

# OSLO'S SUCCESS, A MILITARIZED RESISTANCE: CHANGING OPPOSITION TACTICS IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

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## INTRODUCTION

As the United States embarks on an ongoing relationship with Iraq and the resistance movements there, it would do well to learn from other experiences in dealing with opposition groups. The case of Israel in the Palestinian territories provides a powerful lesson in which seemingly sound military tactics led to an increase in radicalization, not pacification, of the resistance.

A recurring obstacle in policy formation is the persistence in viewing resistance actions, including Islamist ones, as centrally directed and hierarchically organized. Whereas some may fall into this category, most movements are highly decentralized. Policymakers are surprised when, after assassinating the organization's leaders, the movement not only persists but fights back harder. Equating the opposition with, and attributing all responsibility to, its elite leaders has led to an incorrect evaluation of the causes and dynamics of the resistance itself, and yielded flawed policies to moderate these movements.

The trajectory of resistance movements in Palestine in the 1990s demonstrates that militarization becoming a fundamental characteristic and strategy of the conflict was not a foregone conclusion. Continued collective repression, combined with divide-and-conquer population control policies, which are embodied in Oslo, has made both the Palestinian territories and Israel less secure. In this chapter, I advance theories of repression and underground movements using social movement theory, and use the experience of Palestinian opposition groups since the 1993 Oslo accords to demonstrate factors promoting its militarization. Promoting the decentralization and fragmentation of a domestically based movement will not lead to the dismantling of the movement as long as the underlying issues remain. Instead,

fragmentation may create a situation of continuing military insecurity and an increase in violence.

It is generally acknowledged that the Oslo peace accords between Palestine and Israel have failed, and this failure is often viewed as causing the radicalization of opposition groups. I argue the opposite. The very implementation of Oslo's provisions constituted one major cause for the militarization of the resistance. Oslo entailed the repression of dissent, the removal of the masses from the organized opposition, the targeting of Islamist and secular leaders, and the extreme fragmentation of the resistance. Fundamental to the Oslo process is the fragmentation of the territories and continued Israeli control of exit points. These policies, perhaps premised on a false conception of security for Israel through disarming the Palestinian opposition, have resulted in the opposite: the decentralization and fragmentation of resistance created competition, as local resistance groups were cut-off from both their leadership and a larger public constituency. Therefore, their actions were unhindered by any source of accountability as the struggle for movement leader raised the bar for activists.

My theoretical conclusions regarding the dynamics of decentralization in resistance movements are tested on two groups of the Palestinian resistance. The case of the Palestinian group Fatah, in particular, accords with my expectations. The more fragmented and leader-less the resistance group, the higher the level of anarchy, independent decision-making, abrogation of agreed-upon truces, and internal battles for dominance. Often, such battles are characterized by the use of bold military maneuvers in order to establish and institutionalize a new leadership. In decreasing order of fragmentation, the groups are Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. Hamas is currently the most disciplined and hierarchical of the movements. Fatah's al-Aqsa Brigades was relieved of its middle leadership in approximately 2002, from which time autonomous tendencies increased substantially. If the current wave of assassination of Hamas leadership continues, the future of that group will likely resemble the current anarchy in Fatah.

On a proactive note, this study yields policy prescriptions designed to moderate domestic-based conflicts.<sup>1</sup> An analysis of the causes for growing militancy in the Palestinian resistance provides insight into movement dynamics in other locations, which will hopefully lead to policies effectively deterring further militarization. Instead of treading the bloody path of Israel, the United States has the ability to learn from those mistakes. I argue that the hierarchical leadership of resistance movements should be left in place, and popular nonviolent social movements encouraged. Population control policies designed to fragment the opposition are counterproductive, as they lead to an exit of much of the general population from the movement. It is this popular involvement that can moderate resistance actions, provided nonviolent protest and organizing is allowed.

I start by analyzing the provisions of the Declaration of Principles, more commonly known as the Oslo accords, and the Israeli perspective of obtaining security in the occupied Palestinian territories.<sup>2</sup> Next, I develop theories

of the dynamics of terrorism and underground movements in the context of policies of repression and decentralization, policies contained in the accords and part of Israel's security concept. Finally, I trace the timeline of the Palestinian resistance from the first Intifada through the militarization of the opposition in Oslo, analyzing how policies intended to increase security for Israel worked in the opposite direction. I conclude with policy implications that arise from this study for reducing the violent wings of grassroots opposition movements.

### THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE ON THE ACCORDS: SECURITY AS CONTROL


The Declaration of Principles was negotiated in Oslo, Norway, and was signed in September 1993 in Washington, D.C., by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, with President Bill Clinton presiding.<sup>3</sup> Initially, many hailed the Oslo accords as a solution to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over a decade later, however, Oslo's timetable has not been met. It is this failure that is generally held responsible for the increased violence by opposition groups in the West Bank and Gaza strip. The common interpretation is that Hamas and other militarized Islamist groups emerged out of "frustration" with the lack of progress in negotiations. The assumption is that if Oslo had been fully implemented, societal opposition and violent rebellion would not occur.

If Oslo was meant to bring peace to Israel via the creation of a Palestinian state, it has indeed failed. However, those goals were not in the Oslo accords. The aim was an open-ended process whose main and concrete provision was the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Oslo entailed a piecemeal process by which a Palestinian authority would gain partial control over increasingly more land. The substance of this land transfer was to be negotiated in interim agreements, none of which dealt with "final status" issues or the ultimate fate of the territories: water control, borders, and refugees, amidst others. The end game was left undecided.

Much has been made of the ambiguity of the Oslo treaties, the power discrepancy embodied in the agreements, and the many subjects they leave unresolved. Nonetheless, from an objective perspective, to a large extent, Oslo has been enacted. Intermediate transfers of authority to the Palestinian Authority (PA) have certainly gone beyond the stated timetable. The result is a drastically, radically altered landscape of the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>4</sup>

Palestinians hoped that Oslo would lead to an independent state, but Israel's primary goal was security. That security was obtained through the accords in two ways: first, through military policing policies, and second through population control policies such as checkpoints. Through these means, twin goals were achieved that the Israelis presumed would thwart violent resistance. Formal opposition organizing of all types, including peaceful forms, was officially prevented and repressed, and existing opposition groups were fragmented and forced underground, effectively inhibiting the functioning of group hierarchies.

Military policing functions are clear in Oslo. The Palestinians agreed to bear responsibility for the suppression of Islamist groups and all dissent, and Israeli withdrawals were conditional on Palestinian ability to meet Israel's security needs. Indeed, one of Oslo's few clear stipulations is the creation of a Palestinian police force to enforce internal order.<sup>5</sup> A "strong Palestinian police force" for this purpose is repeatedly mentioned in the accords. That force now numbers about 40,000. Even so, Israel retained the right to



Map 4.1: Oslo II plan for the west Bank, 1995

Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASIA), [www.pasia.org](http://www.pasia.org)

intervene in areas under the authority of the Palestinians (areas "A") when security justified it. This notion of security included protection of Israeli settlers in the occupied territories.

Oslo expanded and legitimized Israel's supervision of population movements, resulting in a "matrix of control."<sup>6</sup> The tiny West Bank, smaller than Delaware, is currently fragmented into 300 separate areas as shown in map 4.1.<sup>7</sup> Measures designed to exercise control over population movements were variously coded in the accords as economic, bureaucratic, or demographic. The accords increased the number of borders, checkpoints, and the use of closure or refusing Palestinian workers entry to Israel. As per Oslo II, the responsibility for the security of all Palestinian borders would rest with Israel.<sup>8</sup> "Borders" became internal borders, including exit or entry from any areas transferred to the PA. In effect, the occupied territories became a patchwork of small areas under the control of the PA, surrounded by borders that Israel had the right to police.

Oslo involved planned, partial withdrawals from land in the West Bank and Gaza, which would then come under the PA's rule. These were termed areas "A." The Israeli military would be redeployed from these areas and be stationed outside them. Areas B and C would remain in Israeli hands during the initial phases of Oslo. By the end of 1999, the PA was in control of over 200 small areas—most of them smaller than one square mile.<sup>9</sup> Passage to or from them was controlled by Israeli military checkpoints. Border controls and physical barriers, such as trenches, electric fences, and barricades of sand, rock, or concrete, lie outside each of these areas. Additionally, roads in the territories are policed by numerous standing and mobile checkpoints, the latter termed "flying checkpoints" due to their lack of a permanent location. In the last four years, over 500 new military checkpoints have been established.<sup>10</sup> A Palestinian going from one area of the PA in the north, Jenin, to another in the south, Hebron, would have to pass through 50 such border crossings.<sup>11</sup>

Further bisecting the territories is a grid of bypass roads, linking the settlements to Israel but insulating them from the surrounding Palestinian population. Unlike the Palestinian traveler mentioned above, Israelis travel freely throughout the territories, via bypass roads, without ever changing zones or being held up at a checkpoint. According to a member of the Knesset, settlements were purposely located in the midst of densely populated Palestinian areas in order to prevent territorial integrity for the PA and thus any possibility of a Palestinian state.<sup>12</sup> The confiscation of land to build these roads was approved by Oslo II,<sup>13</sup> and the Hebron protocol served as an exemplar to justify positioning Israeli settlements in the middle of Palestinian population centers.<sup>14</sup>

The wall that Israel is currently constructing is another means of segregating Israel from the Palestinians. Like the bypass roads and settlements, it incorporates Palestinian land, de facto, into Israeli control and cuts villages off from each other and from their agricultural lands. Sixteen Palestinian villages are caught between the wall and the official Israeli border, isolated not only from Israel but from the rest of the West Bank as well.<sup>15</sup>

Closure is a further element of population control in Oslo. Closure is defined as limitations imposed by Israel on the movement of the Palestinian population and its goods. Closure can be internal, within the West Bank and Gaza strip; external; or between those territories and Israel. It can be partial or total.<sup>16</sup> Whereas closure predates Oslo and the advent of suicide bombings inside Israel, it was institutionalized by the accords and presented as an antiterrorism measure.<sup>17</sup> Internal closure is effectively a curfew, preventing movement between villages. Closure combines with the pass or permit system, whereby even when restrictions are lifted the population needs permission to move from place to place.<sup>18</sup>

Curfews are closely linked to closure, and serve as yet one more method for controlling population movement. In those areas remaining under Israeli control (B and C), curfews were enacted throughout the Oslo process. Further, if Israel deems that the PA fails to meet Israel's security concerns, area A could come under curfew also. This last provision was used as a rationale for the al-Aqsa or second Intifada.<sup>19</sup>

These measures accord with the Israeli military's basic premise for interacting with the Palestinian population. Indeed, the military had a hand in Oslo, one that was more pronounced in Oslo II, and it viewed the agreements as fulfilling Israel's security requirements.<sup>20</sup> For Israel, security consists of preventing attacks or deterrence. Deterrence is achieved through the demonstration of military superiority, communicating the futility of resistance. Disproportionate military responses to real or alleged security threats are an integral part of this deterrence. Retaliating with overwhelming force was termed "escalation dominance," as stated by Moshe Dayan; it was believed to deter future attacks by raising the cost of Israeli blood to a level untenable for the Palestinians or enemy populations.<sup>21</sup> In the beginning of the second Intifada, the Israeli military acted with disproportionate force, since they believed their mistake in the first Intifada was initially responding without enough strength, thus not communicating sufficient resolve and force.<sup>22</sup> This policy has remained central to Israeli military philosophy and relations with the Palestinians.<sup>23</sup>

Oslo embodied the Israeli military solution for insurgent populations: demonstrating military superiority and deterring resistance activities. The Oslo regime provides a daily display of Israel's overwhelming military power through population control. Closures, permits, checkpoints, and curfews serve as an ongoing "shock and awe" program. These policies are meant to increase frustration among the Palestinian population, convincing them of the futility of defeating the Israeli military.<sup>24</sup> The population, in turn, would theoretically compel the fighters to cease their attacks. The population must have the will and capacity to force the insurgents or protesters to stop.<sup>25</sup> However, Oslo prevents the populace from being able to play such a role.

The separation of the population into fragmented and separate territories is believed to enhance deterrence. Thus the parcellization of territory accords with Israeli security doctrine, which aims to prevent actions by others, rather than work toward direct military conquest.<sup>26</sup> The location of Israeli settlements has both political and military goals. In addition to the political goal of preventing

a contiguous Palestinian state, placing settlements in densely populated Palestinian areas also increases the presence of the Israeli Defense Forces. This provides more opportunities to thwart military advances or even the organizing of Palestinian forces, preventing insurgency. In addition, it creates new borders to police, red lines whose crossing signals international (primarily American) justification for retaliation. This is particularly important since securing international legitimacy for military actions ranks high in Israeli calculations, more so than domestic considerations.<sup>27</sup>

## DECENTRALIZED MOBILIZING AND COMPETITION

Israeli policy rests on collective punishment, popular frustration, and physical separation to impede the organizing capability of the populace. Ultimately, so the theory goes, the Palestinians should realize that opposition cannot succeed, and give up.

Clearly, the pacification expected by the Israelis has not occurred. Instead, Oslo has resulted in the radicalization and militarization of the opposition, an increase in insurgency, and more attacks on Israelis. Why? Is it because, as Israel maintains, the opposition is part of a well-organized and directed challenge, which neither Arafat nor his successors acted to prevent, or indeed, has encouraged and led? If that were the case, increased enforcement of the above measures would be called for: more separation between Israelis and Palestinians and collective punishments.

The evidence from cases worldwide demonstrates that the tactics employed by Israel should be expected to increase, rather than end, the political violence of the resistance.<sup>28</sup> The radicalization of the opposition during the Oslo period and the second Intifada is due, in part, to policies pushing groups into increasingly decentralized organizing, while at the same time exacerbating the underlying grievances and causes of opposition.<sup>29</sup>

Numerous Israeli-Oslo policies caused the decline of mass popular participation, including the inability to move freely or gather together. Oslo's provisions inhibited organization and freedom of association, which removed the popular character of the opposition and forced the remaining activists to work underground in decentralized cells. Prohibitions, harsh penalties for organizing, and increased difficulties of convening meetings caused the exodus of most classes from organized resistance. Closure has almost completely hindered all forms of involvement and community participation and, in many cases, even the ability to work. Increased economic hardship, repression, and the lack of public space created by Oslo's fragmentation of the territory all decreased the ability and willingness of the populace to become involved in the opposition. These same mechanisms diminished the levers of political control and hierarchy within opposition groups. Further, the nature of the PA itself added to the dissociation of the community from formal organizing. Coming from outside the territories, the PA wanted to establish a governing base independent of the indigenous leaders developed in the Intifada. It did so by drawing on old traditional

elites and its own street cadres. The middle class and popular leadership, which organized democratically, were marginalized.

Economic hardship, caused by closure, has exacerbated these tendencies by reducing the number of individuals available for protest actions. The increase in poverty which resulted from closure is not directly responsible for the radicalization of the opposition.<sup>30</sup> The poor are not the mainstay of organized oppositions, even in suicide actions, and are, in any case, too busy trying to survive to participate in such organizations.<sup>31</sup>

### Theories of Popular Mobilization

Policies to inhibit mobilizing are based on the premise that these movements are hierarchical, controlled by a leader who commands his followers. Without the leader, the reasoning goes, the masses would be either unable or unwilling to act. One theorist calls this the "microwave" theory of political violence. The leader pushes a button, and militancy is turned on or off.<sup>32</sup> However, the difficulty of formal organizing more often leads to decentralized and underground activities, not to the disappearance of the organization as top-down theories of opposition suggest.

What happens when a movement becomes exclusive and fragmented? Accountability and moderation suffer, and violence increases. The remaining small groups of activists move underground to survive, becoming isolated from the influence of the community and immune to external factors. Without a social base to consider, the movement is liberated from the constraint of maintaining the good will of the masses.<sup>33</sup> Cut off from outside contacts, they become trapped within underground "spirals of encapsulation," which diminish the potential of outside ideologies, ideas, and individuals to alter activists' views.<sup>34</sup> Such isolation, or segregation from the object of their resistance, is key to the creation of oppositional consciousness. For this, autonomous spaces where the movement can develop without ties of affection, friendship, or business are necessary to promote more radical views.<sup>35</sup> Integration spoils this oppositional consciousness. Insulation from alternative opinions or practices has been instrumental in creating loyal members for cults.<sup>36</sup> In the extreme, as is the case in exclusive and underground organizing, separation promotes "anti-system" ideologies, a process that has led to violence against civilians in Algeria.<sup>37</sup>

Violence is most prominent when the majority of the movement has either integrated into the establishment or disbanded. The relationship between numbers and the use of violence in protest activities is inverse: the more people, the less violence is necessary to demonstrate commitment to the goals of the movement. The majority, in any movement, is unwilling to engage in violence, and this logic is behind the democratic regulation of social movements. Once danger exists, most participants exit, leaving behind only those most committed.

As numbers dwindle, the need to make a big statement remains. During Italy's period of social activism and terrorism, it was the groups that lacked resources and the ability to engage in organized movement politics that

specialized in violence, a cheap and available resource not requiring much coordination. Without the necessary numbers to communicate such a message, more violent methods are used to achieve the desired result. Violence indirectly aids the cause through publicity, demonstrating the credibility and commitment of the protesters, which adds legitimacy to their cause, recruiting members by being the most active organization in the field, keeping members in line and committed, and provoking a response that polarizes the sides, forcing previously neutral individuals to take a stand.<sup>38</sup>

Organization and bureaucratization tend to moderate movements, both by subjecting members to a hierarchy of authority and through the constraining influences of the majority. Arguably, this pushes formal organizations toward greater acceptance of the status quo. Theorists of the poor bemoan the co-optation and pacification of social movements through the establishment of formal organizations. In particular, the use of disruptive actions decreases, since the organization incorporates various classes: the middle, which has an aversion to violence; and the leadership, with an interest in becoming part of the "reputable" establishment.

What if the community itself approves of the use of violence? Currently a majority of Palestinians condone continuing military operations within Israel.<sup>39</sup> In this case, too, formal organizing moderates the movement. The community may condone the actions of the few who take violent action, but it is unwilling to engage in or take responsibility for those acts. In addition, organizational dynamics themselves mitigate against violence.

Violence is problematic for the stability of organizations. The practical organizational need for resources and money limits the amount of anti-establishment and disruptive activities.<sup>40</sup> Organizations are fragile and resource dependent. In order to survive, they must incorporate various classes with access to necessary resources, including money, networks, access to elites and influential individuals, and meeting locations. The middle professional and business classes are usually involved—classes with concrete, tangible interests, which can easily be threatened by negative repercussions from the authorities. Organizations institutionalize decision-making processes, spreading responsibility for the organization's actions among the membership. Formal organizations incorporate hierarchical control and adherence to the decisions of the leadership, factors that moderate group activities.

Leaderships not only authorize but also constrain resistance activities. In Hamas, as in most Islamist movements, political wings are separate from military branches, and political approval is required before operations are authorized. Leaders not only authorize but also prohibit operations. Subjecting the military to political constraints has the potential to moderate the movement with practical considerations. Numerous cease-fires have been enacted by Hamas leaders. Only leaders popularly recognized as authorities are able to pledge their movement's commitment to a deal. Since the organization is not formal, leadership depends on accepted authority. In Lebanon, the use of suicide bombing by Hizballah was subject to the approval of the

clerical leadership. After the Israeli withdrawal in 1985, leaders proclaimed an end to the use of the tactic, with rare exceptions.<sup>41</sup>

Further, leaderships are subject to the requisites of public opinion in their constituency, which can act as a brake on violent movement activities. The community was able to perform this function in Egypt, for example. Popular outrage against the killing of tourists in November 1997 by al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya convinced the leadership of that group to amend its ideological stance and strategy, effectively ending the violence.<sup>42</sup> Israeli policies of collective punishment rely on the community to rein in the activists. To do this, the populace must have the will and capacity to deter the insurgents or protesters. By severing the link between the community and the activists, decentralization prohibits the community from performing this moderating function.

The absence of leaders able to command the respect and adherence of movement followers means that community influence is not felt on activists. An extreme example is the international Islamist group al Qaeda, which is divorced from any domestic or community connections, and therefore accountability. Similarly, externally based leaderships are less moderating, since they too lack the consideration of a social base in constraining their decisions. Domestic-based leaderships are the most moderating and accommodating to political opportunities. This is clear in Hamas. The external leadership in Jordan and the decentralized cells are both more radical and willing to use violence than the domestic leadership.

Israeli policy is expanding on Oslo's decentralizing tendencies by systematically eliminating the resistance leadership. This opens the field for potential leadership battles, characterized by a competition of one-upmanship. Competition is an important factor in violent protest actions. Competition within a social movement among various groups with similar goals, for example, led to high amounts of violence during Italy's experience with terrorism. Violent acts are advertisements that distinguish one group from the rest. Increased use of violence occurs when numerous groups with like goals exist, all vying for prominence and social support.<sup>43</sup> In the extreme, would-be leaders attempt to outdo each other through demonstrating their ability to implement ever more daring acts.

The dynamics outlined here hold when the underlying issues remain unaddressed, or indeed those problems are exacerbated, as is the case in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Grassroots support will continue to feed the opposition in such a case. In the Palestinian territories, ongoing collective repression and general punishment have effectively renewed and strengthened the commitment to the fight. The opposition in the West Bank and Gaza has more volunteers for suicide operations than it can handle.<sup>44</sup> It is they who seek out the organizations. Recruitment plays a marginal role.<sup>45</sup>

Repression, particularly indiscriminate repression applied to all without regard to whether they participated in opposition activities or not, is by itself powerfully linked to the militarization of opposition movements and the formation of broad revolutionary coalitions against the reigning authorities. Removing nonviolent options to change and influence, or even to voice protest,

increases the likelihood of violent protest. Violence is legitimized as the only "way out."<sup>46</sup> By contrast, nonviolent options are dependent upon the response of the authorities: if the authority is not bound by "universalistic moral principles," then such action is worthless. The government remains unlimited in the range of its responses, and can merely eliminate the protesters.<sup>47</sup>

In a democracy, repression of unlawful activities will channel most of the group into lawful pursuits. In contexts where no mobilizing is allowed, repression will, over time, create more violent actions on the part of the group. Whereas Israel is a democracy, the occupied territories are not. Freedom of peaceful association is not a right in either the territories under Israeli or PA control.

Despite the predominance of militarized protest and substantial public support for it, nonviolent possibilities are not dead. Clearly nonviolent demonstrations are logistically more difficult than previously, as less public space is available to mobilize, network, and stage protests. Still, nonviolent actions are discussed, debated, and undertaken. Generally, however, they are neither reported by the media nor do their participants escape (Israeli) military or (Palestinian) police action. There is a widespread opinion that nonviolent protest, although desirable in theory, will only result in slaughter for the participants, effectively removing the masses from such participation.<sup>48</sup> This opinion is backed by experience, as nonviolent demonstrations have been met with lethal force by both the PA and Israel.<sup>49</sup> Advocates and organizers of nonviolent activities end up in jail alongside those engaging in violence, even members of organizations uniting Israeli Jews and Palestinians. For example, a leader of such a demonstration was placed under administrative detention since, according to authorities, he was embarking on an "unhappy" path.<sup>50</sup> Thousands of Palestinian political prisoners on a hunger strike, similarly, found their effort did not seem to warrant media coverage or draw attention to the conditions they were protesting. An Israeli official likened the hunger strike to terror, saying he would not give in to their demands.<sup>51</sup> Explicitly in reference to the lack of attention to this nonviolent action, armed groups declared their desire to kidnap soldiers and settlers to promote the prisoners' demands.<sup>52</sup> A demonstration in which Americans and Israeli Jews participated was greeted by live fire.<sup>53</sup> Another nonviolent demonstration, declared free of weapons by Amnesty International, held to draw attention to the plight of the Rafah refugee camp under curfew, was attacked by four tank shells, killing eight.<sup>54</sup>

Populations do rebel against more powerful authorities. Jeff Goodwin states that political exclusion and repression, not economic exploitation or poverty, explain the revolutionary movements that took place throughout the Cold War.<sup>55</sup> It is only states that were particularly closed throughout and excessively repressive, that faced broad revolutionary movements. Insurgencies will be popularly supported where the authorities have abused civilians in a random fashion. Continuing and increasing repression and political exclusion, Goodwin concludes, will most likely give rise to revolutionary movements.

Oslo's policies achieved the end desired in Israeli security doctrines. The cumulative effect has been to increase frustration, humiliation, and feelings of injustice among the Palestinians. However, they have not led to surrender or pacification. Nor should they be expected to. In other contexts, such effects have been crucial in creating a broad base of community support for rebellion. Senses of injustice and victimization provide tacit community approval for militarization by creating oppositional consciousness, a mental state that facilitates protest actions against a more powerful opponent. Frustration and "righteous" anger fuel this mental state.<sup>56</sup>

Although Israeli doctrine presumes that frustration should result in a cold calculation that insurgency is pointless and should therefore cease, only riots and crowd violence have been associated with frustration in the social analysis of protest.<sup>57</sup> In older crowd analyses, rational thought and action were believed to be inhibited by an increase in frustration among the populace. Whether frustration is in fact behind such events is questionable, but the emotions involved have not been linked with passivity or surrender.<sup>58</sup>

Failure to grasp the essential grassroots nature of the opposition and the broad support for its activities has been the mistake of many governments. Within a context of general support for opposition activities, decentralization of a movement will not end it, but only exacerbate the characteristics found in underground and exclusive organizations. If, in fact, the underlying rationale is addressed, or when the populace is provided a political opportunity to participate in formal institutions, pushing the few remaining holdouts underground can terminate the violent movement itself.

**THE PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION: FROM MASSES TO MILITARIZATION**

This section tests the theory outlined above against the chronology of opposition organizing from the first through second Intifada. It concentrates on two groups, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawima al-Islamiyya—the Islamic Resistance Movement) and Fatah (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Wataniyya al-Falastiniyya—Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine), the main religious and secular opposition groups, respectively. During the first Intifada, the popular character of organizing, incorporating multiple classes of society, was directly responsible for the (relatively) nonviolent character of that uprising.<sup>59</sup> The progressive fragmentation of hierarchical authority in Fatah, and the increasing anarchy in that movement, resulted in less security for people in both Israel and Palestine. Fatah's lack of organizational control was partially caused by the territorial fragmentation and anti-leadership policies of Oslo. The predicament of Fatah demonstrates the future we can expect for Hamas, should these policies continue. To a large degree, and Hamas has to date maintained discipline in its ranks. Such hierarchical control should be recognized as a situation to be encouraged; fragmentation in a resistance movement with widespread support will increase its violence and inhibit a conclusion to the conflict.

**The First Intifada**

The first Intifada, beginning at the end of 1987, was a time of massive popular organizing involving all sectors of society. Particularly evident was the participation of women and children. A new mobilizing infrastructure emerged, revolving around democratic local committees and a rotating leadership comprising all the political factions. Strictly speaking, the Intifada was not nonviolent; however, its violence was limited to the throwing of stones against the Israeli military, not civilians. The main weapons were economic: the boycotting of Israeli commodities and taxes, and commercial strikes. Stores closed as merchants joined the Intifada, refusing to open or to sell Israeli goods.

This was not the first time the population protested. It had been doing so for years. But previous demonstrations, protests, and strikes had ended. In the period from 1977 to 1982, an average of 500 such protest events took place per year. From 1982 to the start of the uprising, the average was between 3,000 and 4,000 per year.<sup>60</sup> The first Intifada saw popular organizing reach a new stage by daily strikes encompassing all areas of the territories.

The self-perpetuating nature of this uprising was possible due to the development of a new organizational infrastructure. A new middle class and professional leadership, including merchants, created a network of committees that provided support for everything from education to health care. Committees ran and decided all types of actions, from strike days to the provision of education, since schools were closed by Israel. Estimates suggest that tens of thousands of committees were established, including those focused on food storage, security, health and medical relief, and agriculture.

The first Intifada had created a new leadership infrastructure in the territories. The Intifada itself came as a surprise to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership outside the territories: they were politely "informed" of UNLU (United National Leadership of the Uprising) decisions; their permission was requested for demonstration events usually after the fact. Instead, up-and-coming personalities took control, subjecting their decisions to popular consent. The democratic and popular character of the Intifada demonstrated this, with prominent roles played by women, children, and even the elderly.

The leadership of the uprising was organized through the UNLU. UNLU members were young, educated, lower and middle social strata. The leadership was rotating, providing a steady flow of new leaders. They mediated quarrels, made binding decisions and imposed fines, announced demonstrations and strikes, and issued communiqués on behalf of the uprising.<sup>61</sup>

Hamas participated in the first Intifada along with other groups, and gained popularity due to its nationalist activities.<sup>62</sup> Hamas began as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, an organization that had been conciliatory or passive toward the Israeli occupation until the first Intifada began in December 1987. Hamas was created in order to not lose the public, which was fast demanding active opposition to

the occupation.<sup>63</sup> At this point, the group's military wing conducted occasional operations against Israeli soldiers and military targets, but not against civilians.<sup>64</sup>

Repression by the Israeli authorities merely increased the level of protest.<sup>65</sup> The Israeli military government's attempt to keep stores open by force backfired, solidifying the merchants' support for the Intifada. Defense Minister Rabin later admitted that trying to force commercial stores to open was the biggest mistake made at that time.<sup>66</sup> The merchants added needed credibility and organizational and financial resources to the uprising.

### The Peace Process and Arafat's Return

The Intifada led to the Madrid conference, a negotiating process involving all parties to the conflict, sponsored by President George H.W. Bush after Gulf War I. The Palestinian parties to the conference were unaware, as was everyone else, of Arafat's intermediaries negotiating directly in Oslo, Norway. The premise of the Madrid conference was that negotiations to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict needed to involve the countries neighboring Israel and those that hosted Palestinian refugees. This process was abruptly halted when it was announced that Arafat and Rabin had reached an agreement. The news took the Palestinian negotiators in Washington, DC, by surprise. Within days, Arafat arrived in the capital, shook Rabin's hand on the White House lawn, and they agreed to recognize each other.

The Declaration of Principles between the two sides effectively ended the Intifada. The Palestinian community was split on the merits of the agreement: those in the West Bank and Gaza were mainly in favor, those in the diaspora in the Arab countries were against. The Palestinian leaders found it hard to object to being upstaged by such a revered leader, whose name became equated with the Palestinian cause internationally and who had publicized the little-known cause until it had become widely recognized. Some leaders did express disapproval. As time went by, more moved into the critical opposition against the PLO, which by this time had become the PA. However, for the first few years, even Hamas could not remain opposed to the new situation, or again risk being out of step with its public support and losing its constituency.

Arafat could not enter and rule over this existing indigenous infrastructure: the new leadership created by the first Intifada would not acquiesce to be ruled in the style of a dictator. Their resistance, after all, had established the most democratic institutions in the Arab world during the uprising. They earned street credentials, popular legitimacy based on their own personal suffering for the cause, time spent in prison, and leadership abilities. But to build a centrally controlled state, Arafat had to dominate these internal leaders.<sup>67</sup> Coming from the diaspora, Arafat needed some basis for his leadership, and he found this in the same social base as the Jordanian monarchy: the old landed elite families or notables who had been marginalized by the democratic Intifada.<sup>68</sup> Arafat's entourage were viewed as outsiders. Coming from

Tunisia, they were termed the "Tunisians." The decision to base his rule on the old upper class was consequential, since the lack of social mobility has been a frequent complaint of the Islamists. Indeed, the main Islamist social base is among those rising stars, would-be leaders butting up against the lack of meritocracy.

Further opposed to the Intifada's democratic and meritocratic structure was the revival of the influence of extended families, tribal law, and notables in support of Arafat's administration. As is true of resurrections in general, the newly revived family was not the same as the older version, but its place in the social structure and social role was the same.<sup>69</sup> As Mona Younis demonstrated in her comparison of the revolutionary nationalist movements in South Africa and the Palestinian territories, the passage from elite to mass movement is necessary for the resistance's overall goals to be met.<sup>70</sup> In this case, the mass movement phase was the first Intifada. Arafat's homecoming signaled a reversal of the process to a conservative, status-quo social base. In one of the least clannish and tribal societies in the Arab world, tribalism made a comeback in the 1990s.

Arafat managed to create a system personally dependent on him, in which the power brokers and networks of influence and jobs were those closest to him. The new president's signature was necessary for everything. Beneath the formal structures of democracy lay informal control and patronage networks. Control over job provision, increasingly important with the closure imposed by Israel, was in the hands of Arafat loyalists. A large portion of employment was with the PA: 17 percent of all employment in the West Bank, upward of 30 percent in the Gaza strip. The new political elite allied with and in many cases became part of the economic elite. Holders of VIP cards were able to pass Israeli checkpoints during closure, providing them a comparative advantage economically.<sup>71</sup>

In order for the PA to fulfill its side of the Oslo bargain, a large security force was needed. As mentioned earlier, the Palestinian police forces were one of the only concrete institutions stipulated by Oslo. Shortly after Oslo, 40,000 police and intelligence officers operated among the small West Bank and Gaza strip population of around three million people. These forces were heavily staffed by foreign-based Palestinians, in addition to Fatah loyalists or the Tanzim (the Organization). The latter were internal PLO activists, somewhat hesitantly embraced by Arafat. They proved difficult to control and of dubious loyalty to the PA. They became active during the second Intifada, against the wishes of the PA, fighting Israeli military forces during their incursions into the West Bank and targeting military posts.<sup>72</sup>

Arafat attempted to maintain control of these forces by borrowing a page from Machiavellian and colonialist tactics. He created numerous security and intelligence forces (from between seven and nine in 1995 to eleven security services during the second Intifada), intentionally fragmented, with overlapping and vaguely specified boundaries.<sup>73</sup> Some groups monitored others, but ultimately, they were all supposed to be directly responsible to Arafat.<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, the indigenous Intifada-era leadership was bypassed. Faced with the reality of their marginalization and increasing power in the hands of Arafat loyalists, the domestic-based leadership was divided between several forms of retreat from the new PA system. Some accommodated themselves and attempted to integrate into the system, particularly Fatah members. Many were co-opted, often in the logical pursuit of employment. Other leaders of civil society organizations, unions, women's organizations, committees, and professional associations were integrated into the PA's governing structure.<sup>75</sup>

Much of the nonreligious opposition, the left, democrats and intellectuals who were unwilling to participate in the nondemocratic PA, retreated into nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). They were easily marginalized through threats of imprisonment, harassment, and threats to their funding. Desiring to do good works, and dependent on external financing from the West channeled through the PA's Ministry of the Interior, the secular opposition was effectively removed from politics and fragmented among multiple NGOs. The perceived elite character of these NGOs further divided this leadership from the grass roots of the first Intifada. Arafat's government had control over all the aid money coming into the territories, from government to the PA.<sup>76</sup> These associations, far from the hopes put upon them by the West as emerging centers of resistance to the state and watchdogs for democracy, have been unable to accomplish any of these goals. They did not even try, apart from mobilization to resist imposition of laws based on Egypt's version of NGO control.

By contrast to the incapacity of the secular opposition, religious opposition was independent of Western and PA financing. Their funds were from alternative sources, such as almsgiving and charitable donations. Vacated by the secular groups, the field of protest and activism became dominated by the religious groups. The PA dealt with these through alternative means. PA-Islamist relations deteriorated, progressively, from an understanding to avoid conflict, to imprisonments and raids on Islamist organizations. Originally hopeful that it could participate in the PA's government, Hamas became aware that the PA intended to stick by its agreement in Oslo, stipulating that all forms of dissent be stamped out.<sup>77</sup> In fact, progress in Oslo's planned redeployments was conditional upon Israel's security concerns. Since the PA's legitimacy was based on Oslo and continued progress toward Oslo's goals, the PA was obligated (and Arafat had agreed) to enforce Israel's version of security. Even if it had desired to allow participation of the Islamist groups in the government, Oslo would prevent it.

As part of the Oslo accords, the PA was charged with stamping out Hamas and all voices of protest. It did so. Waves of arrests took place of suspected opposition members. Within a few years, there were 17 PA prisons in Gaza.<sup>78</sup> PA clashes with Hamas resulted in deaths of the latter. After each attack, the PA conducted roundups of suspected militants. In 1996, it raided social service and educational institutions, and even mosques.<sup>79</sup> In 1997, after hundreds of arrests, the PA closed 16 religious-run charities and commandeered almsgiving committees.<sup>80</sup>

Hamas and the PA came to an agreement at the start of Oslo.<sup>81</sup> Realizing the popularity of the Oslo accords, Hamas had to align itself with public opinion and agreed not to fight the PA or do anything to hinder Oslo. The group desired to be part of the governing process, and contemplated forming a separate political party for that purpose, a development parallel to that of the Sinn Fein and IRA that led to the eventual end of the conflict there.<sup>82</sup>

Numerous analyses of Hamas have detailed the movement's pragmatism over idealism, its doctrinal flexibility, and the essential retaliatory logic of military attacks.<sup>83</sup> The movement is nationalistic, and only marginally concerned with religious edicts, unlike Islamist movements in other countries.<sup>84</sup> Leaders repeatedly proclaimed their desire to be part of the political process. The use of violence was "controlled" in order to prevent jeopardizing the continued existence of its social service organizations, initiate direct confrontation with the PA, or lose the support of popular opinion.<sup>85</sup> What Hamas is fundamentally after is an alteration of the terms of Oslo and a larger role in the political process within the PA itself.

What is crucial is the relationship between Hamas' leadership and the actions of its following. The structure of Hamas has, essentially, been decentralized, but with a legitimate and authoritative leadership able to speak for the membership and obtain their allegiance to central decisions. Due to the decentralized nature of the organization, and the lack of direct communication between the branches, the decisions are announced publicly.<sup>86</sup> The political leadership of the Islamic resistance issued decrees to either halt or initiate action, which were then enacted by the military wing. Waves of military actions by Hamas against civilians, occurred in response to specific events, such as the Hebron massacre of Palestinian worshippers in February 1994, and mass arrests or repression by the PA and Israel periodically through the Oslo years.<sup>87</sup> Truces or "hudna" have been called at different points in time, ceasing military actions. This first occurred after Oslo, from September 1994 to February 1996, as per the Islamist resistance's agreement with the PA.<sup>88</sup> This ended with Israel's assassination of Yahiya Ayyash in January 1996, triggering a number of suicide bombings. Arrests and roundups of suspected activists by the PA and harsh repression of the organization followed.

As the Oslo regime wore on, the Palestinian population lost progressively more public space and rights, due both to enforcements by Israel and the PA. Israeli settlements and land confiscations of West Bank territory continued and the economic isolation of the Palestinian territories and their dependence on Israel increased. Oslo provided for the increasing isolation into small cantons and the PA denied them a political voice. The public spaces that did open up were ones of confrontation: checkpoints and border crossings, from one zone to another.<sup>89</sup> The time consumed in these activities, along with the humiliation they entailed, fueled existing claims of injustice. As one observer noted, a major consequence has been the "theft of time" and the inability to make plans, even for work.<sup>90</sup> Criticism of the PA began even from within, from Fatah and the Tanzim. Marwan Barghouti is the face of this democratic criticism. Further, the international political process of negotiations was seriously stalled.

### Second Intifada

Seven years after the handshake on the White House lawn inaugurating the Oslo accords, the condition of the Palestinians had worsened and laid the groundwork for a violent movement by small numbers of activists. Paradoxically, although control of some areas had passed from Israeli to Palestinian hands, Oslo created sweeping changes in the geography of the West Bank and Gaza, parceling the territories with crisscrossed checkpoints of control. Israeli settlements increased by over 50 percent during those seven years, and the settler population almost doubled.<sup>91</sup>

The second Intifada began the day after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Dome of the Rock or al-Aqsa mosque in late September 2000. Palestinian demonstrators and worshippers were fired upon, sparking an uprising. In contrast to conditions during the first Intifada, the masses were now marginalized, leaving the field of resistance to small groups of activists.

Fatah and the Tanzim were at the forefront of this uprising. They made up the internal leadership, those who had lived through the first Intifada. From the start of Oslo, their adherence to PA authority had been conditional. This made the disintegration of movement authority in the absence of its leadership more pronounced. Although Arafat did not order the al-Aqsa uprising, he did not act forcefully to halt it in the initial period. His low approval rating, scoring only about one-quarter of the population at that time, led analysts to conclude that any decision to counter the Intifada on his part would have been ignored and his leadership jeopardized.<sup>92</sup>

During the first two years of this Intifada, Israel assassinated over 100 political activists, both religious and secular.<sup>93</sup> During the reoccupation of West Bank towns in spring 2002, much of Fatah's mid-level leadership was eliminated. The leadership vacuum was filled by young men increasingly autonomous of any hierarchy or control. Loosely, they are collectively known as al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, but other names have been coined for some, including Battalions of the Return and Jenin Martyr's Brigade. When the phenomenon first developed, it was interpreted through an elite bias. These new "splinter" groups were assumed to be taking orders from leaders abroad.<sup>94</sup> Later it became clear that groups were acting on their own. The PA leadership increasingly complained about them, calling them gangs, "armed men," thugs, or mafias.<sup>95</sup>

The rise of localized and independent power centers, divorced from national authorities, is clear from the events of the last few years, particularly in the northern area, including Nablus, Jenin, Qalqiliyya, and Tulkaram. Truces accepted by other opposition groups, including the Islamists, have been ignored and violated by the Brigade.<sup>96</sup> Decisions by the Fatah Revolutionary Council could not be enforced. The popular resistance committees refused Arafat's order for them to dissolve.<sup>97</sup> Independent military actions were conducted, including the assassination of collaborators and recruiting children for suicide bombings, without the approval or knowledge of the Brigade leader.<sup>98</sup> Against PA orders for calm before the hearing at the International Court of

Justice, in The Hague, on the legitimacy of the separation wall, one of these groups carried out a bombing.<sup>99</sup>

PA officials have become targets of these groups. For example, the PA's interior minister was threatened in Nablus.<sup>100</sup> Further, that town's governor's cars were set on fire and his brother kidnapped.<sup>101</sup> The Gaza police chief was kidnapped. In Jenin, the governor was kidnapped and beaten publicly, accused of corruption, and his successor's office raided. The home of a PA police officer was set on fire, while 100 other policemen were across the street.<sup>102</sup> Individuals close to Arafat have been attacked, killed, or kidnapped.<sup>103</sup> Offices and journalists have also been attacked. Most recently, Mahmud Abbas was fired upon in Arafat's mourning tent by individuals calling themselves the Abu Ammar (Arafat's *nom de guerre*) brigades.<sup>104</sup> In Gaza, the rift between Arafat's nephew and choice for governor (Musa Arafat) and Muhammad Dahlan has seen much of Fatah siding with the latter, explicitly attacking President Arafat and his orders.<sup>105</sup> The motive, according to PA observers, is to solidify the leadership positions of the actors, and force changes in the PA leadership and policies.<sup>106</sup>

This dynamic of fragmentation is illustrated in the Brigade leader of Jenin, Zakariya Zubeidi. Although he began as a peace activist, he is now known as the unofficial mayor of Jenin.<sup>107</sup> He is independent of PA authority, and his group has attacked and kidnapped PA officials and their offices on numerous occasions. One governor was given a public beating for his alleged corruption.<sup>108</sup> The use of violence in consolidating the chain of leadership is clear. Two days after assuming the reigns of authority, he authorized a suicide bombing in Israel. Since then, he has not authorized any suicide bombings.<sup>109</sup> Other groups tried to join his, exemplifying the stakes of these power struggles. The leader of Fatah in Jenin decided to join his group to Zubeidi's, which won him the ire of Arafat and landed him in prison.<sup>110</sup>

Whereas Islamist actions get all the press, the Israelis held the secular Tanzim and Fatah branches as responsible for half of all attacks on Israelis in 2002.<sup>111</sup> Previously, it had followed the PA's orders, battling against the Islamists and suppressing them. Now many branches of (nominally) Fatah members join the Islamic opposition. In fact, as of 2004, Israeli press reported that these groups were a larger security threat than Hamas.<sup>112</sup> Nablus, in particular, is seen as a prime source of suicide bombers. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for the most part, are viewed as disciplined and trustworthy by comparison, remaining aloof from the "turf wars" going on around them.<sup>113</sup> It is Hamas that is heading the electoral registration drive, attempting to convince the populace to exercise their democratic rights.<sup>114</sup>

Particularly since the assassination of the Hamas leader Shaykh Yasin and then Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, fragmentation has been observed in Hamas in the West Bank, but still less than that in Fatah or Islamic Jihad. In Gaza, Hamas is the most centralized. Although the leadership assassinations were meant to deter the formation of a "Hamasland" in Gaza, Hamas is more solidified there than previously.<sup>115</sup>

## CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What causes movements to use violence, and under what circumstances can they be induced to abandon such methods? What tactics should be used to battle a violent nationalist insurgency with grass roots support? In many cases, an inaccurate appraisal of the phenomenon has resulted in policy prescriptions that have exacerbated, not solved, the problem. One of the most violent, ongoing, national-based conflicts with Islamism today is in the occupied Palestinian territories. The Oslo process expressly provided the elements for the future militarization of the opposition to the PA. Oslo exacerbated the underlying issues in the Palestinian conflict, while at the same time pushing the decentralization of the resistance.

Oslo embodies Israel's tactical strategies for battling the opposition movement. Identical strategies are being utilized in the current U.S. battle with Iraqi insurgents. If intended to moderate violent opposition, the premises of Israeli interaction have proven inaccurate. The intent of the Oslo accords is a secondary and less pressing conclusion arising from this study. The more important implication of this analysis is the effect of increasing the decentralization of a movement and fragmenting it, the use of collective punishment, prevention of any political role, and eliminating the movement's leadership.

This study showed that resistance movements cannot be characterized by a broad brush, as either violent or not. The use of violence can be calculated or the result of internal organizational factors, such as the quest to establish leadership or compete with other factions of the movement. Collective punishment or indiscriminate repression provides increased support for opposition activities and justifies the use of violence against an unjust oppressor. When any individual, guilty or not, young or elderly, can be the object of military or police reprisals, a backlash occurs and creates more resistance.

Just as violent actions can be the result of tactical and organizational concerns, rather than essential ideologies of the movement, so too can seemingly neutral processes of institutionalization moderate the movement. Movements do pay attention to their public's opinion. Formal organization and hierarchy create structures of accountability to the community and multiple classes, which approve the use of violence much less than underground, exclusive groups.

The repeated insistence on seeing insurgencies as coordinated, hierarchical movements has clouded the policy options for both the United States and Israel, and has enflamed the militarization of the conflicts. Leaving the leadership in place provides a negotiating partner with the ability to command allegiance to whatever deal that leader negotiates. Removing the leader does not increase the chances of peace, but merely transfers the resistance to uncontrollable underground and uncoordinated groups. When the underlying causes of the movement still exist, such as collective punishment, lack of political voice, population control, and humiliation, a violent spiral will be created. Both history and social science have shown that to formulate policy options for an insurgency, one must first identify the movement's character.

Too often, the fundamental reality of an insurgency with grass roots appeal, not hierarchically controlled, has not been acknowledged. Eliminating leaders in this situation will prolong and deepen the conflict.

## NOTES

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1. Internationally based movements without a domestic constituency behave differently.
2. I concentrate here on Israeli security perspectives; this should not be construed as neglecting the very real Palestinian security concerns. However, this chapter focuses on the effect of counterterrorist techniques used by the Israelis.
3. The Declaration of Principles (1993), and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995), Oslo I and II respectively, can be found at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, [www.mfa.gov.il](http://www.mfa.gov.il), accessed May 27, 2005; and on MidEast Web, <http://www.mideastweb.org>, accessed May 27, 2005.
4. I take no position here on the justice of the accords, but analyze their implications for opposition tactics.
5. See Oslo II, especially Annex I.
6. The goal of this control, according to Halper, is not defeating but paralyzing the enemy. He likens this strategy to that of the Viet Cong, who used it successfully to defeat an army of superior numbers. Jeff Halper, "The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix of Control," *Middle East Report*, no. 216 (2000), 15.
7. Sara Roy, "The Palestinian State: Division and Despair," *Current History*, January 2004, 33.
8. Oslo II (1995) established three zones of jurisdiction within the West Bank. The PA now ruled over Area A, Area B was controlled by both the PA and Israel, and Area C was Israel's sole responsibility. This patchwork of differential territorial control resulted in exit and entry checkpoints for passage between areas. See also Rabin's speech to the Knesset on the Interim Agreement, October 5, 1995, printed in "The Peace Process," *Journal of Palestine Studies* vol. 25, no. 2 (1996), 137-139.
9. Sara Roy, "Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy," *Current History*, January 2002, 9.
10. Roy, "The Palestinian State."
11. Camille Mansour, "Israel's Colonial Impasse (Essay)," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 30, no. 4 (2001), 85.
12. Quoted in Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 118.
13. Roy, "Why Peace Failed," 10.
14. The Hebron protocol (1997) split the city internally into areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, effectively placing a Jewish population center or enclave in the middle of a densely populated Palestinian area. *Ibid.*, 12.
15. Lucy Mair and Robyn Long, "Backs to the Wall: Israel's Stranglehold on the Palestinian Economy Is Consolidated by a Massive Wall," *Dollars & Sense*, November/December 2003.

16. Leila Farsakh, "Under Siege: Closure, Separation and the Palestinian Economy," *Middle East Report*, no. 217 (2000); Sara Roy, "Ending the Palestinian Economy," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 9, no. 4 (2002), 124. Closure is provided for in the Economic Protocol of Oslo II, Article VII.1.
17. Amira Hass, "Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3 (2002).
18. The pass system is included in Oslo II, Annex III, Article 11.
19. Rubenberg, *The Palestinians*, 115.
20. Eva Erzioni-Halevy, "Civil Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1996), 407; also Yoram Peri, "The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy: From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada" (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), 27.
21. Quoted in Uri Bar-Joseph, "Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking," *Security Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1998), 152. On retaliation in Israeli military practice, see Ranan D. Kuperman, "Rules of Military Retaliation and the Practice by the State of Israel," *International Interactions*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2001).
22. Peri, "The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy," 31.
23. Zeev Maoz, "The Unlimited Use of the Limited Use of Force: Israel and Low-Intensity Warfare, 1949-2004." Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004.
24. Israel Tal, *National Security: The Israeli Experience*, trans. Martin Kett (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 52.
25. Maoz, "The Unlimited Use of the Limited Use of Force."
26. Tal, *National Security*, 47.
27. Bar-Joseph, "Variations on a Theme," 155; Ranan D. Kuperman, "The Effect of Domestic and Foreign Pressure on Israeli Decisions to Use Limited Military Force," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40, no. 6 (2003).
28. Political violence can be defined as activities by individuals or collectives aimed at creating social or political change through public protest. Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.
29. Radicalization is the process of increasingly stringent and uncompromising views among a group; militarization refers to the group's turn to political violence as the mainstay of its tactics.
30. See, for example, Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 17, no. 4 (2003).
31. Economic hardship does increase the legitimacy of protest, since poverty demonstrates the injustice of the authority's policies. This merely adds to the pile of current complaints, and is neither necessary nor sufficient for large-scale protest to occur. In fact, the countries that experienced revolutions were not the most poor, but were those with closed political systems and political repression. Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
32. Glenn E. Robinson, "The Peace of the Powerful," in Roane Carey, ed., *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid* (New York: Verso, 2001), 111.
33. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 149.

34. Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State*, 12.
35. Aldon Morris and Naomi Braine, "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness," in Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris, eds., *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
36. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 72-73.
37. Mohammed M. Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of Gia Violence in Algeria," in Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).
38. Richard E. Rubenstein, "The Psycho-Political Sources of Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley Jr., ed., *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 140.
39. Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, Public Opinion Poll Unit, Poll no. 51, June 2004, at [www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2004/051.pdf](http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2004/051.pdf), accessed May 26, 2005.
40. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "Normalizing Collective Protest," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
41. Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2000, 70.
42. Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 62.
43. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, "Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966-1973," *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 14 (1986), 626, 29; Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989).
44. United States Institute of Peace, "Islamic Extremists: How Do They Mobilize Support?" (Washington, DC: USIP, 2002).
45. Even in international terrorism, recent data shows that members are not recruited, but it is they who actively seek to join the organization. Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*.
46. Goodwin, *No Other Way Out*.
47. Gay W. Seidman, "Blurred Lines: Nonviolence in South Africa," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2000).
48. Lori A. Allen, "Palestinians Debate 'Politie' Resistance to Occupation," *Middle East Report*, no. 225 (2002).
49. This is in addition to many technically nonlethal methods, which in fact often result in critical injuries.
50. Amira Hass, "Non-Violence Frightens the Army," *Ha'aretz*, November 10, 2004.
51. *Middle East International*, August 27, 2004, 13-14.
52. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Frustrated Fatah Threatens Kidnappings," *Jerusalem Post*, August 27, 2004.
53. Graham Usher, "The End of the Road?" *Middle East International*, January 9, 2004, 15.

54. Graham Usher, "Rafah: The End of the Rainbow," *Middle East International*, May 28, 2004, 5.
55. Goodwin, "No Other Way Out."
56. Jane Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," in Mansbridge and Morris, eds. *Oppositional Consciousness*.
57. Historical and social scientific analysis reveals that frustration and feelings of injustice from indiscriminate repression merely increase the potential for developing a broad revolutionary coalition. See Goodwin, *No Other Way Out*; Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
58. Recently, the IDF have become aware of the dangers of humiliation, and instituted seminars to attempt to train soldiers on proper checkpoint behavior. However, the inherent power discrepancy embodied in the border crossing, with Israeli soldiers in charge, will effectively prevent humiliation from being erased from the situation. Anura Hass, "Checkpoint Behavior," *Ha'aretz*, September 2, 2004.
59. Throwing stones at armed soldiers and tanks is relatively nonviolent. Certainly, unarmed civilians were not targets. The context here can be compared to other insurgencies against heavily armed authorities that do not obey universalistic principles. See Seidman, "Blurred Lines."
60. Lisa Hajjar, Mouin Rabbani, and Joel Beinin, "Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Beginners," in Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds., *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press, 1989).
61. Ghassan Andoni, "A Comparative Study of Intifada 1987 and Intifada 2000," in Carey, ed., *The New Intifada*; also see Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
62. See Graham Usher, "What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories," in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Census data shows that even now, at the height of Hamas' popularity, its own adherents do not share the Islamist goals of the organization, but support it due to its nationalist actions. See Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, at [www.jmcc.org](http://www.jmcc.org), accessed May 26, 2005.
63. Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement," in Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism*, 121.
64. The exception to this was in 1990, after Palestinian civilians were killed at the al-Aqsa mosque by the IDF. The method was knife stabbings.
65. Marwan Khawaja, "Resource Mobilization, Hardship, and Popular Collective Action in the West Bank," *Social Forces*, vol. 73, no. 1 (September 1994).
66. Salim Tamari, "The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie: Urban Merchants and the Palestinian Uprising," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 159.
67. Glenn E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 175.
68. *Ibid.*, chapter 7.
69. Hillel Frisch, "Modern Absolutist or Neopatriarchal State Building? Customary Law, Extended Families, and the Palestinian Authority," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 29 (1997).
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## ISLAMIZATION AND AMERICAN POLICY

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At the end of the twentieth century, observers of the Middle East worked to define the parameters, reach, and trajectory of Islamization. Particularly after 9/11, policymakers and analysts redoubled efforts to gauge the extent of Islamization's current and future progress and to grasp its implications for American interests. The American political-military policy community has also publicly and analytically worked to disaggregate the seemingly monolithic Islamist threat into two camps: those whose interests are inimical to American interests and those whose attitudes toward the United States do not go beyond mild antipathy or ambivalence.<sup>1</sup>

These are no doubt important matters. The nature of religious debate, and its impact on mass ideological proclivities and state policies of interest to America, are of deep concern to the United States. Although an internal matter, American power and diplomacy cannot forego engagement with trends possessing transnational potential in favor of an abstract, sterile notion of nonintervention in other countries' affairs. It is important to grasp the differential meanings of Islamization in various geographical environments and among diverse economic and intellectual strata.<sup>2</sup> No less important is the debate over whether moderate Islamists are moderate in fact—whether they are auto-reforming—or whether moderate tactics and democratic rhetoric conceal goals no less authoritarian and sociopolitically intrusive as those of the Middle East's current authoritarian, aging, and decidedly secular regimes.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter begins with a broader reflection on Islamization in the twenty-first century Middle East. For purposes of this discussion, the term Islamization is preferable to Islamicization. Such semantic modification signals a substantive conviction. Rather than identifying the sociopolitical, cultural, and discursive prominence of Islam as breaking a pattern or presenting a new, divergent phenomenon within the natural teleology of modernity, it has been secularism that has presented the break. This interruption is best viewed as a