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Keynote Address**

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**INTRODUCTION**

Thank you for the kind introduction. Good to be with you – especially good to be with a group that is aggressively working both the political and technical solutions necessary to ensure the security of the Maritime Domain for our future. This is a topic I believe is essential to our current and future security.

I would guess one of the advantages I have after almost six years in command within the Pacific is a little bit of context. I have seen the effort to take on these maritime security challenges in our new and globalized world gather considerable steam. The partnership with Singapore and Australia and the nations of Southeast Asia have been especially important.

In fact, I would peg the real start of discussion on this topic to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore a little over two years ago.

But it is time to move past discussions and put both concepts and technology in place. And this is the right group... one that really understands the problem.

In fact, I'm reminded of Winston Churchill's famous quote that the three most difficult things to do in life are:

- Climb a wall leaning toward you
- Kiss a woman leaning away from you
- Or talk to a group that knows more than you do

Let me spend a few minutes this afternoon providing an overarching framework for your discussions, and then I'll be happy to take your questions.

**SECURITY BACKDROP**

Maritime history has been dominated by efforts to master the seas for defense against invasion, to project power and influence, and to secure resources and trade to fuel our economies.

Certainly, maritime security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century must provide for these traditional needs of the past. Land and resource disputes still require resolution... and in fact are the genesis for much of these discussions. And secure sea lines of communication will

assume even greater importance. You all know the numbers: Oil currently accounts for half of Asia's energy consumption. Japan imports 98% of its oil, and by 2020, China's oil consumption alone will nearly double. Much of that oil will transit through the narrow straits of Southeast Asia. This oil, like the straits, must be protected.

But the contextual change lies in the degree to which we can maintain control of the infrastructure of globalization – the tools we use to advance trade, travel, and intellectual exchange – while denying access to those who would abuse it. We must facilitate and even enhance information sharing among peace-loving nations while defending against cyber-attack or exploitation. We need exquisite knowledge of traffic on the seas, and agreement on methods for regulating that traffic. And, if deterrence and discussion fail, our military forces must provide mobile havens from which we can defend friends and allies, disrupt aberrant behavior, or project power without being threatened by conventional or unconventional attack from any dimension. Finally, we must strengthen those nations left behind in the globalization age; otherwise they may unwillingly serve as portals through which the community of nations can be threatened.

So let me briefly cover our primary maritime threat concerns and then provide a vision for a maritime security framework in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **OUR PRIMARY THREAT**

Our primary threat to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region directly reflects the larger international security context.

First and foremost, we worry about transnational threats like terrorism and proliferation, both of which have advanced on the dark side of globalization. Our main terrorist concerns include Al Qaida and of course in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah. In addition, organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines are problematic from a couple of standpoints. While not projecting regional capabilities, they clearly threaten the security and stability of that country and they can facilitate the training and movement of the JI throughout the Archipelagic region. Although acts of terror can and do occur on the high seas, it is maritime movement of terrorists, and their use of vessels as weapons or weapons couriers, that pose a significant maritime security challenge.

Closely related is the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. There is no greater proliferation threat than that posed by North Korea. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the world's greatest missile proliferators would destabilize Northeast Asia, pose the threat of trafficking nuclear weapons or fissile material, and undermine international treaties and norms against proliferation. It is this sobering conclusion that validates regional unity on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and requires multilateral cooperation to irreversibly and verifiably end North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.

Our greatest fears are the possible nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction and the use of a large commercial vessel as a weapon. Armed with these weapons, undeterrable, unaccountable enemies could inflict enormous damage without warning. If Pirates or Sea Robbers can board a ship, what is achievable by a trained terrorist willing to give up his life? Hence our collective security depends on a more proactive, a more multilateral, and frankly, a more courageous approach.

## **IMPERATIVES FOR MARITIME SECURITY**

This security context challenges Asia-Pacific nations to cooperate in unprecedented ways. A collaborative effort is needed to coordinate maritime security in the Pacific and ultimately worldwide. So let me talk to what I believe are five imperatives for maritime security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **1. Advanced Situational Awareness**

- At the top of my list is the urgent need to obtain a clear and accurate operational picture of traffic on the seas in support of maritime security. Technology can provide this picture – just as it does in great measure today in the air. And I see the preponderance of your program over the next few days will deal with this immediate requirement.
- There are necessary steps to better awareness of our maritime environment:
  - First, we need sensors to gather timely information in regions of interest.
  - Next, we require processes, protocols and standards with which to fuse that information with intelligence from other sources in order to ascertain intent.
  - And finally, fused information and intelligence must be exchanged between like-minded governments.
  - Obviously we need the communications structure in place to support all of the above.
- Advanced sensors ashore, at sea, and certainly both the air and space, are central to this effort. An accurate picture of seaborne traffic will facilitate border security and contribute to counter-terror, counter-narcotic, and counter-piracy efforts. (We have solved this problem once before in our counter-narcotic effort in the Carribean.)
- We are also challenged to increase our awareness of people and goods moving across our borders without erecting barriers to progress. We recognize clearly that ninety percent of the world's freight moves by sea. The US Customs Service Container Security Initiative, which a multitude of Asian nations have joined, is an effort to ensure safe movement of that freight. Private industry has developed associated efforts like the Secure Trade Lanes Initiative to improve safety of shipping containers through portal screening and end-to-end real-time electronic

monitoring. Strict portal monitoring to enforce common standards is an essential defensive element of modern maritime security.

- I should allow that nobody believes this is easy – especially container security – but it is essential.
- So what is the product of all this situational awareness? Perhaps the most important dividend of true situational awareness is cueing – knowing who or what to go after. The vast expanses of ocean and complex networks of coastal waterways will defeat perfect knowledge of enemy intent. Cueing is thus required to direct our attention to the most pressing threats. (Anyone who has spent time sorting contacts in the South China Sea understands this well.)

## **2. Responsive Decision Making Architecture**

- Cueing is only a first step. Timely responses require agile and rapid information sharing to support combined or national decision making processes. In the new threat context, it is all about speed of command.
- Efficient command response is facilitated by three factors:
  - First, national policies that permit cooperative engagement of enemy threats must be established and exercised. Criminals thrive on gaps in governance or poorly coordinated seams in jurisdiction. The sparsely populated archipelagos of our region pose obvious challenges. But there are also seams at the transition from territorial to international waters, in the straits accessed by ships of many flags, and in consensus gaps both within and between governments. Our policies must transcend these seams.
  - Second, we need strengthened legal frameworks within which to execute the will of the international community. For example, the gray area between drugs and terrorism is very real and perhaps necessary, but certainly self-imposed. Maritime forces need the authorities necessary to responsibly turn that ambiguity into a liability for the threat rather than permit it to be a barrier to our security.
  - Third, and once again, our speed of command must operate inside the decision timeline of the enemy. For example, how do we handle hot pursuit? We must streamline national and coalition command and control processes to prevent those supporting elements from dictating operational timeliness.

## **3. Expeditionary Military Capabilities**

- Another imperative is the special relevance of expeditionary military capabilities. Naval, Marine, and Coast Guard forces are inherently expeditionary, but they, too, can be enhanced for a variety of scenarios. Air and land forces are necessarily

- moving in this same direction. In the maritime security context, regional force requirements include tactical intelligence assets, nimble power projection capabilities, and robust maritime interdiction forces.
- Long dwell intelligence assets are essential elements of our vision for the future. Maritime Patrol Aircraft – such as in eye in the sky initiative – contribute in this manner, and unmanned aerial vehicles launched from sea or shore have demonstrated great utility.
  - Expeditionary forces proved their value in the Tsunami relief effort. Maritime platforms matched with helicopter lift and amphibious craft have great utility. Appropriate high-speed lift and interdiction assets ensure we can respond with regionally tailored power on short notice. For example, we are encouraged by preliminary testing of leased High Speed Vessels – such as those built in Australia – for moving troops and equipment around the theater on short notice.
  - Tailored air packages, based and launched from capable maritime platforms, can satisfy a variety of missions ranging from noncombatant evacuation to disaster relief to maritime interdiction. This concept is particularly adaptable in joint and combined settings.

#### **4. Provide Security in Contested Littoral Regions**

- We all recognize that Maritime Security remains more than just dealing with terror. Our ability to operate in contested littoral regions poses perhaps our greatest maritime challenge and is the fourth aspect of our framework. Land and resources are contested, jurisdictions overlap, and the environment never cooperates. And anti-access assets like mines, missiles, and submarines can wreak havoc in the hands of potential enemies.
- Although global issues affect the security of every nation, the ability to secure borders and territorial seas is a fundamental responsibility. The reality, then, is that most nations need a coast guard before they need a blue-water navy. Once established, integration of coast guard operations with naval forces is essential to eliminating seams at sea. This fact is the basis for the US Coast Guard's Integrated Deep Water System initiative, which improves the service's ability to sense and share information with forces at sea and with homeland security elements ashore.
- Mine countermeasure forces are in short supply and unfortunately Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities have atrophied. No single technology has proven absolutely effective against these weapons systems. We will continue to rely on coalition contributions of air and surface forces, as well as unmanned undersea vehicles, to neutralize these threats.
- The United States is developing a Littoral Combat Ship, designed from the keel up to defeat anti-access and asymmetric threats. Agile, stealthy, and modular, this

flexible littoral warship will contribute to coalition efforts before the end of the decade. It is especially important that we build ships that can operate in shallow water and deploy off-board systems.

- Lastly, the Pacific theater is home to some of the world's most acute missile concerns. Growth of existing missile forces, coupled with continuing proliferation threats, demands development of multi-dimensional defenses to seamlessly engage a missile in any stage of flight. Seaborne and airborne cruise and ballistic missile defenses, deployable on short notice to the region of immediate need, are a high priority.

## **5. Apply All Elements of Multi-National Power**

- Maintaining maritime security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is much more than the application of military capability or the capability of a single nation. Transnational threats demand multilateral solutions, and interagency cooperation plays a key role in applying all elements of national and multi-national power. The reason is clear. Pick any country and you will find that Homeland Security is the province of multiple agencies.
- I saw on your program that you have a session scheduled that will discuss the Tsunami relief effort. I really do believe that many of the lessons from that multilateral operation certainly apply directly to the political and diplomatic aspects of Maritime Security. Ultimately as with every important security issue in Asia and the Pacific, a multi-national solution will be the appropriate approach.
- When you look back on the Tsunami relief operation, a number of points are germane:
  - We established a set of principles at the outset that would guide our effort.
  - Speed and tempo are essential. If you wait for assessments to be completed, lives are lost.
  - Each Nation is proud and sovereign. They have to remain in charge of the effort within their country. Other parties like the U.S. play a supporting role and help build capacity.
  - This has to be a unified effort. We called the organization a Coordinated Support Force to make it inclusive and encourage participation by organizations not comfortable with a rigid command structure. Coordinate vice compel or command became the thrust of our arrangement.
  - Would leverage our previous experience with respect to combined and multi-national operations to great advantage. We had developed Standing Operating Procedures on a multi-national level and now was the time to use them.
  - This complex relief effort didn't just happen because we wanted it to... or because we decided to act together quickly – which we did. IT was

possible because of a set of habitual relationships – really habits of cooperation that had been established over many years.

- Exercises, exchanges, combined training, and well developed relationships are essential.

## **CONCLUSION**

Let me conclude by thanking the Naval Postgraduate School, the Temasek Defense Systems Institute, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory once again for pulling this symposium together. Clearly we have yet to make adequate progress on technical solutions, and the light you shed on the political elements will be necessary to improve our Maritime Security posture and helpful indeed.

Once again, nobody said this was easy or inexpensive, but clearly it is important and I think we all believe within our reach.

And while no nation can unilaterally control all the variables involved in any transnational threat – *every* nation can contribute – and every nation has a unique capacity and responsibility to help.

Thank you each for your personal commitment.