Enemy in the Wire(less): T&E Perspectives on Wireless Security

Brief for the Naval Postgraduate School Wireless Technology Forum



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David J. Aland 19 July 2011

US v. Ardolf

- Barry Ardolf hacks his neighbor's WEP-protected wireless home network in retaliation for police complaint
 - "Certified Ethical Hacker", Internet technician for MedTronic
 - Downloads and uses "AirCrack" to reduce WiFi passwords
 - Creates fake accounts tied to victim identity, social network sites
 - Sends porn, nasty emails, and death threats against VP Biden in his victim's name with dire results for victim
 - NOT caught by Secret Service or police
 - Caught by a private security company

GUILTY in Federal Court

- 18 years in prison
- no computer use until released
- 20 years probabtion after release.



Hackers v. Wireless

Thomas Roth, University of Köln, Germany

- Rents space on the Amazon Elastic Computer Cloud for \$0.28/min
- Generates 400,000 brute-force passwords per second
- Breaks WEPs, averaging 6 min (approximate cost = \$1.68 / network)

CryptoCard, UK

- Sends testers to coffeeshops to set up bogus WiFi hotspots
- Captures an average of 350 usernames/passwords per hour

Navy Research Lab, Washington DC

- During BETA test of wireless discovery tool (with GPS/Google Maps), discovers internet thieves stealing wireless cash register data
- News of the World, UK
 - Hacks cell phones of celebs, politicians, 9/11 victims

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Exercise IA Assessments

DoD conducts IA assessments during major exercises with the support of the operational test agencies and the Information Warfare Centers

- ATEC, 688TES, COMOPTEVFOR, MCOTEA, JITC
- 1IOC, 24AF, 10TH FLT, MCNOSCC, NSA

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- `20-25 exercises per year at COCOMs and Services
- Results are aggregated and analyzed for enterprise level issues and recommendations
- "Smoking Gun" issues are sent as formal findings to cognizant Service or Agency at the 3-star level
- Annual trends are reported to DoD and Congress

Wireless and Mobile Tools

- Exercise assessments show three major issues with operational proliferation of common wireless/mobile tools:
 - Physical accountability and TEMPEST controls
 - · Loss of physical control over a device loaded with sensitive data
 - Loss of CAC card and device credentials
 - Signal monitoring (quantity and quality)
 - Environmental Masking of effects and vulnerabilities
 - Only the most austere environments are wireless-free
 - Urban combat environments are wireless-dense
 - Stupid human tricks
 - Storing and transmitting PII or sensitive data
 - "Pretending" the device is secure
 - Cross-infection techniques



To Secure or Not To Secure

- The majority of wireless/mobile devices in use in operational environments are not secure or meant to be
- Secured wireless devices like SME-PED are rare
- Therefore ... the principal security problem is NOT:
 - Type I or Type II encryption
 - Multi-Level Security

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- Suite B compliance and effectiveness
- The principal security problem is that unsecured wireless/mobile devices are <u>cheap</u>, <u>ubiquitous</u>, and <u>highly functional</u>, and often misused

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Technology is not the whole answer...

- Better device security is a MUST
 - Wireless devices will not just "go away" because they are tough to secure.
- <u>Functional</u> standards are needed as badly as technical standards
 - The first device to market may be attractive, but the competitor catch-ups are usually better provisioned
 - The device maker must have an incentive to build in safeguards that can be re-purposed for specialized security environments
 - Device management cannot be "iSourced" out or untouchable
 - An operational doctrine of Perishability should be applied to their use: handle data only appropriate to that level of operations, and only handle perishable data on portable devices

Conclusion

- Wireless mobile devices are here to stay (at least until we invent something even better)
- Wireless mobile devices provide an undeniable tactical advantage to combat forces as well as enviable convenience to senior decision makers
- Wireless mobile devices provide an almost indefensible vulnerability to any user, regardless of technical profile
- Use of perishable frequencies, "thin client" devices (Tech) as well as transitory information practices (SOP) can make the security technology gap less dangerous
 - If <u>speed</u> is why you have a mobile device, use it to your advantage!