VAMC New Orleans did not mass evacuate prior to the storm, and during the two days that followed, August 30 and 31, its evacuation plans were activated. Five five-ton trucks were used in cooperation with DOD’s air transport staff and HHS to evacuate 98 patients to the New Orleans Airport on September 1. From there, the patients were flown to the Houston, Jackson, and Alexandria VAMCs. At this time, efforts were also underway to evacuate the remaining 94 patients and 367 staff and family members at VAMC New Orleans. By Friday, September 2, all patients, staff, and family members were evacuated from VAMC New Orleans.

Donald Smithburg, CEO of LSU Health Sciences Center/Health Care Services Division, and approximately 20 members of his staff provided a detailed account of the evacuation of their facilities, Charity Hospital (Charity) and University Hospital (University).\(^\text{146}\) Smithburg went to Baton Rouge to staff the state EOC on the Saturday before the storm, and on Sunday at 7:00 a.m., he activated Code Grey but decided against calling for evacuation. At 5:30 a.m. on Monday morning, University lost electrical power. Charity followed, losing power at 8:00 a.m.\(^\text{147}\) Both hospitals began using their emergency generators just two to three minutes after the power failures. Charity’s generators and electrical equipment were located in the basement, and LSU officials said they knew Charity would probably lose emergency power if severe flooding occurred. The waters continued rising over the course of Monday, and late that night, Charity lost its emergency generators. Unlike Charity, University’s emergency generator and electrical equipment were housed on the second floor, considered high enough to avoid flooding and low enough to avoid wind damage. University lost emergency power anyway, and both hospitals were left in darkness and without the means to care for their patients.

On Tuesday, August 30, Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries evacuated nine of the 17 Intensive Care Unit (ICU) patients at University and four from the Charity campus.\(^\text{148}\) Evacuation efforts were suspended, however, due to reports of gunfire and impending nightfall. On Wednesday, August 3, at 3:00 a.m., LSU received a request from the state OEP to prepare a patient roster. Officials were told patients should be triaged to red, yellow, and green status (red, critical; green, stable), and LSU staff gathered the necessary information manually. Later that morning, the state OEP notified them via the HEAR system to prepare for evacuation, but evacuation aid never arrived. At 11:00 a.m., Charity was notified its evacuation was to begin in 30 minutes, but by 4:00 p.m., they were still awaiting word from the National Guard regarding potential evacuation. That evening, the hospitals were notified the water level was too high for evacuation via the National Guard’s five-ton trucks.

Further complications arose on Thursday, August 31 when LSU was told evacuation orders were on hold due to rumors of violence and potential harm to rescue workers.\(^\text{149}\) An e-mail between HHS employees that morning confirms this: “Patient evacuation has been hampered by security issues on patient movement. It is unsafe for patient movement to continue without security provided.”\(^\text{150}\) LSU was told evacuations would resume after the arrival of federal troops. Smithburg said the Coast Guard and National Guard were evacuating people in the most immediate danger, so LSU was not a top priority.
Evacuations for University and Charity patients and staff began on Friday, September 1 at 8:00 a.m. and noon, respectively. The U.S. Coast Guard arrived by helicopter. Patient evacuations were facilitated by the Coast Guard, Louisiana and Florida Wildlife and Fisheries, NOPD, and state police. HHS e-mails that morning also indicate, “today’s priorities are Charity and University Hospitals.”

A total of 167 patients were evacuated from University and approximately 200 from Charity. LSU indicated that all of these patients were sent with paper records and three patients died due to the storm; two were ventilator patients who died on the roof of the hospital during evacuations.

Larry Graham, CEO for Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital (Methodist), monitored the storm on his own and stated he received no calls from the city or state government. On Friday at 5:00 p.m., he believed the storm would miss New Orleans, but on Saturday, he realized there was going to be a problem. He began contacting all hospitals with which Methodist had transfer agreements, but none would admit patients due to concerns about how the storm might affect them. All of Methodist’s agreements are with hospitals in Louisiana or Mississippi because all patient transport is handled via ground ambulance. He likewise indicated Methodist is a “for-profit” hospital, meaning it does not receive FEMA funding and is responsible for the costs of airlifting patients. Even with such funding, however, Graham is not sure evacuation measures are practical. In anticipation of Hurricane Ivan, Methodist evacuated over 30 ICU patients over a total of 45 hours. However by Saturday, August 27, Methodist did not have time for an evacuation of this scale.

Methodist housed a total of 750 people during Hurricane Katrina, including 130 patients. Twenty-eight were ICU patients with 12 patients on ventilators, and 16 were dialysis patients. Chalmette Medical Center (Chalmette), Methodist’s sister hospital located 12 miles away, evacuated its six ICU patients to Methodist. The remaining people at Methodist were staff, family, and people who had sought shelter in the hospital from the storm.

Like University and Charity, Methodist’s emergency generators failed after the storm. The generators were located on the roof, but the fuel pumps had flooded. Graham cut power in all areas that were deemed “not critical,” and they hand-ventilated patients requiring oxygen. The next day, they began hand-carrying fuel to the generators. Chalmette’s generators were located on ground level. At the time, however, Tim Coffey, the then CEO of Chalmette, believed the facility was sound.

On Sunday, August 28, ambulances were supposed to be en route to the hospital, but Graham said they were commandeered by government officials. Methodist’s parent company, Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS), located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, was sending the hospital supplies, including fuel and water, via helicopter. The supplies never arrived because, as Methodist and UHS believe, FEMA intercepted the cargo. Army officers and FEMA officials arrived on Tuesday, and Graham informed them he needed assistance with evacuations. The officials assured him they would return but never did. Throughout the ordeal, Methodist had the assistance of 12 National Guardsmen as well as police forces that stayed for security reasons. Post-Katrina evacuations started taking place on Wednesday, August 31 because Methodist’s corporate office contracted with private companies. The difficulties the hospital encountered were still enormous, though, as a September 2 e-mail from a Methodist doctor to HHS staff indicates:

“Contrary to what has been reported on the news, Methodist Hospital, including Albert and Maxine Barrocas have not been evacuated, and the details are grisly. FEMA has been intercepting supplies sent to the hospital, and patient and staff evacuations have essentially ceased.

If anyone can help bring attention to this problem, please help us. Below are some facts related to us by the staff at the hospital during one of the few occasions we have been able to talk to them.

- 600 People in hospital
- 13 patients on gurneys
- Staff is dehydrating
- FEMA is DIVERTING support being sent in by UHS (owners of hospital) away from the hospital
■ Temperature is 110 degrees with humidity
■ NO fuel left to operate th!!e hospital tower (sic)
■ NO communication with National Guard to coordinate evacuation of patients
■ Having to feed 500+ non-patient refugees — they are very close to rioting for the balance of food water and supplies
■ NO power, NO communication
■ Everything is manual — no xray — running out of supplies
■ Patients are on the 2nd floor and 3rd floor — having to carry patients up the stairs and helicopters didn’t come back
■ Without power, the ventilator dependant patients are being manually bagged in 1 hour shifts by staff
■ Refusing to take gurney patients
■ FEMA is commandeering all supplies and all private efforts to get supplies including fuel, food, water
■ Governor is misrepresenting what is going on
■ Snakes in hospital
■ Rashes on staff from water
■ Losing nurses as result of dehydration
■ Need FEMA to land on roof and prove what they are saying is correct
■ No security—uprising for f!!ood, water and supplies (sic)
■ Governor did not allow for the evacuation of hospitals and now won’t help
■ Uprising of refugees

Graham said the evacuations at Methodist were completed late on Friday, September 2. He also stressed that mid-way through the evacuation, he learned patients who were triaged to the New Orleans Airport were not receiving adequate care. He began withholding patients who were supposed to be taken to the airport because Methodist was in a position to provide them with better care. He cited this as a primary “critical issue” — the evacuation of patients to locations unable to provide medical care. Coffey added that Chalmette doctors who went to the New Orleans Airport to offer their services were turned away by DMATs who said they were not credentialed in the NDMS physician database.

On September 20, an official from Tenet Healthcare (Tenet), Memorial Hospital’s (Memorial) parent company, told CNN the National Guard evacuated some patients from Memorial before the flooding began on Tuesday, August 30. The next morning, Wednesday, Tenet reported to CNN that it asked New Orleans local authorities for assistance in evacuating critically ill patients but was told it would have to hire private companies. Later that day, Tenet says local authorities and good samaritans provided limited assistance with evacuations by boat. On Thursday, helicopters hired by Tenet airlifted approximately 400 patients, employees, and evacuees from Memorial to another Tenet-owned hospital in Slidell, Louisiana. Tenet indicated flights were suspended overnight after reports of sniper fire, but evacuations resumed, and were completed, by the end of the day on Friday, September 2.

### Louis Armstrong International Airport

The medical operation at the New Orleans Airport was chaotic due to lack of planning, preparedness, and resources.

After patients were evacuated from medical facilities, most were taken to the New Orleans Airport, which served as a hospital for the sick, a refuge for thousands, and the hub of medical evacuations and airlifts. There were two separate missions at the airport. The first was attending to the medical needs of evacuees and the second was processing evacuees not needing medical attention. According to OR-2 DMAT, evacuees who needed medical treatment were triaged, treated, and prepared for transports. People not requiring medical
care were processed and prepared for transport to shelters in other states by commercial aircraft. In total, over 21,000 displaced persons not requiring medical care were evacuated.

“Overnight, we turned New Orleans’ airport into the busiest helicopter base in the entire world. At any given time, there were at least eight to 10 helos off-loading on the tarmac, each filled with 10 to 40 survivors at a time, with 10 circling to land . . . It was a non-stop, never-ending, 24-hour-a-day operation,” said Dr. Hemant Vankawala, a member of the Dallas DMAT deployed to the New Orleans Airport.¹⁶⁰

Medical patients arrived by truck, bus, ambulance, and helicopter with little or no information or records about their conditions. The medical personnel at the New Orleans Airport were challenged by the sheer number of patients and the lack of information about patient medical histories. By August 31, three DMATs had arrived at the airport.¹⁶¹ Eventually, eight DMATs would be stationed at the New Orleans Airport to help provide care during patient movement operations in New Orleans.¹⁶² The Air Force also deployed an EMEDS team, on Thursday, September 1, to augment the medical assistance operation in place at the airport.¹⁶³ These EMEDS teams also assisted with aeromedical evacuations.

An OR-2 DMAT after-action report described medical facilities established in the upper and lower levels of the west terminal of the airport.¹⁶⁴ These facilities were supplied and staffed by DMATs and PHS officers. The flow of patients was constant, and it is estimated the entire medical operation at the New Orleans Airport treated approximately 3,000 patients who were eventually evacuated by military aircraft to other facilities. Some DMATs believe the number was much greater — as high as 6,000 to 8,000 patients.¹⁶⁵

Despite the treatment and evacuation of thousands, the medical operation at the New Orleans Airport was chaotic due to lack of planning, preparedness, and resources.

FEMA officials did not conduct an adequate assessment of the situation before deploying DMATs. Upon arrival, many teams were confused about where to place assets and how to integrate into the existing operation. Many DMATs arrived before their cache of supplies, limiting their ability to do their work. According to Vankawala, medical personnel were operating with a limited amount of supplies and a generator with only partial power. “All we could do was provide the barest amount of comfort care. We watched many, many people die. We practiced medical triage at its most basic — black tagging the sickest people and culling them from the masses so that they could die in a separate area,” Vankawala said.¹⁶⁶

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TX-1 and TX-4 DMATs, which were among the first to arrive, had equipment that was not updated and could not link together other critical equipment, such as ventilators.¹⁶⁷ Similarly, one team member from OR-2 DMAT observed “five different models/brands of glucose monitors, all using their own proprietary test strips that weren’t interchangeable. The CA-4 cache, which was current, arrived later and supplemented these caches.”¹⁶⁸

OR-2 DMAT reached the conclusion that, “there didn’t appear to be a clear plan for dealing with the approximately 25,000 evacuees who arrived at the airport.
There was insufficient food, water, and sanitation.*169 One team member said evacuees were being taken from a dehumanizing experience (flooding and rescue) and placed into an equally dehumanizing environment at the New Orleans Airport.

Finding: The Government did not effectively coordinate private air transport capabilities for the evacuation of medical patients

The Association of Air Medical Services (AAMS), comprised of 300 mostly private air transportation providers, represents 85 percent of all hospital transport capabilities.170 In coordination with the Center for Transportation Injury Research, AAMS has a database called the Atlas and Database of Air Medical Services (ADAMS)—a web-based, interactive database listing these air medical services (rotary and fixed wing aircraft) and receiving hospitals. The database is updated annually, funded by the Federal Highway Administration, and receives technical support from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In response to Hurricane Katrina, there was only one governmental request for access to ADAMS.171 Nevertheless, AAMS companies provided support for medical evacuations of both hospitals and nursing homes in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath. They were not used for pre-landfall evacuations and provided most of their resources without official contracts with hospitals.172 Authorities were slow to establish a system for filtering evacuation requests. Confusion and indecision about evacuations led to delays.

AAMS said FEMA did not help their efforts.173 On the morning of August 30, FEMA tasked Carla Brawley, a Department of Transportation contractor, to find and secure air medical resources.174 Brawley contacted Acadian Air Ambulance (Acadian) flight coordinator, Mike Sonnier, to request resources. Acadian is the largest air ambulance provider in Louisiana. An AAMS after-action report stated,

“According to Mr. Sonnier, sometime later that morning the National Guard Air Boss (name unknown) contacted Mr. Sonnier and Acadian air ambulance was then tasked with coordinating missions into and out of New Orleans airspace, coordinating requests for air evacuations from many of the New Orleans area hospitals, and also serving as the main contact between civilian providers and the lone FAA contracting officer that was tasked for this job by the Department of Transportation for FEMA.”

By the end of the day, approximately 50 medical helicopters and 13 fixed-wing aircraft were in New Orleans.175 While the first air evacuation took five hours, coordinators were in place to expedite the process on Wednesday. Over the next 96 hours, approximately 2,000 air medical evacuations were coordinated through AAMS members.176 Acadian estimates it was responsible for 800 of these evacuations.177 AAMS members accomplished these evacuations despite difficulties in communication and coordination. Poor use of assets and lack of coordination prevented additional evacuations. AAMS estimates it could have been able to move up to 7,000 patients if a better system had been in place.178 “The first 72 hours was chaos,” said one AAMS member.179 The majority of requests came directly from hospitals, such as Tulane University Hospital and Charity Hospital, because they were not receiving help through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).180 On August 29, Hospital Corporation of America Division President Dave Smith requested AirHeart Air Ambulance of Sacred Heart Health System help with evacuations of Tulane. Smith said fuel for the generators was running low and floodwaters were approaching the facility.181 The following morning, Tuesday, Tulane University Hospital requested assistance with transporting “two specialty pediatric patients” from New Orleans to Little
Rock, Arkansas. The Arkansas Children’s Hospital and its affiliate, Angel One Transport, responded along with other children’s hospitals. Fixed wing aircraft were provided by two hospitals in Texas: Texas Children’s Hospital in Houston and Cook Children’s Hospital in Fort Worth, and Mercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri. Additionally, Miami Children’s Hospital provided a helicopter to assist with the evacuation of “13 critically ill PICU (Pediatric Intensive Care Unit) patients and family members.” Tulane also directly contacted Florida-based Air Methods Lifenet Division that same day for evacuation assistance. In addition to these requests, personal networking also proved valuable in the absence of formal agreements. On August 31, a doctor who lived in Hawaii and had attended Tulane University, contacted a colleague at Tulane University Hospital. Together, these two doctors coordinated the assistance of Hawaii Air Ambulance. AAMS donated helipad coordinators to aid in efficiency and were able to evacuate 200 patients by noon on Friday, September 2.

Compared to New Orleans, AAMS involvement in Mississippi was markedly different. Air Methods Lifenet Division summarized their experience in Mississippi by saying, “During the entire Katrina experience in Mississippi, there was no federal command and control or coordination of resources across the whole area. Attempts to coordinate with FEMA rescue operation center in Jackson, Mississippi were rebuffed by federal officials there who stated clearly that all air evacuations in Mississippi, medical and USAR, had been federalized. And that no civilian medical aircraft were needed.”

John Dickerson, the FEMA EOC representative in Mississippi, declined offers from one AAMS agency to provide 25 helicopters to Mississippi. The Mississippi EOC had requested support, through EMAC, from Florida air transport agencies. Johnny Delgado, program manager of Baptist Health South Florida, Baptist Health Air Transport, and a Board Member of AAMS, had a crew and was ready to fulfill the request. They were en route to Gulfport, the meeting point for air medical evacuation support agencies, but were turned back. Dickerson told them because the response was now federal, private agencies are not allowed to assist. However, a different AAMS company dealt with the Mississippi EOC directly and was able to provide support to the state.

Finding: Hospital and VAMC Emergency Plans did not adequately prepare for communication needs

The Biloxi, Mississippi VAMC Emergency Plan states when a hurricane is in the Gulf of Mexico and is 24 hours or less away from landfall, the Facilities Management Services (FMS) “will distribute emergency communications equipment. The facility’s HF/VHF radios will be ready to be set up in the Director’s Conference Room.” This part of the emergency plan does not, however, indicate which FMS team member is responsible for the distribution, including what specific equipment is to be distributed and to whom. Instead, the plan says FMS should develop its own Service Supplemental Hurricane Plan (SSHP) to address these issues.

The SSHP lists communication preparations and available equipment. In addition to providing emergency communications equipment, the FMS is responsible for ensuring there are adequate linens, the Recreation Hall is set up as an employee shelter, and evacuation services are in place. VAMC Biloxi says its FMS team typically includes four to six people (two or three craftsmen and two or three housekeepers) to handle this wide range of operations.

The plan also lists the VAMC’s communications capabilities but does not mention satellite phones discussed previously in the SSHP. It relies “primarily upon the use of telephones” and focuses on a telephone system designed exclusively for internal communications. Two-way radios are designated for specific personnel, but the plan recognizes limits to radio capabilities, stating, “The limited number of radios and single voice transmission, however, combine to impose several restrictions.” The radios are intended as back-up to the inter-office telephone system. The VAMC plan relies on landline telephones and the Hospital Emergency Area Radio (HEAR) Network System to communicate with the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and outside world.

The VAMC New Orleans Emergency Management Plan also depends on the HEAR Network System for communication with area hospitals and ambulances. The Chief of Police Services is to maintain a “pool” of Motorola radios, the exact number of which is not specified but will be used upon activation of the
emergency plan. Radios should be distributed to 11 staff members, all of whom are designated in the plan. The plan also indicates radios will operate for about eight hours before needing to be charged and provides the frequency at which these radios operate. The failure response section does not mention potential power failures, and in turn, the inability to recharge the radios. Additionally, no section of the plan addresses when the two-way radios should be distributed in preparation for the storm. In fact, the Hurricane section of the plan fails to mention radios or refer the reader to the communications chapter.

The Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VISTA) Contingency Plan cites hurricanes as a “high probability” threat. A telecommunications contingency plan included within the VISTA plan lists responsibilities and procedures for personnel in charge of communications during a telephone system failure. This plan indicates hand-held radios and/or cell phones will be used if landlines do not work and details who distributes the radios as well as who or what areas receives them. A total of 26 areas within VMAC New Orleans are to be provided with two-way radios (one radio per area), but there is no indication of how these radios should stay charged in the event power is lost. Additionally, “a cache of cellular phones are maintained by CIM Service Line Director . . . . . The exact number is not specified, but the plan states eight areas are “designated as first priority to receive cellular telephones.” As with the two-way radios, there is no planning for how to keep these cellular phones charged in the event that power is lost.

Charity and University use the Emergency Management Manual for the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans. The hospitals depend on two-way radios, cell phones, HEAR Radio, HRSO Radio, 800MZ Radio, and HAM Radio links for internal and external communications backup.

Methodist’s Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Plan charges the Hurricane Preparedness Control Center with establishing and maintaining emergency communications. The control center is assigned special telephone extensions as well as backup telephone numbers in case landlines fail. HEAR radio equipment, including the backup system, should be tested when a storm is more than 72 hours away. At 72 hours, the director of Facility Services is to designate the radio operator’s availability and “ensure operator adequately (sic) trained.” At 60 hours before landfall, battery supplies are checked. When the storm is 24 hours from landfall, the director of Facility Services provides the maintenance supervisor with a two-way radio unit. When the storm is 12 hours away, the director of Facility Services should “position emergency equipment supplies and prepare for immediate operations” and conduct a “final check of the emergency power system.” He or she is also supposed to ensure the radio operator is on duty and has contact on the HEAR system.

Methodist’s plan takes into account the potential for flooding as a result of a Category 3, Category 4, or Category 5 hurricane stating, “Flooding conditions to some extent can almost certainly be expected to accompany a hurricane.” Several recent studies and surveys by hurricane forecasting experts indicate that the entire New Orleans area is extremely vulnerable to “catastrophic flooding” as a result of a major storm. If flooding is predicted or reported, the CEO is instructed to shut down telephone communications equipment and reassign communications attendants to the Control Center. As such, all communications would obviously be lost.

These hospital and VAMC emergency plans lack a clear communications section, often leaving unanswered questions about what communications capabilities are in place, who is responsible for the equipment, and how to respond if power is lost. As a result, Gulf coast medical facilities were left without appropriate equipment or a proper understanding of how to implement an effective emergency communications plan.

Finding: Following Hurricane Katrina, the inability of VAMC New Orleans and hospitals to communicate impeded their ability to ask for help

Hospital executives said in Katrina’s aftermath, hospital emergency area radio HEAR systems simply did not work. Cell phones worked occasionally and allowed them to get in touch with the Louisiana Hospital Association, which in turn contacted the OEP on their behalf. The primary source of information was
television. In an interview with CNN on September 30, Dr. Albert Barrocas, a physician at Methodist, said, “We were trapped, communications was a big issue. The fact that we could not bring family and patients together, a lot of them were separated. The majority were separated. We did not even know where these people were going to.”

The Director of VA Veterans Integrated Service Network 16 (VISN 16), Robert Lynch, tells a similar story. “There was no plan in Biloxi and New Orleans. Hard-working people did a lot of workarounds with a lot of creativity. We’re going to learn from that,” he said. VISN 16 lost communications through its telephone landlines, operated by Sprint, during the storm. Lynch indicated that satellite phones worked sporadically and only when outside. In Biloxi, reports indicate only one cellular tower remained, and cell phone users could only make calls — not receive them. The VA worked around the communication failures by establishing a schedule for employees to be outside with satellite phones.

Smithburg said that on Sunday at 7:00 a.m., the hospital set up an incident command center in its board room for communications. The following day, the hospital went to Code Grey, and HAM operators arrived at the hospital. LSU had a point of contact at the OEP, but after the storm, LSU couldn’t receive information from the OEP or FEMA. On Monday, August 29, Smithburg reported that Nextel and cell phone service were temporarily lost on the University campus, and text messaging was “intermittent.”

Smithburg cited inadequate Health Resources and Services Administration grant funding as the primary reason for communication failure and said the LHA receives the federal grant money and allots it to Louisiana hospitals. While the grants were helpful for supplying Motorola phones and a HAM network, he believes the funding for LSU was disproportionately small in comparison to its needs and patient load.

In the days following Hurricane Katrina, Gulf coast hospitals and VAMCs were responsible for hundreds of patients, some of whom were in critical condition. Without necessary communications capabilities, these facilities were almost completely isolated from first responders and the outside world. Incapacitated and without supplies, many struggled to provide care and keep patients alive until help arrived.

Finding: Medical responders did not have adequate communications equipment or operability

Inadequate communications and situational awareness among and within federal agencies contributed to a diminished understanding of the health needs of affected populations.

On October 20, Stephens told the Associated Press, “Anything that could go wrong in communications went wrong.” Interviews with health officials and countless e-mails from ESF-8 agency personnel support his statement. Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, cell phones and landlines were not working, blackberries were not dependable (and in some cases, unavailable), and satellite telephone capabilities were not sufficient.

In preparation for Hurricane Katrina, Stephens oversaw the placement of an incident command trailer inside the Superdome. Immediately following the storm, he said landlines, the only mode of communication for his team, worked just five to 10 percent of the time. By Wednesday, cell phones began working intermittently but not enough to meet their communication needs, and despite his initial preparations, Stephens said these communication failures “weren’t anticipated at all.”

Colonel Kenneth K. Knight, Chief of the Air Force Medical Operations Center presented a timeline that showed similar difficulties — its communication systems were inoperable until September 1. On this date, the Air Force medical response timeline says there were, “Few working landlines and cell phone success [was] spotty.” It was not until four days after the storm, on September 2, the “cell phone network [was] improving.”

Likewise, Colonel Falk, an Air National Guard Surgeon, cited communications as the number one area needing
Both the Air National Guard and Army National Guard experienced almost a total failure in communications. The Army satellite system was not working, and personal cell phones (service provided by Verizon) were the only means of contact. Likewise, the National Guard Bureau’s “After Action Review” indicates communication failures adversely affected situational awareness. It states, “Lack of situational awareness was caused largely by the loss of communications. The lack of communications and difficulties with interoperability of equipment between forces as well as between the military and civilian leadership also hampered the rapid generation of EMAC requests. Poor communications also resulted in a lack of visibility of available assets in nearby states.”

National Guard Bureau Chief Lieutenant General Steven Blum indicated many guardsmen were equipped with outdated radios, and it was impossible for them to communicate with the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division and 1st Calvary Division. “You don’t want two units operating in the same area, doing the same function, that can’t coordinate their efforts because they don’t have the communications equipment,” Blum said.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of HHS, Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Dr. Robert Blitzer, said communications were initially a big problem. The command center used land lines and cell phones, and Blitzer also ordered a mobile communications center, which was deployed from Washington, D.C. to Atlanta and then to Baton Rouge. Blitzer had not needed to deploy the mobile communications center for the previous four hurricanes that hit Florida. HHS Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, Dr. Gerald Parker, knew of just one satellite phone, located on the command bus, and said all SERT leaders “probably” had one. Simonson said he thought there were two satellite phones per SERT, but for every satellite phone call that was successful, there were probably six failed attempts.

Communication failures also affected NDMS. NDMS Chief Jack Beall said not only did his staff not have enough equipment, the operability of the equipment they had was “in and out.” Satellite phones worked only when trucks containing the satellite equipment were pointing in the right direction. But as Beall said, “When you have people dying, there’s no time to mess with satellite phones.” Overall, his Nextel cell phone was his best option for communicating, but when he or his staff worked in the Superdome, it was “total blackout.” Efforts to remedy this problem began on September 3, with NDMS working to reach agreements with private cellular companies for the provision of “communications on wheels.”

OR-2 DMAT also cited communications as a key obstacle — particularly the operability of cell phones and interoperability of radios inside the New Orleans Airport. “There is an over reliance on cellular phones for communications. The cellular infrastructure was severely damaged during Katrina and cell phone service was initially unavailable . . . .” OR-2 DMAT reported. Radios also proved insufficient — the JT-1000 radios provided for the team could not contact radios in distant areas of the airport. Similarly, the team had no communication with security personnel via radio until the Forest Service provided Bendex King radios.

The breakdowns in communication experienced by government officials are illustrated in ESF-8 agency personnel e-mails. These e-mails show correspondence was almost non-existent until August 31, and difficulties sending and receiving messages persisted well into the first week of September. On August 31, a SERT member e-mailed the EOC and said, “My BB doesn’t work at all, any communications with me will have to be through cell.”

In Mississippi, a September 3 e-mail from the Gulfport Field Command Center indicates, “No phones or power as of now. Cells sometimes, Nextel service best. T-mobile not good for BBs at this area but do work other locations.” On September 5, a week after the storm, e-mails indicate that communications had not significantly improved. A CDC employee wrote the EOC saying, “Our folks in the field only have access to blackberry now. (The phone lines are going in and out and faxes are very difficult to send).”

Much attention has been paid to lack of operability and the inability of first responders to connect with each other through the equipment they had. Some responders, however, were having difficulties just getting the equipment itself. A SERT team member on her way to Baton Rouge e-mailed HHS officials on September 5 saying she needed a cell phone and blackberry. A response from an HHS official states, “We do not issue Blackberry’s to individuals for deployments (and we don’t have any anyway), we have also exhausted our total cache of phones, so we have absolutely nothing to issue. If things
change, I will advise you.  Likewise, the OR-2 DMAT report says there were an insufficient number of Motorola JF-1000 radios for their convoy, and other teams who did not have access to radios at all "encountered safety-related issues due to a lack of communications." The radios and satellite phones inside the FEMA trucks were also of no use to DMAT teams, as they had not been programmed.

From lack of equipment, to inoperability, to failure to program satellite phones, communications proved to be one of the greatest obstacles to the Hurricane Katrina medical response. Critical time was wasted. And energy that should have been spent treating patients was instead spent on repeated, and often times unsuccessful, attempts to communicate.

Finding: Evacuation decisions for New Orleans nursing homes were subjective and, in one case, led to preventable deaths

“We see where there are gaping holes in our system. It has become clear that no one was evaluating these plans in any real sense. The system provides no check and balance.”

—Louisiana State Representative Nita Hutter

Like its hospitals, Louisiana’s nursing homes (all privately owned, with the exception of two) are responsible for having their own evacuation plans. These plans are required to be updated annually, and before the start of hurricane season each year, DHH sends a reminder letter. DHH also checks to ensure every Louisiana nursing home submits a plan; however, media reports indicate DHH cited only one nursing home in the past year for submitting an inadequate plan.

Most plans encourage patients’ families to help with evacuations, and several southeast Louisiana nursing homes have agreements with nursing homes in northern Louisiana for the transfer of residents after evacuations. The statewide occupancy of Louisiana nursing homes is roughly 70 percent, which allows evacuated nursing homes to find bed space elsewhere. Before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, 19 nursing homes evacuated their residents. After the flooding in New Orleans, an additional 32 nursing homes evacuated. One nursing home, Saint Rita’s, did not evacuate at all, and 35 residents died. Overall, it is estimated that 215 people died in New Orleans nursing homes and hospitals as a result of Katrina and failed evacuations.

Three Louisiana Nursing Homes

Michael Ford is CEO and owner of three nursing homes in the New Orleans area — Riverbend Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (Riverbend), located in Plaquemines Parish, Metairie Health Care Center (Metairie), located in Jefferson Parish, and Waldon Health Care Center (Waldon), also located in Jefferson Parish. Combined, these nursing homes house close to 360 patients. Ford is also the Vice President of the New Orleans region of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA) and is a member of the Plaquemines OEP. According to Ford, all nursing homes’ emergency plans must be approved by the state. Riverbend’s emergency plan calls for the establishment of a pre-determined evacuation site, usually in a church gym in Kentwood, Louisiana, for both staff and patients. Ford has evacuated his nursing home patients once before, in anticipation of Hurricane Ivan, using an 18-wheel flat bed trailer equipped with air conditioning and a generator. The experience was trying, with the patients sitting “on a bus for eight hours to go one hundred miles,” but he also says it gave him and his staff experience for Hurricane Katrina.

Ford received notice of the mandatory evacuation for Plaquemines Parish on the Saturday before Katrina made landfall. Jesse St. Amant, the OEP Director for Plaquemines Parish, declared the evacuation at 9:00 a.m. on August 27 and said, “If they don’t leave, I tell ‘em they’re going to die in place.” Despite the difficulties moving patients for Hurricane Ivan, Ford listened to St. Amant and evacuated his nursing home in Plaquemines. Evacuation of Riverbend to the church in Kentwood was assisted by approximately 25 church volunteers, who
moved patients by carrying them on mattresses. Ford eventually relocated all but 50 of his patients to a wing he rented at Kentwood Manor Nursing Home. The rest were taken to one of Ford’s other two nursing homes in Jefferson Parish. It took almost six weeks to find accommodations and move everyone.229

Ford decided against evacuating Metairie, thinking it would withstand the storm. Subsequent flooding, however, forced him to evacuate 115 patients.230 Using Wildlife and Fishery department boats and a Louisiana Army National Guard two and a half ton truck, patients were taken to higher ground on the interstate. Buses from the New Orleans’ EOC collected some patients on the evening of August 29 and took them to a staging area in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Ford had some pre-existing contracts for housing his patients elsewhere, but he moved them to the first available locations — all of which were in Louisiana. By mid November, patients from Metairie were moved to the Waldon facility (which was not evacuated for Katrina), where they remain today.

St. Rita’s Nursing Home

The night before landfall, Ford had a phone conversation with Mabel Mangano, who co-owns St. Rita’s Nursing Home with her husband. “I’m staying,” she told him.231 Media reports indicate the Manganos were so confident about the safety of St. Rita’s, they invited staff, friends, and relatives to use it as a shelter.232

The Manganos and their 78 patients remained in the nursing home throughout the storm, and like many in New Orleans, thought they were safe after the hurricane passed.233 But the floodwaters began to rise — eight to nine feet in 30 minutes — and the Mangano’s grandson swam out and brought back a boat. They began putting patients on mattresses floating like rafts.

On September 13, the Manganos were charged with 34 counts of negligent homicide.234 Attorney General Charles Foti’s September 14 press release stated the “charges stem from Mable Mangano and Salvador Mangano, Sr.’s alleged failure to evacuate St. Rita’s Nursing Home, contrary to the facility’s own evacuation plan and in violation of the St. Bernard Parish’s mandatory evacuation. Additionally, subsequent to the mandatory evacuation order, authorities offered to send two buses and drivers to evacuate residents from the facility and the Manganos allegedly declined this offer.”235

The News-Star, a Monroe, Louisiana newspaper, says despite these charges, “the Manganos did not abandon St. Rita’s during the flooding. Nor did they seal the fate of their elderly residents by strapping them to their beds before leaving, as was widely reported. They worked alongside their staff and a few Good Samaritans during the frantic rescue effort . . . .”236 Parish residents may soon be the judge.

Finding: Lack of electronic patient medical records contributed to difficulties and delays in medical treatment of evacuees

Although HHS partnered with the AMA to establish a website allowing physicians and pharmacists to electronically access the prescription records of patients affected by Katrina, few patients or health care providers had access to medical records or a common medical record system

As Hurricane Katrina tore through the Gulf coast region, it destroyed millions of pages of paper files and patient medical records in doctor offices, clinics and hospitals. Thousands of patients displaced from the region by the storm lacked medical records and were forced to depend on memory and knowledge of their medical history, allergies, and other important information.
Kindred Hospital in New Orleans was one of the few facilities in the Gulf coast with electronic patient medical records. When Kindred evacuated 54 patients following Katrina, the hospital was able to send patients’ medical records electronically to other Kindred operated facilities in Baton Rouge and Houston where the patients had been transferred. Additionally, Kindred was able to print and mail hard copies of a patient’s electronic medical history for those who were evacuated to non-Kindred facilities.

Eighty pediatric cancer patients from the Gulf coast were evacuated to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital (St. Jude) in Memphis, Tennessee. The hospital was tasked with tracking down oncologists who fled flooded New Orleans with treatment records to ensure appropriate treatment for the pediatric patients. Additionally, doctors at St. Jude were forced to rely heavily on parents’ recollection and notes of their children’s treatments. “I honestly feel quite comfortable that the worst-case scenario is we delayed treatment” for some children, Dr. Joseph Mirro said. But there was “a lot of flying by the seat of your pants to get it right.”

According to Stephens, all medical files and documentation made regarding the treatment and medical attention provided to evacuees in the Superdome were lost. This contrasts sharply with how patients’ medical information was handled at the Astrodome in Houston. Thousands of the evacuees at the Superdome and Convention Center were transferred to the Astrodome without any paper or medical files. Volunteers in Houston were tasked with documenting patient information and registering evacuees to create new electronic medical records. The Harris County Hospital District created a large clinic in the Astrodome, which included 80 computer terminals to aid in registering patients and recording their medical history and information. By September 9, records had been created for approximately 8,000 Katrina evacuees.

Additionally, the American Medical Association (AMA), National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA), and several other organizations collaborated to launch the KatrinaHealth.org prescription medication network in September. The network is a secure online service to help physicians and authorized healthcare providers access medication and dosage information for Katrina evacuees. The network allows and authorizes physicians and pharmacies to provide prescription refills, or prescribe new medications. It facilitates coordinated care and helps to avoid potential medical errors by providing access to patient information. The AMA provides physician credentialing while NCPA provides authentication of pharmacists and pharmacies.

Because the VA has developed an electronic patient record system for its facilities, electronic records for over 50,000 New Orleans VAMC patients were downloaded to tapes and transferred to the VAMC in Houston. The Houston VAMC was able to reconfigure and restore them after the New Orleans VAMC evacuation. The records chief for the South-Central VA Healthcare Network said, “Every single thing on that computer was saved.”

Hurricane Katrina showed that physicians are often our “second” responders. They, too, need the support of sophisticated IT systems, enabling them to respond to a crisis quickly and retrieve and share critical records and information. “I honestly feel quite comfortable that the worst-case scenario is we delayed treatment” for some children, Mirro said. But there was “a lot of flying by the seat of your pants to get it right.”
The emerging public health threats of the 21st Century require the seamless flow of information at all levels of government. The need for better integration of IT into the healthcare industry was highlighted by thousands of Katrina evacuees with no medical patient records.

HHS has made recent efforts to support digital health recovery for the Gulf coast. In November, HHS announced partnerships with the Southern Governors’ Association and DHH to accelerate electronic health records in Gulf states to create accessible, accurate medical records and medical information. These partnerships will help physicians, medical practices, and hospitals rebuild medical records for their patients as they return to the region. However, National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Dr. David Brailer, said, “Making patient data accessible to authorized physicians, whether it is following a hurricane or as part of routine care, remains a challenge that must be addressed.”

Finding: Top officials at HHS and NDMS do not share a common understanding of who controls NDMS under ESF-8

On a larger scale, the command structure between HHS and the NDMS was problematic. ESF-8 is implemented by the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness at HHS; however, NDMS is housed and operates under FEMA (DHS) authority. For Hurricane Katrina, NDMS was activated by FEMA on August 25. According to the FEMA Office of General Counsel, activation of NDMS would certainly have “stood up” ESF-8. However, there is no evidence of action under ESF-8 until August 27, when HHS first convened conference calls. During a natural disaster or public health emergency, HHS and NDMS communication and coordination is essential for an effective response.

According to Simonson, coordinating the public health response under ESF-8 was “a strain without operational control and logistical support.” He says the relocation of NDMS left HHS with few operational assets. Despite HHS responsibility for coordinating the federal response to public health emergencies, HHS only has PHS Commissioned Corps, SNS, and other smaller functions under its command. Unlike NDMS, none of HHS remaining assets are configured for a quick response. Instead, HHS assets are meant to sustain existing medical services and infrastructures. Simonson also indicated that without direct control over NDMS assets, the efficiency and effectiveness of ESF-8 is crippled.

As executor of ESF-8, Simonson attempted to coordinate the pre-positioning of medical assets prior to Katrina’s landfall. He spoke directly to Stephens on Saturday, August 27 and Sunday, August 28 to ask what supplies the Superdome needed. As a result of those conversations, Simonson called then Acting Director of the Response Division Edward G. Buikema at FEMA to “aggressively advocate” DMATs, water, ice, and MREs be positioned in the Superdome prior to landfall. Simonson believed it would have been much easier to task NDMS if those assets had been under his direct control. When asked about attempts at coordination between the two agencies, Simonson said NDMS participated in ESF-8 conference calls, but despite its participation, acted as an asset of FEMA without coordinating mission assignments with him.

An e-mail from a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Liaison at DOD, Mark Roupas, to Assistant Secretary for Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale on August 29, however, suggests Simonson did have a say in NDMS’ activation. Roupas says: “ . . . . DHHS is trying to decide which health care approach is better: 1) activate NDMS and move the patients out of the state or 2) move medical beds and personnel into the affected area and treat there. DHHS medical planners are meeting with Mr. Simonson at 6pm to discuss and decide which course of action to accept. If the decision is to move the patients via NDMS, then DHHS will activate the NDMS system. If the decision is to treat intrastate, then we should expect a formal RFA for -500 beds and personnel support.” This e-mail begs the question: how was the primary coordinator of medical response unaware that FEMA had activated NDMS on August 25?

Simonson believes ESF-8 should be more “clearly articulated.” He also believes the relocation of NDMS to DHS in 2003 undermined NDMS effectiveness.
Since its transfer, funding for NDMS has been stagnant, with millions of dollars being siphoned off to support “unidentified services.” NDMS has lost two-thirds of its staff since 2003. “There is room for substantial improvement in coordination between NDMS and the rest of ESF-8. Either ESF-8 should be directly responsible for NDMS or ESF-8 should be moved to where NDMS is located,” Simonson said.

Beall disagreed and told a much different story about the coordination between NDMS and HHS. He said HHS has the authority to move NDMS and its assets under ESF-8 and that, to his knowledge, NDMS did not deploy any assets, with the exception of pre-positioning, without a direct order from HHS. He said HHS and NDMS were in close coordination throughout the operation, and that any coordination issues were more likely a result of internal difficulties within HHS — not between HHS and NDMS. He believes NDMS relocation to FEMA allows the system to “lean forward” more than it could under HHS.

How these two senior officials view the coordination and authorities for HHS and NDMS speaks for itself. Without a clear understanding of who has functional jurisdiction over NDMS, coordination of the system and all of its assets was certain to result in failures.

The OR-2 DMAT report illustrates command structure confusion, and general coordination problems, between NDMS and the DMAT teams it managed at the New Orleans Airport. OR-2 DMAT members reported a number of command-related issues, including:

- ICS/NIMIS (or any form of an organized internal command and control structure) was not implemented by FEMA/NDMS at the airport. (Some attempts to use ICS were made by FEMA/NDMS following the arrival of a Forest Service overhead team, but were generally not that effective.)
- There was no formalized unified command established between the many participating agencies until late in the response.
- No safety officer was initially appointed at the command level (in a very unsafe environment).
- Roles, responsibilities, and reporting structure of the two MSTs (Baton Rouge and Airport) were never clearly articulated. It was unclear what role the PHS representative at the airport had.
- Liaisons with military and civilian entities participating in relief efforts at the airport were never established.
- There did not appear to be any initial interfacing at a management level with knowledgeable local medical providers, public health officials, and local emergency providers.
- There appeared to be a lack of communications between the Airport MST and Baton Rouge MST as well as NDMS headquarters.
- Information was not being effectively communicated to the DMATs from either of the MSTs.
- There was considerable friction between DMATs and the MSTs. An ‘us and them’ attitude was prevalent.
- Only one fulltime FEMA/NDMS employee was present at the airport MST (arriving after operations had started). All other Airport MST staff were taken from onsite DMATs, reducing the number of team personnel for patient treatment and operations support.
- Inexperienced leaders were placed in an overwhelming and chaotic environment that caused their effectiveness to rapidly deteriorate.
- Management decisions that were being made were not based on the best interests of the patients.
- There was inadequate equipment available to produce the copies and paperwork FEMA was requiring.

The OR-2 DMAT report further states, “FEMA/NDMS operations at the airport were extremely disorganized compared to parallel military and Forest Service operations.” Tensions between FEMA/NDMS and DMATs is an ongoing problem and “continues to compromise the efficiency of operations due to a lack of trust between both parties.”

Beall agreed there was tension and speculated DMAT members are accustomed to being in control of their environments and are not used to taking orders from federal officials. He also said most of the FEMA NDMS officials deployed during Katrina and giving orders to DMATs were unseasoned and their inexperience contributed to the friction.

Historically, the mission of DMATs was to rapidly deploy and set up self-supporting field hospitals and provide medical care within the first 72 hours after a disaster before the arrival of other federal assets. Alternatively, FEMA has historically operated under the assumption that state and local officials are the first line of defense during the initial 72 hours following a disaster until a federal response can
Finding: Lack of coordination led to delays in recovering dead bodies

The lack of coordination among agencies also contributed to delayed recovery of dead bodies in the Gulf coast region. According to ESF-8, HHS is responsible for victim identification and mortuary services. HHS has authority to ask DHS and DOD to assist in providing victim identification and mortuary services; establishing temporary morgue facilities; performing victim identification by fingerprint, forensic dental, and/or forensic pathology and anthropology methods; and processing, preparation, and disposition of remains.267 The most experienced personnel in this area are a part of NDMS under the authority of FEMA and DHS. DOD also has significant expertise in mortuary affairs and mass fatality management.

Despite having this authority, HHS was slow to respond and coordinate efforts with DOD and DHS. On Sunday, September 4, DOD sent an e-mail to DHS recognizing the need to assist overwhelmed state and local authorities in victim identification. The e-mail provided a brief analysis of the situation in the Gulf coast region and said, "If this analysis is correct, it’s not if, but when and how DOD will be asked to assist in the mortuary affairs response."268 The e-mail further says DOD has developed "potential plans on what kind of requirements will be needed and how DOD can provide response support. Currently we have identified the potential missions of search and recovery, remains transport to establish human remains collection points, and assistance with DNA capture analysis."269 The e-mail recommends a meeting between DHS, HHS, FEMA, and DMORT to discuss coordination among agencies and the commercial sector. It is unclear if and when this meeting took place. What is clear, however, is DOD essentially took the lead in coordinating an operational mortuary affairs plan, which was originally the responsibility of HHS.

Following the e-mail from DOD, HHS personnel recognized the need for an "integrated ESF-8 response" and devising a "coordinated way to collect and share information."270 When asked why it took an e-mail from DOD six days after Katrina’s landfall, Simonson responded, "HHS was not involved in discussions with actual body recovery. FEMA, DOD, and Kenyon International Emergency Services (Kenyon), a mortuary services contractor, were in discussions for recovery services and it was unclear who was in charge of the recovery effort."271 ESF-8 is not responsible for recovering bodies but is responsible for mortuary services. As a result, HHS "had to wait for certain discussions to be made before going ahead with specific decisions. Everyone was frustrated with how slow the initial discussions were going."272 Before HHS can coordinate victim identification and other mortuary services, FEMA, DOD, and state officials must have a recovery plan in place.

Body recovery was no less confused. For days, bodies went uncollected as state and federal officials remained indecisive on a body recovery plan. With state and local officials utterly overwhelmed by the disaster, they were initially more focused on rescuing Katrina’s survivors than recovering dead bodies. By September 5, inaction was causing frustration. "Number 1 issue is body collection," Army Colonel John J. Jordan, military assistant to Brown at FEMA, wrote in an e-mail that day.273 Jordan continued, “This issue must be addressed, and frankly, there is operations paralysis at this point. FEMA is pushing State to see what they want to do, and indications are that Governor is involved in some of the decisions, especially regarding interment.” A week later, Blanco publicly blamed FEMA for the delay and its inability to sign a contract with Kenyon for body collection services.274 Kenyon later signed a contract with the state.275

One week after landfall, on September 5, Simonson requested “ample mobile mortuary services throughout the affected region.”276 An order for 200 mobile mortuary trucks was issued with 130 designated to Louisiana and 70 to be delivered to Mississippi.277 By the next day mortuary services were being established in St. Gabriel, Louisiana with 96 personnel.278 FEMA and Louisiana collaborated on drafting a body recovery plan which required the approval of Brown, and the Louisiana “newly appointed” state medical examiner.279 In Mississippi, mortuary services were established at the Naval Air Station in Gulfport. By September 6, one DMORT had set up facilities at the Naval Air Station. Body recovery was an enormous task that took several months to complete. Each home in the affected area was inspected twice for bodies. Mortuary services continue in the region as remains are identified and returned to families.
Finding: Deployment confusion, uncertainty about mission assignments, and government red tape delayed medical care

“Coordinating all of those agencies isn’t a simple thing and [is] very difficult to practice. We sit down and do tabletop exercises where we go over who’s going to do what, but a disaster of this magnitude is something that is very difficult to simulate or really practice. So, we rely on really well-trained, capable people that can adapt and adjust to whatever the situation is to get the job done.”

— Colonel Richard Bachmann, U.S. Air Force

In the wake of Katrina, first responders worked tirelessly — days and nights in miserable conditions — to provide medical care to thousands of hurricane victims. The coordination of these medical personnel, supplies, and equipment proved to be a daunting task. At one point, a frustrated member of the CDC Division of Emergency Operations wrote: "The approval process for a bottle of aspirin seems to be the same as for a 500 bed hospital." From confusion about mission assignments and deployments, to broader misunderstandings about command structure, coordination was undoubtedly an obstacle to the Gulf coast medical response. Coordination efforts were impeded, and in turn, these impediments adversely affected the overall medical response.

Deployment Assignments

Hundreds of e-mails were sent from medical first responders to government officials expressing confusion and frustration over their deployment orders. On Friday, September 2, a PHS officer in Oregon sent an e-mail saying, "I’ve got supervisory approval and have had my bags packed and ready in the trunk of my car to leave at a moment’s notice since Tuesday. Is there anything further you can tell me?" On September 5, a Food and Drug Administration employee e-mailed the PHS coordinating officer saying,

"I’m deploying tomorrow. I don’t have any information about the mission and whether my role has changed from the original (FMCS MST 4 – there has been some issues with travel and just got my itinerary tonight so not sure if those issues were due to a change in assignment). I’ve gotten a phone call from a member of my team looking for direction and I don’t know what to tell him. Please provide any information you can." Another PHS officer wrote, "Once again, sorry to bother you. However, what is the status of this mission? From the email I received earlier this week things were supposed to happen in 24-72hrs. At your earliest convenience, could I please get an update on this?" There was also confusion within government ranks regarding who had the authority to deploy officers and what officers had already been approved for deployment.

An internal PHS e-mail sent September 1 stated,

"We are receiving reports from one Warden indicating that many of his staff are deployed. The problem is they are not on our Master list that we have been providing to OFRD. Can you provide me your latest deployed roster identifying the BOP officer/assets. I am thinking maybe these officers are on August or September rosters??" An August 30 e-mail from the chief of the Coast Guard medical division said,

"I apologize for the confusion of the rosters with CG officers that were released earlier. It appears that all PHS officers were required to go to a website and register yesterday AM per the attached email. Many officers did this without knowing that registering automatically noted agency approval for a CCRF mission. I attempted to register without the agency approval box clicked in order to provide CG comments. The website only allowed submission with this box clicked positive . . . kind of a Catch-22." A member of OFRD wrote FEMA saying, "This officer is stationed in AR and is not on our list of officers deployed. Who deployed him?" There was also limited visibility between agencies. An e-mail from a CDC employee to HHS/OS staff and CDC staff on September 9 stated, "Since OSHA is Labor Dept we have no visibility on their deployments at this time...could be they will link up with NIOSH team when..."
they all arrive, but we may well not know anything." This correspondence reflects the absence of updated and accurate lists of who was available for deployment, who was not available, and who had already been deployed.

**Mission Assignments**

As late as September 22, evidence of confusion remained about who was in charge of what aspects of the response. An HHS incident manager wrote, "...it appears that the POC for the 250 ambulances is no longer the State EMS Director Terry Bavousett, but has changed to the three names below. Please get your representative at the JFO to address this ASAP or the ambulances will end up at Reliant Park instead of the locations that Terry Bavousett has requested." The FEMA liaison to CDC wrote, "I might be the only one — I doubt it — but I’m really confused with the structure within CDC/DEOC for this operation. Can you send out a team structure list of team leads as well as their DEOC schedule?"

Clarity about missions was also lacking in the medical response to Hurricane Katrina—as evidenced by the lack of planning for the United States Navy Ship (USNS) Comfort. The USNS Comfort is a medical treatment facility with a primary mission of supporting medical needs for the military and serve as hospital facilities as part of a humanitarian effort. It has a 1,000 bed capacity with 80 beds designated for an intensive care unit and 12 operating rooms. The Select Committee received varying cost estimates for operating costs for the USNS Comfort. According to the U.S. Northern Command, operating costs for the USNS Comfort are roughly $82,910 per day underway and $29,155 a day pier side. However, a Philadelphia Inquirer article states, "When on full operational status, the daily costs exceeds $700,000 a day, according to the Navy."

Originally destined for New Orleans to provide medical care to storm victims, the Comfort was redirected on September 9. "The Comfort is now headed for Pascagoula, Miss due to the lack of a medical mission in NO. Do not have anticipated arrival at that site, but SOC will advise when they get the information. Decision has been made that two cruise ships will now be used to house state workers." That same night, clarification about a mission assignment was never received. An e-mail exchange between HHS employees states, "USNS comfort docked today in Pascagoula. I listened in to most of the conference call and nobody could seem to think of a mission for them. State Health Dpt was clear that they had nothing at this time."

Additionally, the redirection of 250 ambulances required a significant number of approvals. An HHS incident manager wrote, "I have just been informed by FEMA HQ that Jack Colley or Dr. Sanchez the originators of the request will need to approve the change in the location of the delivery of the ambulances. Would you please contact your representatives at the JFO and ask that they confirm the location change with Reliant Stadium to the two staging areas noted in your e-mail with either the ESF# 7&8 representatives. GSA will then confirm back to you the delivery locations and times."

**Government Red Tape**

Bureaucratic red tape also stood in the way of the medical response. The OR-2 DMAT report states, "The team was activated on the afternoon of Tuesday, August 30, and given instructions to be in Houston the next day, August 31. Because of the policy of making individual travel arrangements (see below), the last team member arrived in Houston shortly after midnight on September 1. The team departed for Baton Rouge in rental SUVs and vans at 5:00 a.m. on September 1. During the drive, team commanders had several phone conversations with other teams at the New Orleans Airport who stated the team was urgently needed due to the large number of patients. Instead of heading directly to the airport, the team was requested to first stage at LSU. After staging for nearly two hours, the team received an escort to the New Orleans Airport, arriving at approximately 3:30 p.m. Roughly 48 hours had elapsed since the activation order and the team arriving at the incident." The report further says that because team members were deployed individually, their medical response was delayed.
On September 2, the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Jon G. Ferko, wrote McHale saying Blanco was withholding medical supplies until she received President Bush’s word Louisiana would be reimbursed. The e-mail to McHale says:

Sir,

Some information that I thought you should know:

My brother is on the ground at the health and human services command center in Baton Rouge. He says the situation is ‘grave’ — he and his team are working desperately to save lives without medical supplies – he said he doesn’t even have a bandaid.

His team spoke with the Governor of LA and she refuses to release ANY amount of funds for supplies until POTUS assures her of reimbursement. The team down there does not know who to work through to release funds – and this is the federal command team.

I felt that you should have this info – my brother actually called home in tears because they can’t do anything to stop the loss of life…. 299

**Conclusion**

The numbers do not lie. Thousands of lives were saved, a tribute to the medical professionals and volunteers who worked around the clock under enormously grueling conditions. Yet, there is another, more sobering realization that can’t be ignored either. Those numbers could — should — have been even greater. It wasn’t a lack of effort that hindered their success. It was a lack of planning, lack of initiative, and lack of response.

There were not, for example, nearly enough medical personnel teams in position prior to landfall, which led to unnecessary delays in getting the right equipment and supplies to the right people. FEMA and HHS needed to plan for the worst. Instead, they scrambled for supplies in an effort that was often times uncoordinated. In too many cases, it was too late. Clearly New Orleans residents with “special needs” paid a disproportionate price. Neither the Louisiana Medical Director and State Health Officer, nor the Director of the New Orleans Health Department, could clearly define the “special needs” population, much less adequately provide for it.

From the storm’s impending landfall through the flooding of New Orleans, confusion grew over if, and when, hospital, VAMC, and nursing home evacuations should occur. Time was rushing by, lives were in jeopardy, and even when evacuations were finally deemed necessary, these institutions were not prepared to do it efficiently. One possible solution would have been better utilization of private firms to aid in evacuations. It was the answer in a few instances, but it could have been the answer in so many more. In all, an estimated 215 people died in New Orleans nursing homes and hospitals as a result of Katrina and failed evacuations.

Compounding problems for medical responders was poor communication and coordination. So poor, in fact, that at times, the only way to receive information was through television. And the lack of access to medical records, or a common, electronic medical record system, led to delays in treating evacuees. Suffering was also prolonged as attempts at coordination, within and between government agencies, proved frustrating and inadequate. Confusion arose over mission assignments and command structure. Medical officers and volunteers had little information about their deployment orders, many waiting for days with their bags packed and ready. And while some medical teams waited, without equipment or supplies to care for patients, state and federal officials squabbled over reimbursement.

Thousands of American men and women selflessly gave their time, money, and expertise to save lives. Unfortunately, lack of preparation, reticence to act, and confusion over coordination are all part of the story as well. Though there was the will, the medical response to Hurricane Katrina showed there wasn’t always a way. The initiative of men like Mike Ford and Jesse St. Amant was the exception to the rule.

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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

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NRP at ESF#8.
“We were then lured to the so-called evacuation points. This was several days after the hurricane had struck. The city was flooded ... They loaded us onto military trucks after they told us they would take us to shelters where our basic needs would be met.”

“We were in a wide open space along the interstate and under the Highway 10 causeway. The overpass provided little shade, however ... It was early September and still extremely hot. Our skin blistered. My mother’s skin is still not fully healed.”

Leah Hodges
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 2005
Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing

“Scooter: Please see below. The trailer idea is worse than I originally thought. Per the data below, the last batch of the trailers that we are now purchasing will be coming off the production line in approximately 3.5 years.”

E-mail from Neil S. Patel, Staff Secretary to the Vice President, to Charles P. Durkin, Personal Aide to the Vice President, (apparently destined for Chief of Staff J. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Jr.), September 9, 2005

Summary

Like food and water, shelter is a basic human need. Hurricane Katrina transformed thousands of people’s lives into a battle for survival — and, for some, finding adequate shelter proved at least as difficult as finding something to eat or drink.

Katrina, of course, was a powerful storm that hit vulnerable areas, requiring more than traditional solutions for immediate shelter and, later, temporary housing. Louisiana and Mississippi immediately were faced with thousands and thousands of the suddenly homeless, without the ability to provide emergency shelter or longer-term housing for all of them. Within a month, 44 states had played a role in sheltering the evacuees from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

But it is clear state and local governments in the areas most affected by the hurricanes were not adequately prepared. They failed to learn important lessons from the Hurricane Pam exercise, and lacked the necessary information about temporary housing. Shelters of last resort, designed for people to take refuge in the immediate hours before and after landfall (such as the Superdome), were not of sufficient capacity. Instead, the Superdome, itself located in a floodplain, had to bear a burden for which it was not prepared. The New Orleans Convention Centre, never planned as a shelter, became one out of sheer necessity and improvisation.

There was no comprehensive database of available shelters, which only complicated relief efforts. There were also delays in getting people out of shelters and into temporary housing. And FEMA’s strategy of ordering 200,000 trailers and mobile homes shortly after the storm was blind to the nation’s manufacturing capacity of 6,000 units per month.

Housing issues remain a tremendous concern for residents of the Gulf coast affected by Hurricane Katrina. Local elected officials in both Louisiana and Mississippi remain disappointed in FEMA’s pace in setting up temporary housing. Debate over how long rental assistance will continue rages on. The question of where to build, or re-build, in the Gulf coast is the subject of great debate, both locally and nationally, as is who will pay for it. However, the long-term housing challenges in the Gulf coast are beyond the scope of the Select Committee’s inquiry and are not covered in this report. Our charge was to examine the immediate response, not the recovery. We are certain the longer-term issues will continue to be discussed by others in Congress.
Finding: Relocation plans did not adequately provide for shelter. Housing plans were haphazard and inadequate

Shelter needs overwhelmed state and local governments

Initially, Hurricane Katrina displaced more than a million Gulf coast residents. As in most natural disasters, some evacuees only needed short-term shelter and were able to return home after the immediate crisis passed. However, because of the magnitude of the storm, hundreds of thousands remained displaced — for days, weeks, even months. Many are homeless today.

For example, Louisiana had 563 American Red Cross or state emergency shelters with a peak population of 146,292 in the early days following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. Additionally, Louisiana had 10 special needs shelters that housed 2,480 persons.

In Mississippi, initial damage estimates projected 120,000 individuals needing emergency temporary housing. A month after the storm, 44 states and the District of Columbia have been given emergency declarations to cover expenses related to sheltering evacuees forced from their homes by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

In a catastrophic event like Katrina, many evacuees may be displaced for a longer than normal period of time or may permanently lose their housing. As FEMA and state officials learned from the Hurricane Pam exercise, temporary housing was an area of weakness. Deputy FCO Scott Wells noted there were several follow-up items from the Hurricane Pam Exercise that state and local governments failed to execute, including developing more detailed concepts and plans on sheltering and temporary housing. Similarly, Alabama state and local government plans lack information about temporary housing.

Finding: State and local governments made inappropriate selections of shelters of last resort. The lack of a regional database of shelters contributed to an inefficient and ineffective evacuation and sheltering process

The evacuation of millions of people prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall created an urgent need to identify, and direct people to, suitable shelters. Officials had worried about the high number of people who would ignore hurricane evacuation orders in coastal areas. Indeed, thousands of people in New Orleans did not obey the mandatory evacuation order. Shelters of last resort — places for persons to be protected from the high winds, storm surge, and heavy rains, but with little or no water or food — were needed for those who did not or could not evacuate the area.

A shelter of last resort is intended to provide the best available survival protection for the duration of the hurricane only. In Louisiana, emergency operations plans required shelters of last resort to be located outside of the floodplain, or have the ability to locate on floors elevated above flood potential, and have a hurricane wind resistant structure. The Superdome was used as a shelter of last resort even though it was located in a floodplain. In addition, the Superdome roof suffered extensive wind damage, demonstrating that it was not a hurricane wind resistant structure.

Many residents who took refuge in the Superdome found conditions there unbearable. Some tried to leave, only to find themselves trapped by the floodwaters that surrounded the hulking structure. Cleo Fisher, an 86-year-old resident of Bywater, told a local newspaper that he left the dome to try to get some heart medications. He didn’t
Evacuees tend to go to the most convenient and familiar shelter they can find, even though it may be inadequate.

get far — and, in fact, had to be rescued after he fell into the nearby water — but he did not want to return inside, either.  

“It’s worse than being in prison in there,” he said. “They don’t have nothing for me.”

Even some of the police officers and military personnel charged with keeping order inside the dome became frustrated with the lack of organization.

“This plan,” said one police officer, “was no plan.”

Although some local emergency plans call for the identification of local shelters, in a multi-state disaster, a compilation of available shelters in the region may be more appropriate. Government officials did not have a comprehensive database from which to identify suitable and available shelters; therefore, identification of alternate shelter locations was done on an ad hoc basis. Because of the lack of a database of shelters, local, state, and federal officials have had a difficult time identifying the numbers and locations of displaced individuals. This lack of information has complicated the relief effort, and led to the inefficient use of shelter resources.

The lack of a comprehensive means for tracking evacuees has exacerbated difficulties in reuniting family members and in determining accurate counts of people so as to more accurately provide for their needs. Out of human nature, evacuees tend to go to the most convenient and familiar shelter they can find, even though it may be inadequate. A database could be a helpful resource for planning and providing emergency public information. Similar initiatives have been proposed previously during the Cold War as part of civil defense, such as Crisis Relocation Planning.

Finding: There was inappropriate delay in getting people out of shelters and into temporary housing — delays that officials should have foreseen due to manufacturing limitations.

Dr. Gavin Smith told a congressional committee that “[w]ithout the rapid provision of temporary and permanent housing solutions, recovery will be slowed or fail to occur in a manner that meets the needs of disaster victims . . .” Although temporary housing efforts in the wake of Katrina have far exceeded any previous effort, individuals remained in shelters for unacceptably long periods of time. Temporary housing efforts have fallen short of meeting demand. Federal, state, and local agencies failed to implement a successful program to shelter and place many evacuees in temporary housing.

FEMA established a Housing Area Command to oversee all temporary housing operations across Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Although this group began identifying available land prior to landfall, temporary housing efforts suffered from delays. A Mississippi recovery official hailed FEMA for “the fastest deployment of temporary housing units to a disaster-stricken area since the program was established,” but also noted the effort has not been good enough. Specifically, he noted that operational and long-term planning and inter-organizational coordination remains unrealized, and the current approach is not sufficient to address the needs of communities and states following a catastrophic disaster like Hurricane Katrina.

Due to the massive need for temporary housing, the federal government put together a plan that included a combination of old and new housing strategies, including housing people in trailers and on cruise ships.
Additionally, FEMA used hotels to serve as temporary emergency lodging, utilizing 85,000 rooms nationwide at the program’s peak. However, state and local officials complained of poor coordination by FEMA on these temporary housing solutions. Immediately following the storm, FEMA contracted with cruise ships to provide transitional housing for hurricane victims close to the disaster area. Many evacuees rejected this option, something that perhaps could have been avoided if there had been better coordination beforehand. Many individuals felt they needed to focus on finding jobs and obtaining permanent housing.

Although FEMA began strategic housing planning before Katrina’s landfall, and the private sector mobilized quickly to fill FEMA's manufactured housing demand, many issues also have plagued the relocation into this form of temporary housing. Mississippi Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) William Carwile testified that over 24,000 travel trailers and mobile homes had been occupied in Mississippi. FEMA logistics has reported that nine trains a week have been carrying approximately 90 trailers per train into the Gulf region. And, on January 11, 2006, FEMA announced that nearly 62,000 travel trailers and mobile homes were serving as temporary homes for Hurricane Katrina and Rita victims. This number nearly tripled the number of units used following all of last year’s Florida hurricanes and far outnumbered any housing mission in FEMA’s history.

Despite this commendable effort, housing still falls short of the overwhelming need. There are still delays in getting evacuees into trailers once they are delivered, due to among other things infrastructure, zoning, and environmental issues. In Mississippi, the lack of working utilities for private sites and environmental and zoning issues with group sites have delayed the installation of travel trailers and mobile homes.

FEMA’s strategy of ordering 200,000 trailers and mobile homes shortly after the storm was blind to the nation’s manufacturing capacity of 6,000 units per month. On Friday, September 9, staff to the Vice President and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials ratcheted up concerns about FEMA’s decision to rely on trailers and mobile homes to house displaced residents. Special Assistant to the Vice President Marie Fishpaw wrote in an e-mail to Patel:

FEMA have (sic) set up arrangements to order 200,000 units of trailers (and mobile homes) and committed up to $500 million to do so. They want to get 30,000 units (79% of the existing market) soon. FEMA plans to order another 100,000 units. OMB and OVP staff remain skeptical about this strategy. The nation can produce 6,000 units per month. There is probably some capacity for expansion (possibly by about 10%) to meet increased demand, but we don’t know how much. That means most of these units won’t be available for months. Further, some states, including Louisiana, are balking at the idea of large (25,000 units, as proposed by FEMA) trailer parks. We got all this info from OMB career staff.

That message was then forwarded, apparently intended for then Chief of Staff to the Vice President, “I Lewis Libby, Jr.: “Please see below. The trailer idea is worse than I originally thought. Per the data below, the last batch of the trailers that we are now purchasing will be coming off the production line in approximately 3.5 years.”

Finding: FEMA Failed to Take Advantage of HUD’s Expertise in Large-scale Housing Challenges

FEMA has been working in partnership with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to meet the challenge of finding and securing sufficient rental assets to meet the huge demands created by mass evacuations. By early
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

In this case, FEMA failed to take full advantage of HUD’s expertise and perspective on large-scale housing challenges, such as the agency’s experience with voucher programs. HUD and public housing authorities have the expertise and infrastructure to help non-HUD clients during disasters.

Conclusion

Despite this Herculean effort, state officials feel there has been a lack of coordination within the interagency community causing delay in relocating and housing people. Although the federal government has shown some ingenuity in coming up with unique solutions such as lodging on cruise ships, and orchestrated the largest mobilization of temporary housing units in history, both of these solutions have proven inadequate.

Carwile, the Mississippi FCO, noted the need for taking a new look at housing solutions:

In Mississippi, while temporary housing has been provided in numbers far exceeding any previous effort, this success is obscured by the overwhelming need and an exceptionally long period of time that people remain in shelters. New methodologies must be examined and implemented to take care of Americans in need of humane housing while in a catastrophic event.

The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina was heartbreaking enough for the people who lost their homes. Sadly, however, the days and weeks and months that followed provided little relief. The government plans for their shelter were far from adequate.

December 2005, 5,000 displaced families had been placed in federal housing of some sort. USDA has offered units from their own inventory, placing 974 families from Louisiana alone.

Additionally, FEMA has concluded an inter-agency agreement with the VA to rent unused VA housing units to evacuees, and FEMA is pursuing a similar arrangement with Fannie Mae. On September 12, 2005, FEMA signed an Interagency Agreement with HUD. This agreement identified and made available 5,600 HUD single-family homes. Hundreds of disaster victims have made these homes their temporary residences, including 207 families in Texas.

FEMA and HUD have also partnered on the Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP), a transitional housing assistance program funded by FEMA and administered by HUD and the network of public housing authorities. Through KDHAP, HUD is providing vouchers to evacuees previously receiving public housing assistance, as well as evacuees who were homeless prior to the hurricane. By December 2005, nearly 15,000 families received rental assistance through KDHAP.

In contrast, FEMA has used direct payments to evacuees to provide rental assistance to more than 500,000 applicants, totaling more than $1.2 billion. Unfortunately, many displaced households received their initial rental assistance before receiving mailed guidance and did not use this assistance for housing, but instead used it to meet other disaster-related needs. Although FEMA has shown flexibility by allowing those individuals to be eligible for additional rental assistance, use of a voucher system similar to the one administered by HUD could have prevented this mistake.

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In this case, FEMA failed to take full advantage of HUD’s expertise and perspective on large-scale housing challenges, such as the agency’s experience with voucher programs. HUD and public housing authorities have the expertise and infrastructure to help non-HUD clients during disasters.

Conclusion

Despite this Herculean effort, state officials feel there has been a lack of coordination within the interagency community causing delay in relocating and housing people. Although the federal government has shown some ingenuity in coming up with unique solutions such as lodging on cruise ships, and orchestrated the largest mobilization of temporary housing units in history, both of these solutions have proven inadequate.

Carwile, the Mississippi FCO, noted the need for taking a new look at housing solutions:

In Mississippi, while temporary housing has been provided in numbers far exceeding any previous effort, this success is obscured by the overwhelming need and an exceptionally long period of time that people remain in shelters. New methodologies must be examined and implemented to take care of Americans in need of humane housing while in a catastrophic event.

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Id. (written testimony of James N. Russo, Federal Coordinating Officer for MS, FEMA) at 3.


Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Louisiana State officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).

Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA officials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005).


Timothy R. Brown, Miss. Governor Declares State of Emergency as Katrina Nears, LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Columbus, GA, Aug. 27, 2005.


Id.

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Hearing on Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Before the Comm. on Financial Services Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 12 (written testimony of David Garratt, Acting Director, Recovery Division, EMA) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Financial Services Comm. Hearing].

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Id. (written testimony of David Garratt) at 13.

Id. at 13-14.

Id. (written testimony of Brian Montgomery) at 6.

Id. (written testimony of David Garratt) at 6.

Id. at 6-7.


“[O]ne of the lessons that we need to learn from this catastrophic event is that we do need to get better about marshaling those assets and moving them around. I will tell you up front, FEMA has a logistics problem, we have a problem understanding all the time. I can point out where our stuff is and I can point out where it’s supposed to go to; I can’t always tell you that it actually got there.”

Michael D. Brown
Former FEMA Director
Select Committee Hearing, September 27, 2005
FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities

Katrina overwhelmed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) management and overloaded its logistics system. Response and relief personnel had little visibility into available federal assets and resources. The process for requesting assistance could not support the volume of requests, and the technology supporting that process proved inadequate. Federal, state, and local officials requested assistance outside existing channels with little coordination and communication. “[M]anagement by crisis would be the best way I could put it,” said Kip Holden, Mayor of East Baton Rouge Parish.1

By September 9, Congress had passed legislation providing over $63 billion to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for disaster relief.2 The circumstances and urgent needs created by Hurricane Katrina provided significant opportunity for fraud and mismanagement, and the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) estimates the cost to recover from the storm and rebuild the affected areas could exceed $200 billion.3

As of November 30, 2005, $19.3 billion has been obligated to needs resulting from Hurricane Katrina.4 The funds have been used to relieve the immediate suffering of individuals and families, clear debris, reimburse federal agencies for the costs of technical and direct assistance, and support federal operations such as search and rescue, and delivery of consumables. The $19 billion has been obligated as follows:

- $8 billion for human service needs including unemployment compensation, personal needs that are not met by insurance, and temporary housing (including vouchers for hotel/motel rooms and mobile homes);
- $2.2 billion for debris removal, public building repair and replacement, and damage inspections;
- $4.4 billion for technical and direct assistance provided by federal agencies;
- $14.7 million for inspections and hazard mitigation; and,
- $4.7 billion for administrative expenses, almost $3 billion of which has been obligated for mission assignment operations undertaken by other federal agencies at the direction of the federal officer responsible for coordinating response activities.5

Despite this outpouring of funds, procurement officials struggled to balance the competing and conflicting demands of local and elected officials. On October 21, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin complained about the time-consuming amount of federal oversight accompanying the federal dollars going to contracts and local governments. He said

“Ithe money is sitting in the doggone bank . . . We can’t use it, and as soon as they gave us the money, they sent a team of auditors and said, ‘If you spend this money, we’ll be watching you real close . . . ’ So we’re gun shy about how we use this money . . . .”

and

[we just got these huge multinational companies that are using the shield of, ‘We’ve got to work quick,’ [rather than] trying to find local contractors.7

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is undertaking a review of Katrina relief contracting

“[Hurricane Katrina] was beyond the capacity of the state and local governments, and it was beyond the capacity of FEMA. It was the largest natural disaster ever to strike the United States — 92,000 square miles. Logistics were falling apart.”
activities. GAO’s review includes acquisition planning, communication of responsibilities between various entities, contract management, and the use of emergency acquisition authorities. GAO briefed the Select Committee on their review efforts, which will complement the findings of this report.

Finding: FEMA management lacked situational awareness of existing requirements and of resources in the supply chain. An overwhelmed logistics system made it challenging to get supplies, equipment, and personnel where and when needed.

When President Bush authorized a federal emergency declaration for Mississippi and Alabama on Sunday, August 28, in response to these states’ requests, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown said he began to “predeploy all the assets [including] the medical teams, the urban search and rescue teams, the emergency response, the management teams, the rapid needs assessment teams, prepositioning the water, the Meals Ready to Eat, the ice, the tarps.” However, given that landfall occurred on Monday, August 29, this was too late to begin the pre-deployment process.

FEMA leadership acknowledged this lack of planning. “[Hurricane Katrina] was beyond the capacity of the state and local governments, and it was beyond the capacity of FEMA,” said Brown. “It was the largest natural disaster ever to strike the United States — 92,000 square miles. Logistics were falling apart.” When FEMA did arrive, representatives sometimes were empty-handed. “[W]hen FEMA finally did show up, everybody was angry because that is all they had was a Web site and a flier. They didn’t have any real resources that they could give,” reported Senator Pryor following visits and conversations with victims.

Brown’s testimony outlined some of the resources FEMA had in place. Prior to landfall FEMA had 14 trailer loads of Meals Ready to Eat (“MREs”) at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, four trailers in Moffit, 42 in Forth Worth, 15 trailer loads in Fullersville, 75 at two locations in Atlanta, three in Cumberland, Maryland, 15 in Charlotte, North Carolina, six in Eastover, South Carolina, 46 in Palmetto, Georgia, 15 in Homestead, Florida, at the airbase, 10 in Meridian, and two at the Superdome.

Some suggested these resources should have been more readily available. Rep. Chip Pickering said “[most MREs] were [prepositioned] across the region, only a few in Meridian and a few in New Orleans, and that should have been closer, I think, to the storm.” Rep. Gene Taylor pointed out the provisions were too far away from the FEMA team, questioning what part of the FEMA plan envisioned that the first responders in Hancock County and in much of the Mississippi Gulf Coast would have to loot the local grocery store and loot the local Wal-Mart in order to feed themselves, would have to loot the local Wal-Mart in order to have a change of clothes? What part of your plan was that?

Brown, however, strongly rejected the contention of having relief items in the immediate impacted areas, saying expectations must be realistic:

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Brown, however, strongly rejected the contention of having relief items in the immediate impacted areas, saying expectations must be realistic:

The last thing I’m going to do is to put equipment or manpower in place where they themselves become victims and then cannot assist the people they are there to assist. You cannot, you cannot physically — I don’t think you can do it statutorily or any other way — say to any victim in this country that the minute you come out of your
abode, your home, your shelter, whatever it is, that the Federal Government is going to be there with a meal ready to eat for you. That is an unreasonable expectation. So what we do is we preposition those supplies so that we can move them in and help them. And that’s why the FEMA plan, that’s why the basic emergency management system says you should, as an individual, take personal responsibility and be prepared to be on your own for perhaps up to 2 or 3 days. If Congress expects the Federal Government to be able to supply every individual food and water immediately following a catastrophe or a disaster, then this committee in Congress needs to have a serious public policy debate about what the role of FEMA and the Federal Government is in disasters.14

According to the Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Robert Latham, the federal logistics system failed in the days immediately following Hurricane Katrina, leaving state officials without adequate supplies of food, water, and ice for emergency shelters.15 FEMA representatives working with MEMA requested 450 trucks of water and ice, and 50 trucks of MREs. When less than 15 percent of the requested supplies arrived, state emergency responders were forced to purchase the commodities on the commercial market or obtain supplies from neighboring states.16 Mississippi officials had to deal with shortages of commodities for the first nine to ten days after landfall.17 Fortunately, Mississippi officials had purchased supplies for Hurricane Dennis (July 2005) that were not used. Similarly, Florida officials had pre-positioned considerable resources to be used in the Florida Panhandle,18 which, until Friday, August 26, was where Katrina was projected to make landfall. Commodities were provided by Governor Bush to Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and offered some relief to the victims in Mississippi’s coastal counties.19

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Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) Bill Carwile speculated the shortages were the result of an overly centralized logistics system overwhelmed by the requirements of the three large disasters: Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, and Rita. Mississippi officials asked permission to purchase (on their own) commodities from elsewhere to supplement those being provided by the centralized system. Carwile said he was authorized by FEMA Director Michael Brown to make these purchases.20

According to the Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA), Bruce Baughman, a better contracting process for essentials and commodities is needed.21 In the days before Katrina made landfall, when officials submitted commodity requirements for Alabama for items such as water, ice, MREs, these requests were unilaterally reduced by FEMA officials – often so reflexively that it appeared to be part of standard FEMA procedure. Baughman said their initial requests were carefully and precisely tailored to meet the actual needs of Alabama. Tim Payne, AEMA Branch Chief and Emergency Management Program Coordinator, said in advance of Katrina, their needs assessment concluded Alabama would require 100 trucks of water and 100 trucks of ice.22 In response to this request, FEMA made available only 17 trucks of water and 16 trucks of ice.

Frequently during the Alabama response to Katrina, FEMA did not follow through with AEMA’s requests for supplies and emergency support.23 It appeared FEMA did not have the ability to track commodities within its own logistics system. To defend against commodity shortfalls in future emergencies, Alabama recently issued a Request for Proposals for key commodities and materials needed for an effective emergency response.24 Baughman suggested having standing contracts in place and supplies
at the ready so the states would not again fall victim to an inadequate FEMA response or supply shortages due to other market competitors in times of crisis. Payne identified 12 categories of items that need to be on hand to effectively deal with an emergency.

According to Brown, “one of the lessons that we need to learn from this catastrophic event is that we do need to get better about marshaling those assets and moving them around. I will tell you up front, FEMA has a logistics problem, we have a problem understanding all the time. I can point out where our stuff is and I can point out where it’s supposed to go; I can’t always tell you that it actually got there.”

These problems are not new, however. FEMA’s “bureaucratic slowness” in securing long-term housing and loans, removing debris, and getting basic assistance and reimbursement were “huge problems that have been very frustrating,” stated Florida Governor Jeb Bush before the House Homeland Security Committee. Getting one truckload of ice from Atlanta to Florida in 2004 took a series of separate contracts that caused needless delays. “FEMA’s logistics program is broken and needs to be fixed. . . . I can say with certainty that federalizing emergency response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina,” Governor Jeb Bush testified. “If you federalize, all the innovation, creativity and knowledge at the local level would subside.”

It should be noted FEMA used existing resources, procedures, and staff to organize and conduct a massive civil logistics operation beyond any this country has seen before. Over 11,000 trucks of water, ice, and meals were moved into the disaster region during the month after landfall. This is more than three times the number of trucks used during all hurricanes in 2004. FEMA tried, but Katrina’s magnitude exposed significant weakness and inefficiencies in the process.

Finding: Procedures for requesting federal assistance raised numerous concerns

Requests for federal assistance go through a standard process. Local government officials submit their requests to the state, and, if state officials cannot meet the request, they forward appropriate requests to federal officials. In Louisiana, state and local emergency management officials manage requests for assistance during disasters using specially-designed commercial software called “E-Team.”

E-Team is a web-based system and can be accessed from any computer with internet connectivity. According to Matt Farlow of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) Information Technology Division, Louisiana has used E-Team since 2000 and LOHSEP personnel are well-experienced in its use. In addition to using E-Team to register and track parish requests, the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC) also uses it to send out e-mail alerts and notifications to parishes.

The parish-to-state process is much the same as the state-to-federal process. The parishes declare emergencies and request assistance from the state. The parishes register their requests for assistance with the state directly via the internet with E-Team. However, according to state officials, not all parish officials know how to use E-Team well: “They don’t know all the bells and whistles.” Parish officials can also register requests to the state by telephone or radio. If the parish communicates a request outside E-Team, by voice, e-mail, or fax communications, then the state EOC officials enter that request into E-Team.

The state receives the parish requests for assistance and determines whether the requests can be met from a nearby parish or with state resources. If so, LOHSEP tasks that mission to another state agency. The state can also request assistance from nearby states through the EMAC. When a state makes an EMAC request to another state, it is undertaking an obligation to pay that state for that assistance. FEMA has a mechanism to later reimburse appropriate costs to the requesting state, which the state can use to repay the sending state. Finally, if the state cannot meet the request from its own or other state resources, the state can prioritize the various requests and pass them on to
FEMA officials. The state is supposed to make such requests after it has already reviewed its own capabilities.

FEMA officials determine whether to accept or reject the state request. This determination is documented. A request might be rejected for a number of reasons, such as not being appropriate, a state getting the resources from elsewhere, or a state canceling a request while FEMA officials are considering it. In some cases, a state request might be made verbally to expedite assistance, but FEMA officials expect the paperwork to soon follow. The paperwork from the state certifies that the state will pay its share of the requested assistance.

Once FEMA accepts the request and agrees to meet it, officials use a system called NEMIS (National Emergency Management Information System). FEMA does not use E-Team. NEMIS is used by FEMA officials to track the request within the federal government and all requests FEMA officials accept are entered into this system. FEMA can meet the request from its own resources and capabilities, from other federal agencies, or from private contractors. If FEMA officials task another federal agency with the request, that is known as a "Mission Assignment" (or MA), whereby the task is assigned to the other agency. Mission Assignments to another federal agency could also be passed on to a private contractor. This is done because some agencies have more expertise and experience in contracting for certain types of items. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contracts for debris removal. Some federal agencies, including FEMA, have pre-existing contracts that can be modified quickly to add additional items. NEMIS is used to track the request and completion of the mission, as well as to track spending and reimbursement later by FEMA officials.

In Louisiana there was widespread confusion about the process for obtaining federal assistance. In addition, the catastrophic nature of the disaster overwhelmed the existing procedures and systems.

Louisiana state and parish officials said degraded communications and the effective loss of parish E-Team software forced them to deviate from normal procedures for requesting federal assistance. These problems also made it difficult for the state EOC to check on the status of specific tasks assigned to state agencies. State officials complained about FEMA's non-automated process that made tracking status difficult. State officials also noted they had included FEMA on their E-Team license, but during Katrina the FEMA staff assigned to the EOC were not familiar with the E-Team system. This had not been the case in earlier hurricanes, when FEMA staff assigned to the EOC knew how to use E-Team. State officials also complained about weaknesses in tracking the transportation and estimating arrival of FEMA-contracted commodities. FEMA officials have acknowledged these weaknesses. Further, state officials said the federal government contributed to the problem when other federal agencies tasked FEMA directly rather than having requests go from parish to state to FEMA and then onto appropriate federal agencies.

According to Governor Blanco's chief of staff, Andy Kopplin, the governor had to go beyond the normal LOHSEP and FEMA process because these processes were too bureaucratic and impracticable. Parish officials were universally critical of FEMA for providing relief commodities late. There were clearly misunderstandings of what constituted an official request for assistance. The Jefferson Parish Emergency Manager, Walter Maestri, said he directly communicated his needs before landfall in a conference call to the EOC, where FEMA personnel were present. In his view, this constituted a request for assistance. However, both the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) and the FCO said while the purpose of these conference calls was to share information, they were not considered valid ways for a parish to make a request.

New Orleans Director of Homeland Security, Col. Terry Ebbert, also said the existing systems for requesting assistance does not work during a catastrophic disaster. The system assumes the parish knows what it wants,
the state knows what it wants, and both have the communications capabilities to make requests of FEMA. Ebbert said the current system is a “pull” system in which parishes must make requests to pull an item from the state and federal government. However, the parishes were too overwhelmed and their communications were too degraded to allow this to work. In a catastrophic disaster, FEMA needs a “push” system in which FEMA officials anticipate needs (e.g., for food, water, medical supplies, ice, tarps, generators) and push the commodities to the parishes without receiving the request. Under such disaster circumstances, it would be better to have too much of something than too little; the excess items can always be shipped elsewhere or stored for the next disaster.\(^5\(^2\)

As such, Ebbert was “shocked” to hear FEMA Director Michael Brown say the local parishes never got FEMA commodities because they never asked for them. In his opinion, FEMA officials should have known what was needed from their own experience. Similarly, Governor Blanco’s chief of staff, Andy Kopplin, said the state had to go beyond both LOHSEP’s and FEMA’s bureaucratic processes for requesting and providing assistance.\(^5\(^3\)

However, parish officials also acknowledged their emergency managers were overwhelmed. Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Jiff Hingle said his parish emergency manager was completely overwhelmed and unable to cope with the situation.\(^5\(^5\) Hingle found he and the parish president had to make all requests for assistance through other channels because the normal system was not functional.

FEMA officials Scott Wells and Tony Robinson put much of the blame on the state, saying the standard request for assistance process was not working because the state was incapable of analyzing and prioritizing requests.\(^5\(^6\) Wells and Robinson said many of the requests from parishes came up through channels to the EOC, but state officials appeared “overwhelmed” and they “lost control.” The EOC did not attempt to prioritize such requests, did not try to figure out if the requests could be met from state resources, and did not go through EMAC channels to see if other nearby states could provide the assistance. The EOC just passed the unfiltered requests on to FEMA officials. Wells said the FCO staff did a quick analysis of parish E-Team requests the EOC was passing on unfiltered to FEMA, and found many inappropriate items, such as writing tablets. According to Wells, these requests were inappropriate because the state should not be relying on FEMA for basic items that are otherwise easily obtainable.

Parishes were frustrated by the degraded communications and their desperate need for assistance. Robinson said while the parishes were still able to communicate requests to the EOC (via radio or other means), they were not able to use E-Team.\(^5\(^7\) The EOC was not systematically entering the requests into E-Team, so the state could not track or check the status later, which led to many parishes becoming frustrated. The parishes probably blamed FEMA officials for any delays in getting assistance because they had communicated their requests and assumed the EOC had duly registered these requests and passed them on to FEMA officials. Many of the highly publicized parish requests for commodities such as for food and water assistance may have never even reached FEMA officials.

Some confusion arose because states and not the parishes are supposed to make requests to FEMA.\(^5\(^8\)

It was Louisiana’s responsibility to take these parish requests, combine them with similar requests, determine whether the state could meet them, prioritize them, and, if appropriate, make requests to FEMA. That process, where the state enters the request into its E-Team system, allowing formal registry and tracking of status and completion, is the only way to provide an orderly processing of requests. Using verbal requests, without documenting them in a formal process, leads to chaos, particularly in a large disaster where there are hundreds
or thousands of local requests for assistance. If the parish is unable to use E-Team because of communications or power difficulties, the state EOC (which, in fact, retained power during the hurricane and its aftermath) could have still entered them into E-Team. Then the state should perform its review, and, if appropriate, pass the request on to FEMA. It was the state’s job, not FEMA’s, to take down any parish requests from conference calls and enter them into the system. FEMA officials saw these conference calls serving the function of information sharing and situational awareness, not substitutes for the parish-to-state and state-to-federal formal request process.

Interoperability between state and federal automated systems

FEMA FCO staff said there is no automatic or electronic interface between state systems (such as E-Team) and the FEMA system (NEMIS).\(^\text{59}\) Both systems, if used correctly, have independent capabilities to track requests for assistance and determine their status. The two systems meet in the EOC, where the E-Team requests are converted into NEMIS. However, there is no way for the state EOC officials to use E-Team to track the status of their request in NEMIS, nor any way for the federal FCO officials to use NEMIS to check information on the E-Team requests originating at the local level.

According to FEMA officials involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina, the breakdown of a unified command structure at the state EOC level hampered FEMA’s ability to meet state and local requests for commodities.\(^\text{60}\) Without a unified command, some state and local officials began submitting commodity requests outside FEMA’s normal logistics channels. FEMA, in turn, started fulfilling such requests on an “ad-hoc” basis before these requests were properly authorized or logged into its logistics system.\(^\text{61}\) When supply requests and subsequent supply distributions were not logged, FEMA could not accurately keep track of the resources it staged at regional facilities.\(^\text{62}\) As a result, supplies and equipment were delivered not according to specifications, delivered late, or not delivered at all, and priority needs were not met.

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Brown acknowledged these logistical problems and the need for a better tracking system. He said if

\[\text{[y]ou don’t have a unified command, [y]ou kind of go into an ad hoc mode. S}o \text{ we hear that, for example, County X is requesting five truckloads of Meals Ready to Eat, so we will then figure out that, okay, we have got four available, so we are just going to ship four into that county . . . .}\] \(^\text{63}\)

Then, “[another county] may send in a legitimate request for five trailer loads [and] you think they are still there because no one has yet entered in the [trailers] that have gone out.”\(^\text{64}\)

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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

Management lapse

According to Holden, lack of "knowledge and understanding by many agencies paralyzed the efforts" to provide an orderly and efficient response, and required paperwork also "hindered immediate action and deployment of people and materials to assist in rescue and recovery efforts." Pre-positioned federal assets critical to the operations of hospitals were never received. Resources from the Strategic National Stockpile, despite requests, were never locally deployed due to bureaucratic red tape.

According to Carwile, "in any operation, particularly in a chaotic environment, there needs to be a balance between 'going outside the system' and following a plan and a procedure." Carwile suggested "there needs to be a well-disciplined, systematic approach based on a solid plan that is sufficiently flexible for a variety of situations. Experienced personnel know where the pitfalls are and can make decisions where flexibility is required. Doctrine, policies, training, and exercises should be developed that meet the needs of a trained and ready workforce."

Even Brown experienced bureaucratic frustrations. Rather than have FEMA's food provision efforts oriented almost exclusively toward securing MREs, Brown sought to devise an arrangement in which distributors or retailers would deliver meals or groceries, like those that would ordinarily be conveyed to typical commercial outlets, directly to shelters. Brown testified he came to believe we were too focused on meals ready to eat. The issue was food, not the MREs. So we came up with what we thought was this brilliant idea that we would utilize Wal-Mart or some grocery distribution system because they are accustomed to going to these 7-Elevens, [and other] convenience stores, to replenish them all the time . . . .

Brown said FEMA started "trying to do a contract to do that very thing [but] ran into a bureaucratic wall [so much that] I finally had to scream at some people on the phone, ['just make it happen, I don't care, just do the contract and make it happen.'][".

According to Carwile, over the past four years, there has been no operational doctrine developed by FEMA. He said, as a consequence

"there is no clear understanding of the responsibilities of each level (Washington, the Regions, and deployed Emergency Response Teams) and how they are to interact. This lack of operational doctrine results in unacceptable levels of overlap, double and triple ordering of resources, and long video teleconferences and conference calls [which can] disrupt field operations."

Carwile believes "well-understood and defined operational methodologies based on doctrine would minimize the need for lengthy conferences and would achieve other efficiencies."

Alabama officials said FEMA officials lacked management skills. Nobody with FEMA seemed to know what assets existed and how to marshal them, they said. FEMA does not have a robust lessons learned/after action program to assist in the refining and reorganizing of processes. Instead, FEMA seemed to move from one emergency to the next without incorporating any formal reviews.

Alabama officials recommended FEMA adapt its training requirements to allow states to use monies targeted for state training exercises for after-action reviews of actual emergency-related operations. One official echoed the thoughts of many AEMA personnel when he said the state was better prepared for Katrina by virtue of its experiences with previous hurricanes within the last year, notably Dennis (July 2005) and Ivan (September 2004).

Carwile suggested the logistics supply system was overly centralized and recommended allowing the state to contract with private entities to provide logistical support and commodities distribution services, with the federal share of costs reimbursed by FEMA.
Select Committee Members stated and Brown agreed FEMA should develop a formal planning and logistics process similar to that developed by the Department of Defense (DOD). Some officials have suggested the DOD simply assume a larger role in logistics, or even take control outright. Although recognizing the value of DOD assistance, Brown indicated DOD involvement would not be appropriate for smaller events. “I think that the Army can help FEMA in that regard,” Brown said. “I would rather see it remain within FEMA because logistics is something that you need in every disaster, the smallest one that FEMA might be involved in to the largest; and I don’t want to see us utilize the military in all of those.”

However, According to Carwile

...the factors contributing to the slow delivery of commodities should be examined and addressed for future disasters. Possible solutions include much better planning between State and Federal emergency management logisticians and operations personnel, the assistance and advice of DOD strategic logistics planners, and much more robust private sector partnerships, e.g., the US Army LOGCAP or USAF AFCAP programs. It is also possible for states to enter into their own contractual agreements with the private sector for procurement and delivery of response commodities. The federal share is reimbursable by FEMA and Florida routinely enters into such agreements.

Rep. Bill Shuster pointed out the private sector provides the best relief model and, while government agencies such as the DOD are excellent with logistics, “[s]ome of our private companies . . . are even better and our military learns from [these companies because they] know exactly what’s in a truck. They know exactly where it’s moving.”

For their part, private sector firms expressed the need for a get-it-done-and-ask-questions-later mentality. The director of Business Continuity Global Security for Wal-Mart said “[f]lexibility in our plans, flexibility in our structure, and flexibility of our Associates is paramount to success.” Southern Company’s plans provide “for flexible and decentralized authority to make decisions as close as possible to the disaster.” They demonstrated creativity in helping restore fuel service to Chevron pumps, in helping expand their communications system to assist other companies, and in the way they used their “family services plan” to provide emergency services to employees.

Starwood hotels worked to engineer a way to pump water into the hotels, knowing the city’s water system wouldn’t be up and running for some time. They also contracted at the last minute for security to protect their hotels from looting. IBM provided services to governmental and non-governmental organizations as needed on the ground. These services ranged from temporary housing to websites and missing persons registries including the CNN Safe List, which it hosted.

FEMA’s Information Technology Systems are unable to support large-scale logistical challenges

The technology used to manage FEMA’s logistics system may be partly to blame. FEMA’s Logistics Information Management System III (LIMS III) is used to manage the agency’s inventory of equipment and supplies. A recent DHS OIG report found FEMA’s computers were overwhelmed during the 2004 hurricane season, which hindered disaster-recovery efforts, delayed emergency supply shipments, and put emergency-response personnel at risk. The report found during August and September 2004, when four hurricanes struck Florida, the IT system could not track essential commodities such as ice, water, and tents.

According to the report, LIMS III is not integrated with other FEMA IT systems such as the database used to identify and deploy personnel to disaster sites. Nor can it share information across federal, state, and local agencies. LIMS III was designed, however, to track “accountable property” such as bar-coded cellular phones and pagers, not “bulk commodities.” Although LIMS III contains information on the quantity and location of emergency supplies, it does not indicate when they will be shipped or when they should arrive. In Florida, emergency personnel tracked items on spreadsheets and spent hours calling trucking companies to determine the status of goods in transit.

Brown received this DHS report several weeks before Hurricane Katrina, but he and FEMA Chief Information Officer Barry West rejected the OIG’s findings, calling the report’s characterizations “inaccurate.” According to a FEMA spokesperson, “[FEMA’s] [l]ogistics-support systems
have presented us with some concerns over the past 18 months, and we are addressing this.  

During Katrina relief efforts, FEMA tested a system using global-positioning technology to track trucks transporting commodities. FEMA also is installing an intranet-based electronic document system to replace paper documents and improve data sharing among agency officials via an intranet.

The DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, which FEMA was part of, established an enterprise architecture office in 2003 and hired a chief enterprise architect in 2004 to develop a system to tie in the directorate’s system with the rest of DHS. Of the Katrina federal aid package, $4.6 billion is designated for FEMA logistics, search and rescue, and emergency supplies.

Private sector fills void

Several tractor-trailers were strategically located throughout the region by various officials and organizations to collect local contributions, which were then sent to a warehouse for collection and distribution. When the first of 14 packed trailer loads arrived, volunteers unloaded the first two and quickly realized much more assistance was needed to efficiently process the donations and prepare them for distribution. A clear plan for the organized collection, sorting, storing and distributing of such a large volume of goods was not in place, however.

Local officials turned to the private sector. “Once we started seeing that we were going to have this enormous influx of material, we knew that there was no one better in the world for distribution and collection than Wal-Mart Corporation. So we made some calls. And they immediately sent down some folks. And they showed us how to arrange a warehouse and they made it spin like a top,” according to the Mayor of Fayetteville, Arkansas, Dan Coody.

Several companies had existing disaster plans which eased the challenges they faced. Southern Company has a separate plan for each category of hurricane, and each year they conduct a major disaster simulation. Before the storm hit, Southern Company had already pre-positioned trailers, caterers, laundry facilities, and 11,000 people for their response. Starwood developed a crisis management plan which “structures preparedness and response at the Corporate, Division, and Hotel levels” and defines responsibilities for each level of employee. Wal-Mart keeps an Emergency Operating Center up and running 24 hours a day, every day of the year. IBM had its Crisis Response Team on the ground four days in advance of Katrina, which worked with FEMA, the states, and private entities, providing a list of the services they could provide.

Ad Hoc response

In Fayetteville, Arkansas, individuals who had traveled there to stay with family or friends began to stop by the distribution center “in search of financial aid, food, clothes and other assistance,” recalled Coody. Officials had not anticipated receiving evacuees at the distribution center and were not sure how to respond. They had heard stories of survivors being bounced from place to place or from town to town, so they took it upon themselves to find answers, information, and assistance for everyone who needed it.

Officials and volunteers pulled boxes off pallets and made food and clothes available to these displaced individuals. They moved all relief agencies into the distribution center offices to make a one-stop location where evacuees could get various types of assistance and support, and set up a “store” where people could shop for what they needed, free of charge.

In addition, relief supplies were shipped from the Fayetteville distribution facility to the Salvation Army staging warehouse in Corsicana, Texas. It was eventually
destined to aid the stricken areas of Louisiana and Mississippi. Many of these shipments were sponsored by local businesses and churches and were arranged by making direct contact with community members in the affected areas. Fayetteville officials also learned many rural areas were not receiving adequate support and were still in desperate need of various items that were in stock. This spurred officials to focus their large-scale distribution efforts on rural Louisiana.

Coody testified while Fayetteville had food, water, wheelchairs, baby supplies and many other items on pallets and ready to go, communicating and coordinating the movement of supplies to these areas was a challenge. He said the distribution center had not received “any communications from the State or Federal level about the needs in these areas.”

Although Fayetteville officials wanted to send goods where they were needed, arranging transportation also proved to be a problem. Nonetheless, Coody recounted some success in arranging deliveries including that they asked J.B. Hunt and other trucking firms, “[c]an you please donate your time and some drivers to load up this trailer that we have . . . ready to go and take it to a particular town in Louisiana?” And they said, “[]sure[ ], . . . .”

In another instance, Bogalusa, Mississippi had requested water and baby food from Fayetteville. Coincidentally, a truck arrived from Kansas City, and the driver announced, “I have got a load of baby food and water and I am [being] told to get off the road because I am overloaded.” The mayor said [as soon as] we saw what we had, we gave him a map and we said, “[t]his is where you need to go[,]” and we sent [the items] on their way. As they pulled into Bogalusa and off-loaded food [—] baby food, adult food [—] and everything else, people started opening packages and eating food directly off the truck because they had not had any food in three days.

Coody reported the realization that Fayetteville had the necessary supplies in stock previously but had “no knowledge” or “no real infrastructure to get it there” was disturbing, and “it broke our hearts.”

Finding: The failure at all levels to enter into advance contracts led to chaos and the potential for waste and fraud as acquisitions were made in haste.

Concerns have been raised with respect to how FEMA awarded its contracts in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and regarding the contract vehicles it had in place before landfall. In the weeks following Katrina, more than 80 percent of FEMA’s $1.5 billion in contracts were awarded on a sole-source basis or pursuant to limited competition. Many of the contracts awarded were incomplete and included open-ended or vague terms. In addition, numerous news reports have questioned the terms of disaster relief agreements made in such haste. Questions have also been raised about USACE’s awarding of contracts with limited competition for debris removal and clean up.

In the face of the massive destruction caused by Katrina, acquisition personnel acted to meet pressing humanitarian needs, contacting firms in an effort to provide immediate relief to survivors and to protect life and property. Many of these firms were called into action on a sole-source basis under acquisition provisions that allow the government to acquire urgently needed goods and services in emergency situations. These firms provided emergency housing and shelter for victims and emergency personnel, to start debris cleanup, and to secure property from further damage.
The Shaw Group Inc., Bechtel National Inc., CH2M Hill, and Dewberry Technologies were engaged by FEMA to provide emergency housing and shelter for victims, to start the cleanup of hazardous waste, and begin restoration of the transportation infrastructure. Before Katrina struck, however, FEMA had only one contract in place relevant to the Katrina response for temporary housing. Immediately after the disaster, USACE competitively awarded contracts for debris removal to ACI/AshBritt, Inc., Environmental Chemical Corp., Central Environmental Services, and Phillips & Jordan, Inc. through an emergency competition, which resulted in the submission of 22 proposals.120

FEMA executed few, if any, written contracts during what officials called “the real nightmare emergency” (Aug. 29-Sept. 15).121 The circumstances surrounding their contract awards made it difficult for FEMA to understand fully the contract specifics. FEMA simply instructed companies to begin work and submit vouchers for payment. FEMA used this method for the acquisition of food, ice, buses, and other supplies. This could raise issues of enforceability, which will need to be resolved when written contracts are issued.

FEMA’s contracting practices were described by state and local officials as “problematic.”122 Louisiana officials cited lack of FEMA oversight and management in the awarding of contracts. Further, state officials suggested there were no performance-based standards under the contracts and suggested under “time and materials” contracts, the longer the contractor takes to perform the necessary service, the more money the firm stands to make.

Rep. Jefferson also conveyed complaints from Louisiana officials about FEMA’s failure to contract out the mortuary and body recovery effort.123 This was a particularly sensitive issue because New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin was predicting thousands of casualties.124 State officials reported FEMA implemented a contract with Kenyon International in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane. According to officials, Kenyon was not given the support it needed from FEMA to meet its objectives and ended up pulling out of the contract. Ultimately, Louisiana contracted with Kenyon directly.125

When asked whether FEMA had contracts in place for disaster-related supplies, including tarps, ice, generators, and temporary shelters, Brown equivocated, stating they had some contracts in place for provision of MREs, water, ice, temporary housing, and some of the trailers. In other cases, however, FEMA had to “start buying off the street to meet the demand.”

By the end of September, it was reported that 80 percent of the contracts — and half of the $3.2 billion spent — had been awarded without full and open competition.127 The agency awarded 60 percent of its contracts without full competition in October 2005, 68 percent in November 2005, and 50 percent in the first half of December.128

The Select Committee heard testimony from representative companies that contracted with FEMA and USACE to provide immediate response and recovery requirements to the federal government. Carnival Cruise Lines provided temporary housing; The Shaw Group provided, among other services, “blue roof” emergency tarps to cover storm-damaged homes; Landstar System provided transportation support, including trucks for supplies and buses for evacuees; AshBritt provided debris removal services; Innotech provided emergency packaged meals.129

**Typical contracting issues**

The experiences of The Shaw Group are typical of the issues raised by contractors in the aftermath of Katrina. The company is a $3+ billion company with 20,000 employees worldwide. According to company officials, Shaw performed $800 million in federal work last year, and contracts for Hurricane Katrina and Rita relief have been the firm’s biggest undertaking.130 Shaw was originally awarded two separate $100 million contracts: the first by the USACE and the second by FEMA. Shaw
is participating in competitive procurements for FEMA requirements which, originally, were awarded on a sole-source basis. USACE contracts (including blue roof and rapid response contracts) were awarded on a non-competitive basis. Overall, most of Shaw’s business comes from USACE ($300 million), followed by DOD, DOE, and the EPA.

The Friday before the storm, the Shaw Group was asked by another firm to conduct damage assessments and inspections. They were also contacted by FEMA and the USACE to begin work. They established a command center in Baton Rouge run by a retired general who served as the point of contact for all requests. FEMA placed a contract specialist within Shaw’s operations to help with compliance and other issues. Officials were unsure if other companies were offered FEMA assistance as well but said they offered to provide Shaw personnel at FEMA.

According to company officials, Shaw’s existing blue roof contract uses the highest number of workers from the impacted areas of any firm project. Last year, Shaw took Louisiana contractors to Florida, which made preparations and response for this event easier. Their rapid response contract has expanded over the years and was activated by the USACE. Shaw was not successful in a bid for a debris removal contract.

Shaw officials raised several concerns, which were typical of the issues raised by several contracting firms:

- **Liability**—Shaw officials expressed concern that the federal government might hold them liable for environmental issues arising from pumping contaminated water out of the city.
- **Changing Requirements**—FEMA tasked Shaw with securing temporary housing, which the company began doing, before FEMA officials changed their minds. Although they did not lose money, the company did lose time and goodwill.
- **Contract Signing and Follow-through**—Shaw officials had problems getting contracts signed by the appropriate agency officials. Although all the contracts have since been signed, payments from FEMA remain slow.

Because Shaw’s subcontractors are generally small businesses with tight cash flow, they cannot wait long for payment. Shaw also had to turn down certain projects because it had no indication from FEMA that it would be paid. The Stafford Act requires that the federal government give preference, if practicable, to local businesses. However, this was largely not done and, according to Shaw officials, some local companies have since gone out of business. For example, debris removal contracts were given to Minnesota, California, and Florida firms.

- **Conflicts of Interest**—Shaw officials continue to struggle with the propriety of working for FEMA and for the parishes. Officials indicated complications could arise if FEMA hires them to assess a situation, and then a parish hires them for rebuilding using FEMA money.
- **Bonding**—Shaw officials did not know what the bonding requirements were for Katrina recovery work. However, they noted few small subcontractors are bonded to levels necessary to enable them to perform major contracts.

**Oversight and proposed reforms to address outstanding issues**

Although some emergency awards were made on a sole-source basis, they do not constitute the majority of those awarded in support of the relief efforts. Nevertheless, FEMA recognized the need to revisit non-competitive contracts issued quickly immediately after the storm.

Shortly after emergency needs arose, DHS’s Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) requested the OIG to begin overseeing FEMA’s acquisition process. The DHS-IG assigned 60 auditors, investigators, and inspectors
Finding: Before Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals. DHS procurement continues to be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach, and its procurement office was understaffed given the volume and dollar value of work.

FEMA's grossly understaffed acquisition unit was not ready for the Katrina disaster. FEMA had 55 acquisition slots, and procurement officials think it should have had a minimum of 172. Further, only 36 of the 55 slots were actually occupied. FEMA is one of the DHS agencies that are not under the control of the DHS chief procurement officer, thus the FEMA acquisition office reported to Michael Brown. As of the time of the interview, FEMA was relying upon staff from the central acquisition office, comprised of 60 acquisition personnel and led by a member of the Senior Executive Service. Regardless, the office was understaffed.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the OIG had repeatedly cited as a major challenge the lack of consistent contract management for large, complex, high-cost procurement programs. DHS procurement continues to be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach. DHS has seven legacy procurement offices that continue to serve DHS components, including FEMA. Notably, FEMA has not been reporting or tracking procurements undertaken by its disaster field offices, and its procurement office remains understaffed given the volume and dollar value of work. The CPO recently had established an eighth office called the Office of Procurement Operations to meet the procurement needs of the rest of DHS.

FEMA had 55 acquisition slots, and procurement officials think it should have had a minimum of 172. Further, only 36 of the 55 slots were actually occupied.
Louisiana officials also noted a shift during the Katrina recovery of the personnel FEMA placed in charge of contracting and logistical decisions. Instead of relying on FEMA’s regional personnel, with whom the state is accustomed to working in the aftermath of a disaster, FEMA sent headquarters officials to the affected areas to make key contracting and logistical decisions, causing the process to become more bureaucratic. For example, adding individuals to FEMA’s Individual Assistance Program has been problematic, according to local officials.

In the past, the FCO from Region VI was able to add individuals in the field. With Katrina, however, state officials had to send the request to FEMA headquarters, which has become, some say, “gridlocked.” Further, as previously mentioned, Louisiana state and local officials also criticized FEMA contracting. They said the focus seems to be shifting from the local FCO to FEMA headquarters and becoming more bureaucratic in the process.

Finding: Ambiguous statutory guidance regarding local contractor participation led to ongoing disputes over procuring debris removal and other services

Under the Stafford Act, federal contracts with private firms for debris clearance, distribution of supplies, reconstruction, and other activities must give preference, to the extent feasible and practicable, to organizations, firms, and individuals from the area affected by the disaster or emergency. However, there is no statutory guarantee that, after a major disaster or emergency, recovery and reconstruction work will be awarded to businesses, organizations, and individuals, regardless of where they are from.

The award of federal contracts for disaster or emergency assistance activities are, in general, governed by the standard competitive bidding statutes that apply to all government contracting activities. The Stafford Act, however, contains a “local preference” provision, which can be implemented by the inclusion in a solicitation of a clause creating a price preference for local firms or by a set-aside that only permits local firm to compete. The implementation is at the discretion of the contracting officer. Significantly, the Stafford Act local preference is not a guarantee that local firms will be awarded recovery contracts.

Similarly, prime contractors are often required to give preference to local subcontractors. USACE Acting Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, Colonel Norbert Doyle, suggested there is some uncertainty as to the geographical preferences allowed and required by the Stafford Act. Another official testified that different laws are necessary, and stated “[the Stafford Act is] like bringing a donkey to the Kentucky Derby.”

Numerous public officials have complained about the small number of local firms given relief contracts, particularly with regard to debris removal. AshBritt, the Florida-based prime contractor for debris removal in Mississippi, was awarded a contract in early September by USACE. According to AshBritt official Randy Perkins, the company was one of 22 firms that bid for USACE debris removal contracts. AshBritt won the Louisiana and Mississippi debris removal contracts, making the firm the only contractor for that job in those states. AshBritt was notified of the award 72 hours after the RFP was advertised.

The debris removal contracts have a $150 million ceiling at $30 million per year, and were intended by USACE to get work underway as soon as possible, with the agency reassessing the requests later. USACE’s delay in issuing RFPs was understandable given the disaster, according to Perkins. He stated, it costs “hundreds of thousands of dollars to keep pre-existing contracts in
place, and firms receive no funding for this upkeep, which represents a free insurance policy for USACE, and few companies can secure the bond necessary to perform such a large-scale project. AshBritt official Perkins says he encountered political “fallout” from local officials because the company is not based in Mississippi or Louisiana. The Select Committee was not able to substantiate his allegation, however. Perkins also discussed receiving mixed messages from local officials and “officials in D.C.” While state officials told him “just get the debris out,” he indicated officials in D.C. sent the message to “hire local workers.” Although the company’s contract with the government does not require it to hire local workers, Perkins says local contractors receive 80 percent of AshBritt’s payments to sub-contractors. Although this percentage seems to differ from data provided in USACE progress reports, the Select Committee was not able to substantiate the actual level of debris removal work provided by the local subcontracting community.

Brown suggested the scale of the disaster and the complexity of the response require a large firm’s expertise:

Debris is a huge issue. Debris is one of those issues that is fraught with local politics. It’s fraught with fraud, waste and abuse [and] in cleaning up debris in a situation like Katrina, you really have to have experts overseeing that global perspective because you have hazardous waste. You have the whole issue of private property versus public property . . . . So I would caution us about going down a path that says we’re going to have all locals do it. I know, in my subdivision, the local garbage folks are very adept at picking up my trash twice a week, and they’re pretty good about hauling out debris after a storm or something. But in the kind of debris removal we’re talking about in Mississippi, Alabama and Florida from last year and this year, you really need to have a substantial company overseeing that, to not only protect the taxpayers, but to make sure it’s done right.

Later Brown said, “in a small town that’s hit by a tornado and you have to clean up 45 blocks, city blocks, that’s one thing. Here, where you’re cleaning up entire cities, it’s a different issue. So I would just caution that we approach that systematically.”

Even if this point is conceded, it appears that, despite the Stafford Act’s preference provision, only a fraction of the money being spent in Mississippi is going to subcontractors based there, according to press reports citing documents from FEMA and USACE:

- Of approximately $3.1 billion FEMA had awarded by Nov. 4, only $52.4 million, or about 1.7 percent, had gone to Mississippi firms.
- Of the $476 million that has been spent by the Corps of Engineers in Mississippi as of Nov. 2, about 28.5 percent has gone to Mississippi companies through direct contracts and subcontracts.
- Of the $164 million AshBritt has been paid so far by the Corps, only about $30 million, about 18 percent, has made it to Mississippi subcontractors.

However, Perkins said AshBritt has far exceeded its contractual requirements for hiring local, small, and minority-owned businesses. “People don’t understand that the general administrative costs are very high. It takes a lot to manage one of these projects,” according to Perkins. “We have a tremendous amount of quality control people and logistical support and we need to pay for their housing.” He said the data released by USACE do not reflect the involvement of Mississippi businesses because there are several major contractors from the state that he called “team members,” who are helping the company administer the overall contract. He said AshBritt also has provided “hundreds” of administrative jobs to Mississippians.

Use of local firms

Some have suggested FEMA’s policies need to be changed to have local contractors in Gulf states ready to begin recovery work well before hurricane season. For instance, instead of hiring the USACE to manage debris removal, states susceptible to hurricanes could prepare lists of businesses who meet federal standards to remove debris or haul trailers, thereby enabling local governments to award their own contracts. Local governments are more likely to go with local contractors and local governments have been able to get the job done more quickly and cheaply.
As of December 2005, of the nearly $8 billion expended by all direct contracts with the federal government, only five cents of every dollar reached Mississippi prime contractors. Expenditure rates show DHS (including FEMA) has spent $4,150,359,361, with 3.5 cents for every dollar contracted directly to Mississippi businesses. A January 23, 2006 USACE report reported USACE awarded over $2.3 billion in Katrina contracts with 3.54 percent of total contract dollars going to Mississippi businesses.

Rep. Pickering noted Congress wrote the Stafford Act to maximize the impact of federal dollars by giving preference to local contractors, strengthening the damaged economy and providing jobs to communities and victims of the disaster. . . . Mississippians have the ability, capacity and personal incentive to do this work. We want to rebuild and restore our home state, and these federal contracts will help our economy more through local contractors than sending the money to out-of-state corporations.

Current federal policy discourages local governments from assuming responsibility for debris removal. Local officials are responsible for a cost share of 10 to 25 percent (depending on the magnitude of the disaster) if they use their own contracts. However, if USACE contractors are used, the reimbursement for the life of the debris removal effort is 100 percent with no cost share. Communities removing their own debris have been notified they will incur a 10 percent cost share beginning March 16, 2006.

Additionally, the specter of a federal audit can be very intimidating for local officials, especially for rural communities and those that have incurred major damage. Risk can be avoided by simply signing on with USACE, even if it is more costly and offers less control. For example, USACE is removing debris in Waveland, Mississippi and other locations at a reported cost of approximately $23 per cubic yard. Nearby Gulfport hired its own contractor at $14.95 per cubic yard and appears to be making faster progress. Gulfport’s action is particularly bold given their significant loss of ad valorem tax base. Finally, the $8.05 per cubic yard margin is particularly substantial given the 40 million cubic yard debris removal requirement in Mississippi alone.

Ambiguities regarding the implementation of local contractor preference under the Stafford Act should be resolved. In addition, clear, unambiguous remedies and penalties for failure to meet such statutorily mandated preferences may need to be considered.

**FEMA response to local participation issue**

In response to these concerns, FEMA plans a two-pronged approach. First, FEMA will competitively award multiple five-year technical assistance contracts to small disadvantaged businesses for recovery work in the Gulf states, with evaluation preferences keyed to the location of both the prime contractor and subcontractors in the affected areas. Second, FEMA plans a full and open competition for multiple five-year contracts to provide technical assistance support on a national basis for disaster response and recovery. Under this competition, FEMA will require that these prime contractors meet significant small business subcontracting goals, including the preference for local businesses as provided under the Stafford Act.

Through this strategy, FEMA hopes to provide a diverse group of companies the opportunity to contract with FEMA for the Gulf coast hurricane recovery by adding prime contracting opportunities for small disadvantaged businesses with a geographic preference for those located in the Gulf states. The national competition approach is intended to preserve subcontracting goals and opportunities for small and disadvantaged businesses as part of all prime contracts for future disasters. Both strategies will emphasize the importance of using local businesses, a critical piece of a successful economic recovery in a disaster-ravaged area. Select Committee staff did not receive detailed information on what efforts, if any, USACE is planning for its long-term Katrina-related acquisitions.

In addition, DHS representative Larry Orluskie said FEMA is changing some of its policies. Recently, FEMA announced it will set aside $1.5 billion under 15 contracts worth up to $100 million apiece. Acting FEMA Director David Paulison stated that priority would be given to local contractors on the five-year contracts for trailer maintenance. Orluskie also cited the rebidding of several large, prime contracts as evidence that the agency is trying to be as transparent as possible in its contracting
process. Regarding the $100 million contracts held by Bechtel, Fluor, Shaw, and CH2M Hill, agency officials said the requests have been completed and will be awarded again in February 2006.

Nevertheless, Carwile testified “[t]he Public Assistance program provided under Section 406 of the Stafford Act is far too cumbersome and time consuming in terms of getting funds through the states down to the impacted communities” and “could be totally revamped . . . .” He said “[t]he program is one of the most difficult and contentious aspects of disaster recovery,” and “the entire issue of Federal reimbursement for debris removal should be addressed in a comprehensive manner.”

Finding: Attracting emergency contractors and corporate support could prove challenging given the scrutiny that companies have endured

When federal agency resources were overwhelmed and existing contractors unable to meet the huge demands created by the storm, federal officials turned to the private sector for assistance. In an effort to meet pressing needs by any means possible, federal officials looked to alternative sources for food, transportation, and housing. Many of the firms approached by agency officials had never contracted previously with the federal government. Housing was one resource in short supply. Officials considered a variety of options to shelter victims and first responders, and approached a number of cruise ship operators.

According to Carnival Cruise Lines representatives, on Wednesday, August 24, federal officials contacted the company regarding chartering ships. Carnival found this unusual given that the firm had never served as a federal contractor. “[W]e were watching just the total devastation, and we felt very strongly that it was a situation where we were in a position to help, and we very much wanted to help,” stated Terry Thorton, a Carnival Vice President.

The Military Sealift Command informed Carnival the RFP was being issued. Carnival indicated it wanted to “help” and responded to the RFP. Thirteen ships were potentially available from Carnival and others. Four ships ultimately met the RFP requirements (which included a requirement for medical and pharmaceutical facilities), three belonging to Carnival. Carnival received the RFP at 9 a.m. Friday, and the initial response was due two hours later at 11 a.m. Carnival offered three ships, and negotiated all day with “best and final” offers provided at 9 p.m.

Carnival based its bid on projected cruise revenue for six months out, and agreed it would reduce the final bill and provide a refund if, after an internal audit by an independent accounting firm, it was found Carnival earned more than it would have in the cruise market. To make the ships available, Carnival canceled approximately 100,000 existing reservations for which travel agent fees still had to be paid. Carnival makes its profit from ticket sales and “add-ons” (drinks, shore excursions, etc.) and not in the “time charter” business, which is a comprehensive package of food, beverages, and activities. In addition, it incorporated taxes into its offer,
which will be refunded if it is determined it does not owe taxes under U.S. law.¹⁹⁷

Despite these provisions, numerous public officials and press reports have criticized the arrangement. Attention focused on the ships when FEMA revealed it intended to use them to house first responders. At the time, housing for first responders was in short supply, and FEMA sought out a variety of options. “I’m not sure that everyone on this panel would have made the same choice that FEMA made, but this was FEMA’s choice as to how they wanted to house people . . . . And you’ve simply said, ‘[ ]if you want us to do this, here’s what the circumstances are,’ and FEMA said, ‘[ ]that’s okay with us,’ and we accept that,” stated Rep. Jefferson.¹⁹⁸ When appreciation was expressed by Select Committee Members for Carnival’s assistance, Carnival officials replied, “[t]hank you. Because honestly, that’s one of the few times that we’ve really been thanked for the effort . . . .”¹⁹⁹

The intense public scrutiny could limit the willingness of private sector companies to offer assistance during future disasters. Several firms expressed the view that the challenges associated with emergency contracting may not be worth the trouble. Finally, unfounded negative publicity harms company reputations. Public sector missions divert company assets from primary missions and could raise questions about whether a company was meeting its fiduciary duty to shareholders. Given the important role the private sector played in all aspects of the response and recovery, any loss of private sector involvement could be critical.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE


3 DHS IG Rpt. at 111.

4 Amy Belasco, Cong. Research Service (CRS), Reallocation of Hurricane Katrina Emer. Approps.: Defense and Other Issues (Dec. 15, 2005) at CRS-3 [hereinafter CRS Approps Rpt.].

5 Id. at CRS-3-CRS-4.

6 Frank Donze, Nagin decries slow pace of relief, TIMES-PIC. (New Orleans, LA) Oct. 21, 2005 at 1.


11 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 65 (statement of Michael Brown). Note, each trailer contained 18,000 meals.

12 Id. at 150 (statement of Rep. Chip Pickering).

13 Id. at 65 (statement of Rep. Gene Taylor).

14 Id. at 66 (statement of Michael Brown).


16 Id.


18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, in Clancy, AL (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Baughman Interview].

22 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tim Payne, Branch Chief and Emergency Management Program Coordinator, Alabama, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Payne Interview].

23 Baughman Interview.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Payne Interview. These items included transportation, water, ice, materials handling equipment, cots plus bedding supplies, sandbags, meals, fuel, tarps, project management and logistics services, special needs beds, headquarters / office coordination capabilities.

27 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 73 (statement of Michael Brown).


29 Id.

30 Briefing for Select Comm. Staff by Gary Moore, Director of Logistics, FEMA (Jan. 9, 2006).

31 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005), [hereinafter Wells Interview]; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tony Robinson, FEMA Operations Officer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Robinson Interview].

32 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Matt Farlow, Chief Information Technology Division (LOHSEP), in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Farlow Interview].

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id.


37 See Doran Interview; see also Ballou Interview.

38 See Wells Interview; see also Robinson Interview.

39 Robinson Interview.

40 Id.

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 See Doran Interview; see also Ballou Interview; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Maestri Interview]; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Plaquemines Parish Sheriff, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Hingle Interview]; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Ebbert Interview].

44 Farlow Interview.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

339

Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 110 (statement by Michael Brown); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer, in Washington, DC (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Lokey Interview].

See Doran Interview; see also Ballow Interview; see also Lokey Interview; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Phil Parr, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Officer, FEMA, in Washington, DC (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Parr Interview].

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Governor Blanco, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Kopplin Interview].

See Maestri Interview; see also Hingle Interview; see also Ebbert Interview.

Maestri Interview.

See, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Smith Interview]; see also Lokey Interview; see also Wells Interview.

Ebbert Interview.

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Governor Blanco, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Kopplin Interview].

See Maestri Interview; see also Hingle Interview; see also Ebbert Interview.

Maestri Interview.

See, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Smith Interview]; see also Lokey Interview; see also Wells Interview.

Ebbert Interview.


Id. at 108 (statement of Michael Brown).

Id. at 110 (statement of Michael Brown).


Id. at 110 (statement of Michael Brown).

Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 110 (statement of Michael Brown).

Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 5-6 (written statement of Melvin Holden).

Id. at 7 (written statement of Melvin Holden).


Id.

Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 164 (statement of Michael Brown).

Id. Note, Mr. Brown left FEMA shortly after this plan was devised. He testified that he was unaware of whether this proposal was ultimately implemented. Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 164 (statement of Michael Brown).


Baughman Interview.

Baughman Interview; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Tranter, General Counsel for Alabama Emergency Management Agency, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Tranter Interview].

Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Toby Roth, Chief of Staff to Governor Barbour, in Montgomery, AL (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Roth Interview].

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 6 (written statement of William Carwile).

Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 149-150 (statement of Rep. Chip Pickering); see also Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 146 (statement of Michael Brown.).


Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 150-150 (statement of Michael Brown).

Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 6 (written statement of William Carwile).

Id. at 163 (written statement of William Carwile).


Id. at 2 (written statement of David M. Ratcliffe).

Id. at 5 (written statement of David M. Ratcliffe).

Id. at 7-8 (written statement of Kevin T. Regan).

Id. at 3 (written statement of Stanley S. Litow).

Id.


See generally, DHS IT Report; see also Laurie Sullivan, FEMA’s Foul-up: Report says agency’s computer systems failed to track supplies during last year’s hurricane season, INFOR. WEEK, Oct. 3, 2005 [hereinafter FEMA Foul Up Article].

FEMA Foul Up Article.

DHS IT Report at 21.

Id. at 3.

Id. at 27.

FEMA Foul Up Article.

DHS IG Report at 46.

FEMA Foul Up Article.

Id.

Id.
Mr. Coody further stated that Wal-Mart “immediately responded by sending two engineers to create a warehouse system for our facility, a distribution center supervisor and two additional employees to oversee the operation. During peak hours we had over 100 volunteers, city employees, Wal-Mart employees, and work release inmates working side by side to organize the donations. The trailers were unloaded by Saturday [September 10], and the donations were ready for shipment by September 15.” Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 2 (written statement of Dan Coody).


Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Greg Rothwell, DHS Chief Procurement Officer, and Mui Erkum, Chief of Staff to Greg Rothwell, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Rothwell / Erkum Interview].

The blue roof program involves teams of contract personnel professionally installing high quality plastic sheeting over damaged roofs. This was first used extensively following Hurricane Andrew and again in Hurricane Georges in Puerto Rico, and, in 2004, in Florida. It enables families to reoccupy their houses until more permanent repairs can be made.

Procurement officials indicated that the $250,000 card threshold increase was unnecessary and did not plan to use it.

See generally Rothwell / Erkum Interview.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Smith Interview; see also Maestri Interview.
156 During the Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing on contracting, Members posed questions that witnesses from DHS and FEMA were unable to answer. Although they committed to providing answers to these questions as well as additional information, agency personnel failed to do so despite repeated inquiries. See generally, Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing.
157 Stafford Act. Note, the Stafford Act was first enacted in 1974.
159 See Stafford Act, at §§ 5121-5206, which directs that preference be given “to the extent feasible and practicable” to businesses and individuals from the affected areas.
161 See Stafford Act, at §§ 5121-5206.
163 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing (statement of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordination Officer, FEMA (citing press reports)
165 Interview by Select Comm. Staff of Randy Perkins, Managing Vice President of AshBritt Environmental, Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Perkins Interview].
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 150-151 (statement of Michael Brown).
172 Id. at 153 (statement of Michael Brown).
173 Joshua Cogswell, Doling of storm funds rapped, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Mississippi) Nov. 13, 2005, at 1A [hereinafter Storm Funds Article].
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
179 Dep’t of Homeland Security, Report of U.S. Gov’t Direct Contracts, including FEMA, as provided by the HCIC, as of December 12, 2005.
181 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Small/Local Business Update as of 1/23/06.
182 Mike Brunker, Dust flies over Katrina’s Debris, MSNBC, Jan. 29, 2006.
184 Select Committee Members who toured the Gulf coast in January 2006 agreed with this assessment.
185 Storm Funds Article.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
194 Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 170 (statement of Terry Thornton).
195 Carnival Counsel Interview.
196 Id.
197 Id.
199 Id. at 173-174 (statement of Terry Thornton).
“While well intentioned, the volunteers never had a good grasp on security requirements for financial assistance distribution operations. On numerous instances, the ARC [American Red Cross] volunteers would simply find a vacant parking area and commence voucher distribution operations. Immediately, crowds would gather and would overwhelm the distribution site. The ARC would then call on the Guard for assistance.

“Repeated attempts were made to reinforce the need for prior coordination for site security. It was not until mid-September that the ARC started coordinating these operations.”

Major General Harold A. Cross
The Adjutant General, State of Mississippi
In Response to Questions from Select Committee, November 22, 2005
Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process.

Summary

Following Katrina’s devastation, countless numbers of charities provided billions of dollars in relief to those in need. According to the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, as of January 9, 2006, private donations, including cash and in-kind gifts have reached $3.13 billion. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the efforts of charitable organizations in the Gulf coast represent the largest disaster response effort in United States history.

Under the National Response Plan (NRP), the American Red Cross (Red Cross) is the primary agency responsible for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6, Mass Care, Housing and Human Services. As the only nongovernmental organization with lead agency responsibilities under the NRP, the Red Cross plays the crucial role of helping to provide food and shelter to disaster victims.

Katrina, however, was too much for the Red Cross. The Red Cross was challenged to meet its responsibilities under the NRP, as its $2 billion relief operation was 20 times larger than any previous Red Cross mission. Like FEMA, the Red Cross did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to deal with a catastrophe of Katrina’s size. The Red Cross was dependent on FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide critical commodities such as kitchen supplies, water, and food. The Red Cross was challenged by the sometimes disorganized manner in which shelters were established. Some shelters were unknown to the Red Cross until after they were already opened by local officials. The Red Cross was unable to staff some locally-operated shelters, including the Superdome, because charity officials were denied access.

Challenges aside, as of January 12, 2006, the Red Cross reported it had raised $2 billion for Katrina relief, by far the largest amount of money raised by a charity. The Salvation Army had raised the second-highest amount, $295 million. The Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund and Catholic Charities were the next-largest fund raisers, raising $137 and $100 million respectively. Other major U.S. charitable organizations, including the United Way, have also contributed meaningfully to the response and recovery effort. One feature of the United Way’s response has been its focus on restoring the network of local social service agencies in the region.

Many of the charities responding to Katrina worked with each other to coordinate the delivery of a multitude of services, including providing food, shelter, and medical assistance. Charities have shared information through daily conference calls and through electronic databases that allow multiple organizations to obtain information about services provided to hurricane victims.

As much as any organization, public or private, the Red Cross played a substantial role in the immediate response to Hurricane Katrina. In what became a $2 billion, 220,000-person enterprise, the relief efforts undertaken by the Red Cross include the provision of financial assistance to 1.2 million families, encompassing more than 3.7 million hurricane survivors. As of January 9, 2006, the Red Cross reported that since Katrina made landfall, it had provided hurricane survivors with nearly
3.42 million overnight stays in nearly 1,100 shelters across 27 states and the District of Columbia. In coordination with the Southern Baptist Convention, the Red Cross has served more than 52 million meals or snacks to hurricane survivors. The Katrina response is larger — 20 times so — than any other Red Cross mission in its 125-year history.

### Pre-landfall actions

The Red Cross' Gulf coast-area preparation was far along two days before Katrina made landfall. As of 2:00 p.m. on August 27, the Red Cross reported to the White House and the Department of Homeland Security, among other governmental organizations that it "has every resource at its disposal on alert/moving in anticipation of this event to include personnel, equipment, and materials." Key aspects of this preparation included:

- Chapters across the region are opening shelters in support of evacuations in all states.
- 275,000 HeaterMeals staged in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
- 225,000 HeaterMeals staged in Montgomery, Alabama.
- 15 sites being identified to bring in big kitchens with support of Southern Baptists to provide 300,000 meals per day feeding capability.
- All 14 Disaster Field Supply Center warehouses loading supplies including 50,000 cots, 100,000 blankets, comfort and clean-up kits.
- All vehicles in the Red Cross fleet across the country are on alert for possible deployment and are being dispatched to staging areas.
- All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles (ECRVs) deployed to staging areas.
- Red Cross staff deployed to NRCC, Region VI RRCC, Region IV RRCC, ERT-As and other ESF #6 posts.

By August 28, the Red Cross started to understand the potential magnitude of Katrina. One of its Disaster Operations Reports noted, if Katrina makes landfall at its current pressure, "it will be the most intense storm to hit the U.S. mainland." Also on the same day it was reported, "For the first time ever, an ESF6 coordination center will be set up tomorrow at American Red Cross national headquarters to coordinate the deliver [sic] mass care services with our governmental and non-governmental organization partners."

### Post-landfall actions

As Katrina made landfall on August 29, the Red Cross was fully staffing all of the relevant state and federal Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), including Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regions IV and VI's Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), FEMA's National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), as well as Emergency Response Advance Element Teams (ERT-A) teams in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. Sites for 25 kitchens for a total daily capacity of 500,000 people were identified and pre-staged. The Red Cross was also aware of the increasing population at the Superdome, a shelter of last resort it did not support. Figure 1 shows Red Cross interactions with these various operations centers.

**Figure 1:**

**Red Cross Involvement at Emergency Operations Centers**

![Red Cross Involvement at Emergency Operations Centers](image)
Montgomery, Alabama Regional Headquarters

The day-to-day paid operations staff of the service area coordinates the fundraising and communications and provides the institutional knowledge of the affected area. Armed with the right data, and knowledge of the area, the information and resources management cell can provide essential services to those in need.

The Red Cross’ temporary, regional disaster headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama serves Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and the Florida panhandle. The facility serves, “triple functions:” (1) a volunteer and staff shelter; (2) a warehouse for food and supplies; and (3) a temporary regional corporate headquarters – basically a hub for all relief operations in the Gulf coast region.

The facility has been under lease for over a year, and was used during the 2004 hurricane season as a base of response operations for Hurricanes Dennis and Ivan. Following Hurricane Katrina, the facility was re-opened Thursday, September 1, and was mostly operational within 24 hours and completely operational within 72 hours. Skip Batchelor, a 20-year Red Cross veteran, said the facility would remain operational through October 2005. The lifecycle of the emergency facility was, therefore, about two months.

Located in an old K-Mart building, the facility houses all of the functions of a major corporation. Having the appearance of large political campaign, there are hundreds of folding tables and chairs divided into work areas by function. Some functional areas included:

**Warehousing.** Approximately 30 percent of the facility served as storage location for food stuffs and supplies, including, cots, blankets, coolers, comfort kits, and meals ready to eat (MREs).

**Staff Shelter.** At its peak the facility housed 450 Red Cross personnel (staff and volunteers).

**Transportation.** The facility’s parking lot was approximately 30 percent populated with large rental trucks, most supplied by Budget, which donated approximately 50 percent of the rental trucks free of charge. Numerous truck drivers reported each morning ready to drive goods to various points of service in the region. The Red Cross contracted with Shell to install an on site gasoline supply for its vehicles. The Red Cross was able to take advantage of wholesale pricing on this gasoline.

**Information Technology (IT).** Work stations had computer, internet and telephony capability. There was a central IT department that supported the entire facility.

**Real Estate.** The Red Cross leased other facilities to serve as points of contact for client interaction. Their real estate team located and secured these properties.

**Chapter Outreach.** Personnel attempted to coordinate the field needs with the resources available at headquarters.

**Jobs and Training.** Served as a clearinghouse for job opportunities and training for the displaced.

**Financial Assistance.** Analysis of client needs and eligibility for financial assistance.

**FEMA interface.** Provided assistance in connecting victims to FEMA.

**Other NGO Coordination.** Personnel worked to coordinate with the other key charities and non-government organizations (NGOs) to ensure that the clients are directed to and made aware of all of the potential relief resources. The key charities that clients are referred to include: Baptist Kitchens
(food), Mennonites (home rebuilding), VOAD – Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (various local volunteers and other smaller relief entities, many of which are faith-based), Catholic Charities, and Habitat for Humanity (new homes).

**Government Liaison.** Government outreach to coordinate shelter operations, rescue and client outreach.

**Volunteer Coordination.** At its peak, the facility processed 45,000 volunteers.

**Data Entry.** There appeared to be 60 to 100 work stations for data entry, half of which are paid temporary workers and half are volunteers.

The ability of the Red Cross to rapidly open and operate such a sophisticated facility in a short amount time reflects the sophisticated planning regime the Red Cross has long had in place. The rapid standing up of the facility was described by Laura Howe a Birmingham-based Red Cross official as the equivalent of opening a Fortune 500 company in a couple days time.33

The Red Cross, much like FEMA, did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to deal with a truly catastrophic disaster the size of Katrina

The Red Cross was dependent on FEMA and DOD to provide certain supplies—particularly food in the form of MREs—so it suffered from all the weaknesses in the FEMA and DOD supply chain discussed earlier.

The flooding of New Orleans became a reality on August 30 and the Mayor declared that “80 percent of the city is under water and media sources report the water level is still rising, due in part to broken levees and failed water pumps in the city.”34 By 8:00 a.m. on August 30, the Red Cross was operating 254 shelters for 41,013 people and serving more than 63,000 meals a day.35 According to the Red Cross’ periodic reporting documentation, these numbers continued to grow. The largest number of meals served in a day occurred on September 4, when nearly 946,000 meals were provided.36 Figure 2 shows the Red Cross daily statistics for the number of shelters in operation, their population, and the number of meals served per day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Shelters</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of Meals</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>DOSR #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>3,884</td>
<td>DOSR #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>DOSR #6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>37,091</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>DOSR #9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 30</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>41,013</td>
<td>63,175</td>
<td>DOSR #11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 31</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>52,719</td>
<td>114,413</td>
<td>DOSR #12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>76,453</td>
<td>170,465</td>
<td>DOSR #14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>94,308</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>DOSR #17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>96,178</td>
<td>137,588</td>
<td>DOSR #18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 4</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>106,970</td>
<td>945,886</td>
<td>DOSR #20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 5</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>124,617</td>
<td>618,938</td>
<td>DOSR #22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>125,941</td>
<td>485,983</td>
<td>DOSR #24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 7</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>143,712</td>
<td>669,271</td>
<td>DOSR #26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 8</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>138,294</td>
<td>683,826</td>
<td>DOSR #28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>101,381</td>
<td>534,864</td>
<td>DOSR #30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>97,892</td>
<td>501,318</td>
<td>DOSR #32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>86,883</td>
<td>491,751</td>
<td>DOSR #34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>74,890</td>
<td>444,793</td>
<td>DOSR #36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>62,931</td>
<td>359,816</td>
<td>DOSR #38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Red Cross

Figure 3 shows the daily shelter population for Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and a fourth category with the shelter population in all other states.

**Figure 3:**

**Daily Shelter Population By State**

The Red Cross was encouraged by its pre-landfall staging operation, deeming it largely a success.37 That being said, the unprecedented devastation of Katrina, both in terms of property damage and number of
individuals affected, was much larger than the Red Cross was equipped to handle. Its logistics system was not sophisticated enough – especially with regard to food service. Many problems were experienced in obtaining enough food to satisfy client needs. Many of the food orders processed through FEMA were either inexplicably canceled or never satisfied. On follow-up, it was discovered that many of the orders placed by the Red Cross with FEMA were not reflected in FEMA’s systems. The logistics system was not sophisticated enough to handle the volume Katrina triggered.

The Red Cross experienced substantial communication issues with FEMA. The Red Cross relied on FEMA to provide food, fuel, mobile refrigeration equipment, portable toilets, and many other primary necessities to operate its shelters. Ordinarily these needs are requested by the Red Cross through the respective states. As Katrina gathered force the Red Cross compiled requests for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama among other states. These requests reflected predicted need levels for food, MREs, water, fuel, and other indispensable commodities. In Mississippi, the Red Cross requests were cut substantially by FEMA middle management. Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President of Preparedness and Response told Select Committee staff that the upper management of FEMA, including Dan Craig, the Director of the Recovery Division was responsive to Red Cross needs, but the middle level personnel, who were described as “FEMA’s mushy middle” proved to be unnecessarily meddlesome. FEMA’s middle ranks, according to Becker, canceled orders, lost orders and were the root cause of many of the problems experienced in the field. MREs were ordered and were to be used to feed people during the period before the feeding kitchens were up and running. These MREs were canceled by FEMA under the logic that the Red Cross had also ordered food for the kitchens.

The master log of official requests made by the Red Cross to FEMA under ESF #6 further reveals the ineffective logistics system. The official requests, called Action Request Forms (ARFs), are processed through the FEMA logistics system. A total of 99 ARFs were submitted to FEMA by the Red Cross. Red Cross resource requests are processed through the five emergency coordination centers – the NRCC at FEMA headquarters (18 ARFs), the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) for FEMA Region IV in Atlanta, Georgia (22 ARFs), the RRCC for FEMA Region VI in Denton, Texas (9 ARFs), the Joint Field Office (JFO) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (30 ARFs), the JFO in Jackson, Mississippi (13 ARFs), and the JFO in Austin, Texas (7 ARFs).

Given the enormous nature of the Katrina relief effort, and the important role the Red Cross plays in the NRP, 99 requests is not an extraordinarily large number. FEMA, however, could not handle these requests. Only 22 of the 99 ARFs were deemed “Received” by the Red Cross, and 8 were canceled or withdrawn.

A careful review of the master log suggests that the logistics system did not work. Figure 4 is a table identifying logistics problems.

Figure 4: Official Requests By The Red Cross to FEMA (selected).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Date Requested</th>
<th>Resources Ordered</th>
<th>What Occurred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NRCC</td>
<td>August 30</td>
<td>700,000 MREs for AL and MS</td>
<td>Received only 400,000 and not until September 8 did 600,000 additional MREs arrive for MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRCC</td>
<td>September 1</td>
<td>300,000 MREs for LA</td>
<td>Order canceled, then un-canceled. Product delivered on October 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRCC</td>
<td>September 10</td>
<td>126 5-person security teams needed (630 total) for sites in MS</td>
<td>No security received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg. IV</td>
<td>September 1-3</td>
<td>13 orders for “Kitchen Support,” which includes refrigerator, propane, diesel, hand washing stations, porta potties, water buffalo, among other kitchen items.</td>
<td>Received, 10-14 days after request was approved. RC forced to purchase items independently to ensure continuous feeding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the first 48 hours. If expanded to 72 hours, FEMA should be able to assist the Red Cross at the national level in restocking the pipeline.51

The Red Cross was challenged by the sometimes disorganized manner in which shelters were established

While the Red Cross has an established role in operating shelters, many of the local governments set up ad hoc shelters without notifying the Red Cross. In other cases, the Red Cross was denied access to shelters.

The Red Cross has been criticized in both Mississippi and Louisiana for a variety of reasons, from excessive levels of bureaucracy to lack of sufficient shelters and food.52 Becker said the root cause of many problems centered on substantial incongruities between the state and local political leadership on one hand and state emergency management personnel on the other.53 Far too often state emergency management personnel and local political leadership were not aligned.54 The Red Cross would receive one set of directions from the state and another from the locals.55 Becker said, however, with independently elected sheriffs, mayors, and county and parish commissioners, this is not an easily avoidable problem.56 Many complaints lodged at the Red Cross reflected their policy of not operating shelters in danger zones.57 Local political leadership often feels compelled to open shelters in their locales even when the entire county or parish is subject to a mandatory evacuation order.58 The Red Cross has trouble servicing these shelters, both from an access perspective (the roads are sometimes inaccessible) and from an identification perspective (sometimes nobody tells the Red Cross where the shelters are).59

The Mississippi National Guard had numerous issues with the Red Cross. The primary complaint was the Red Cross’ failure to establish a formal operations section in accordance with the National Incident Management System combined with the fact that the Red Cross is staffed almost exclusively by volunteers. According to Major General Harold Cross, the Mississippi Adjutant General:

While well intentioned, the volunteers never had a good grasp on security requirements for financial assistance distribution operations. On numerous instances, the ARC volunteers would simply find a vacant parking area and commence voucher distribution operations. Immediately, crowds would gather and would overwhelm the distribution site. The ARC would then call on the Guard for assistance. Repeated attempts were made to reinforce the need for prior coordination for site security. It was not until mid-September that the ARC started coordinating these operations. Also, the ARC had volunteers who attempted to coordinate directly with subordinate Guard units for shelter and distribution site security. The Forward EOC operations officer met with ARC representatives on numerous occasions to define the requirements for security taskings. The ARC rarely adhered to these requirements. Consequently, the National Guard stayed in a reactive mode concerning security of distribution sites and shelters and hundreds of man hours were wasted. For future events, if the ARC would position a senior operations representative in the Forward Emergency Operations Center, many of the security issues would be resolved. This senior person should not rotate every few days.60

Cross also recommended the integration of NGO’s like the Red Cross, into the Incident Command System.

GAO has testified the Red Cross did not provide relief in certain hard-to-reach areas because of safety policies.61 Similarly, media reports indicate the Red Cross was slow to arrive in some small rural towns.62 The Mississippi town of Pearlington, population 1,684, received no Red Cross support for weeks.63 A Florida state disaster team set up a shelter, but the Red Cross said it was unsafe and declined to run it.64 In Pearlington, the Red Cross declined to operate one shelter because it lacked a dehumidifier.65

Far too many shelters were unknown to the Red Cross, making it difficult for it to deploy resources.66 Many of these shelters were within the danger or surge zones, including the Superdome. The Red Cross does not service these “shelters of last resort,” as it would put its volunteers in harm’s way.67 After Katrina passed, the Red Cross did attempt to deliver provisions to the Superdome, but was denied access.68 “The Homeland Security Department has requested and continues to request that the American Red Cross not come back into New Orleans. Right now access
The Red Cross does not service these “shelters of last resort,” as it would put its volunteers in harm’s way.

is controlled by the National Guard and local authorities.

We cannot get into New Orleans against their orders,” Renita Hosler, a Red Cross spokesperson, told The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.69

The Red Cross encountered many access problems where local law enforcement would not permit entry to establish a shelter.70 The Select Committee asked the Red Cross for an accounting of the shelters utilized as compared to the pre-approved shelter list,71 and for the reasons behind any differences. The Red Cross provided the Select Committee with a complete list of every shelter in operation between the dates of August 25 and September 30,72 but will not provide a specific listing explaining why certain pre-approved shelters were not used. Lori Polacheck, of the Red Cross general counsel’s office said this was too difficult an undertaking.73

The Red Cross was challenged by the magnitude and chaos of the evacuation of people before landfall and after the flooding in New Orleans. People were moved, either by government agencies or on their own initiatives, all over the country in a haphazard way, making it difficult for the Red Cross to track and care for the needs of evacuees.

From the Red Cross’ perspective, the transportation of evacuees by FEMA was disorganized and uncoordinated. As a primary provider in the feeding and sheltering of the displaced, the Red Cross needed advance notice of how many people it would be asked to serve. Many problems were reported in this area. The information communicated to the Red Cross by FEMA was unreliable. There appeared to be no correlation between the information communicated by FEMA and what actually happened.74 Howe noted that often airplanes of evacuees would arrive without any warning. Conversely, it seemed to Howe, whenever warnings of arrivals were communicated, the arrivals often failed to materialize.75

This has been chronicled in the press. The San Jose Mercury News reported on September 8 that a plan to send 1,000 evacuees to California had been put on hold.76 The Red Cross, Catholic Charities, and the city of San Francisco had spent days readying a shelter at St. Mary’s Cathedral.77 On September 11 The Columbus Dispatch reported a similar story; Columbus, Cleveland and Cincinnati were set to take 1,000 evacuees on September 8, but the in-bound flights were canceled by FEMA.78 Evacuees were scheduled by FEMA to be transported to Ohio. Fred Strathman, a spokesman for the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, indicated to the newspaper that the plan to send evacuees to Ohio was delayed twice by FEMA and then apparently canceled.79

A spokesman for the Red Cross of Greater Columbus, Lynn Cook said, “Are we a little tired of pumping things up and taking them back down? Yeah.”80 Similarly, The Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky reported that on September 13, FEMA suspended evacuation flights due to the unwillingness of evacuees to relocate so far from the Gulf coast.81 According to the newspaper, on September 5, federal officials told Louisville that 500 evacuees would be arriving at any time.82 The Red Cross had worked to prepare a shelter and had stockpiled food and clothing.83 All for nothing.

More than any other hurricane, Katrina has produced a large volume of seemingly permanent evacuees. The Red Cross is now finding that a large number of evacuees are not going home.84

The Red Cross has not escaped substantial public criticism

The Red Cross has not escaped substantial criticism.85 The most obvious casualty of this criticism came on December 13, when its president, Marsha Evans, announced her resignation.86 According to press accounts, even Evans acknowledged the organization’s response to Katrina and Rita had been uneven, “eclips[ing] even our direst, worst-case scenarios.”

At a December 13 hearing conducted by the House Committee on Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee to review the response by charities to Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana Representative Jim McCrery was extremely critical of the Red Cross.

Hurricane Katrina, and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, displaced roughly one million
people from their homes in Southeast Louisiana. Tens of thousands of evacuees sought shelter in my district. It was clear from the beginning that the Red Cross simply did not have the sheltering capacity to meet immediate needs. Small independent shelters began popping up by the dozens across Northwest Louisiana. At the peak, there were over forty shelters in my district, while fewer than ten of those were operated by the Red Cross. Red Cross had serious trouble operating at least three of the larger shelters in my district: Hirsch Coliseum in Shreveport, LA, CenturyTel Center in Bossier City, LA, and the Health and Physical Educational Building at Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, LA. Several days after Katrina’s landfall, the American Red Cross asked a network of local churches, led by the First Assembly of God, to take over the Red Cross Shelter at Hirsch Coliseum in Shreveport, LA. Steve Beyer, an Associate Pastor with one of the churches, agreed to manage the shelter until a replacement Red Cross manager could be found. No one replaced him. Mr. Beyer operated the Hirsch Coliseum shelter, where 6,200 people came through its doors, with only two Red Cross volunteers for the first two weeks. The Red Cross asked church volunteers to wear Red Cross shirts, I suppose to give the appearance that Red Cross was operating the shelter.

The CenturyTel Center in Bossier City, LA, opened as an independent shelter one week after the storm in response to overwhelming need for additional sheltering capacity. CenturyTel operated on the backs of local government and community organizations while it waited for certification from the American Red Cross. Even after the American Red Cross moved in, local charities provided all of the food for seven days until Red Cross could secure food.…

The American Red Cross shelter at Northwestern State University was managed by the City of Natchitoches and the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s Department in conjunction with the University. Dr. Bill Dickens, the shelter’s manager, had one Red Cross volunteer to help service the 1,000 evacuees housed each night at the site for the first 10 days following the storm. I should note that it took seven days for this shelter to receive any of the $60,000 in new bedding that was donated to the local Red Cross chapter by General Motors. The bedding sat unused in a Red Cross facility seventy miles away in Shreveport, LA, despite the fact that some evacuees in Natchitoches were sleeping on the floor. The failure to get these resources to the shelter in a timely fashion represents an inexcusable breakdown in communication and coordination within the Red Cross.

While the Red Cross could barely manage its own network of shelters, the organization offered little assistance to struggling independent shelters. Dennis Butcher, the Office of Emergency Preparedness Director for Claiborne Parish, was instructed by the Red Cross to fend for himself. Mr. Butcher operated an independent shelter of 1,200 evacuees for over a month without any assistance from the Red Cross. I wish Mr. Butcher’s experience was unique, but the Red Cross also refused requests for assistance from the Office of Emergency Preparedness Directors for Claiborne, Sabine, Vernon and Webster Parishes. I also spoke with OEP and other officials on the Mississippi Gulf Coast who experienced similar treatment from the Red Cross.89

But Katrina was bigger than the Red Cross

The response to Hurricane Katrina has been more complex than any previous Red Cross-involved disaster. The string of 2004 hurricanes in Florida was the previous benchmark, when the Red Cross provided financial assistance to 73,000 families. During Katrina, the number is up to 1.2 million families. In 2004 it provided 519,000 nights of shelter. During Katrina the figure currently stands at 3.42 million. The 2004 hurricanes were attended to by 35,000 volunteers; Katrina required 220,000 volunteers.90 The total estimated expenditures by the Red Cross for Katrina-related aid is in excess of $2 billion.

Figure 5 compares Katrina and Rita to Hurricane Season 2004.91
This $2 billion operation must be contrasted with the Red Cross’ overall financial model. According to its 2004 Annual Report, its operating revenues were just over $3 billion. In 2004, its stated operating expenses for domestic disaster services was $261 million. It is unrealistic to expect any charitable relief organization to instantaneously pivot in response to the might inflicted by Katrina. As Katrina was too large for the emergency management professionals in the state of Louisiana, the city of New Orleans, and FEMA, it was as well for the Red Cross. The Red Cross readily agrees it did not have a presence everywhere throughout the affected region. The primary mission of the Red Cross is to provide food, clothing, and shelter to victims of disasters. Given its size, there are misconceptions about its capabilities. The Red Cross does not provide transportation, does not get involved with search and rescue operations, does not participate in evacuations, and does not provide medical care (other than providing assistance with minor medical issues).

In testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, the Red Cross’ Becker said, “we fell short of being universally present everywhere there was a need.” He continued, “Given the number of people in need, our response was geared toward places that we knew we could get to immediately and places where we knew people were congregated. It was our goal to reach the greatest number of people with the most possible speed.”

As a leading provider of food and shelter to those affected by Katrina, the Red Cross is often asked why it was not active within New Orleans, whether it be on the ground, co-located with the search and rescue teams, or in the shelters of last resort such as the Convention Center and the Superdome. Becker addressed this in his testimony:

There were a number of questions regarding why we did not re-enter the City of New Orleans. The American Red Cross of Southeast Louisiana, located in the City of New Orleans, heeded the evacuation order called for by local authorities. The chapter relocated to the town of Covington, located on the north side of Lake Pontchartrain. Our service delivery in New Orleans differed from that provided to other affected areas in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Under the Louisiana State Plan, if a Category 3 or higher storm is headed for Louisiana, 23 parishes, including Orleans Parish, are to begin an evacuation inland. The inland parishes, in cooperation with state agencies and the American Red Cross, are to shelter evacuees from “Risk Area Parishes,” as there are no shelter sites that meet hurricane safety criteria within Orleans Parish. In fact, it has been the policy of the Red Cross that there are no safe areas south of the I-10/I-12 corridor for a large scale hurricane. The Louisiana Plan, which makes no reference to the Red Cross operating shelters within the city, enumerates eight distinct shelter types, plus what is described as the “Refuge of Last Resort.” The Convention Center and the Superdome served as refuges of last resort. Under state plans, these facilities are to open when local authorities terminate an evacuation due to unsafe driving conditions. These facilities are not operated by the Red Cross. In practice, after the threat has passed, the Red Cross at times staffs shelters of last resort, providing services to people. We do not establish

### Figure 5: Hurricane Season 2004 v. Katrina and Rita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hurricane Season 2004</th>
<th>Katrina and Rita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter Nights</td>
<td>519,000</td>
<td>3.42 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Families Provided</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>1.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals and Snacks Provided</td>
<td>Close to 16.5 million</td>
<td>More than 52.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Spent</td>
<td>$130 million</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
</tr>
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</table>
shelters in facilities that do not meet our criteria for safety during landfall.

Consistent with State and local plans, and our practice in previous disasters, we were asked by state and federal officials not to enter New Orleans. While we were in constant communication with local and state authorities, it was not deemed safe for Red Cross personnel to re-enter the city of New Orleans. The Red Cross does not place our client evacuees, staff, volunteers, or resources in harm’s way. It is our practice to heed evacuation orders and assist those in need of shelter outside of high-risk areas.

Additionally, it was the goal of local and state officials to fully evacuate the city of New Orleans after the storm passed. We were instructed by authorities that, in addition to issues of safety, if the Red Cross provided services to survivors within New Orleans, it would discourage people from heeding evacuation orders. At the direction of public officials, we entered New Orleans in a coordinated fashion to provide services at the earliest possible time.

This was a difficult scenario for the Red Cross. Eighty percent of our local Red Cross staff in the Southeast Louisiana Chapter lost their homes to Katrina, yet while they themselves were victims, they desperately wanted to provide support to their neighbors in need, and to this day they continue to do so. We are still engaged in active operations in the city.

Important assistance was provided by the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, the United Way, and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

As the only charitable organization with primary responsibility under the NRP, the Red Cross received a lot of Select Committee attention. Beyond the Red Cross, however, there was a vast network of charities that contributed meaningfully to the response efforts in the Gulf coast area. The important contributions of organizations such as the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities USA, the United Way, and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) merit attention.

Salvation Army

The Salvation Army has been at the site of most major natural disasters in America for more than a century. It has developed areas of expertise in disaster response: mass feeding to survivors and emergency responders immediately after a disaster has occurred; sheltering those affected while tending to their spiritual and emotional needs; and then, the continuation of social service assistance to ensure the survivors have the means to move back into some semblance of the routine known before the disaster struck.

In responding to those affected by Hurricane Katrina, the Salvation Army staged personnel and equipment in the states adjacent to the primary strike zone. Major Todd Hawks of the Salvation Army, summarized some of the key contributions the Salvation Army made to immediate response efforts:

- Loaded meals on 72 mobile canteens, each capable of providing 5,000 hot meals per day, and two 54-foot mobile kitchens, each capable of providing 20,000 hot meals per day. We intended to dispatch these mobile feeding units into those geographic areas determined by FEMA to be the hardest hit, and to dispatch additional units as needed.
- Mobilized 200 officers, employees, and volunteers to man these mobile kitchens.
- Prepared to dispatch portable shower units, trucks transformed into 1-stop shops called comfort stations, and emergency response command stations for officers to direct the response efforts.
In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the Salvation Army facilitated mass feeding, moving mobile feeding units into New Orleans, Biloxi, Gulfport, Mobile and numerous other affected communities within hours after the storm had passed. In total the number of mobile canteens deployed numbered 178 and the number of field kitchens reached 11. Since Katrina struck, the Salvation Army has served more than 5 million hot meals and more than 7 million sandwiches and snacks to survivors and first responders. Although not a primary activity for the Salvation Army, at its highest point, it operated 225 shelters for more than 31,000 people.

Catholic Charities

Catholic Charities USA is the membership association of one of the nation’s largest social service networks. Catholic Charities agencies provide vital social services to people in need, regardless of their religious, social, or economic backgrounds. As of January 6, 2006, Catholic Charities had allocated more than $56 million to over 60 local Catholic Charities and other Catholic organizations responding to the needs of families affected by the Gulf coast hurricanes. In total, Catholic Charities USA has raised $137 million to assist the network’s largest disaster response effort in its history. Dozens of Catholic Charities agencies and Catholic organizations have each received disaster relief grants from Catholic Charities USA, ranging from $6,000 to $25 million. Across the nation, more than 80 local Catholic Charities are working to meet the needs of hurricane victims. Relief efforts have included: providing victims with food, financial aid, clothing, shelter, gas and retail store cards, and household goods; helping with medical and prescription needs; offering clean up assistance; helping victims work with FEMA and other groups; and providing crisis counseling, case management, transportation, job placement, and temporary and long-term housing.

United Way

United Way of America is the national organization that provides leadership to approximately 1,350 community-based United Way organizations. Each is independent, separately incorporated, and governed by local volunteers. As of December 15, 2005, the United Way of America has raised $45 million to support hurricane response and recovery efforts. Through its Hurricane Response and Recovery Fund, the United Way has focused its efforts on restoring the abilities of social service agencies in the Gulf coast region. Many human service organizations in the Gulf coast states suffered tremendous damage to their facilities, which severely limited their ability to provide services to those in need. United Ways throughout the affected areas have worked with partner agencies to ensure services such as emergency assistance, food, clothing, housing and transportation are available to those in need.

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)

NVOAD is a national charity umbrella organization composed of approximately 40 charities that provide services following disasters. As a designated support agency under ESF #6, NVOAD is responsible for sharing information with its member organizations regarding the severity of the disaster, needs identified, and actions taken to address these needs. NVOAD coordinates planning efforts by many voluntary organizations responding to disaster. Member organizations provide a more effective and efficient service to the community in need by agreeing to share information and combine resources. This cooperation has proven to be an effective way for a multitude of organizations to work together in during an emergency. During the immediate response to Katrina, NVOAD organized daily conference calls with FEMA and other federal government representatives and its member
organizations operating in the Gulf coast region.\textsuperscript{123} NVOAD also invited nonmember charitable organizations that were providing relief to hurricane victims to participate in these calls, which sometimes included more than 40 organizations at once. During these calls, both the federal government and charities were able to provide information and answer questions about services provided, needs identified, and the organizations’ abilities to meet these needs.\textsuperscript{124}

Conclusion

Since August 29, charitable donations to Katrina relief have exceeded $3 billion. Two-thirds of this amount has been raised by the Red Cross. With its $2 billion relief effort, the Red Cross has been able to fulfill many of its obligations under the National Response Plan. Katrina, however, overwhelmed the Red Cross. The Red Cross, like FEMA, did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf coast victims. Among other challenges, the Red Cross was required to grapple with the sometimes disorganized manner in which shelters were established. While it has a well-defined role in operating shelters, many of the local governments set up ad hoc shelters without notifying Red Cross officials. In some cases, the Red Cross was denied access to shelters. Despite falling short of being universally present everywhere there was a need, the Red Cross and numerous other charitable organizations performed admirably and heroically in reaching the greatest number of people with impressive speed. ■
The Select Comm. reviewed planning documentation from individual Red Cross chapters. Disaster Response Plans were submitted from the following Red Cross chapters: Southeastern Louisiana (June 2005), St. Bernard Parish Chapter (undated), Northwest Louisiana Chapter (June 2005), Northeast Louisiana Chapter (June 2005), Central Louisiana Chapter (Apr. 2002), South Central Mississippi Chapter (Sept. 2004), Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter (Sept. 2005), Southeast Mississippi Chapter (Feb. 2003), and Alabama Gulf Coast Chapter (Jan. 1997). Statewide plans were received from the Red Cross in Alabama and Mississippi. The Red Cross is now organized into eight Service Areas, rather than by state. The state plans obtained by the Select Comm. from Alabama and Mississippi are now technically obsolete.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE


Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview.


Hearing to Review the Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina Before Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (Dec. 13, 2005) (statement of Major Todd Hawks, Public Affairs Secretary and Associate National Community Relations and Development Secretary, Salvation Army of America) [hereinafter Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Todd Hawks)].


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.


Center on Philanthropy – Donations; Center on Philanthropy – Spreadsheet.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

“Order is indeed the dream of man, but chaos, which is only another word for dumb, blind, witless chance, is still the law of nature.”

WALLACE STEGNER

*Crossing to Safety*

“Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.”

FRANCIS BACON
The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina should disturb all Americans. While the Select Committee believes all people involved, at all levels of government, were trying their best to save lives and ease suffering, their best just wasn’t good enough.

In this report we have tried to tell the story of the inadequate preparation and response. We cover a lot of territory – from evacuations to medical care, communications to contracting. We hope our findings will prompt the changes needed to make all levels of government better prepared and better able to respond the next time.

The resolution that created the Select Committee charged us with compiling findings, not recommendations. But in reality that’s a distinction without a difference. Moving from our findings to legislative, organizational, and policy changes need not be a long or difficult journey.

We are left scratching our heads at the range of inefficiency and ineffectiveness that characterized government behavior right before and after this storm. But passivity did the most damage. The failure of initiative cost lives, prolonged suffering, and left all Americans justifiably concerned our government is no better prepared to protect its people than it was before 9/11, even if we are.

How can we set up a system to protect against passivity? Why do we repeatedly seem out of synch during disasters? Why do we continually seem to be one disaster behind?

We have not found every fact nor contemplated all successes and failures. What we have done over four months is intensely focus on a three-week period, uncovering a multitude of problems. We have learned more than enough to instruct those who will now have to craft and execute changes for the future.

We leave it to readers to determine whether we have done a fair and thorough job, and whether we identified and supported findings in a way that will foster change. Some predicted we would place disproportionate blame on one person or another, or that we would give some others a pass. We hope it is clear we have done neither.

We have not sought to assign individual blame, though it is clear in our report that some were not up to the challenge that was Katrina. Rather, we have tried to tell the story of government’s preparation for and response to a massive storm, and identify lessons learned.

Our interaction with the White House illustrates this point. Some insist the White House’s failure to provide, for example, e-mails to and from the White House Chief of Staff means we have insufficient information to determine why government failed. That view exalts political curiosity over the practical realities of a serious investigation.

While our dealings with the White House proved frustrating and difficult, we ended up with more than enough information to determine what went wrong there, to form a picture of a White House that, like many entities, was overcome by the fog of war. There is a big difference between having enough information to find institutional fault, which we do, and having information to assign individual blame, which, in the case of the White House, in large part we do not.

It’s the former that’s important if the goal is to be better prepared the next time. This was not about some individual’s failure of initiative. It was about organizational and societal failures of initiative. There was more than enough failure to go around:

- Tardy and ineffective execution of the National Response Plan.
- A Catastrophic Incident Annex that was never invoked, and doubt that it would have done the job anyway.
- A perplexing inability to learn from Hurricane Pam and other exercises.
- Levees not built to withstand the most severe hurricanes.
- An incomplete evacuation that led to deaths and tremendous suffering.
- A complete breakdown in communications that paralyzed command and control and made situational awareness murky at best.
- The failure of state and local officials to maintain law and order.
- Haphazard and incomplete emergency shelter and housing plans.
- An overwhelmed FEMA logistics and contracting system that could not support the effective provision of urgently needed supplies.
The Select Committee encountered shortcomings and challenges even among those response elements that went relatively well and saved many lives. The military performed an invaluable role once forces were deployed, but encountered coordination problems with FEMA, the National Guard, and state officials. State-to-state emergency aid compacts were critical in restoring law and order and accelerating relief supplies, but too many people remain unfamiliar with the process. Contributions from charitable groups were enormously helpful, but they too were overwhelmed by the size of the storm.

Many of our findings are mixed in nature. Evacuations of general populations, for example, went relatively well in all three states. But declarations of mandatory evacuations in metropolitan New Orleans came late or not at all, and that, coupled with the decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining population prolonged suffering. We saw heroic examples of medical care and patient needs being met under dire circumstances. But too often the deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not proactive.

The Select Committee acknowledges it was often torn between sympathy and incredulity, compassion and criticism. On the one hand, we understood Katrina was so big and so devastating that death and chaos were inevitable. We understood that top federal, state, and local officials overlooked some steps and some needs in the hours and days after landfall because they were focused on saving lives. But on the other hand, a dispassionate review made it clear that even an extraordinary lack of situational awareness could not excuse many of the shortcomings and organizational inaction evident in the documents and communications the Select Committee reviewed.

Leadership requires decisions to be made even when based on flawed and incomplete information. Too often during the immediate response to Katrina, sparse or conflicting information was used as an excuse for inaction rather than an imperative to step in and fill an obvious vacuum. Information passed through the maze of departmental operations centers and ironically-named “coordinating” committees, losing timeliness and relevance as it was massaged and interpreted for internal audiences.

As a result, leaders became detached from the changing minute-to-minute realities of Katrina. Information translated into pre-cast bureaucratic jargon put more than geographic distance between Washington and the Gulf coast. Summaries and situation reports describing the gross totals of relief supplies directed to affected areas did not say when or how or to whom those desperately needed supplies would be delivered. And apparently no one asked.

Communications aren’t a problem when you’re only talking to yourself.

The Select Committee believes too many leaders failed to lead. Top aides failed as well, primarily in mis-prioritizing their bosses’ attention and action. Critical time was wasted on issues of no importance to disaster response, such as winning the blame game, waging a public relations battle, or debating the advantages of wardrobe choices.

We have spared our readers a rehashing of unflattering e-mails involving Michael Brown and Governor Blanco and others, as they have been given more than enough attention by the media. We will pause only briefly here to urge future responders to make people, not politics, their priority.

We further urge public officials confronting the next Katrina to remember disaster response must be based on knowledge, not rumors. Government at all levels lost credibility due to inaccurate or unsubstantiated public statements made by officials regarding law and order, levee breaches, and overall response efforts.

The media must share some of the blame here. The Select Committee agrees the media can and should help serve as the public’s “first informer” after disasters. In the 21st century, Americans depend on timely and accurate reporting, especially during times of crisis. But it’s clear accurate reporting was among Katrina’s many victims. If anyone rioted, it was the media. Many stories of rape, murder, and general lawlessness were at best unsubstantiated, at worst simply false. And that’s too bad, because this storm needed no exaggeration.

As discussed in our report, widely-distributed uncorroborated rumors caused resources to be deployed, and important time and energy wasted, chasing down the imaginary. Already traumatized people in the Superdome and elsewhere, listening to their transistor radios, were further panicked.

“The sensational accounts delayed rescue and evacuation efforts already hampered by poor planning and a lack of coordination among local, state, and federal
agencies. People rushing to the Gulf coast to fly rescue helicopters or to distribute food, water and other aid steel themselves for battle. In communities near and far, the seeds were planted that the victims of Katrina should be kept away, or at least handled with extreme caution," the Washington Post reported on October 5.  

Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum told the Select Committee on October 27, "We focused assets and resources based on situational awareness provided to us by the media, frankly. And the media failed in their responsibility to get it right. …we sent forces and capabilities to places that didn’t need to go there in numbers that were far in excess of what was required, because they kept running the same B roll over and over….and the impression to us that were watching it was that the condition did not change. But the conditions were continually changing."  

E-mails obtained by the Select Committee reinforce the conclusion that top military officials were relying on news reports for information – information used to plan and deploy resources.  

The Select Committee does not mean to suggest the media is solely responsible for responders’ lack of situational awareness, or the destruction of communications infrastructure that thrust television into the role of first informer for the military as well as the general public. Nor is the media solely responsible for reporting comments from sources they believed to be credible – especially top officials.  

The Select Committee does, however, believe such circumstances make accurate reporting, especially in the period immediately after the storm, all the more important. Skepticism and fact-checking are easier when the sea is calm, but more vital when it is not.  

As with so many other failures related to Katrina, what’s most vexing is that emergency managers should have known such problems would arise among the chaos. Dr. Kathleen Tierney, head of the University of Colorado-Boulder Natural Hazards Center, told Select Committee staff that misleading or completely false media reports should have been among the most foreseeable elements of Katrina. “It’s a well-documented element of disaster response,” she said. “What you do has to be based on knowledge, not rumor, and you’re going to be faced with a lot of rumors.”  

Benigno Aguirre, sociology professor at the University of Delaware Disaster Research Center, told the Philadelphia Inquirer, “It’s discouraging for those who spend their lives studying disaster behavior that journalists so often get it wrong.”  

Former FEMA Director Michael Brown told the Select Committee one of his biggest failures was failing to properly utilize the media as first informer.  

“I failed initially to set up a series of regular briefings to the media about what FEMA was doing throughout the Gulf coast region,” Brown said at the Select Committee’s September 27 hearing. “Instead, I became tied to the news shows, going on the news shows early in the morning and late at night, and that was just a mistake. We should have been feeding that information to the press…in the manner and time that we wanted to, instead of letting the press drive us.”  

Finally, a word about public communications. Both the message and the messengers were ineffective before and after Katrina. Messages to the public were uncoordinated and often confusing, leaving important questions unanswered. Federal, state, and local officials did not have a unified strategy for communicating with the public.  

Risk communication is a well-researched field of study. There are accepted core principles for successfully communicating risks to the public. Information about threats should be consistent, accurate, clear, and provided repeatedly through multiple methods. It should be timely. It should be specific about the potential threat. It needs to get to people regardless of their level of access to information.  

The Select Committee heard loud and clear from Gulf coast residents that the dangers of the coming hurricane could have been presented in a more effective manner, an issue which also carried racial and socioeconomic implications. If people don’t hear a message from someone they trust, they will be skeptical.  

Doreen Keeler, a New Orleans resident who evacuated before Mayor Nagin called for a mandatory evacuation, told the Select Committee local officials should have called for mandatory evacuations earlier, noting how difficult it was to convince the elderly residents of New Orleans to leave. “If a mandatory evacuation would have been called earlier,” she said, “it would have been easier to move seniors out of the area and many lives would have been saved. It took me almost 24 hours to get my in-laws to leave. Others tell the same story. The severity of the storm was not stressed by elected officials.”
The relevant “elected officials,” we are sure, would contest that. In fact they did, in testimony before the Select Committee. But it’s the public perception of what was stressed that’s important here. The failure of initiative was also a failure of empathy, a myopia to the need to reach more people on their own terms.

Four and half years after 9/11, Americans deserve more than the state of nature after disaster strikes. With this report we have tried to identify where and why chaos ensued, so that even a storm the size of Katrina can be met with more order, more urgency, more coordination, and more initiative.

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3 See e.g., E-mail correspondence from 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain to Lt. General Russell Honoré (Aug. 29, 2005).
4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Kathleen J. Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, U. of Colorado at Boulder (Oct. 6, 2005).
5 Beth Gillin, Katrina Spawned rumors; media ran with them, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 28, 2005, at A2.
8 Id.